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Significant changes in global production and trade have occurred over the last three 
decades because of globalisation. The GVC framework has been instrumental in advancing 
knowledge on how firms and nations can participate and benefit from production and 
trade in this era of globalisation. In accounting for the governance of value chains, the 
framework places a premium on lead firm strategies and requirements.  However, recent 
studies have noted that the institutional context, especially local conditions, in which GVCs 
are situated play a more significant role than hitherto acknowledged.  
In the face of changing global value chain governance, the Ghanaian pineapple export 
sector has changed from one dominated by smallholder production to one where exporters 
dominate. Thus, governance has evolved from market governance to captive and/or 
hierarchy. This thesis examines the role local conditions (or the local context) actually 
played in this evolution.  
The thesis finds that governance is shaped and conditioned by the state and its policies, 
inter-firm relations and networks, norms of behaviour and financial incentives. Inadequate 
government support, lack of horizontal collaboration, widespread opportunistic behaviour 
and financial constraints negatively impacted the organisation and coordination of the 
chain in the period prior to 2005. After 2005, chain coordination and organisation have 
improved. Contractual relations provide safeguards for both smallholders and processors; 
exporters are more organised and knowledgeable, although buyers have significant power 
over pricing of output. However, lack of financial incentives due, in most part, to past 
behaviour and perceptions and lack of innovation in financial institutions, still impacts the 






First and foremost, I thank the Lord Almighty for granting me the privilege and ability to 
start and complete this work. My deepest gratitude goes to my supervisor, Prof. Machiko 
Nissanke, who has nurtured and given structure to my thoughts. I also thank the Ghana 
Education Trust Fund (GETFund) which provided the financial support to make my 
education possible.  
To my husband, Kwabena, I appreciate your love and support. I am much indebted to my 
sisters, Drs. Ilara Mahdi and Sophie van Huellen, for their kindness, generosity and 
friendship throughout the years, and especially when I had my son, Kwaku. I could not 
have managed to do it all on my own. Ilara, thanks so much for babysitting even after a 
tedious day at school: and Sophie, I will surely miss those days when we shared 
perspectives and insights on the value chain while we walked to school.   
As for my auntie, Mrs Naomi Odoi, who generously welcomed me into her home and 
ensured that my stay in London was just like home, I cannot thank you enough. I am also 
most grateful to my father-in-law, mother-in-law, husband, mother and siblings for taking 
excellent care of my son whenever I was away from home.  I appreciate the sacrifices you 
made so that I could concentrate on my studies.  
I extend my profound gratefulness to all participants of this study in Ghana and abroad 
who spared time from their busy schedules to grant me interviews or scheduled interviews 
on my behalf. I could not have gathered the needed information without your assistance.  I 
am also immensely grateful to Mr Kwesi Korboe and Mr Baba Adam, for putting me in 
touch with exporters and producers and continuously being available to answer further 
questions or give clarifications whenever I needed them. To Ms Patricia Adoma, I am 
thankful for putting me in touch with the processing firm.  
Thanks to my father, Dr Kwadwo Afari-Gyan, for proofreading my work: and to my 
husband, Abena Poku-Awuku and Sophie for reading through various draft chapters of the 
thesis at different stages. I also thank my two external examiners, Professors Stephanie 
Ware Barrientos and Peter Cornelisse, for thoroughly reading my work and providing 
extremely constructive and insightful feedback. 
To members of the Kings Cross Baptist Church, London, I am grateful for your friendship 
and prayers, particularly Mrs Elizabeth Akinloye for her prayers and words of 
5 
 
encouragement during the tough last months of my studies. I wish to thank everyone else 
whose name is not mentioned here but who has been a part of this journey. Lastly, I 
dedicate this work to my son, Kwaku, for providing a lot of distraction, as I was nothing 




Table of Contents 
Declaration for SOAS PhD thesis 2 
Abstract 3 
Acknowledgement 4 
Table of Contents 6 
List of Figures 12 
List of Tables 14 
List of Abbreviations 15 
Chapter 1 Introduction 17 
1.1 Introduction and Motivation 17 
1.2 Research Context: The Role of Horticulture in Ghana’s economy 19 
1.3 Research Objective, Questions and Hypothesis 23 
1.4 Contribution and Originality 24 
1.5 Thesis Outline 25 
Chapter 2 Global Value Chain Analysis 28 
2.1 Introduction 28 
2.2 Contemporary frameworks for analysing economic development 28 
2.2.1 From the state to lead firms 28 
2.2.2 Origin of the value chain concept 29 
2.2.3 Global Commodity Chain (GCC) 30 
2.2.4 Global Value Chain (GVC) 31 
2.2.4.1 Dimensions of GVC framework 32 
2.3 Governance 32 
2.3.1 Introduction 32 
2.3.2 Governance in Value Chain Analysis 33 




2.3.3.1 Governance as driving 34 
2.3.3.2 Governance as coordination 35 
2.3.3.3 Governance as normalisation 40 
2.4 Actors in Value chains 42 
2.4.1 Lead Firms 42 
2.4.2 Suppliers 43 
2.5 Upgrading 44 
2.6 Governance and Upgrading in the Horticulture/Agri-Food Value Chain 46 
2.7 Levels of analysis in GVCs 47 
2.8 Alternative Framework – Global Production Network (GPN) 48 
2.9 The Institutional Dimension in GVCs 51 
2.9.1 What are Institutions? 51 
2.9.2 Levels of and types of Institutions 53 
2.9.3 Institutions and Power 55 
2.10 Some empirical evidence on the role of local conditions in GVC governance 58 
2.11 Concluding Remarks 61 
Chapter 3 Conceptual Framework 63 
3.1 Introduction 63 
3.2 Global - Local Linkages 64 
3.3 The Analysis of Exchange: The Exchange Configuration Approach 65 
3.3.1 Key Terms and Concepts in the EC approach 66 
3.3.2 Characteristics of Institutions in the EC approach 67 
3.3.3 Main Elements of an Exchange Configuration 68 
3.3.4 Choosing Characteristics of Exchange Elements 72 
3.3.5 Institutional change in Exchange configurations 73 
3.4 A Conceptual Framework to link global and local governance 77 
3.4.1 Linking global and local governance 77 
8 
 
3.4.2 Application to the Ghanaian pineapple value chain 82 
3.5 Concluding Remarks 86 
Chapter 4 Situating Ghana in the Global Context 87 
4.1 Introduction: The Global Pineapple Market 87 
4.2 Production and Trade 89 
4.2.1 Production 89 
4.2.2 Imports 91 
4.2.3 Exports 95 
4.2.3.1 Early 1980s to mid-1990s: The dominance of Côte d’Ivoire 97 
4.2.3.2 Late 1990s to early 2000s: The rise of Costa Rica 98 
4.2.3.3 Mid-2000s – 2013: The dominance of Costa Rica 103 
4.2.4 Prices 108 
4.3 The Global Pineapple value chain 111 
4.3.1 Governance of the Global pineapple industry 112 
4.3.2 The structure of the Global pineapple chain 119 
4.4 Background to Ghana’s Pineapple Export Sector 124 
4.5 The structure of the Ghanaian chain (mid-1980s -2004) 126 
4.6 Concluding Remarks 130 
Chapter 5 Research Methodology 131 
5.1 Introduction 131 
5.2 The Ghanaian pineapple value chain (2005-2013) 131 
5.2.1 The pineapple value chain 131 
5.2.2 Profiles of Some Companies 135 
5.3 Research Process and design 137 
5.3.1 Research Process 137 
5.3.2 Research design 138 
5.4 Actual Research Design 139 
9 
 
5.4.1 Sampling strategy 139 
5.4.2 The sample of producers 139 
5.4.3 The sample of exporters 143 
5.4.4 The sample of processors 143 
5.4.5 The sample of importers 144 
5.4.6 Other stakeholders 144 
5.5 Data Collection 144 
5.5.1 Data collection methods 144 
5.5.2 Language used 146 
5.5.3 Characteristics of the Sample 147 
5.5.4 Ethical Issues 149 
5.6 Data Analysis 149 
5.7 Reliability and Validity of the research 151 
5.8 Challenges of the study 152 
5.9 Concluding remarks 152 
Chapter 6 The Smooth Cayenne Exchange Configuration 153 
6.1 Introduction 153 
6.2 The Smooth Cayenne configuration 154 
6.2.1 Characteristics of the item exchanged 154 
6.2.2 Characteristics of Actors 155 
6.2.2.1 Characteristics of Smallholders 155 
6.2.2.2 Characteristics of Middlemen 158 
6.2.2.3 Characteristics of Exporters 159 
6.2.3 Characteristics of the local context 160 
6.2.3.1 Political conditions 160 
6.2.3.2 Economic conditions 162 
6.2.3.3 Organisational conditions 164 
10 
 
6.2.3.4 Social conditions 166 
6.2.3.5 Technogical conditions 166 
6.3 The form and content of transactions in the Smooth Cayenne configuration 167 
6.3.1 Organisation of producers and exporters 167 
6.3.2 Production and Marketing of Fruits 168 
6.3.3 Distribution of risk 174 
6.4 Role of other actors 176 
6.5 Outcomes of the Smooth Cayenne exchange configuration 186 
6.6 Comparative Case: Costa Rica's pineapple industry (the 1980s to early 2000s) 188 
6.7 Concluding Remarks 190 
Chapter 7 The MD2 Exchange Configuration 192 
7.1 Introduction 192 
7.2 The decision to convert to MD2 193 
7.3 Main forces of change in the Ghanaian pineapple value chain 195 
7.4 Changes in the characteristics of the item exchanged (product characteristics) 195 
7.5 Negotiating the (re)integration of the Ghanaian chain into the global chain (2005-
2008) 196 
7.5.1 Procurement of planting materials 196 
7.5.2 Accessing knowledge and infrastructure 198 
7.6 The form and content of transactions (2005-2008) 202 
7.6.1 Scale of adoption of MD2 202 
7.6.2 Production Relations and the exclusion of smallholders 205 
7.7 The form and content of transactions (2008-2013) 210 
7.7.1 Post-harvest handling of fruits 212 
7.7.2 Exchange interactions between producers and processors 213 
7.7.2.1 Nature and content of contracts 213 
7.7.2.2 Enforcement of Contracts 221 
11 
 
7.7.3 Financial transactions of producer-exporters 225 
7.7.4 Horizontal cooperation among producer-exporters 227 
7.7.5 Cooperation between and among public and private organisations 230 
7.8 Development of the chain 231 
7.8.1 Payment on minimum guarantee basis 231 
7.8.2 Government support 232 
7.8.3 Learning in the chain 234 
7.8.4 Impact on labour and land use 238 
7.8.5 Distribution of risk and risk management 239 
7.8.5.1 Smallholders and processors/exporters 239 
7.8.5.2 Interactions between Exporters and Importers 243 
7.9 Concluding Remarks 245 
Chapter 8 Summary, Conclusion and Implications 248 
8.1 Introduction 248 
8.2 Key Findings 249 
8.3 Implications 253 
8.3.1 Implications for Theory 253 
8.3.2 Implications for Policy 254 
8.4 Limitations 255 







List of Figures 
Figure 2.1: Evolution of GVC governance ................................................................................. 40 
Figure 2.2: Diagrammatical representation of GPN Framework ............................................. 50 
Figure 2.3: Levels of Institutions .................................................................................................. 54 
Figure 3.1: Diagram of a stylized exchange configuration ........................................................ 76 
Figure 3.2: An extended version of an exchange configuration ............................................... 76 
Figure 3.3: Evolution of an exchange configuration .................................................................. 77 
Figure 3.4: Visual representation of the study’s Conceptual framework ................................ 82 
Figure 4.1: Extensively traded varieties of pineapple ................................................................. 88 
Figure 4.2: World Production of pineapples by area (1989-2013) ........................................... 90 
Figure 4.3: Total world imports of pineapple by quantity and value (1989-2013) ................ 93 
Figure 4.4: Imports of pineapple into the EU by quantity and value, 1989-2013 ................. 93 
Figure 4.5: Average annual growth (%) of EU pineapple imports by value and ................... 94 
Figure 4.6: Share of top importers of pineapple by country (2001-2013)............................... 94 
Figure 4.7: US imports and consumption of pineapples 1989-2013 ....................................... 95 
Figure 4.8: Supply markets for US imports of pineapple (2001-2013) .................................... 95 
Figure 4.9: Total world exports of pineapples by quantity and value (1989-2013) ............... 96 
Figure 4.10: Share of exports by region, 1989 - 2013 ................................................................ 97 
Figure 4.11: Share (%) of EU imports of pineapple, 1985-2013 .............................................. 98 
Figure 4.12: Pineapple exports to the EU by top 3 exporters (1989-2013) .......................... 102 
Figure 4.13: Share of world exports of pineapples by volume, 2005 and 2013 ................... 104 
Figure 4.14: Costa Rica’s pineapple exports by quantity and value, 1989 – 2013................ 105 
Figure 4.15: Share of countries in Costa Rica exports of pineapples, 2008 and 2013 ........ 106 
Figure 4.16: Share of pineapple cultivated areas in Costa Rica by CANAPEP members in 
2013 ................................................................................................................................................. 107 
Figure 4.17: European Union import unit values, euro per kg (1995-2013) ........................ 109 
Figure 4.18: The Global Fresh Fruit and Vegetables value chain .......................................... 112 
Figure 4.19: Value capture by different participants in the international pineapple market
 .......................................................................................................................................................... 124 
Figure 4.20: Administrative map of Ghana ............................................................................... 125 
Figure 4.21: Ghanaian pineapple export value chain (mid-1980s – 2004) ............................ 126 
Figure 4.22: Principal Pineapple Production Districts in Ghana ........................................... 128 
Figure 5.1: The Ghanaian pineapple export value chain (2005-2013) ................................... 132 
13 
 
Figure 5.2: Sugar Loaf fruits on sale in a supermarket in Ghana ........................................... 133 
Figure 5.3: Port Destination of Ghana’s pineapple exports to the EU ................................. 135 
Figure 5.4: Akwapim South District map .................................................................................. 141 
Figure 5.5: Agro-ecological zones of Ghana ............................................................................. 142 
Figure 5.6: Ekumfi District map ................................................................................................. 142 
Figure 5.7: Components of data analysis ................................................................................... 150 
Figure 6.1: Ghana’s pineapple exports by quantity and value (1989-2004) .......................... 169 
Figure 6.2: Pineapple exports from Ghana by sea and by air (1994-2004) ........................... 170 
Figure 7.1: Ghana’s pineapple exports by quantity and value (2005-2013) .......................... 199 
Figure 7.2: Pineapple planted on beds covered with black plastic mulch ............................. 202 
Figure 7.3: Average monthly wholesale prices of pineapples exported from Ghana.......... 207 
Figure 7.4:  Unit value (€/tonne) of pineapple exports 2005-2008 ....................................... 208 






List of Tables 
Table 2.1: Theoretical literatures underpinning GVC governance structures ........................ 36 
Table 2.2: Types of governance in the GVC framework .......................................................... 39 
Table 2.3: GVC governance structures and their characteristics ............................................. 39 
Table 3.1: Main Forces of Institutional change in EC approach ............................................. 73 
Table 3.2: Forces responsible for changes in governance in value chains .............................. 83 
Table 4.1: Technical characteristics of Extensively Traded Pineapple Varieties ................... 89 
Table 4.2: World Production of pineapples by country in tonnes, 1989-2013 ...................... 91 
Table 4.3: Growth of exports of pineapple to the EU by top 3 exporters, 1985-2013 ...... 103 
Table 4.4: Monthly Wholesale Price (Euro/ kg) of MD2 and Smooth Cayenne at the 
Rungis Wholesale market, 2004 – 2005. .................................................................................... 109 
Table 4.5: Price (USD per kg) of pineapples on the Fairtrade organic and conventional 
markets ............................................................................................................................................ 111 
Table 4.6: Examples of GLOBALG.A.P. product and process quality requirements ........ 116 
Table 4.7: Requirements for the classification of pineapples ................................................. 121 
Table 4.8: Climatic conditions in producing areas ................................................................... 129 
Table 5.1: Share of exporter in total pineapple exports, 2009 and 2013 ............................... 137 
Table 5.2: Ownership type, acreage and varieties grown by the sample of exporters ........ 143 
Table 5.3: Small and Medium-scale farmers interviewed in the study ................................... 147 
Table 5.4: Educational level of farmers ..................................................................................... 147 
Table 5.5: Means of access to land for cultivation ................................................................... 149 
Table 6.1: Minimum and Maximum bank lending rates (%), 1997-2004 .............................. 160 
Table 6.2: Donor Interventions targeting the pineapple sector (late 1980s into 2000s) ..... 180 
Table 7.1: Specific institutional change forces in the MD2 configuration ............................ 195 
Table 7.2: Costs of GLOBALG.A.P. Certification by pineapple producers (2003-2004) . 203 
Table 7.3: Comparative Costs of per acre Smooth Cayenne production by a smallholder (in 
2004) with that of MD2 for small and medium-scale producers ........................................... 205 
Table 7.4: Bank Lending rates (minimum and maximum) in %, 2005-2009 ........................ 206 
Table 7.5: Acreage and staff strength of some pineapple exporters ...................................... 212 
Table 7.6: Cost of production per acre in 2013 ........................................................................ 216 
Table 7.7: Revenue and profit per acre, 2013 ........................................................................... 217 
Table 7.8: Forms of horizontal cooperation in the sector ...................................................... 229 
Table 7.9: Fertiliser subsidy in 2012 ........................................................................................... 233 
15 
 
List of Abbreviations 
BFL   Bomarts Farms Limited 
C&F   Costs and Freight 
CAJ   Cooperativa Agricola de Juazeiro 
CEO   Chief Executive Officer 
CMC   Cocoa Marketing Company 
CRI   Cocoa Research Institute 
EC   Exchange Configuration 
ECOWAS  Economic Community of West African States 
EDAIF  Export Development and Agriculture Investment Fund 
EMAQP  Export Marketing and Quality Awareness Programme 
ERP   Economic Recovery Programme 
€   Euro 
EU   European Union 
FAGE   Federation of Association of Ghana Exporters 
FBOs   Farmer Based Organisations 
FOB   Free on Board 
GCC   Global Commodity Chain 
GEL   Golden Exotics Limited 
GEPC   Ghana Export Promotion Council 
GIZ   Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 
GSA   Ghana Standards Authority 
GVC   Global Value Chain 
ha   Hectares 
HAG                           Horticulture Association of Ghana  
HAG   Horticultural Association of Ghana 
HAG   Horticulture Association of Ghana 
HDU   Horticulture Development Unit 
HEII   Horticulture Exports Industry Initiative 
16 
 
kg   Kilogramme 
MCA   Millennium Challenge Account 
MFI   Microfinance Institution 
MiDA   Millennium Development Authority 
MOAP   Market-Oriented Agricultural Programme 
MoFA   Ministry of Food and Agriculture 
Mt   Metric Tonne 
NTAE   Non-Traditional Agriculture Exports 
NTE   Non-Traditional Exports 
QCD   Quality Control Division 
SAP   Structural Adjustment Programme 
SPEG   Sea-freight Pineapple Exporters of Ghana 
SSA   Sub-Saharan Africa 
TIPCEE   Trade and Investment Program for a Competitive Export Economy 
US   United States 
US$   United States dollar 
VAT   Value Added Tax 




Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction and Motivation  
Most developing countries, including Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, adopted 
export-led development strategies during the 1980s. However, since then, the 
internationalisation of production and trade has become more pronounced due to the 
influence of three factors.  First, recent processes of economic globalisation (e.g. 
improvements in technology and communication systems, increased consumerism, rising 
production costs, removal of trade barriers and increased mobility of financial capital) have 
aided the fragmentation of production across nations.1  Second, to coordinate fragmented 
supply chains across the world, multinational companies (MNCs) have established complex 
relationships with independent suppliers. Third, product and process standards have 
increasingly become an important means by which product quality is assessed worldwide. 
Thus, production and trade have increasingly been organised in Global Commodity Chains 
(GCCs) and Global Value Chains (GVCs). In these chains, countries need not develop 
entire domestic industries capable of participating in the whole value chain, but can rather 
focus on specific tasks or functions (Cattaneo et al., 2013). These chains have been touted 
by organisations such as the World Bank and the OECD as a means of achieving 
development in developing countries (OECD/WTO, 2013; Cattaneo et al., 2013; Goger et 
al., 2014; Taglioni and Winkler, 2014), since they deliver such benefits as improvements in 
the quality of production, higher incomes, increased productivity of producers and 
profitability (Maertens and Swinnen, 2009; Barrett et al., 2012; Bamber et al., 2013). 
Nonetheless, several studies have shown that integration into these chains and upgrading 
do not necessarily lead to positive outcomes for participants or the development of 
domestic economies (Barrientos, Dolan and Tallontire, 2001; Ponte and Ewert, 2009; 
Mitchell and Coles, 2011; Rossi, 2013; Goger et al, 2014; OECD and the World Bank, 
                                                 
1 Globalisation is classified as having occurred in phases or eras. The first era took place from the mid-1800 
or 1870 until 1914 (Friedman, 2000; ECLAC, 2002; Khaler and Lake, 2003) and was characterised by 
significant capital and labour mobility and increased trade (increased trade was a consequence of reductions in 
shipping costs). This phase of globalisation was ended by the two World Wars fought in the period 1914 – 
1918 and 1939-1945. The second was the Post World War II era from 1945-1973, characterised by the 
development of global infrastructure for financial and trade relations; less capital and labour mobility and 
increased trade in manufactures among developed countries (Berger, 2000). The third era of globalisation 
(1973 - now) is characterised by unparalleled cross-border movement of people, capital, goods and services; 
organisation of production through vertically integrated companies or coordinated networks (Bordo, 




The outcomes of participating in GVCs are determined by how the chains are governed by 
lead firms. These firms wield immense power and decide what is produced, who 
participates in the chain and how products are made (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002). 
Governance, therefore, is ‘the authority and power relationships that determine how 
financial, material and human resources are allocated and flow within the chain’ (Gereffi, 
1994:97). Despite the significant impact governance makes on the chain, its focus on lead 
firms’ interactions with first-tier suppliers is criticised as giving a limited view and an 
unsatisfactory account of how value chains are actually structured, organised, governed and 
impact on chain participants (Henderson et al., 2002; Smith et al, 2002; Gellert, 2003; 
Dussel-Peters, 2008; Gibbon, Bair and Ponte, 2008; Selwyn, 2008; Bair and Werner, 2011a; 
Elola, Vladiliso and López, 2013).  This weakness ensues from the little or insufficient 
attention given to the role of the institutional dimension or pillar (i.e. social, economic, 
cultural, technological and political contexts) in which chains are embedded (Dussel-Peters, 
2008; Bair, 2008; Gibbon, Bair and Ponte, 2008; Sturgeon, 2009; Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 
2011). Overall, Bair (2005) suggests that the institutional dimension of the GVC framework 
was conceived after the other dimensions had been adequately dealt with. Hence it is the 
least developed. Furthermore, in studies where the institutional dimension is included, 
Neilson and Pritchard (2009:47) say it 'tends to appear wooden and simplistic’ due to the 
lack of definition and theorisation.  
In this thesis, I argue that when the GVC framework is applied to interactions between 
actors who are second, third or fourth-tier suppliers i.e. at the national or domestic level, 
governance cannot be fully understood without a consideration of local conditions. 
Recently, much thought has been given to the influence of local conditions in which the 
chains are situated. Empirical work has focused on the role of the local political, social, 
cultural, technological or economic context (Gellert, 2003; Thomsen, 2007, Selwyn, 2008; 
Herath and Weersink, 2008; Neilson and Pritchard, 2009; Nugraha, 2010; Oro and 
Pritchard, 2011; Elola, Vladaliso and López, 2013; Mohan, 2016). Deep insights have been 
gained from these studies: however, apart from Mohan (2016), the empirical literature has 
not attempted to do this from the perspective of New Institutional Economics (NIE) even 
though NIE is one of the theoretical bases for the GVC framework.  
                                                 
2 UNECA (2013:75) cautions that concentrating on tasks at the lower end of the value chain may perpetuate 
the status of SSA countries as commodity-dependent economies.   
19 
 
Mohan’s (2016) work on the tea value chain in Nepal uses endogenous institutional change 
theory to build a stylised typology of how the local context impacts governance and 
farmers’ livelihoods. In her work, the impetus for a change in governance is internally 
triggered by a code of conduct put in place by two industry groups, the Tea Development 
Alliance and the Himalayan Orthodox Tea Producers’ Association (HOTPA), and 
implemented with the assistance of non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The code of 
conduct altered product characteristics and presented both opportunities and challenges for 
the chain actors, resulting in the evolution of actor strategies, norms, and organisations. 
The case of an external trigger of change altering product characteristics and the role of 
local conditions in how actors respond to the change is not considered. This gap in the 
literature is what this study on the Ghanaian pineapple export value chain seeks to fill.  
1.2 Research Context: The Role of Horticulture in Ghana’s economy 
Ghana, a developing country in West Africa, achieved middle-income status in 2010. The 
total land area of Ghana is 238, 842 square kilometres (Ministry of Food and Agriculture 
(MoFA), 2013a:3). Arable land as a percentage of total land area is 21% (FAO, 2016).3 The 
share of agriculture in GDP has been declining over the years and stood at 22% in 2013, 
compared with 32% in 2009 (Bank of Ghana (BoG), 2013; Ghana Statistical Service (GSS), 
2014a). However, agriculture is currently the largest employer with 45% of the working 
population, an increase over the 42% figure in 2010 (World Bank DataBank, 2016). 
Agriculture is also dominated by smallholder production, with about 90% of farm lands 
less than 2 hectares in size (MoFA, 2013a:5). Cocoa is the country’s main traditional 
agriculture export, and together with gold form the country’s foremost exports. In terms of 
volume, non-traditional exports (NTEs), represented 17.20% of total exports in 2013 
(GEPA, 2014).4 Horticulture products including pineapple, mangoes, and vegetables, are a 
subset of NTEs. In 2013 horticulture export receipts represented just 0.3% of the country’s 
total export receipts (GSS, 2014d). However, horticultural exports have significant 
employment and poverty reduction potential. According to the Ghana Shared Growth 
Development Agenda II (NDPC, 2014:112), the highest reduction in the incidence of 
poverty (64% to 24%) over the 1991/1992 – 2005/2006 period was experienced by 
                                                 
3 Available at http://ghana.opendataforafrica.org/ymjdrxb/ghana-fao-stat-land-use-and-agricultural-inputs 
4 NTEs can be grouped into three: (a) Non-traditional agricultural products (NTAEs) e.g. pineapples, yam, 
cassava, beans, okra, rubber, tuna, medicinal seeds and plants (b) Processed and semi-processed e.g. canned 
tuna, plywood, veneer, aluminium utensils, canned fruits and vegetables (c) handicrafts e.g. textiles, 
ornamentals (e.g. beads and jewellery), wood carvings (Addo and Marshall, 2000; World Bank, 2001a).   
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households engaged in export-oriented crops, such as cocoa and horticulture.  
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Ghanaian governments sought to intervene in all sectors 
of the economy through the implementation of policies such as fixed exchange rate, import 
and export quotas, price controls, controlled credit allocations and interest rate ceilings 
(Aryeetey and Harrigan, 2000; Hutchful, 2002). The result of these interventions, together 
with external shocks (e.g. the petroleum price increases of the 1970s, declining commodity 
prices and declines in the export of cocoa) was that by the early 1980s the economic 
situation of the country was perilous. The economy was characterised by large fiscal 
deficits, an overvalued exchange rate, high inflation (122.8% in 1983), low savings 
mobilisation, low government revenue, among others (World Bank, 1984; Addo and 
Marshall, 2000; Aryeetey and Harrigan, 2000; World Bank DataBank, 2016).5 The military-
led Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) government, in an effort to stem and 
reverse the economic deterioration, introduced the Economic Recovery Programme 
(ERP)/Structural Adjustment Policies (SAP) in 1983 with the support of the World Bank 
and IMF (Addo and Marshall, 2000; Aryeetey and Harrigan, 2000). The main objectives of 
the reform were (a) stabilisation (b) liberalisation and (c) rehabilitation (Armstrong, 1996; 
Hutchful, 2002). Nonetheless, the ERP/SAP reforms were partly intended to stimulate 
production in old and new export sectors of the economy (World Bank, 1984). The role to 
be played by the state, which had hitherto actively intervened in the economy, was to be 
kept to a minimum. Specific to the agriculture sector, this involved (a) removal of input 
subsidies e.g. fertiliser subsidies (b) dismantling of state marketing boards and (c) 
privatisation of state-owned agricultural companies (Hutchful, 2002; Asuming-Brempong, 
2003). 
The World Bank promoted NTEs as a strategy to diversify Ghana’s export base and reduce 
its reliance on gold and cocoa.  High-value agriculture products, such as pineapple, were 
identified as products in which Ghana had a comparative advantage due to its climate and 
proximity to Europe (World Bank, 2001a). Incentives were provided at the macro level to 
stimulate the production and export of NTEs. The value of NTE exports increased from 
US$1.9million in 1984 to US$119.3 million in 1994 and US$2.3 billion in 2012 (Ampadu-
Agyei, 1994; Laryea and Akuoni, 2012; MoFA, 2013a). By 1986 pineapple exports had 
become the number one horticulture export of the country, with 85% share of horticultural 
                                                 
5 For example, inflation rates averaged 40% during the 1970s, and the exchange rate was overvalued at 816% 
as at 1982 (Werlin, 1994 in Aryeetey and Harrigan, 2000:8). 
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exports (World Bank, 1990:11). It was also a major contributor of export receipts by non-
traditional agricultural exports (NTAEs).   
The foremost incentive credited with attracting private actors to the export of pineapple 
was the exchange proceeds retention scheme. Exchange rate controls imposed since the 
1960s had led to difficulties in acquiring foreign exchange for imports. As part of the 
ERP/SAP, the exchange rate market was liberalised to ease the inflow and outflow of 
capital.  The exchange proceeds retention scheme served as an incentive for businessmen 
involved in imports and exports to participate in the pineapple industry. In 1986, the 
exchange retention rate of non-traditional exports was 35% and this increased to 100% by 
1992, allowing exporters in the pineapple sector the chance to acquire needed foreign 
exchange for their primary businesses (Jebuni et al., 1992; Daddieh, 1998; Takane, 2004; 
Kastner, 2005; Whitfield, 2011). Other incentives given to the NTE sector  included (a) a 
corporate tax rebate allowing manufacturers or exporters of agricultural produce (part or 
100%) to claim 30 - 75% of their tax liability (b) a customs duty draw back scheme which 
allowed exporters to obtain a refund of import duties paid on imported materials used in 
the production of export goods (c) a bonded warehousing scheme allowing exporters to 
hold imported raw materials to be used in the production of exports without  the payment 
of duty  and (d) an annual national awards scheme for high achieving exporters (Jebuni et 
al., 1992; Addo and Marshall, 2000; Kastner, 2005). 6   
The Smooth Cayenne pineapple variety was then the preferred variety on the international 
market. In 1984, pineapple exports were 650 tonnes and this increased steadily to over 
10,000 tonnes in 1991; and by 1995 the country was exporting over 15,000 tonnes (Takane, 
2004; Faostat, 2016). The country earned the status of third largest exporter of pineapples 
to the EU after Côte d’Ivoire and Costa Rica, from the mid-1980s to mid-2000s and 
commanded a 10% share of the market in 2004. Smallholder farmers who engaged in 
market relations with exporters supplied the bulk of the produce, 40% -60% (Takane, 2004; 
Fold and Gough, 2008). The booming pineapple export sector was, however severely 
challenged, especially in terms of finance, infrastructure and lack of collaboration among 
exporters. Overall, the private sector struggled to access credit. Prior to the economic 
reforms, the financial sector of the Ghanaian economy was characterised by high default 
rates, low savings mobilisation rates, credit controls (e.g. sectoral credit ceilings for the 
                                                 
6 Some of these incentives had been in existence since the 1970s but were not applicable to the NTE sector. 
Others such as the customs drawback scheme increased from 95% to 100%.  
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productive sectors of the economy in addition to the direction of credit to specific areas) 
and high levels of non-performing assets (Aryeetey, 1994, Sowa 2002, Quartey, 2005; 
Asiedu and Fosu, 2008).  In 1986 the Financial Sector Adjustment Programme (FINSAP), 
1986-1991, was launched to restructure the entire financial sector. The components 
included bank restructuring, liberalisation of interest rate determination, the abolition of 
credit controls and a review of the banking sector’s legal and regulatory environment 
(Sowa, 2002; Asiedu and Fosu, 2008; Leith and Söderling, 2003). The reforms achieved 
some successes. However, the restructuring of the financial sector failed to significantly 
change lending flows to the private sector, as rates of savings mobilisation were still low 
and government borrowing was high (Leith and Söderling, 2003; Quartey, 2005). 
Private investors were crowded out, as commercial banks found it less risky and more 
profitable to lend to the government (World Bank, 2001a; Sowa, 2002). A World Bank 
report in 2001, on challenges faced by exporters of Ghanaian NTEs, reported that since 
1996 the 91-day treasury bill rate had averaged around 20% (in real terms), leading to short-
term financing by banks and interest rates charged set above 20% (World Bank, 2001a:7). 
Thus, as demand for pineapples increased, cash constrained entrepreneurs in the pineapple 
sector relied on their own finance or informal means of financing exports. Infrastructure 
was rudimentary both on farms and at the ports. There were no cold storage facilities to 
maintain the quality of harvested fruits (Dixie and Sergeant, 1998). Fruits were harvested 
out in the open, packed and transported to the ports in any available vehicle. Furthermore, 
there was an intense rivalry among exporters, leading to a lack of collaboration.  
In 1996 a MNC, Fresh Del Monte Produce (hereafter Del Monte) introduced a new variety 
of pineapple, MD2, onto the international pineapple market. This is a revolutionary 
product, which has enabled Del Monte and Costa Rica to totally dominate both the EU 
and US pineapple market since the mid-2000s. Furthermore, in response to food scares in 
Europe and the US, the ability to meet food safety and quality standards imposed by 
retailers have become essential to entry and participation in the global value chain. Thus, 
since 2005, Ghanaian producers and exporters have struggled to participate in the value 
chain. Production and export are now concentrated in the hands of a few exporters 
because small-scale producers and exporters could not bear the high costs of production 
and meet standards requirements. Exclusion of producers and exporters has implications 
for the development of the Ghanaian economy, given that the horticulture sector has 
massive potential for poverty reduction in the country.   
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1.3 Research Objective, Questions and Hypothesis 
As GVCs are constantly restructured and reorganised, there are winners and losers. 
Suppliers in agri-food value chains are constantly exposed to changing retailer and market 
requirements that require them to innovate and upgrade. Some actors (suppliers) have been 
excluded from chains because they were unable to adapt to the changes. For example, 
changes in characteristics of the product exchanged may cause an increased use of certain 
inputs, such as labour or finance. The availability of labour may, however, be restricted due 
to social rules on women working in the chain, while access to finance may be limited due 
to collateral requirements or perceptions of banking institutions. Changed product 
characteristics affect suppliers by placing demands on their characteristics (i.e. type of 
supplier, supplier assets and skills, etc.) and their relationships with each other. However, 
Humphrey (2006:582) notes that ‘meeting the changing demands of global markets does 
depend to some extent on the capabilities of local agricultural systems to support the 
technological capabilities of local supply chains.’ Hence, local conditions can influence the 
impact of the demands placed on suppliers. 
Using the Global Production Network (GPN) framework, Neilson and Pritchard’s (2009) 
study of the tea and coffee value chains in India, embeds governance and upgrading 
(development) in local conditions. They view the interaction of global governance and local 
conditions in the form of 'struggles' in locations. In the process of such struggles, local 
conditions 'negotiate the ability of governance structures to determine social, economic and 
environmental outcomes' for chain participants (Neilson and Pritchard, 2009: 2, 12, 24).  
This thesis agrees with the view that local conditions can influence characteristics of 
suppliers and their outcomes from participating in the global chain. At the same time, NIE 
theories are well suited to an analysis of the role of local conditions in development. Hence, 
this thesis’s main objective is to show, from a NIE, how local conditions shaped 
governance and development of the Ghanaian pineapple export sector after significant 
changes in product characteristics occurred. Overall, the thesis is guided by one 
overarching research question and three secondary questions.   
Question: How, and in what way, do local conditions impact or influence value chain 
governance? 
Three secondary research questions were further examined to assist with answering the 
24 
 
overarching research question. They are: 
Q1: How, and in what way, do local conditions shape or structure production and 
exchange relations between and among suppliers at the local level?  
H1.1: Local conditions may impose constraints or create opportunities which directly and 
indirectly influence the behaviour of actors in their interactions.  
Q2: What impact do changes in global governance have on production and exchange at the 
local level? 
H2.1: Global governance alters the characteristics of the item exchanged (product 
characteristics) and elicits corresponding changes in the characteristics of actors in order to 
meet the new product requirements.  
H2:2: Given the existing structure of interactions, the new product characteristics may 
increase supplier’s production and transaction costs. 
Q3: How, and in what way, do local conditions negotiate or mediate the impact of new 
product characteristics on suppliers and the development of the chain? 
H3.1:  Local conditions may provide an enabling setting for the development of the chain 
by altering the rules underlying production and exchange in the chain.   
A case study methodology primarily involving an analysis of available detailed research and 
reports on the Ghanaian pineapple sector and semi-structured interviews with exporters, 
producers, a processor, public officials and industry experts was used to answer the thesis 
research questions. 
1.4 Contribution and Originality 
The thesis attempts to contribute to the growing literature on the embedding of GVCs in 
the local context by making two contributions. First, at the theoretical level, it presents a 
way to incorporate local conditions into GVC analysis.  Cramer (1999) argues that the idea 
that the scope and extent of development of value chains (upgrading) depend on the 
strategies or inputs of lead firms is erroneous. Rather, in certain cases, it is local conditions 
in combination with lead firm strategies that limits development. Also, Selwyn (2012:213) 
for example, criticises Kaplinsky’s (2003) work on upgrading by Costa Rica’s coffee and 
banana producers for not discussing the input of the country’s land tenure system and state 
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investment in upgrading, as these factors impacted the ability of producers to cooperate to 
mobilise and allocate resources. Although proponents of the GVC claim that it can be 
applied to interactions at the local level, evolution of GVC governance predicts what 
happens when complexity of information, codifiability of information and capabilities of 
supplier’s change; but, does not explain how it happens. This is because it does not 
adequately communicate how global governance of the chain interacts with and transforms 
transactions taking place at the local level, and vice versa. Through an understanding of the 
institutional dimension of the GVC as the local context, the study’s conceptual framework, 
based on the Exchange Configuration approach, systematically and coherently embeds the 
value chain in local conditions and sheds light on the interaction between the global and 
local levels and the transformation of transactions at the local level.   
Second, this study provides empirical evidence by grounding the analysis of governance 
and development of value chains in social processes at the level of the Ghanaian pineapple 
export value chain. By analytically emphasising social processes through which items are 
produced and exchanged, this study enables the GVC framework to offer a balanced 
explanation of the evolution of governance in value chains.    
1.5 Thesis Outline  
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 aims to show that the institutional 
dimension of the GVC framework is of greater importance than is usually accorded. 
Hence, the first and second sections of the chapter introduce the GVC framework: the 
concept of governance in the framework, including its definition and evolution. Next is a 
discussion of actors in value chains, the impact of governance on the upgrading of value 
chains (especially the horticulture or agri-food chain which the thesis is basically concerned 
with). In the final section of the chapter, the study’s contribution to concerns of the 
institutional dimension is set out. This is done by first defining what institutions are, the 
types and their nature. Then, using empirical evidence, I show the contribution that local 
conditions make in the governance of value chains. They impact actors’ characteristics and 
influence production and transaction costs (e.g. costs of market access and participation, 
costs of standards compliance, marketing costs and distribution of risks) which have 
implications for the development of the chain.   
In Chapter 3, I seek to conceptualise how governance of national value chains is 
determined by the interaction of global governance with local conditions. Using insights 
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provided by the Exchange Configuration approach into the organisation and evolution of 
exchange, I argue that global governance caused a change in the characteristics of the item 
traded in the Ghanaian pineapple export value chain. This change demanded increased use 
of certain inputs and hence challenged the competitiveness of the Ghanaian chain. The 
response of actors to the challenges presented by the changed characteristics of the item 
was partly dependent on characteristics of the local context. Governance and development 
of the chain are therefore an outcome of the interaction of (a) characteristics of the item 
exchanged (b) characteristics of actors and (c) characteristics of the local exchange 
environment (local conditions).  
Chapter 4 involves a detailed account of the evolution of the global pineapple value chain 
over the last 25 years (1989-2013), with a view of situating Ghana in the chain. Costa Rica 
and Ghana are the focus of this chapter given the decline of Ghana’s sector and the 
spectacular rise of Costa Rica to dominate exports to both the European Union (EU) and 
the United States (US) markets. The governance of the international pineapple value chain 
is discussed, especially regarding the use of product and process standards and changing 
responsibilities of importers. I introduce the Ghanaian pineapple export value chain in this 
chapter, along with a discussion on how it has coped with the new rules of production and 
exchange.  
Chapter 5 describes the current value chain structure, case study area, data collection 
procedures, selection of exporters and farmers and how the data were collected. 
Chapter 6 gives a detailed account of how interactions were structured in the Ghanaian 
pineapple value chain when the Smooth Cayenne variety was the preferred variety on the 
international market. It takes the form of a historical analysis, using the study’s conceptual 
framework to account for how the interaction of local conditions with characteristics of the 
actors and item exchanged determined the types of actors who participated in the chain 
and the nature and structure of interactions (transactions). For example, local conditions 
motivated actors to structure their interactions in a manner which had a detrimental effect 
on cooperation and the coordination of the chain. This effect was intensified when the 
rules of participation changed at the international level. 
In Chapter 7, I examine the evolution of governance in the Ghanaian value chain. The 
discussion focuses on how global governance, that is, the MD2 pineapple variety and the 
use of standards impacted relationships and hence the development of the chain. The 
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relationships between actors, both at the vertical and horizontal levels have significantly 
changed. At the horizontal level, exporters communicate more with each other and have 
invested in infrastructure while farmer cooperatives are key to participating in the chain.  
Government, with the support of development agencies, has greatly improved sector level 
infrastructure and made available subsidies to reduce the costs of production. However, 
many small and medium-scale farmers have been excluded from the chain primarily 
because of the inability of local conditions to alleviate the financial burdens of participating 
in the chain. The few remaining ones meanwhile enjoy formalised contractual relations 
which now underlie production relations. Unfortunately, in many cases, a contract can still 
not be used to access finance from financial organisations, highlighting the limitations and 
lack of innovation in agricultural finance in the country. 
Chapter 8 summarises the study’s key findings and discusses implications for theory and 
policy, as well as for future research.  
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Chapter 2 Global Value Chain Analysis 
2.1 Introduction 
Participation in global value chains has become synonymous with development. The reason 
is that although the Global Value Chain (GVC) framework is not a theory of economic 
development, it has provided insights (which were previously absent) into how countries 
and industries are integrated and inter-dependent in the current global production and 
trade structure. Significantly, how transactions or relationships are ordered (governed) in 
this interaction determines the type and extent of developmental benefits accruing to 
participating firms, industries and countries. Hence a significant number of studies have 
focused on what the framework terms ‘governance.’ 
However, some authors (e.g. Thomsen, 2007, Selwyn, 2008, Palpacuer, 2008; Gibbon, 
2008; Ramirez and Rainbird, 2012) have argued that the framework’s concept of 
governance does not give a full account of how chains are governed and evolve because 
the institutional dimension of the framework is underdeveloped or lacks elaboration. Lack 
of development of this dimension leads Gellert (2003:58) to remark that detailed 
information on the specific conditions which give rise to particular governance structures 
go missing.  
In this chapter of the thesis, I seek to contribute to the development of the institutional 
dimension of the GVC framework. The chapter is organised as follows. The first and 
second sections of the chapter discuss the GCC and GVC frameworks, focusing on their 
history and the governance concept. The third section identifies actors in GVCs; while the 
fourth and fifth sections emphasise the relationship between governance and upgrading in 
agri-food value chains. The sixth section outlines the GPN framework, which sets itself as 
an alternative to the GVC framework. This is followed by a final section which discusses 
the limitations of the institutional dimension in GVCs; defines what institutions are, their 
types and nature; and makes a case for the institutional dimension of the framework to be 
characterised as the local context.   
2.2 Contemporary frameworks for analysing economic development  
2.2.1 From the state to lead firms 
With increased globalisation, that is, ‘the functional integration and coordination of 
internationally dispersed activities,’ (Gereffi, 1999b: 41) traditional theories with the state as 
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the centrepiece became obsolete and a revision was required (Henderson et al., 2002:437) 
as MNCs became the primary actors in the organisation of production and trade in the 
global economy.  To effectively oversee production which was fragmented across borders 
because MNCs had to contend with rising costs of production in view of competitiveness 
(Gereffi, 2005:165), global governance i.e. rules by which global industries and sectors are 
organised and managed became central to the operation of the global economy. 
2.2.2 Origin of the value chain concept  
This section contains a brief overview of the origin of value chains. When the need to 
formulate an appropriate framework to explain the reorganisation of production and trade 
arose, researchers from the fields of sociology, geography and business management, took 
the lead.  Here, relationships among and between firms were envisioned as a chain or 
network construct. The chain or network was analytically termed a value chain.  
Michael Porter made the term ‘value chain’ popular in the book ‘Competitive Advantage’ 
published in 1985; but there is no commonly agreed definition.  In Porter’s opinion, the 
value addition activities undertaken by a single firm represented the value chain. These 
activities, including logistics, marketing, sales and services, gave a firm its competitive 
advantage. Supporting activities which influenced the value chain included infrastructure, 
human resource management and procurement.  
The frameworks of interest to us (discussed in the next section) have their origins in the 
development economics literature. Hopkins and Wallerstein (1986, 1994) formulated the 
concept of a commodity chain, using the World System Theory (WST).  A commodity 
chain was defined as a ‘network of labor and production processes whose end result is a 
finished commodity’ (Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1986:159). This meant that a product’s 
commodity chain consisted of all the raw materials, labour, production and labour 
processes that culminate in the output. In the world capitalist system, firms are located 
within this commodity chain. Specific production processes were described as ‘boxes’ 
(Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1994:18) and the boxes form an interlocking chain because they 
either produce inputs for others to use or use inputs from others.  
The linkages of boxes result in a geographical division of labour, with core activities 
performed in core countries and lesser functions performed in periphery nations. Within 
this chain, the boxes are geographically bounded, though changes to the boundary are 
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possible with technological or social change. The commodity chain construct meant that 
the entire world system (i.e. the division of labour, labour processes) rather than the state 
was the unit of analysis.  
2.2.3 Global Commodity Chain (GCC) 
Gary Gereffi and others in Gereffi and Korzeniewicz (eds.), 1994 took up the concept of 
commodity chains to build the Global Commodity Chain (GCC) framework. This 
framework sought to analyse the ‘global’ economy but unlike Hopkins and Wallerstein, 
firms rather than the state took up the role of coordinator of production chains.  GCC 
refers to ‘sets of interorganisational networks clustered around one commodity or product, 
linking households, enterprises and states to one another within the world economy’ 
(Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994:2). The chain construct is used to underline the sequential 
nature of activities carried out by several firms in the production of goods and services 
(Humphrey and Memodovic, 2006:8) 
Initially, Gereffi sought to examine the role of commercial capital (due to the rise of 
marketers, branders and retailers who usually did not own any production factories), in the 
spread of production activities across the world, by looking at firm strategies and actions. 
However, the use of GCC analysis extended beyond this, in part because of changing 
international trade rules, preference for differentiation products and the rise of the East 
Asian tigers.   
Though similar, GCC analysis differs from the value chain developed by Michael Porter, in 
terms of concentrating on the network of firms (and not a particular firm) as well as on 
‘incomplete’ firms i.e. firms that specialise in specific functions (Gereffi et al., 2001:2).7 
Also, even though GCC built upon WST, it significantly departs from some of the basic 
rules which underlie the theory (Bair, 2005:155-157). First is the period of globalisation. 
Hopkins and Wallerstein (1986) depict globalisation of production not as a recent 
phenomenon, but rather as one that has been occurring since the 16th century.  Gereffi and 
others, on the other hand, consider it to be as recent as the 20th century. This period of 
globalisation is marked by significant improvements in communication technology, 
production techniques, harvesting and post-harvesting techniques, marketing, distribution, 
transportation and storage (Bair, 2005; Gibbon, Bair and Ponte, 2008:317).  
                                                 
7 Gereffi’s ‘value chain’ analyses will correspond to Porter’s ‘value system.’ The value system refers to the 




Second, unlike WST where development was said to be a ‘developmentalist illusion’ 
(Wallerstein, 1994 in Bair, 2005:157) because relations of production and exchange were 
steeped in exploitation (Arrighi 1990, in Bair, 2005:173), GCC investigates the possibility 
for firms in developing countries to shift from the performance of lower value activities to 
higher value ones. WST is concerned with how activities and processes are reconstructed to 
maintain the pecking order in the global capitalist system; whereas GCC is concerned with 
how producers or suppliers in developing countries can advance in their activities (Bair, 
2005; Gibbon and Ponte, 2005). Thus, a nation can develop by gaining competencies in 
producing higher value products.  
The GCC framework in breaking away from the earlier models of development reflected 
current international production and trade relationships and it could explain the 
incorporation of firms and states in production and trade networks in contemporary 
globalisation (Bair, 2005). Succinctly, Daviron and Gibbon (2002:141) describe the 
influence of the GCC framework as offering 'radically new approaches to understanding 
international trade, business networks and 'underdevelopment.' 
2.2.4 Global Value Chain (GVC) 
Over time, limitations of the GCC framework necessitated its reformulation into the 
Global Value Chain (GVC). GVCs refer to ‘the full range of activities to bring a product 
from its conception to end use, including design, production, distribution and consumer 
support’ (Lee, Gereffi and Barrientos, 2011:2) and can refer to the global, macro, meso or 
micro levels. This reformulation broke with not only the theoretical foundations of the 
original framework but also the analytical focus (Bair, 2008).  
Below are some reasons for the reformulation: 
(a) There were concerns about the use of the word ‘commodity’ as it intimated 
standardised products (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2001:25). 
(b) Empirical evidence showed variations in the way in which commodity chains are 
structured (Fold, 2002).  
(c) There was a need to have an industry-neutral typology of governance structures if the 
framework was to apply to other industries (Sturgeon 2008) since the original GCC 
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framework favoured the manufacturing industry.   
2.2.4.1 Dimensions of GVC framework 
Just like the GCC, GVC relies upon four main dimensions: input-output structure, 
geography, governance and institutional framework.  
(a) The Input-Output structure shows the conversion of inputs into output and maps out 
the value added at each stage of the chain. It does not only deal with the firms in a chain 
but also supporting industries which aid in the creation of value. 
(b) Geography is about the geographical scope of the chain whether national, regional or 
international 
(c) Governance explains how the chain or network is ordered and how rents are shared. 
Most empirical work using the two frameworks has focused on this pillar (Gibbon, Bair 
and Ponte, 2008).  
(d) The institutional dimension consists of the social, economic and political context in 
which firms are situated. It influences, for example, inter-firm relationships through the 
availability and skill of labour, access to finance and the ability to innovate, among others 
(Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark, 2011:11). Since it was added on after the other dimensions 
had been conceived, it is the least developed dimension (Bair, 2005:173). Consequently, 
there are weaknesses with the dimension/framework.  
2.3 Governance  
2.3.1 Introduction 
Williamson (1998:37) defines governance as ‘the means by which order is accomplished in 
a relation in which potential conflict threatens to undo or upset opportunities to realize 
mutual gains.’ One way of achieving order is through rules hence Nadvi (2008:324) defines 
governance as ‘the framework and institutional structures by which rules (which include 
laws at one extreme and norms at the other) are set and implemented.’ In neoclassical 
economics, a discussion of governance does not take place because, in the market, 
economic exchange is efficiently carried out under conditions of perfect information. 
Changes in prices communicate all the factors needed in coordinating an exchange. J.R. 
Commons in 1932 disagreed with this assertion. In his opinion, impersonal economic 
exchange requires a focus on the exchange process itself and not the individuals, firms or 
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commodities involved. The transaction should, therefore, be the principal focus in 
understanding economic exchange. 
Furthermore, Commons believed that every transaction has three potential attributes; 
conflict, mutuality, and order. These attributes could lead to situations where a transaction 
will not occur; hence economic theories should stress how order is brought about to 
organise and sustain production (Williamson, 2000:487). Ronald Coase, in his paper ‘The 
Nature of the Firm’ (1937), argued that exchange is not costless as the neoclassicals 
suggested. Apart from the cost of production, exchange involves transaction costs 
associated with, for example, information, negotiation and enforcement. O. E. Williamson 
took up the concept of transaction costs and used it in formulating the Transactions Cost 
Economics (TCE) theory where he views governance as a way the three attributes of a 
transaction can be managed effectively (Williamson, 1999:1088). According to him, due to 
the presence of transaction costs, firms must evaluate how to organise production i.e. the 
‘make or buy’ decision. The ‘make’ decision implies that firms will internalise transaction 
costs and produce in-house while the ‘buy’ decision is to source from outside the firm. If 
transaction costs are non-existent or extremely low, firms may decide to buy on the market; 
if not, they can become vertically integrated backwards and forwards or even laterally, with 
different sections of the firm producing, marketing and distributing the product.  
In the value chain frameworks discussed above, a unifying concept is that of governance. 
According to Kaplinsky (2000a:122), the governance dimension of the GVC transforms the 
framework from a heuristic to an analytical tool. However, researchers have interpreted 
GVC governance in different ways and the concept has evolved over the years. The next 
section discusses the evolution and interpretations given.  
2.3.2 Governance in Value Chain Analysis  
With increased production of goods and services from a multiplicity of locations, 
globalisation is not just the linking of geographical locations, but also the functional 
integration of activities along the production chain.  The need for efficient coordination of 
different activities across space results in the organisation of production in various ways, 
but value chain governance has focused on the coordination of production activities 
exclusively through an inter-firm exchange of information.8   
                                                 
8 However, coordinating and integrating economies all over the world requires a transformation of not just 
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2.3.3 Theoretical and empirical interpretation of governance in value chain 
analysis 
According to Gibbon, Bair and Ponte (2008), the interpretations of governance in value 
chains can be summarised in three conceptualisations. Governance as ‘driving,’ 
‘coordination’ and ‘normalisation’.  
2.3.3.1 Governance as driving 
Much research in value chain analysis is concerned with governance (i.e. the relationships 
that exist among the various actors in the chain). Governance deals with how firms and 
organisations exert influence in the chain through setting, enforcement and/or monitoring 
of parameters (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2001: 20). Implicit in the concept of governance is 
how an organisation (or firm) exerts power on others in the chain.9  
Kaplinsky and Morris (2001:29) state that 'governance ensures that interactions between 
firms along a value chain exhibit some reflection of organisation rather than being simply 
random.' Therefore, starting with the GCC framework, Gereffi (1994:97) identifies non-
market relationships in which governance is ‘the authority and power relationships that 
determine how financial, material and human resources are located and flow within a 
chain.’ Since the theoretical basis of the GCC framework was Economic Sociology, power 
relations were emphasised in how governance take place and the entities charged with 
exercising governance were lead firms. 
Initially, two ideal types of governance were specified; buyer and producer driven. The 
specification is based on how lead firms that determined the conditions by which 
participants were included in the chain or not and the division of labour (Ponte, 2007:4) 
steered the chain.  In producer driven chains, lead firms (industrial capital) are vertically 
integrated in the entire production chain. Capital-intensive functions are done in-house 
while labour-intensive processes are subcontracted to suppliers who are hierarchically 
organised and managed by these firms. Therefore, industrial capital (e.g. MNCs) 
coordinates and manages the entire commodity chain.  
Conversely, buyer-driven firms are prevalent in labour-intensive, consumer-goods 
                                                                                                                                               
inter-firm relations but also rules and organisations at the global and national levels, necessary for an 
effectively functioning system. Thus, Nadvi (2008) notes that Coe and Hess (2007) points to industrial and 
political governance; while Gereffi and Mayer (2006) identify market, corporate and industrial governance.  
9 Power could result from control over resources such as finance, skills or the ability to purchase large 
quantities of a good. 
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industries, characterised by retailers, marketers and branders (commercial capital). Here 
lead firms which dominate the higher-end of the chain – marketing, design and branding 
functions – contract with independent firms. According to Daviron and Gibbon 
(2002:138), a key feature of the ‘buyer–driven’ governance structure is the need for product 
differentiation as opposed to product standardisation when quality becomes a crucial factor 
in the making of a product. Quality concerns serve as the focal point for the interpretation 
of governance as normalisation, discussed in section 2.3.3.3.  
As time went by, the governance classification used by GCC proved inadequate as 
empirical studies showed that governance did not occur in all chains in the way envisaged 
in the framework (Fold 2002; Henderson et al., 2002). For example, in commodity chains, 
Fold (2002) noted that the form of governance could be 'bi-polar' due to the presence of 
different lead firms at various sections of the chain. In the cocoa industry, both grinders 
and branders (manufacturers of chocolate) act as lead firms (Fold, 2002).10 Also, the 
prevalence of outsourcing of even core competencies, subcontracting, and the reliance on 
firms with complementary skills in hitherto producer-driven chains necessitated a change in 
governance (Sturgeon, 2008).   
2.3.3.2 Governance as coordination 
Changes to the notion of governance as 'coordination' occurred in the Global Value Chain 
(GVC) framework. The change took place at both the theoretical and empirical levels. The 
GVC framework is based on (a) Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), (b) Firm capabilities 
and learning in Strategic Management and (c) Production networks in New Economic 





                                                 
10 The horticulture/agri-food value chain is said to be bi-polar due to the dominance of retailers and 
marketers on the one hand, and that of highly-vertically integrated fruits and vegetable producers who can 
determine the varieties of fruits and vegetables in demand on the international market. 
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Table 2.1: Theoretical literatures underpinning GVC governance structures 
Theory Key Concept Key authors 
Transaction Cost 
Economics 
Asset specificity Williamson 
Coase (1937) 
Economic Sociology Embeddedness 
Trust 
Granovetter (1985) 
Firm Capabilities and 
Learning 




Penrose (1959, 2009) 
Barnay (1991) 
Production Network Networks 
Repeated transactions 
Reputation 
Powell (1990), Thorelli 
(1986) 
Source: Frederick (2010)  
In this framework, governance was no longer envisioned as ‘driving’ the entire chain but as 
‘coordination’ (Gibbon, Bair and Ponte, 2008:322) because it deals with specific nodes or 
segments of the chain. The organisation of production chains depends on the transaction 
costs (both ex-ante and ex-post) involved and the nature of relationship-specific 
investments (Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon, 2005:78). Thus, the primary variable 
determining the extent of ‘coordination’ is asset specificity; particularly in the form of 
industry or process characteristics that influence a transaction.11 Opportunistic behaviour 
of economic actors and the frequency of transactions also influence the type of governance 
chosen.  Asset specificity can be in the form of physical investments, equipment, brand 
name, human assets, and financial capital, among others (Williamson, 1999; Ruester, 2010). 
Hence, in line with TCE theory, the governance structures (institutional arrangements) are 
'efficient solutions to structural challenges'12 (Gibbon, Bair and Ponte, 2008:323). 
In TCE, governance structures are a continuum from market to hierarchy. Between the 
two extremes lie hybrid governance forms such as bilateral contracts, networks and joint 
ventures. In similar fashion, GVC governance structures range from market to hierarchy 
with modular, relational and captive governance in between. The network forms of 
governance (modular, relational and captive) are the focus of GVC studies and were 
formulated based on empirical knowledge. Empirically, it was found that even in cases of 
high asset specificity; firms were engaging in partnerships for production. This led Gereffi, 
                                                 
11 The TCE literature is a school of thought in New Institutional Economics. It regards asset specificity as the 
key determinant of the boundaries of the firm (i.e. whether a firm decides to produce in-house or buy on the 
market).  
12 See Bair and Dussel Peters, 2006; Ponte, 2007, for objections to whether the structural constraints 
conceived of in the GVC framework are really constraints. 
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Humphrey and Sturgeon (2005:81) to argue that ‘asset specificity, opportunism, and 
coordination costs can be managed at the inter-firm level through a variety of methods.’  
Theoretically, inter-firm solutions to why inter-firm relations exist regardless of asset 
specificity were found in New Economic Sociology’s concept of ‘embeddedness’ and 
‘networks’ (Granovetter, 1985; Powell, 1990; Thorelli, 1986) and firm capability and 
learning (Penrose, 2009).  New economic sociology stresses that ongoing personal relations 
embedded in the social context cause trust, which help reduce the propensity for economic 
agents to be opportunistic (Granovetter, 1985:490-491). Hence Gereffi, Humphrey and 
Sturgeon (2005:81) note that ‘network actors in many instances control opportunism 
through the effects of repeat transactions, reputation and social norms that are embedded 
in particular geographic locations or social groups.’ The ability of firms to learn and 
improve upon their capabilities is based on the resource-based view of the firm in Strategic 
Management. Here, the firm's resources (personnel, knowledge, skills, etc.) and 
characteristics are the focus of analysis. The basic underlying principle is that the resources 
of a firm determine its capabilities and therefore its competitive advantage. These resources 
are unique and not easily substituted (Barnay 1991 in Sirmon, Hitt and Ireland, 2007: 273). 
The characteristics of a transaction that influenced the type of governance structure in the 
face of asset specificity were empirically determined. Sturgeon (2002) working on the 
electronics manufacturing sector was instrumental in identifying a form of governance 
(modular) where the asset specificity problem was minimised through industry standards 
which made it easier to codify (write down) information. Therefore, in his view, ‘trust, 
reputation and long-term relationships are not the only way to buoy external economies’ 
(Sturgeon, 2002:.480). Furthermore, the parties to the exchange have complementary skills. 
He noted that computer companies like Dell did not necessarily outsource low profit jobs 
to suppliers, but rather these suppliers had high levels of competencies in complementary 
skills that were required by the lead firms. These skills allowed lead firms to specify their 
requirements in highly codified forms without the need for face-to-face interactions. Also, 
Humphrey and Schmitz (2002) show that suppliers with low-level of skills were utterly 
dependent on the lead firm in the governance relationship. Thus, economic sociology, 
production networks and the resource-based view of the firm informed the GVC’s 
'network' forms of governance.  
In market-based governance, perfect information eliminates the need for the sharing of 
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product specific information. However, since products in the value chain are made to 
satisfy specific requirements of particular buyers, information is not freely available and 
shared. The type of information, its characteristics, availability, ease of transfer and 
capabilities to assimilate and use it becomes necessary. Therefore, based on a binary 
measurement of high or low, the characteristics of a transaction needed to determine the 
type of governance in the relationship are given as; Complexity, Codification and 
Capabilities.  
(a) Complexity – Refers to the degree of information and knowledge transfer needed to 
support and maintain a particular transaction. The key factor determining complexity is 
asset specificity, which may create avenues for opportunistic behaviour. In situations where 
complexity is high, the lead firm will exert greater coordination over the chain. 
(b) Codification-  Refers to the extent to which information and knowledge required for a 
transaction are shared easily and efficiently between buyers and suppliers. It may involve 
writing down information to make is easily acquired and transferred, and therefore codified 
knowledge can be ‘transmitted in a formal systematic language’ (Niedergassel, 2011:61). 
Databases, archives and documents contain codified or explicit knowledge (Nonaka, 
1994:17). Increasing codification implies that labour must be skilled in assessing and 
putting the knowledge into practice.  
(c) Capabilities – This refers to the real and likely (latent) abilities of suppliers to meet 
transaction requirements for an exchange to occur. As indicated above, lead firms require 
products made in a certain way, at a particular time and with specific inputs. The ability of 
suppliers to meet these requirements depends on their capabilities. Hence, capabilities may 
refer to skills, labour, finance, accessibility to inputs, among others. Capabilities also 
determine the extent of subordination to buyers (Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon, 
2005:83).  
The three variables, measured as high or low, give rise to five governance structures; 
market, modular, relational, captive and hierarchy (Tables 2.2 and 2.3).13  
                                                 
13 Eight possible governance structures were realised but only five were empirically feasible.  
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Degree of explicit 
coordination and 
power asymmetry 








         
        High 
Modular High High High 
Relational High Low High 
Captive High High Low 
Hierarchy High Low Low 
Source: Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon (2005:87) 
 
Table 2.3: GVC governance structures and their characteristics 
Governance 
Structure 
Characteristics of the Relationship 
Market Governed by price relations; little explicit coordination 
required between buyers and sellers; low costs of switching 
partners  
Modular Highly competent suppliers; the ability to codify information 
through industry standards means interactions between buyers 
and suppliers need not be on a face-to-face basis; low costs of 
switching partners 
Relational Exchange of tacit information; mutual dependency between 
buyers and sellers leads to the use of trust, reputation, family 
ties; spatial proximity to regulate the relationship; exchange of 
tacit information done through face-to-face interactions; high 
costs of switching partners 
Captive Low competences of suppliers mean significant dependence on 
buyers; detailed monitoring of suppliers by buyers; high costs 
of switching partners faced by suppliers 
Hierarchy Vertical integration of stages of production 
Source: Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon (2005:86-87) 
On the other hand, Humphrey and Schmitz (2000, 2001), coming from an industrial cluster 
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background, focus on the risk of supplier failure as the main driver of governance. 14  The 
risk of supplier failure has increased since non-price competition (quality, reliability of 
deliveries, timeliness of deliveries) became vital to global trade.   
Since information sharing and supplier capabilities are the critical determinants of 
governance, changes in GVC governance occur as these factors change (Figure 2.1). For 
example, when standards increase the codifiability of information, it is likely that 
governance will move towards market governance and when suppliers in captive 
governance increase their capabilities, governance is likely to move towards relational 
and/or modular. Nadvi (2008:332-334) however argues that the ability of standards 
requirements (due to increased codification) to move governance to either modular or 
market-based (i.e. one requiring less coordination by the lead firm) may depend on 
commercial factors, risk and the capabilities of suppliers. In the this study, these factors are 
influenced by local conditions. 
Figure 2.1: Evolution of GVC governance 
 
Note: 1: Increasing complexity of transactions also reduces supplier competence in relation to new demands. 
2: Decreasing complexity of transactions and greater ease of codification. 3: Better codification of 
transactions. 4: De-codification of transactions. 5: Increasing supplier competence. 6: Decreasing supplier 
competence 
Source: Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon (2005:90) 
2.3.3.3 Governance as normalisation 
Governance as normalisation perceives inter-firm relations in the wider normative context 
(Gibbon, Bair and Ponte, 2008: 324). It is theoretically rooted in Convention theory, which 
is a French Institutionalist approach to the coordination of economic activities. 
Convention theory rejects the neoclassical theory of economic agents having full and 
complete information and rather asserts that in situations of asymmetric and incomplete 
                                                 
14 Morrison, Pietrobelli and Rabellotti (2008:44) broadly classify GVC scholars into two groups: (a) the 
internationalists, who have a macro approach to value chains, e.g. G. Gereffi, R. Kaplinsky, P. Gibbon and 
(b) the industrialists, who take a micro approach to value chains by focusing on local and cluster 
development, e.g. J. Humphrey and H. Schmitz 
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information; socially defined rules (or conventions) assist in exchange. Thus, it rejects the 
notion that price signals are enough to coordinate exchange and seeks to promote other 
non-price signals. When applied to GVC, it seeks to 'elaborate an account both of the 
immediate normative environment within which value chain actors operate (that is, in 
relation to their functional statuses as buyers or suppliers) and the broader normative 
frameworks influencing the designations attached to the products and services they 
exchange within GVCs' (Gibbon, Bair and Ponte, 2008:324). 
Convention theory is interested in the communication of product quality between buyers 
and suppliers. In GVC, the focus is on the standardisation of products (through third-party 
actors) and industry norms. The increased use of private standards that entail detailed 
product specific knowledge increases the asset specificity characteristic of production, 
making its communication important to the coordination of value chains.  
The retail sector links downstream participants (consumers) of an industry to upstream 
participants (producers). Since the 1990s, retailers in product markets have increased their 
market shares. Dolan and Humphrey (2000:148) assert that the top five supermarkets had 
more than a 50% share of the food market in 1996 in all European Union countries except 
Greece, Italy and Spain. In the UK, supermarkets grew to dominate the food retail market 
in the 1980s and 1990s and by 1997, had a 73% share of the food retail market. As they 
increased their knowledge of consumer wants, in turn, they required a differentiation of 
their products. 
Private standards introduced include GLOBALGAP, British Retail Consortium (BRC), 
International Food Standards (IFS) and Tesco’s Natures Choice. These standards are 
‘voluntary’ and usually go beyond what public standards require such as traceability by 
including processing methods and labour standards. Fruits and vegetables such as 
pineapple, mango, grapes, and chilli are under these standards and so is livestock.15 As 
retailers exert greater influence in the horticulture supply chain, there is fear of 
consolidation by large firms and/or MNCs to the exclusion of smallholders. This is 
because investments required to comply with standards certification are high and principles 
of ‘traceability’ favour transactions between retailers and large firms (Dolan, Humphrey 
                                                 
15 The standards are voluntary in that you only have to adhere to them if you want to supply these retailers. 
Dolan, Humphrey and Harris-Pascal, 1999, show that the requirements of large UK supermarkets act as a 
barrier to smallholder participation in the vegetable supply chain in Kenya. 
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and Harris-Pascal, 1999; Dolan and Humphrey, 2000).16 
2.4 Actors in Value chains 
2.4.1 Lead Firms 
Lead firms in GVCs are the firms that have the power to govern entire value chains. They 
do not have to own the production facilities, but they determine who participates, what is 
produced, how it is produced and when it is produced (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2001:21-
11). Lead firms are generally located in developed economies and they, ‘at the very least, set 
product strategy, place orders, and take financial responsibility for the goods and services 
that their supply chains churn out' (Sturgeon, 2008:22). There are two ways by which lead 
firms coordinate the chain i.e. control suppliers without owning production facilities; (1) 
through the huge volume of purchases they make or economies of scale (2) through market 
power (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2001; Sturgeon, 2008). 
Nonetheless, it is not only lead firms that may set the rules of participation, especially 
concerning production processes such as packaging and labelling. Organisations external to 
the chain may do this, but lead firms are required to enforce and/or monitor the 
parameters. For example, due to the food scares in the 1990s in Europe, the UK 
government made laws that resulted in the devolution of power to supermarkets in 
ensuring that all food they imported met the government food and safety standards. 
Supermarkets were to be liable for any breaches.  
Since governance requires asset specific investments and therefore can be expensive, 
Humphrey and Schmitz (2001:23) ask why lead firms undertake it. They do so to minimise 
the risks of failure by suppliers (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2000; 2001) or hasten the rate of 
product and process development (Morrison, Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2008:46). It is 
therefore not surprising that UNECA (2013:85) describes the term lead firms as a 'political 
economy term and not a normative term implying benevolence.' The decisions and 
strategies taken by these lead firms have a profound impact on the development of 
participating firms and countries as they influence, for example, the distribution of rents in 
the value chain and generally, the development of value chains in developing countries.  
Understandably, lead firms gain the most rent in the value chain. Rent comes from unequal 
                                                 
16 The definition for smallholder is not universal, but generally, it refers to a farm of  less than 10 hectares 
and relying mainly on family labour. 
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access to a valuable factor of production; therefore, those who can extract more rent from 
the value chain are those who control most of the valuable resources (Kaplinsky, 
2000a:122). At the same time, since scarcity of a factor of production can be constructed, 
lead firms can extract high rents from higher value activities, such as marketing and 
branding, by blocking suppliers’ access to these activities (Kaplinsky, 2000a). For example, 
Dolan and Humphrey, 2000, Schmitz and Knorringa, 2000, show that lead firms can 
influence existing and potential capabilities of their suppliers in developing countries while 
at the same time, erecting barriers to entry to their participation in higher value added 
activities in the chain.    
2.4.2 Suppliers  
Suppliers refer to all other firms apart from lead firms. First-tier suppliers refer to those 
from whom lead firms directly source products and services.  They may be importers, 
intermediaries, manufacturers and licensed agents. First tier suppliers contract with several 
second and third tier suppliers to meet the needs of lead firms. 
Over time, the role of first-tier suppliers in the chain has evolved. Lead firms have 
devolved management of aspects of the chain such as logistics to suppliers (Dolan and 
Humphrey, 2000; Humphrey and Memodovic, 2006). This increased responsibility comes 
with the risk of marginalisation and exclusion from the chain for suppliers who are unable 
to keep up (Gibbon and Ponte, 2005 in Pietrobelli, 2008). 
Suppliers may also have some power in the chain. The difference in the power exercised by 
suppliers to lead firms is that it generally does not allow them to determine where, how and 
when products are made (Sturgeon, 2008:23). The following are the types and sources of 
supplier power.  
● Platform leadership is the strongest form of supplier power. It stems from 
exceptional marketing and technological capabilities, which allows them the power 
to set certain parameters in the chain (Sturgeon, 2008:23). Platform leaders do not 
have the purchasing power of lead firms, but they are strongly able to influence the 
type of product that a chain produces. It leads Fold (2002) to describe some value 
chain governance as ‘bi-polar.’  
● Competence power is an outcome of having certain technical and service 
capabilities, which are difficult to replace (Sturgeon, 2008:23).  
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In national or domestic value chains in developing countries, there is most likely no lead 
firm or supplier with platform power (Sturgeon, 2008).  
2.5 Upgrading 
Governance has ‘far-reaching consequences for developing countries, among others, 
affecting the degree of inclusion of poor producers, their income earning opportunities, the 
allocation of risks, and consumer prices’ (Altenburg, 2006:449). Notwithstanding the above 
statement, the main implication of governance in value chain analysis is said to be 
upgrading.  Economic upgrading or simply upgrading involves ‘moving up’ the chain. It is 
‘the process by which economic actors – firms and workers – move from low-value to 
relatively high-value activities in global production networks’ (Gereffi 2005:171). Gereffi 
(1999b) in a study of the East Asia apparel chain identifies lead firms as promoting 
upgrading of their suppliers.  
Humphrey and Schmitz (2002) identify four types of upgrading: 
(i) Process upgrading involves an improvement in the efficiency of production 
processes and may involve substituting capital for labour.  
(ii) Product upgrading refers to the production of higher-value products.  
(iii) Functional upgrading involves firms moving into the performance of functions 
in the production of higher-value products.  
(iv) Intersectoral or chain upgrading involves moving into a different sector using 
the knowledge acquired in a particular chain. The firm, therefore, adapts its 
capabilities from one sector to another.17  
 
Initially, upgrading was viewed in terms of knowledge and information flows from lead 
firms to suppliers (Gibbon, 2008:44) and was thought of as always beneficial to suppliers. 
However, studies have shown that it is not always so (e.g. Barrientos and Kritzinger 2004). 
Although upgrading is the result of learning and innovation in the value chain, the extent to 
which this occurs largely depends on the type of governance structure, under which the 
firm operates (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; Henderson et al., 2002; Bazan and Navas-
Alemán, 2004).18 For example, Bazan and Navas-Alemán (2004) show that in the Sinos 
                                                 
17 Ponte and Ewert (2009:1639) comment on the ambiguity of intersectoral upgrading since it does not 
specify which particular aspect of the business is upgraded.  
18 Guiliani, Pietrobelli and Rabelotti (2005:552) define upgrading as innovating to increase value added. They 
go on to say that this definition does not mean that firms have to come up with new products or processes 
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Valley footwear value chain in Brazil, local producers who were in quasi-hierarchical 
governance relationship with buyers in the US were privy to product and process 
upgrading (which served the interest of the buyers), but not functional upgrading (which 
would have served the interest of the producers). Conversely, when market relations 
characterise the relationship between suppliers and buyers, functional upgrading is possible 
(Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002; Bazan and Navas-Alemán, 2004). In addition, the type of 
knowledge transferred is a determinant of upgrading. When buyers need to transfer tacit 
knowledge to their suppliers, they may be more inclined to assist their suppliers (Giuliani, 
Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2005; Morrison, Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2008).  
Arguing against the notion that upgrading is always initiated by and depends on the 
knowledge flows from lead firms, Morrison, Pietrobelli and Rabellotti (2008) note that local 
firms must invest in certain capabilities before their successful integration into GVCs. Also, 
Saliola and Zanfei, 2009, mention that upgrading depends on the rate of adaptability and 
the capabilities of suppliers to use the knowledge transferred. In line with Gibbon’s (2008) 
claim that the capabilities of suppliers may reflect the environment in which the chain is 
located, this thesis postulates that embeddedness of value chains plays a role in upgrading.  
Another criticism levelled against the upgrading as ‘moving-up’ concept is that upgrading 
may still limit a firm’s competitiveness to its former position in the chain. Meyer - Stamer 
(2009:328-330) argues that upgrading should be perceived as a relational concept that 
considers the competitiveness of a firm relative to its main rivals or competitors, rather 
than its previous position in the chain. This point is especially worthwhile when the ability 
of a chain to deliver developmental benefits to an economy in the face of new actors (e.g. 
countries or firms in other countries) entering the chain is the focus of research (Dussel-
Peters, 2008).  
Selwyn (2008) and Whitfield (2012) also comment that although upgrading is seen as 
essential to suppliers in the value chain, the GVC framework does not clarify how and why 
upgrading takes place when lead firms are not the facilitators of upgrading. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
before they upgrade, but rather refers to minor changes by firms in their processes and products that allow 
them to perform better, whether financially or output wise. 
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2.6 Governance and Upgrading in the Horticulture/Agri-Food Value Chain19 
The GVC literature notes that governance of agri-food value chains is principally exercised 
by retailers (lead firms). They set the rules on what is to be produced, how it should be 
produced and other parameters (especially price). Reasons for setting rules include the need 
for product differentiation, increasing income levels of consumers, concerns about the 
capacity of developing countries to export food which is safe for consumption and retailer 
strategies to lower costs (e.g. inventory and labour costs).20 At the same time, retailers need 
to ensure that their suppliers can deliver produce in a reliable, predictable and timely 
manner (Taglioni and Winkler, 2014:2). Thus, governance in these chains has evolved from 
arms-length (market) transactions to non-market transactions.  
The ability of retailers to govern the chain stems from the power they exert on it.  Power in 
the GVC framework is regarded as (a) the ability to ensure consequences along the chain 
and (b) the ability to actively manage or coordinate the operations of the different nodes 
within the chain to ensure that consequences are met (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2001: 29-30).  
The power of retailers has two sources; economic (market) power i.e. the ability to 
purchase large amounts of produce and control over knowledge or information e.g. about 
consumer wants.  
At the global level, retailers in fruit and vegetable value chains stipulate the rules of 
participation especially using standards (see Chapter 4). Such standards specify rules 
regarding the size of the product, colour, absence of blemish, input use e.g. labour and 
other conditions (Table 4.6). In exercising power this way, retailers do not have to own or 
make direct investments into production entities. Rather, these rules impose both 
production and transaction costs on small producers and exporters who may then be 
excluded from the chain because they are unable to meet the requirements set out.  
                                                 
19 Others frameworks that employ the chain or network concept include: (a) Filière approach developed by 
researchers at the Institute National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA) and the Centre de Coopération 
Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement (CIRAD) (b) Commodity systems 
analysis by William Friedland (c) Systems of provision approach (SOP) by B. Fine and Ellen Leopold. These 
approaches are distinct from the value chain approach discussed. The filière approach, for example, does not 
apply to any specific period and is significantly influenced by the needs of the French colonial government in 
developing countries (Raikes et al., 2008).  SOP integrates the production and consumption spheres of a 
commodity. It seeks to analyse how the configuration of or organisation of production influences how a 






The use of standards in high-value fruit and vegetable chains implies that small producers 
and exporters must engage in process and product upgrading. However, some forms of 
upgrading may not be possible (Pietrobelli and Rabellotti 2004; Bernstein and Campling, 
2006) partly because of the additional costs imposed by complying with standards (Ponte 
and Ewert, 2009:1638).21 Thus, in agreement with Morrison, Pietrobelli and Rabellotti 
(2008:41), Ponte and Ewert (2009:1637) concede that ‘going up the ladder’ is not the only 
way by which upgrading can take place. Upgrading can also be in the form of deepening 
capabilities at the same stage of production or ‘going down’ the ladder.   
Building on the initial upgrading trajectories offered by Gibbon (2001a), Ponte and Ewert 
(2009:1647) classify upgrading in the agri-food chain to include what the ‘traditional’ 
upgrading literature will term as downgrading:  
(a) Product upgrading should include effects that do not necessarily improve upon the 
product quality itself. It may include strategies, which increase volumes, consistency of 
supply and improvements in forward contracts. However, Gibbon (2001a) notes that, this 
does not lend much support to forward linkages.  
(b) Process upgrading should encompass not only how to efficiently produce a good but 
also environmental and logistics management which helps advance the position of firms in 
the value chain. 
(c) ‘Downgrading’ which may refer to producing or selling more products in lower 
segments of the markets, for example, the domestic market, should be considered together 
with upgrading when looking at functional and product upgrading.22 
 
2.7 Levels of analysis in GVCs 
According to Sturgeon (2009:123), the analytical level of the GVC framework is not 
restricted to the global level, as 'the word global in global value chains simply signals our 
interest in value chains that include an element of vast distance.' Thus, value chain 
researchers have focused on: 
                                                 
21 Gibbon (2003:18) also points out that in horticulture or agri-food value chains, it is often difficult to 
differentiate between some of the upgrading stages identified by GVCs. For example, should the introduction 
of organic processes which bring about a new product be categorised as product or process upgrading. 
22 In the Italian tile industry, producers pursued a dual strategy of downgrading and product upgrading 
(Meyer-Stamer et al., 2001 in Meyer-Stamer, 2009:331) 
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(a) The Geographic level e.g. Global (Fold, 2002; Frederick and Gereffi, 2011), Regional 
(WEF, 2012; Bamber et al., 2013), National (Ponte, 2007; Thomsen, 2007; Kirimi et al., 
2011; van Wijk and Kwakkenbos, 2012)  
(b) Industry or sectoral level e.g. Apparel (Gereffi and Memedovic, 2003), Call Centres 
(Staritz and Reis, 2013), Wine (Ponte, 2007), Horticulture (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; 
Humphrey and Memodovic, 2006). 
(c) Type of product or service – Finished product (Navas-Alemán, 2011), Intermediate 
product (Goes and van Dijk, 2012), End-of-life goods (Crang et al., 2013). 
(d) It may also investigate the relationship between specific chain participants or the entire 
chain i.e. the focus can be on a two-way relationship (dyadic level) or on the entire chain 
(Croom, Romano, and Giannakis, 2000).  
2.8 Alternative Framework – Global Production Network (GPN) 
The GCC/GVC framework is not the only one designed to provide an insightful analysis 
into the organisation of production in the current era of globalisation. The GPN 
framework developed by economic geographers at the University of Manchester is an 
alternative framework (Figure 2.2). It seeks to extend the analytical account of GVCs by 
focusing on elements the GVC leaves out in the organisation of production or its biases 
(Gibbon, Bair and Ponte, 2008:316).  
As an alternative framework, GPN seeks to evaluate the gaps in the GCC/GVC 
framework and rectify it (Henderson et al., 2002), by employing a relational view to the 
organisation of production. These gaps include: (a) the underdeveloped dimension of 
geography (territory). GCC/GVC is said to be ‘dealt with at a very high level of spatial 
aggregation’ (Dicken et al., 2001:99).  This leads Bair (2008:357) to describe it as ‘placeless’ 
and the institutional and regulatory context of GVC framework as weak. In addition, GPN 
proponents argue that a devotion to the governance concept leaves the GCC/GVC 
framework unable to appreciate the role that the institutional dimension plays, especially 
the role of the state and other important actors (Dicken et al., 2001; Henderson et al., 2002; 
Bair, 2005, Smith et al., 2002). 
The main feature distinguishing the GPN from the GCC/GVC is the focus on the macro 
level (country/territory) context of a value chain by incorporating the specific roles of 
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other actors such as the state, NGOs, trade unions and societal norms within a 
geographical setting. However, the GVC and GPN have some similarities (Oro and 
Pritchard, 2011). First, epistemologically, both frameworks try to explain 'the social and 
developmental dynamics of contemporary capitalism at the global-local nexus' (Bair, 
2005:154); secondly, both use variants of the network concept (Coe, Dicken and Hess, 
2008).  
The theoretical literature establishing GPN are: (1) Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) (2) Actor 
Network Theory (ANT) (3) Business School literature (especially the value chain concept 
of Michael Porter) (4) New Economic Sociology (5) GCC/GVC framework (Henderson et 
al., 2002; Hess and Yeung, 2006).  
The Actor-Network Theory (ANT), which explains a network as a mix of human and non-
human actors (Dicken et al., 2001:101-102) coupled with the territorial bias of the 
framework, allows the GPN to circumnavigate the network problem in Granvotter’s 
definition. By emphasising the embedding of economic activities in a ‘spatial’ setting rather 
than social ties, the concept of space is viewed in ‘relational’ rather than absolute terms. 
Therefore, the framework transcends a geographical setting and views embeddedness in 
terms of relations with organisations external to the sector (geographically and 
functionally). In addition, territorial embeddedness implies implicit local knowledge known 
to the people and organisations operating within the territory. 
In Economic Geography, ‘relationality’ and ‘relational turn’ (Boggs and Rantisi, 2003; 
Yeung, 2005) are terms used to describe the theoretical orientation where the social 
relations of production have become the unit of analysis, instead of the transaction itself. 
This theoretical orientation makes use of both the notions of networks and embeddedness, 
but focuses on the global rather than the micro-sociological relations of production.23  
Yeung (2005:37) notes that the GPN in ‘relational economic geography is concerned 
primarily with the ways in which socio-spatial relations of actors are intertwined with 
broader structures and processes of economic change at various geographic scales.’ A GPN 
is conceptualised as a network of ‘relational processes and structures’ (Dicken et al, 
2001:92) paying attention to the social processes and interactions between participants in 
                                                 
23 According to Boggs and Rantisi (2003:109), this change in emphasis in economic geography happened at a 
time when there were major changes in the organisation of production, globally. Most importantly, the new 
forms of organising production did not need a physical presence and went beyond just contractual changes to 
include, for example, knowledge transfer and skills upgrading. 
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the network rather than on the commodity itself (Hughes, Wrigley and Buttle, 2008) 
thereby espousing its horizontal linkages (Dicken et al, 2001:91). Conflict, bargaining and 
power relations are brought back into the governance of value chains (Dicken et al., 
2001:93) because institutions are ‘perceived as social and political formations – be they sub-
national, national or international – with attendant histories, values and cultural practices 
which have consequences for how GPNs are formed and develop over time.’ (Henderson 
et al, 2002:460). They are thus contested and embedded at the territorial, network and 
societal levels (Henderson et al., 2002; Hess, 2004).  
Studies using the GPN approach have given emphasis to both economic and non-
economic factors and formal and informal institutions, affecting the organisation of 
production and thus the development of industries, firms and nations (Henderson et al., 
2002). For example, GPN assesses the role played by international organisations, such as 
the WTO, and the state in the governance of value chain whereas the GVC framework 
does not (Gibbon, Bair and Ponte, 2008). Also, in linking governance and upgrading 
through institutions, the ‘Capturing the Gains’ project under the GPN framework, 
introduced the concept of social upgrading in value chain analysis (Barrientos, Gereffi and 
Rossi, 2011). Social upgrading is labour focused and seeks to assess how economic 
upgrading leads to social upgrading in terms of employment conditions and living 
standards. Issues including worker rights, bargaining power and skills development are 
highlighted, drawing attention to the role of organisations such as labour unions and 
NGOs.  
Figure 2.2: Diagrammatical representation of GPN Framework 
 




Although a strength of the GPN framework is its focus on embeddedness of the value 
chain, it has a less defined structure of lead firm governance (Parrilli, Nadvi and Yeung, 
2013). The chain under consideration in this study, though embedded in local conditions, is 
significantly impacted by vertical relationships driven by lead firms. Since the goal of this 
thesis is to explore how global governance (by lead firms) interacts with the local context, 
the GVC framework is more applicable to this study.  
 
2.9 The Institutional Dimension in GVCs 
2.9.1 What are Institutions? 
In the GVC framework, the institutional arrangement between firms is the focus of 
analysis. The main defining trait of an actor's ability to govern is power. Power (or lack 
thereof) enables (or limits) what actors in the chain can do. Thorelli, (1986:38) defines 
power as ‘the ability to influence the decisions or actions of others.’ Power in the GVC is 
regarded as (a) the ability to ensure consequences along the chain; and (b) the ability to 
actively manage or coordinate the operations of the different nodes within the chain to 
ensure that consequences are met (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2001: 29-30).  Lead firms have 
market power i.e. the ability to purchase large amounts of the product and this enables 
them to dictate the activities of their suppliers. Also, they exercise power through their 
knowledge of consumer demand and the imposition of product and process standards.  
Critics of the GVC framework remark that GVC governance is embedded in the 
institutional context in which it operates (Henderson et al., 2002). That is, it is influenced 
by the cultural, economic, social and political context of the place it is situated in.  In 
response, proponents of the GVC framework note that the institutional context affects 
chain governance (e.g. Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark, 2011). But the mechanisms by which 
it does so are not well articulated (Morrison, Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2008). One likely 
reason why is that the institutional dimension is broadly defined, with no consensus on 
what it refers to (Sturgeon, 2008:25). While Gereffi (1995 in Thomsen, 2007; Bair, 2008) 
defines it as 'rules of the game,' Coe, Kelly and Yeung (2007: 97) referred to it as ‘local, 
national and international conditions and policies’ and Gibbon (2001a:347) suggested that 
it referred to ‘…conditions under which control over market access and information are 
exercised on the global plane’.   
 
Insights from New Institutional Economics (NIE) can point us in the right direction as to 
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what the institutional dimension is.24  North’s (1990:3) widely acknowledge definition of 
institutions is: ‘the rules of the game in a society or, more formally ... the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence, they structure incentives in 
human exchange, whether political, social or economic.’ Three key points are noted in this 
definition; (a) institutions are humanly devised (b) they act as constraints and (c) they shape 
incentives.25 Another characteristic of institutions is their endogenous or exogenous nature. 
It is endogenous when the actor exerts control over it, and vice versa. For North (1990), 
the primary function of institutions is to reduce uncertainty in the way in which exchange 
takes place. Although institutions provide incentives or motivations for decisions and 
choices of actors and therefore reduce the costs of transacting, they are not necessarily 
efficient. There are also costs of institutions. These include the costs of negotiating, 
monitoring and enforcement of rules. Earlier on, North assumed that relative price changes 
were responsible for institutional change. However, in North (1990:6), he notes that 
institutional change is driven factors such as formal and informal rules and the manner in 
which society enforces rules. When the benefits to be derived from institutions are greater 
than the costs, institutions emerge and persist.     
In the Game theory, economic agents are rational and seek to maximise utility. For an 
institution to occur, certain conditions relating to beliefs and preferences are imposed: (a) 
there is a set of players (b) there is a set of choices or preferences for actors to select from 
and (c) rules outside the game being played are assumed to be ‘rules of the game’ and 
exogenous to the players.26 Through players’ interactions, all players have common 
knowledge of the game and also have shared knowledge. From this, actors make their 
choices and this is how an institution is selected.  The selected institution is said to be 
efficient (i.e. a Nash equilibrium) since no player in the game has the incentive to change 
his choice because such choices reflect the best possible move given available resources 
and the expected behaviour of others (Grief, 2006; Aoki, 2007). People behave the way 
they do in response to an institution because they expect others to behave in a certain way. 
Thus, it is the regularity of behaviour brought on by the rule that motivates economic 
                                                 
24 Institutional Economics can be broadly classified into two; Old Institutional Economics (OIE) and New 
Institutional Economics (NIE) 
25 J.R. Commons in the OIE tradition viewed institutions as having a dual purpose of enabling and hindering 
action: thus, he defines it as ‘collective action in the control and the liberation of the individual action’ 
(Commons, 1931 in Rossiaud and Locatelli, 2010:2). 
26 Rules of the game are stable and do not influence the players in the game although the players are aware of 




agents to obey the rule (institution).  Game theoretic forms of institutions are however 
criticised for their inability to explain institutional change, even though they may be good at 
explaining the enforcement of institutions. 
Starting with the idea that an institution is an equilibrium A. Grief and M. Aoki formulated 
the endogenous institutional change theories of Comparative and Historical Institutional 
Analysis and Comparative Institutional Analysis, respectively. Grief (2006:30) defines an 
institution as ‘a system of rules, beliefs, norms and organizations that together generate a 
regularity of (social) behavior:’ while for Aoki (2007:6) they are ‘self-sustaining, salient 
patterns of social interactions, as represented by meaningful rules that every agent knows 
and are incorporated as agents’ shared beliefs about how the game is played and to be 
played.’ Unlike game theory, however, institutions are not necessarily efficient, and they are 
endogenously determined by the outcomes of the interactions of actors.  
Scott (2008), in the Sociological or Organisational Institutionalism tradition in Sociology, 
also identifies three pillars of institutions; regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive. 
These dimensions are on a scale ‘from the conscious to the unconscious, from the legally 
enforced to the taken for granted’ (Hoffman, 1997:36, in Scott, 2008). The regulative 
dimension stresses rule setting, monitoring and sanctioning; the normative dimension 
prescribes how actors should behave; while the cultural-cognitive dimension describes how 
actors behave, usually because it is how they have always done (Scott, 2008).27  The 
cultural-cognitive dimension contains ‘symbols’- words, signs, gestures which are 
representations of the actual world. Everyone is shaped by the symbols because the 
individual has a ‘subjective’ interpretation of these representations: while at the same time, 
since the representations are available to other individuals, they are deemed to be 
‘objective.’ The cultural-cognitive dimension thus stresses the common meaning of 
situations which are socially facilitated (Scott, 2008:59).  
2.9.2 Levels of and types of Institutions 
Institutions are nested and hence occur at different levels (see Figure 2.3). They may occur 
at the global, regional, national, community or family levels; or, simply, at the macro – 
micro levels. At the macro level, institutions take the form as defined by North, i.e. they are 
the ‘rules of the game’ or institutional environment and set by public actors (Level 2 in 
                                                 
27 There are objections to the cognitive dimension proposed by Scott. He is criticised for the assumption that 
actors cannot conceive of alternatives to their situations. Some have called for a relaxation of this assumption 
to mean that though they can conceive of alternatives, they deem them as useless. 
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Figure 2.3). An institutional environment is the ‘set of fundamental political, social and 
legal ground rules that establishes the basis for production, exchange and distribution’ 
(Davis and North, 1981 in Neilson and Pritchard, 2009:107). At the micro-level, TCE 
defines an institution as an institutional arrangement (Level 3 in Figure 2.3), that is, ‘the sets 
of rules and structures governing the allocation and exchange of resources through specific 
transactions’ (Dorward et al, 2009:26). It is negotiated by private actors and is the best 
response by interacting actors to the constraints created by institutions in levels 1 and 2 of 
Figure 2.3.28 
Figure 2.3: Levels of Institutions 
 
Source: Williamson (2000:597) 
Apart from operating at various levels, institutions can also be formal or informal.  Formal 
institutions (e.g. a constitution or property rights) are generally written down rules (North, 
1990:46) or those designed and enforced by actors obligated to do so, e.g. judiciary or 
                                                 
28 Ostrom (2005 in Kingston and Callabero, 2009) gives three levels of institutions; (1) Operational rules 
which deal with day-day exchanges (2) Collective choice rules which are used to select operational rules (3) 
Constitutional rules which are used to select collective-choice rules. Higher level rules are fixed, and the 
choice of a rule depends on collective bargaining or ‘minimum coalition’ being met. 
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police (Milgrom et al. 1990 in Kingston and Callabero, 2009; Williamson, C. 2009). On the 
other hand, informal institutions (e.g. norms, beliefs and conventions) refer to unwritten 
rules, conventions, norms, beliefs, perceptions, trust, or reputation (Granovetter, 1985; 
Sugden, 1989; Powell, 1990; North, 2003) which are not designed and enforced by the state 
(Williamson, C. 2009:372). Informal rules are self-enforcing (Sugden, 1989; North, 1990) 
i.e. they usually do not require third-party enforcement, because they are adhered to in the 
interest of satisfying society rather than rational self-interest.  They also change very slowly 
(Williamson, 2000).29  
2.9.3 Institutions and Power  
Recall that institutions are humanely devised, i.e. they are created by actors either 
intentionally or unintentionally. How then are they created and/or changed? North (1990; 
2008) makes a distinction between institutions and organisations (players or actors). While 
institutions are the rules of the game, organisations are players who have a common 
objective e.g. the state, firms, trade unions and cooperatives.30 A two-way relationship 
exists between organisations and institutions in that organisations are influenced by 
institutions and at the same time, institutions are embedded in organisations. Hence, 
institutions may influence the setting up and workings of organisations while some 
organisations may make the rules (institutions).   
Also, since a function of institutions is to incentivise actors, actors will seek to alter 
institutions to achieve their own objectives. North (2008:22) defines institutional change as, 
‘a deliberate process shaped by the perceptions of the actors about the consequences of 
their actions.’ Creating or changing institutions may involve a process of bargaining, 
negotiating, force or even violence hence, two conditions exist for actors to change 
institutions (a) they must see the need to do so i.e. ‘institutional change is triggered by those 
who 'realize (or hope) that they can benefit from it' (Grief and Kingston, 2011:39) and (b) 
they must wield power i.e. be able to influence the choices and actions of other. Power (or 
lack thereof) enables (or limits) what actors can do. During institutional change, it is likely 
that both rules and organisations may evolve i.e. they may be altered or, destroyed or new 
                                                 
29 Conventions can be defined as self-enforcing solutions to coordination problems that both parties to an 
exchange are interested in maintaining (North, 2008:385). Norms are ‘prescriptions that are known and 
accepted yet involve intrinsic costs and benefits rather than material sanctions or inducements’ (Kirsten, 
Karaan and Dorward, 2009:55). They motivate behaviour because participants accept to adhere to them and 
also expect others to do the same (Grief, 2006). 
30 North belongs to the Economic History school of thought.  
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ones’ may arise. 
Several authors including Raikes, Jensen and Ponte (2000), Altenburg (2006), Gibbon, Bair 
and Ponte (2008), Hess (2008) have argued that actors and factors that are external to GVC 
governance but exert power on the actions of the participants in the chain should be 
considered in GVC analysis. Kaplinsky and Morris (2001:67) suggest that governance 
‘highlights both power relations in the chain and the institutions which mould and wield 
this power.’ The ability of an actor’s power to impact governance is measured by the 
‘extent to which it affects the core activities of individual parties in the chain. For example, 
do the rules which are set by the value chain governors affect the core or peripheral 
operations of individual links in the value chain? (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2001:32).  Three 
forms of governance can be distinguished; a) Legislative: sets the conditions of 
participating in the chain (b) Judicial: checks compliance with the set rules and (c) 
Executive: assists and supports participants to meet the set rules of participation (Kaplinsky 
and Morris, 2001:30-31). The different actors’ power of governance has consequences for 
the division of labour and development (upgrading capabilities) of participants (Kaplinsky, 
2000b:11). 
 
The impact that other actors can make in GVC governance is evidenced by Reardon and 
Berdegué (2002), Selwyn (2008), Neilson and Pritchard (2009) among others. Reardon and 
Berdegué (2002:382) for instance note that although small farmers and exporters are 
challenged by changes in rules at the global level, their exclusion from a value chain is not 
automatic. They cite successful cases such as vegetable production in Purranque, Chile: 
despite standards and other buyer requirements, which result in the need for new 
investments in production technology and equipment, local farmers are able to sell to 
supermarkets through the help of technical assistance provided by a public actor.   
 
Altenburg (2006: 503-507) also identifies several other factors at the local level which may 
contribute to governance. These include: the extent of market uncertainty, incentives to 
spread risks, consumer demand, market structure, capital intensity and cost of capital. For 
example, the unavailability of inputs may incentivise firms to integrate backwards or have 
formal contractual relations with some input supply firms, while an activity that requires 
significant investments may lead to buyers favouring independent suppliers.31 
                                                 




Unlike the GVC framework, the literature on industrial clusters has given prominence to 
the interaction between firms and the local context. A Cluster is defined as 'a 
geographically proximate group of inter-connected companies and associated institutions in 
a particular field, linked by commonalities and complementarities' (Porter 2000 in Nadvi 
and Barrientos, 2004:1). They include firms, government institutions, universities, specific 
input suppliers and trade associations. Clusters facilitate development since they help with 
access to knowledge, infrastructure, services of related companies, labour and technology, 
among others (Chaudhry, 2005; Nadvi and Barrientos, 2004; Ketels and Memedovic, 2008). 
In this literature, collective efficiency and joint action have been identified as the main 
avenues through which clusters are promoted or upgrade. Collective efficiency refers to 
'competitive advantage derived from local external economies and joint action' (Schmitz, 
1999a: 141). Local external economies (e.g. a pool of skilled labour, research and 
development by universities or research agencies) are incidental to the firm while joint 
action refers to purposeful or deliberate actions by firms to gain competitive advantage 
(Schmitz, 1999b).32  Two types of cooperation are identified in joint action; bilateral and 
multilateral (Schmitz, 1999a), practised either formally or informally (Coles and Mitchell, 
2011:144). Bilateral cooperation is that between two firms while multilateral refers to 
cooperation under the umbrella of an organisation e.g. business or producer associations 
(Schmitz, 1999a:142). 
 
In summary, all the definitions of institutions in this Section 2.9.1 are instructive: however, 
two considerations stand out. First, North’s institutions as the ‘rules of the game’ hints at a 
wider context than Gereffi’s interpretation which points to the rules that lead firms set to 
minimise production and transaction costs. Second, institutions (rules) provide incentives, 
manage conflicts and cooperation, and reduce uncertainties in interactions. They therefore 
establish the framework within which actors make their decisions and choices. This would 
suggest that the political, economic, social, technological and cultural conditions at both the 
global and local levels make up the institutional dimension of the value chain and possibly 
interact. Thus, although Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon (2005:82) acknowledge that local 
                                                                                                                                               
not necessarily map onto the governance structures given. He notes that there is no actual need for captive 
suppliers to have less capability than other types of suppliers, since the captive relation is primarily due to 
relation-specific investments made. 
32 McCormick (1999) proves that the economic and social environment in which clusters are found are vital 
to its development. Weak contract enforcement, small market size and mistrust among sector participants 
undermined efforts at collective efficiency. 
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conditions such as history and local rules will influence governance they advance a 
simplified framework to highlight key variables that influence governance: to fully 
understand governance of a value chain and its impact on chain participants, there is the 
need to take into consideration the local context.33 
In this study, the governance of a value chain can be understood in terms of the rules and 
actors which exert power or influence over the actions and behaviour of value chain 
participants. Also, the institutional dimension is narrowed to what I term local conditions 
(i.e. local political, economic, social, cultural, technological rules or circumstances and 
actors). Rules and actors in the local context can impose constraints on the decisions and 
choices of value chain participants. Hence, in accounting for the governance of local value 
chains, the focus must be on how the rules of participation set by lead firms interact with 
local conditions to affect the decisions and choices of chain participants.   
2.10 Some empirical evidence on the role of local conditions in GVC governance 
In agriculture, characteristics of the crop or product play a role in its governance (Grosh, 
1994; Swinnen, 2006; Talbot, 2009). Several studies using either the GVC or GPN 
framework, have empirically analysed the role of local conditions in value chain governance 
and upgrading. Changed product characteristics (initiated either by an internal or external 
chain actor) necessitate a response by chain participants. Their response can and is, 
however, negotiated or mediated by local conditions.  
Neilson and Pritchard (2009) document the interaction of global governance and local 
conditions in the tea and coffee value chains in India. Tea producers in Nilgris, Southern 
India, sold their produce to both the low-priced export market and the domestic market. 
Smallholders in this area sold low-quality tea in comparison with their colleagues in 
Northern India. Thus, as quality parameters increased globally, prices of South India tea 
declined. Smallholders responded to the increasing cost-low price scenario by engaging in 
practices which further reduced the quality of their produce. These actions, however, 
aggravated their situation and lead to the exclusion of many smallholders. To halt and 
reverse the exclusion of smallholders from the chain, the government of India instituted a 
Quality Upgradation Programme (QUP) which aimed, among other things, to improve 
field maintenance, increase plucking of fine leaf grades and improve buyer-seller relations. 
                                                 
33 Furthermore, Sturgeon (2008:19) contends that because it is difficult to account for all the governance 
structures and mechanisms of coordination in a value chain, GVC proponents found it best to view 
governance as the linkage between lead firms and first-tier suppliers. 
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The scheme was able to insert women’s self-help groups into the value chains by providing 
them with finance and management skills. The need for factories to accept fine leaf grades 
also lead to the implementation of the Factory Upgradation Programme, which allowed 
factories to receive a subsidy of 50% of their costs of investment and certification. Finally, 
the QUP led to the government agreeing to increase the minimum price of tea per kg.  
With the enforcement of product and process standards by lead firms in Europe, Selwyn 
(2008) shows that producers in the São Francisco valley grape value chain in Brazil had to 
engage in process upgrading. With changed attributes of the product exported, both public 
and private actors worked individually and together to ensure producers upgraded and 
continued to participate in the global chain. Assistance provided included research and 
training. For example, the producer association, Cooperativa Agricola de Juazeiro (CAJ), 
helped small and medium-scale producers to overcome challenges by supporting them with 
(a) technical assistance in the form of agronomists making regular visits to individual farms 
to assess the plants and give advice where needed (b) bulk purchase of inputs and 
providing them to members on credit and (c) providing storage and packing facilities 
(Selwyn, 2008:388-389). 
Mohan (2016) used endogenous institutional theory to analyse the role of local conditions 
in the governance and upgrading of the Nepal tea value chain. A code of conduct was 
initiated by internal industry associations. It interacted with both labour and financial 
institutions and informal norms about gender and environmental awareness to motivate 
chain actors’ behaviour. For example, upgrading to organic certification by farmers resulted 
in increased labour use. Labour was, however, scarce partly due to the migration of young 
men. Informal rules of labour also restricted women from participating fully in the chain. 
The result of informal rules, labour shortage and organic certification was the inability of 
farmers to fully benefit from the higher prices offered by producing organic tea.  
Gellert (2003) shows how both state and non-state power was used to negotiate market 
linkages between Indonesia’s timber firms and Japanese buyers, resulting in Indonesia’s 
domination of the Japanese market for a decade. The ability to do so partly depended on 
the characteristics of the product itself and partly on the political economy relationship 
between the state and the Indonesian Wood Panel Association (Akpindo).  Thomsen 
(2007) draws attention to the relationship between business-state relations and ethnicity in 
the governance of the Vietnamese clothing export sector. In the chain linking Vietnamese 
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suppliers to Western buyers, former state employees who run clothing firms were more 
likely to participate in the chain while those excluded were of Vietnamese Chinese 
ethnicity.  The state also created barriers to entry by mediating contact between buyers and 
Vietnamese suppliers. The state regulated suppliers access to finance and participation in 
trade fairs. Buyers who bypassed state protocols had difficulty in accessing local suppliers 
partly because of bureaucracy.  
Oro and Pritchard (2011) view the changes in governance of the Australia-Japan beef value 
chain from 1987-2009 through the lens of evolutionary economic geography. Initially 
(1987-1995), Japanese beef buyers established captive governance relations with their 
Australian suppliers because the Japanese market demanded product characteristics that the 
Australian suppliers were not familiar with and did not have the infrastructure for. In the 
second phase (1995-2003), drought and competitive pressure from non-Japanese beef firms 
in Australia and economic recession in Japan led to a fall in demand, but the buyers still 
maintained captive – governance relations as they made attempts to diversify. In the third 
phase (2003-2009), due to an outbreak of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) 
disease in the US, Japan banned beef imports from the US. This necessitated a move by 
other suppliers to fill the gap. Also, mislabelling of products in the Japanese market by 
Australian suppliers led to the need for greater traceability. Australian suppliers, who were 
not in captive governance relations with Japanese buyers, took advantage of the 
opportunity provided (as they had earlier on upgraded their capabilities) to diminish the 
hold of captive governance relations.   
Informal rules also impact governance and upgrading of value chains by incentivising 
actors’ behaviour. Nugraha (2010) based on Scott’s (2008) definition of institutions 
identifies the social norm of 'pakewuh' as shaping governance and upgrading of suppliers in 
the national dairy value chain on the Java Island of Indonesia. ‘Pakewuh’ promotes the 
avoidance of situations which potentially cause conflict in relations and applies to 
individuals with the same status or of different status levels. Thus, due to the extent of 
social and business interactions between the chain participations (cooperatives and their 
members), pakewuh increased the prevalence and acceptance of opportunistic behaviour. 
Cooperatives in adhering to ‘pakewuh’ did not enforce quality rules which would have 
potentially caused conflicts. These emboldened dairy farmers to engage in opportunistic 
behaviour, such as adding fresh water from a well or river to milk to increase its volume. 
With increasing competition for milk, cooperatives focused on milk quantity rather than 
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quality, and abandoned measures aimed at improving the quality of milk produced by 
farmers.  
From the examples, above, local conditions (e.g. infrastructure and norms) affect 
production and transaction costs. Also, history plays a part in the emergent governance 
structure as participants’ decisions, choices and actions reflect the past. It is therefore 
necessary to pay attention to specific local conditions rather than to view them as passive 
or of limited significance in GVC governance. NIE perspectives which embrace both 
formal and informal rules can be used to conceptualise the interaction between GVCs and 
local conditions. Mohan’s (2016) work on the tea value chain in Nepal uses endogenous 
institutional change theory to build a stylised typology of institutional change (changes in 
governance) in national value chains. Changes in governance of the chain were initiated by 
the code of conduct developed by the Tea Development Alliance and the Himalayan 
Orthodox Tea Producers’ Association (HOTPA). The new rule first changed the 
characteristics of the item exchanged. The new characteristics demanded new actors or 
evolved actors. The types and characteristics of the actors as well as the benefits of 
participation were however mediated by formal and informal rules in the financial, 
organisational and social domains of society.  
In this thesis, I adopt a NIE approach to illustrate the change in governance in the 
Ghanaian pineapple export value chain. This approach can adequately address how changes 
in global conditions impact GVC participants who are embedded in the local context. 
Unlike Mohan’s work, changes in characteristics of the item traded was initiated by external 
factors at the level of global governance. However, just like in Mohan’s work, the changed 
characteristics of the item influenced the types and characteristics of actors who could 
participate in the chain, as well as their interactions with each other. This process was 
however mediated by local conditions. Thus, the specific mechanism through which the 
prevailing governance structure of the chain emerged, as well as the chain’s development, 
form the study’s focus. 
2.11 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, governance, upgrading and institutions as conceptualised in the GVC 
framework have been emphasised. The governance of the fruit and vegetable value chain is 
buyer driver meaning that buyers at the global level dictate the rules for the products they 
purchase. These rules impact the characteristics of the item exchanged and its 
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consequences goes beyond ‘moving up the chain’ (Altenburg 2006). The interpretation of 
governance in the GVC framework however is based on global characteristics which does 
not actively take into consideration the embeddedness of suppliers in their local conditions.  
The neglect of processes and specific conditions in the local institutional dimension and 
their impact on chain actors implies that the actual form and content of GVC governance 
in value chains is glossed over. Given that developing countries are continuously 
encouraged to participate in GVCs, this thesis sets out to investigate how the interaction of 
global governance and local conditions affects the governance and development of 
chains.34 To achieve this objective, chapter three, sets out the conceptual framework used 
in this study.   
                                                 
34 Due to limited benefits of participation in GVCs by developing countries, some argue that developing 
countries should specialise in specific tasks (Draper and Lawrence, 2013). UNECA (2013:75) cautions against 
this and rather advocates for linkages (e.g. forward, backward and horizontal linkages) in the local economies  
to exploit the benefits participation in GVCs provide. 
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Chapter 3 Conceptual Framework 
3.1 Introduction  
The new mechanisms through which international trade and production are governed have 
changed the structures and relationships in agri-food chains.  GVC analysis provides one 
way of analysing how these market structures and relations have been reconfigured. Such 
analysis focuses on how lead firms wield power over suppliers through mechanisms such as 
standards. Standards affect product characteristics and require that suppliers make products 
that conform to specific characteristics and/or are produced under specific conditions. 
This drive impacts the characteristics of suppliers at the national level and their 
relationships with each other. In the GVC framework, the nature of relations between 
buyers and suppliers (governance) thus determines the upgrading (development) of a chain.  
Upgrading, as previously explained in Chapter 2, refers to how to move up the chain or 
make products more efficiently.  
 
As already indicated governance and upgrading are inadequate to explain the development 
of national value chains. Altenburg (2006:308) argues that the development of value chains, 
especially at the national level, must include, among others, the allocation of risks, the 
quality of supply, entry barriers and opportunities for inclusion, and income generation. 
Such an analysis cannot take place without a consideration of local conditions which 
structure production and exchange.   
 
The importance of local conditions in GVC governance and its implications for 
development has been explored (Section 2.10). However, apart from Mohan (2016) who 
uses an NIE approach none of the other studies has done so. Also, Mohan (2016) looked 
specifically at an internal trigger (cause) of change in the governance of the Nepalese tea 
chain. In all, the case of an external or exogenous trigger of change has not been 
considered. The objective of this chapter, therefore, is to develop a conceptual framework 
which draws on an NIE analysis of exchange to elaborate how global governance impacts 
governance and development of national value chains. The framework introduced here 
adds to our understanding of how local conditions influence the construction, altering, 





The chapter is organised as follows: in the first section, I consider why GVC analysis needs 
the support of another approach to account for the role of local conditions in value chain 
analysis. The following section discusses the aspect of the NIE framework chosen for the 
study, i.e. the Exchange Configuration approach. This approach postulates that ‘institutions 
are an important aspect of the exchange environment’ (Cornelisse and Thorbecke, 2010:61) 
and hence highlights the important characteristics of the local context which influence 
governance of transactions. These characteristics either enable or hinder cooperation and 
coordination along the value chain. With a focus on the role of institutions in structuring 
exchange, the final section uses insights from the EC approach to develop a conceptual 
framework for the Ghanaian pineapple export value chain. 
 
3.2 Global - Local Linkages  
In Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, the agricultural sector is crucial to economic 
development, especially in terms of its contribution to foreign exchange, employment and 
its multiplier effects. Nonetheless, agricultural development in Africa faces many 
challenges, including the lack of infrastructure and inadequate government support. 
Currently, a major challenge facing agricultural producers in Africa is the ability to 
effectively compete in the global market, given the leading role played by private actors in 
setting, implementing, enforcing and monitoring rules.  
The strength of the GVC framework lies in its ability to characterise governance dynamics 
at the global level, i.e. how lead firms dictate the conditions of participation and benefits 
for suppliers.  However, this focus does not make it possible for it to give a satisfactory 
account of a chain’s governance at the national level and so the framework’s potential for 
analysing development is limited. One way of overcoming this deficit is to combine GVC 
analysis with the cluster literature (section 2.9.3; Knorringa, 1999; Nadvi and Halder, 2005). 
On the other hand, local level analysis is a strength of the NIE frameworks.  
 
Since empirical evidence has shown the active role of the local context in GVC analysis and 
NIE is an underpinning literature of the GVC framework, it is pragmatic to attempt to 
characterise, from the point of view of NIE, the interaction of global and local governance 
in a systematic and coherent manner. Consequently, with the goal of making explicit the 
conditions and processes through which governance of national value chains emerge and 
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are reconfigured, I combine GVC analysis with insights from the Exchange Configuration 
Approach.  
 
3.3 The Analysis of Exchange: The Exchange Configuration Approach  
Miles and Huberman (1994:18) define a conceptual framework as a visual or written 
product which ‘explains, either graphically or in narrative form, the main things to be 
studied—the key factors, concepts, or variables—and the presumed relationships among 
them' The Exchange Configuration Approach (hereafter EC approach), developed by Peter 
Cornelisse and Erik Thorbecke, serves as a general conceptual framework from which a 
conceptual framework for the study's objectives is constructed.35  
The starting point for the approach is that transactions, for example, the exchange of a 
product between suppliers and buyers, occur within exchange configurations (Thorbecke, 
1993:591). Cornelisse and Thorbecke (2010:55) define a transaction as 'various forms of 
agreements among willing owners in which ownership rights are transferred.' In analysing 
transactions, the agreement itself must be considered in tandem with activities involved in 
carrying out the agreement, situations which threaten or cause changes in the agreement, 
and the enforcement of the agreement. Thus, three elements are crucial to mapping out the 
configuration within which a transaction is determined: the characteristics of the item 
exchanged, the characteristics of actors and the characteristics of the exchange 
environment (i.e. characteristics of the local context). An exchange configuration is ‘an 
entire constellation – consisting of a particular combination of characteristics of elements 
of exchange, the decision process actors go through, and the resulting transactions’ 
(Cornelisse and Thorbecke, 2010:5).  
The approach highlights the interaction of the three elements of exchange in determining 
the governance of a transaction. Any change in the elements will be responded to by actors 
who will choose to govern transactions in a manner which minimises production and 
transaction costs (Thorbecke, 1993:591). Thus, it is the reactions of actors to the incentives 
(constraints and opportunities) provided by the configuration that determine the form and 
content of transactions (how a transaction is governed). Actors on their own can also 
                                                 
35 The approach is like the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) Paradigm in Industrial Organisation, in 
that the organisation of the firm (structure) determines the conduct (tactical and strategic choices) of 
participants of the industry and performance. It, however, differs from the SCP; because while the SCP leads 
to definitive conclusions about the performance of industries, the consideration of a wider sphere of actors 
(number, types, and varying characteristics) and their active nature in the EC approach means performance 
may be varied. 
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impact governance; however, this depends on their characteristics.  
There are two reasons why the EC approach is appropriate for this study. First, it enables 
the study to depict how changes in related configurations affect other exchange 
configurations. In this way, how changes in rules affecting relations between global buyers 
and first-tier suppliers is likely to alter or modify the characteristics of the item exchanged 
at the local level can be depicted. Second, it seeks an understanding of the consequences of 
change in any one characteristic, as occurring in conjunction with the characteristics of the 
remaining elements of exchange. So, a change in rules at the global level must be 
understood in terms of its interaction with the characteristics of the elements of exchange 
at the local level. At the same time, it permits an evaluation of how the response of actors 
to the changed characteristics impact outcomes in the configuration.  
3.3.1 Key Terms and Concepts in the EC approach 
(a) Transactions and Transaction activities  
Three types of transactions are specified by J.R. Commons: bargaining, managerial and 
rationing. For an exchange to occur, actors must have the right to allow such an exchange. 
Since ownership is central to transactions, Commons' writings stressed the legal basis of 
transactions.  Bargaining (or market) transactions assume the legal equality of the parties to 
the exchange. However, economic equality is not assumed; therefore, four types of conflict 
are found in this transaction; competition, discrimination, economic power and due 
process (Witzel, 2005:89).  Managerial transactions involve a legal superior and inferior (e.g. 
a manager and an employee relationship). Intrinsically, the parties are assumed unequal. 
Also, in rationing transactions, the relationship is between a superior and an inferior; but 
the superior is a collective superior (e.g. board of directors) while the inferiors are 
individuals (Medema and Samuels 2003; 687).  
Overall, a transaction involves the transfer of ownership rights, the structure and terms of 
exchange, transfer of resources and power relations; hence activities involved with these 
components must be included in the analysis (Cornelisse and Thorbecke, 2010:55). The EC 
approach deals mainly with market transactions (bargaining transactions) which occur 
‘between individual actors and between individual actors and firms’ (Cornelisse and 





(b) Uncertainty and Risk 
Risk and uncertainty are elements of transacting. Cornelisse and Thorbecke (2010) adopt 
Knightian uncertainty, i.e. when the probability distribution of an action is unknown and 
thus the outcome cannot be calculated. Risk, on the other hand, is when the probability 
distribution of an action is known and so the outcome can be calculated. Both uncertainty 
and risks lead to an increased likelihood of transaction failure and hence the need for 
increased investment in specific assets to bring about the transaction. Thus, uncertainty and 
risk affect actors’ decision-making. Since it is possible to calculate the riskiness of an action, 
it is manageable through a mechanism such as a contract.  
(c) Cognitive abilities of actors  
Uncertainty and risk are also impacted by the cognitive ability of actors. Actors do not 
possess full and complete information when making economic choices; hence information 
asymmetries exist in their interactions. Cognitively, actors are bounded rational; that is, 
actors are limited in the extent to which they can possess all the information necessary to 
‘objectively’ view the structure of the game.  An actor’s rationality depends in part on the 
amount of information available, his access to this information and skills, among others. 
Bounded rationality recognises that an economic agent may not have all the information 
needed to make a decision, or the information may not necessarily be reliable or accurate. 
However, a decision must be and is made based on the available information.36   
 
3.3.2 Characteristics of Institutions in the EC approach 
The EC approach does not provide a definition of institutions; however, it discusses the 
definition of institutions by North (in Chapter 2), in favourable light (Cornelisse and 
Thorbecke, 2010:65). Institutions are found in the exchange environment and the following 
are their characteristics.  
 
                                                 
36 Two types of uncertainty are identified in NIE; behavioural and environmental. Behavioural uncertainty 
results from the bounded rationality characteristic of actors themselves, in addition to not knowing the 
amount and extent of knowledge possessed by other actors.  Environmental uncertainty may result from 




(a) Institutions are dynamic 
Institutions are not static and/or passive. They evolve over time because of actors actively 
changing their beliefs and behaviour. Hence, the same institutions faced by different sets of 
interacting agents may result in different behaviours and development outcomes. 
According to Di Matteo (1980:14, in Leca et al, 2009:68), actors with sufficient resources 
can affect the form and nature of institutions because ‘they see in them an opportunity to 
realize interests that they value highly.’ Processes involving bargaining and struggle reflect 
the distribution of resources and power of those who brought them into existence 
(Campbell, 2004:1); more importantly, they are embedded in the social, political and 
cultural setting of society (Granovetter, 1985).  
(b) Institutions are path dependent 
The mechanism through which changes in institutions occur is usually characterised by 
path-dependence (Campbell, 2004:65).  Path dependence refers to the potential for initial 
conditions and historical trajectory to cause institutions to behave in a predetermined way 
and hence the possibility of changes in the content of institutions but not the form 
(Sindzingre, 2003:9). Also, it may result in the persistence of inefficient institutions.  
(c) Institutions are not necessarily efficient  
The EC approach also subscribes to the idea that institutions are not necessarily efficient. 
Since institutions are human constructs borne out of a process of conflict, bargaining, and 
negotiation, it is possible that behaviour and expected behaviour exhibited by economic 
agents are sub-optimal, because relatively more endowed actors will agitate for 
arrangements in their favour. This is in addition to the fact that the characteristic of 
bounded rationality may lead to the emergence and stability of inefficient institutions.  
3.3.3 Main Elements of an Exchange Configuration 
(a) Characteristics of the item to be exchanged 
Every item to be exchanged has its own characteristics. In economic exchanges, the 
characteristics may be technological and/or economic. The technological characteristic of 
the item may determine the extent to which an item (e.g. a crop) can be further developed 
or used (Goldsmith, 1985 in Baumann, 2000:20). For an agricultural crop, for example, it 
may be the length of time it takes to mature, whether it is perishable or non-perishable and 
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storability. These characteristics have a role to play in determining production and labour 
processes that aid in development (Binswanger and Rosenweig, 1986). 
The economic characteristic can be whether it is a final, intermediate, consumer or 
industrial good, the frequency of exchange, the extent of uncertainty involved and its asset 
specificity, among others (Dorward and Omamo, 2009; Cornelisse and Thorbecke, 2010). 
It is important to be able to clearly identify the characteristics of the item to be exchanged 
as it enables a greater understanding of the kind of institutions or structures used to govern 
its production and exchange.  
(b) Characteristics of actors  
This refers to the 'preferences and objectives and other characteristics on the one hand, 
and the instruments available to them in pursuing their objectives, on the other hand' 
(Thorbecke and Cornelisse, 2014:145). Following is a discussion of the types of actors and 
their characteristics. 
i. Types of actors 
In all domains, we have actors or players who frequently interact with each other. Actors 
can broadly be categorised as individuals or organisations. Organisations may include firms, 
the state (government), development agencies, cooperatives and other collective action 
organisations. Actors (those who are directly involved in the exchange) are the only 
elements in the domain who have the power to make decisions; hence the decision-making 
process of actors becomes an integral part of why different exchange configurations exist 
(Cornelisse and Thorbecke, 2010:47). 
ii. Cognitive abilities  
The cognitive characteristic used by NIE, and adopted by the EC, are those of bounded 
rationality, explained in Section 3.3.1. 
iii. Characteristics of actors  
The characteristics of actors influence their decision-making. Cornelisse and Thorbecke 
(2010, 119-123) observe that the main characteristics of actors which influence transactions 
are: (a) the number and density of actors (b) resource endowments including assets, 
income, education, social status, and skills (c) actors’ attitudes and preferences, including 
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attitudes towards risk – which   are to an extent influenced by social norms and values (d) 
the level of social capital and (e) access to information and knowledge. For organisations, 
such as firms, their characteristics may differ from those of individuals due to their 
economic and political power, bargaining abilities and size, among others.   
Actor characteristics can exert power on an exchange relationship. The choice of exchange 
configuration, type of exchange transaction and outcomes of interactions are affected by 
actor characteristics. Some characteristics of an actor are partly affected by other 
characteristics. For example, an actor’s attitude towards risk may be affected by his access 
to information, income level, education and skills.  Also, the attributes of an actor may 
define the types of activities that can be engaged in. It may permit the actor to take the 
institutional environment within which he operates as given or not (Greif, 2006; Kingston 
and Caballero, 2009; Cornelisse and Thorbecke, 2010). For example, if the actor is a 
dictator, he can change rules by fiat. On the other hand, a collective action organisation will 
need to go through a process of bargaining and negotiating with other actors in the 
exchange relationship.  
(c) Characteristics of the Exchange environment  
The EC approach identifies six areas of interest which make up the local context. Rules and 
actors in this context impose constraints on the decisions and choices of interacting parties 
(Cornelisse and Thorbecke, 2010:64). The six areas (domains) of the exchange 
environment, grouped into three sets are: (i) Cultural, Political and Legal (ii) Physical and 
Technological (iii) Socio-economic (Cornelisse and Thorbecke, 2010:105).  
i. Cultural, Political and Legal Environment  
Cultural: This consists of 'collectively held norms and values' (Cornelisse and Thorbecke, 
2010:106), which influences behaviour. In this domain, language, norms, values and 
symbols are used to order exchange. Cultural attributes are mostly observed where 
intensive and frequent interaction takes place among the members.  
Political and Legal: This is the domain where rules made by all levels of the state (national, 
federal, constituency, and district) are found. Political decisions are influenced by norms 
and values of society, the distribution of power, self-interest, and interest groups: thus, the 
motivations of decision makers in this domain are not purely benevolent. The approach 
considers policy to be the main instrument of action in the domain. Policies can be ‘fluid 
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and volatile’ (Cornelisse and Thorbecke, 2010:111) as actors may try to promote their own 
interests or advance the interests of particular groups. Continuous pressure by various 
organisations (both internal and external) means that rules (policies) can be short-lived or 
fail to achieve intended policy objectives. In certain cases, policies required may not be 
initiated and implemented at all, due to such pressures. 
Usually, rules made in this domain have implications for other domains, such as the 
economic domain.  For example, property rights institutions which affect economic 
transactions are usually created and enforced by the state, judiciary and traditional 
authorities.  Nonetheless, there are feedback effects between economic and political 
institutions. In the legal domain reside institutions related to the making of laws along with 
their monitoring and enforcement. Proper enforcement and monitoring of institutions 
reduce transaction and production costs as they minimise uncertainty; thus, institutions in 
the judiciary and law enforcement are also important.  
ii. Socio-economic environment 
The social domain refers to the differentiation or division of society into groups based on 
characteristics such as age, gender, religion, kinship, educational level and income level. 
These social determinants influence the ordering of exchange in other domains, such as the 
economic and political domains. The economic domain is where the production and 
distribution of goods and services takes place (Aoki, 2007:13). Therefore, the socio-
economic environment refers to the domain where these social characteristics determine 
economic production and distribution. An institution of much importance in the social 
setting is power.  The balances of power and/or the social statuses of persons are not taken 
for granted (Colson, 1974 cited in North, 1991):  this is due to (a) ‘the intrinsic motivation 
by individual actors whose attitude towards others reflects the cultural environment (b) the 
external social control (c) the tendency among actors to reciprocate in a way similar to how 
they were approached’ (Cornelisse and Thorbecke, 2010:107). However, the greatest 
impact of social norms and values is found in situations where the actors ‘interact 
frequently and intensively’ (Cornelisse and Thorbecke, 2010: 106).  
The income level of a geographic area is an important characteristic of the socio-economic 
environment, as it determines the volume and variety in production. Generally, in 
developing countries income levels are lower than in developed countries; therefore, the 
volume and variety of goods and services are lower. Another characteristic of the socio-
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economic environment is the 'sectoral composition and spatial dispersion of production 
activities' (Cornelisse and Thorbecke, 2010:119) in the production structure. The spatial 
distribution of activities has consequences for employment and hence the labour exchange 
configuration. In addition, variables addressing the structure of the industry, e.g. the 
number of competitors, distribution channels, alternative products, availability of finance 
and access to knowledge, influence the volume and variety of production.  
iii. Physical and Technological Environment  
Physical: This domain includes soil, location, climate, pests, and infrastructure (Cornelisse 
and Thorbecke, 2010:113-114). In view of institutions being man-made and aimed at 
minimising transaction and production costs (North, 1990), infrastructural development is 
considered the most important characteristic of the physical domain (Cornelisse and 
Thorbecke, 2010:114). Infrastructure, such as a good road network, warehouse, 
communication and irrigation facilities, reduces transaction costs in exchange.  
Technological: This refers to the application of knowledge in the creation of equipment, 
machinery, processes, information and communication devices which are used in the 
production of goods and services. Technological innovations have rapidly increased with 
globalisation. Developing countries usually adopt and/or adapt technology from developed 
countries rather than innovate, because they lack the capabilities (skills, financial resources, 
and intellectual resource protection) needed to motivate investments in innovation. The 
adoption of appropriate and efficient technology is not straightforward, but it enables the 
production of advanced goods, resulting in higher skilled employment, income, and wealth.  
Changes in the technological domain result in changes in exchange elements, such as 
changes in the item exchanged and the characteristics of actors. Innovations and improved 
technology result in the altering of characterises of the product, e.g. intrinsic qualities and 
appearance, and may also alter the skills and knowledge required to produce a good. 
3.3.4 Choosing Characteristics of Exchange Elements  
Theoretically, the set of characteristics which influence an exchange configuration is large. 
However, empirically, this set is small (Thorbecke, 1993; Cornelisse and Thorbecke, 2010). 
The EC approach advocates three ways of making a discriminatory choice among the 
possible characteristics. First, exchange elements are usually discrete and not continuous; 
therefore, they can be found in 'two or at most only a few states' (Cornelisse and 
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Thorbecke, 2010:131). Bimodal states generally used in development economics include: 
traditional and modern, formal and informal, discretionary and nondiscretionary, rural and 
urban (Cornelisse and Thorbecke, 2010:131-150). Second, there are identify characteristics 
which may be highly inter-correlated with others (Thorbecke and Cornelisse, 2014: 145). 
Third, cost considerations serve as a limit to the number of distinct real life transactions 
observed.   
For example, Cornelisse and Thorbecke (2010:131-145) note that alternative technology 
choices faced by a smallholder farmer are generally few and discrete, presenting themselves 
in a bimodal state, modern and traditional. Modern technology is characterised by high 
factor productivity, is capital intensive and generally imported. On the contrary, traditional 
technology is labour intensive, locally available and of relatively lower total factor 
productive. The choice of which technology is used is likely correlated with other 
characteristics of the smallholder, e.g. asset level, access to finance and risk attitude. This 
serves to limit the characteristics of exchange elements likely to influence transactions. 
3.3.5 Institutional change in Exchange configurations 
In the EC approach, institutional change occurs when there are changes in the exchange 
elements. Changes in exchange elements may be instigated by factors which are either 
endogenous or exogenous to an actor. Endogenous and/or exogenous factors may also be 
classified as intended and/or unintended (Cornelisse and Thorbecke, 2010: 176; Table 3.1). 
Endogenous factors which cause an evolution of the exchange configuration are specific to 
actor’s tactics and strategies or the loops and feedbacks in the systems of exchange. 
Exogenous forces, on the other hand, refer to acts and decisions by actors who are not in 
the exchange configuration under review, and can be in the form of shocks or public 
policies (Cornelisse and Thorbecke, 2010:176-177; Table 3.1). The forces of changes are 
discussed below. 
Table 3.1: Main Forces of Institutional change in EC approach 
 Endogenous  Exogenous 
Intended Actors’ tactics and 
strategies 
Public policies 
Unintended Loops or feedbacks in 
systems of exchange 
Shocks 
Source: Cornelisse and Thorbecke (2010:176) 
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(a) Actors’ Tactics and Strategies 
Actors will seek to change the form or content of transactions when they are not satisfied 
with it. In addition to reacting to changes in the exchange elements, actors make tactical 
and strategic decisions. Tactical decisions refer to the short-term changes actors make in 
response to a change in exchange elements, while strategic decisions refer to ‘…conscious 
and autonomous manipulations of aspects of the exchange elements’ (Cornelisse and 
Thorbecke, 2010:183). Strategic moves are deliberate and calculated to affect not only the 
initiator of the move, but also other actors involved in the transaction. The ability of actors 
to take tactical and strategic decisions involves learning and the range of instruments 
available to them. 
Learning is described as ‘the process of acquiring new knowledge and behaviour’ 
(Cornelisse and Thorbecke, 2010:79).  It can be passive and mechanistic or active and 
purposeful. Active learning involves awareness of changes and the willingness to learn and 
adapt to changes. The EC approach gives prominence to active learning as actors learn 
from their experiences, observations of the behaviour of other actors, and observations of 
changes in exchange elements and then make decisions and choices regarding their next 
course of action (Cornelisse and Thorbecke, 2010:78). As mentioned in Chapter 2, learning 
in GVCs has significant effects on the upgrading of actors. At the same time, the ability to 
learn depends on the type of knowledge, local conditions and the characteristics of the 
actor, for example, the actor’s absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).37  
(b) Loops or feedbacks in systems of exchange 
Loops and/or feedbacks (or spill-over effects) are endogenous and unintended results of 
change. Two types are identified in the economic literature; positive externalities and 
negative externalities. However, four other loops or feedback effects stemming from the 
continuous flow of information are identified by the EC approach (Cornelisse and 
Thorbecke, 2010:193-194). These are: (a) changes in perception concerning variables, e.g. 
price and volume; (b) changes in expectations among actors in other or related exchange 
configurations; (c) changes in the allocation of scarce resources; and (d) changes in the 
distribution of power.  
 
                                                 
37 Absorptive capacity is a function of the characteristics of the actor e.g. educational level 
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(c) Public Policies 
These are policy interventions instituted by the state or government to influence the 
elements of exchange.  They are exogenous intended forces of change but can be termed as 
endogenous strategic when the state directly participates in the transaction. For example, 
the state in the Ghanaian cocoa sector is a major player in the industry, as it is responsible 
for buying and selling all cocoa produced in the country. It provides credit and input to 
producers and determines the price paid to smallholder producers.   
(d)  Shocks 
Shocks are unpredictable changes in exogenous factors and have differential impacts on 
actors. They may emanate from the global, national, regional, family, firm, or even 
individual level. Shocks include wars, famine, epidemics, and death in a family. They have 
differential impacts on actors exposed to them, as the characteristics of the actor mediate 
the effects on the actor 
The initial characteristics of exchange elements result in a transaction which is indicative of 
the specific combinations of the exchange elements (Figure 3.1). As the elements change, 
they affect the functioning of the configuration and may result in new characteristics of the 
transaction, which may in turn influence the exchange elements in the configuration under 
consideration and/or other configurations (Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3). At the same time, 
changes in elements in related configurations may influence exchange elements in the 
configuration under consideration (Figure 3.3). Nonetheless, the relationship between 
changes in the exchange elements and the actual changes that take place in the 
configuration are not deterministic, because they are dependent on the responses 
(decisions, choices, and reactions) of actors who directly transact (Cornelisse and 








Figure 3.1: Diagram of a stylized exchange configuration  
 
Source: Cornelisse and Thorbecke (2010:27) 
 
Figure 3.2: An extended version of an exchange configuration  
 
Source: Cornelisse and Thorbecke (2010:50) 
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Figure 3.3: Evolution of an exchange configuration 
 
Source: Cornelisse and Thorbecke (2010:197) 
 
3.4 A Conceptual Framework to link global and local governance 
3.4.1 Linking global and local governance 
Insights from the EC approach indicate that actions undertaken in a related exchange 
configuration may impact transactions in a configuration under examination. Since 
production and marketing in value chains are inherently linked, the governance of 
transactions in one sphere affects the other. That is why even though most agricultural 
producers in developing countries are not directly linked with retailers in developed 
countries, the governance of relationships between retailers and first-tier suppliers (i.e. 
transactions in related configurations, No. (6) in Figure 3.3) can impact transactions 
between suppliers in a country.  
 
In the global pineapple value chain, retailers’ move to MD2 and the use of standards 
significantly transformed the characteristics of pineapple traded on the international market 
(see Chapter 4). Changes in product characteristics add to the risks of transacting, because 
they increase the complexity of exchange and uncertainty. The new pineapple variety and 
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product characteristics such as traceability, quality specifications, and flexible delivery 
deadlines impacted actor characteristics (such as the number of actors, assets, income, 
skills, attitudes towards risk, access to information and knowledge, among others).  The 
initial production structure in many developing countries was not conducive to production 
and exchange under the new rules, and the trickle-down effect of such profound changes 
has been a significant impact on the organisation of producers and exchange, especially 
among smallholder farmers and exporters. 
Smallholders and exporters in developing countries usually face constraints related to 
missing input and output markets. Such constraints include inadequate access to credit and 
inadequate infrastructure, which have become more complex and profound with 
transformations in the governance of agri-food chains. They increase production and 
transaction costs, due to high levels of asymmetric information, uncertainty and asset 
specificity.  
Specifically regarding standards requirements, small producers and exporters face problems 
related to ‘(1) how to produce safe food; (2) how to be recognized as producing safe food; 
(3) how to identify cost-effective technologies for reducing risk; and (4) how to be 
competitive with larger producers’ (Narrod et al., 2005 in Narrod et. al., 2009:8). These 
problems put them at the risk of exclusion from the chain, as they are unable to engender 
and/or enhance the characteristics required from producers who can participate in these 
chains.  Dolan and Humphrey (2000:166), for example, indicate that in 1992 75% of fruit 
and vegetable produce was sourced from smallholders in the Kenyan chain, but this had 
declined to 18% in 1998 as standards became more prevalent. Exclusion is, however, not 
automatic and can be mediated by local circumstances and actors.  
The impact of transaction costs on inter-firm relations can be immense. One way of 
ensuring its minimisation is by using contracts. Contracts minimise information asymmetry, 
asset specificity and uncertainty in a relationship, thereby allowing the integration of 
smallholders and small exporters into national and global value chains (Masakure and 
Henson, 2005; Barrett et al., 2012). Mighell and Jones (1963, cited in Minot, 1986, p.5) 
classify agricultural contracts as (a) Market-Specification contracts (b) Resource – providing 
contracts and (c) Production-management contracts. Market-specification contracts usually 
name the price and the quantity of a future transaction; resource-providing contracts are a 
combination of the market-specification contract with the contractor providing inputs to 
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the contractee; and production-management contracts combine market-specification with 
technical assistance.  According to Key and MacDonald (2006), market-specification 
contracts focus on the produce and not the services rendered. They offer farmers a 
premium if some quality standards are met, and the farmer retains control over the 
production process. Comparatively, under production management contracts, the farmer 
provides services for the contractor who owns the produce. Therefore, the contractor 
conveys detailed information about the quality of the produce and agricultural practices. 
The farmer’s payment is said to be based on exact services offered and not on the market 
value of the produce (Key and MacDonald, 2006). Thus, contracts provide certain 
advantages to smallholders and exporters, including reduction in search and negotiation 
costs, access to extension services and new information, access to credit and hedging 
against price fluctuations using fixed prices, among others. 
Nonetheless, relations between firms or farmers and exporters, as well as within groups of 
chain participants, are structured by local conditions. Therefore, the use of a contract, that 
is, its design, implementation and effectiveness, is essentially defined by local conditions. 
Contracts are usually incomplete, due to imperfect information and uncertainty; so, parties 
to a contract are unable to specify ex-ante all the possible situations which may arise during 
the contract’s tenure. This failure increases the possibility of actors behaving 
opportunistically. After the agreement is completed, either party may attempt to exact 
quasi-rents from the relationship. For example, the buyer and producer may negotiate over 
the price to be paid for the product; however, when the market price of a contracted 
product turns out to be greater than the contracted price, there is an incentive to sell the 
product on the market than to the contractor. Also, a buyer may unilaterally renegotiate the 
price to be paid or may delay payment to the producer.  
The literature on contracting notes that a third party (e.g. the judiciary) will typically 
adjudicate contractual breaches. This third party monitors contractual breaches and makes 
the information available to all participants. However, in the agriculture sector of many 
developing countries, resorting to the judiciary to mediate breaches in agricultural contracts 
can be complex and time-consuming. This is partly due to the small-size of producers and 
hence the lack of any viable assets which can be seized. Thus, where it is not feasible or 
cost effective for third party adjudication, informal rules, such as trust and reputation, may 
be used to enforce contracts.  
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Schmitz (1999b:141) defines trust as ‘the willingness to expose oneself to the possibility of 
opportunistic behaviour by others.’ Trust can be derived from both formal and informal 
institutions. Humphrey and Schmitz (1998: 35-36) classify sources of trust into three 
groups; macro, meso and micro. Macro-level trust is defined in terms of formal institutions 
or rules, e.g. certification, and gives information about potential partners (Humphry and 
Schmitz, 1998: 35, 39). Meso-level trust is based on: (a) norms in society which reflect 
societal virtues, such as reciprocity and honesty, and actor characteristics, including 
ethnicity, religion, social status, and wealth (Humphrey and Schmitz, 1998, Fukuyama, 
1999); and (b) sector level organisations which monitor adherence to rules (Humphrey and 
Schmitz, 1998: 35).   Micro-level trust is process-based and ‘earned’ through experience 
gained from interacting on a personal basis with particular partners (Humphrey and 
Schmitz, 1998; Schmitz, 1999b). Micro-level trust is built up through repeated transactions 
and over a period of time. Repeat interactions with the same supplier leads to increased 
information about the supplier, providing a business reputation (Fafchamps, 1996:432). 
Also, path dependence (i.e. the existence of positive past interactions between supplier and 
buyers can affect future interactions and vice versa) (Fafchamps, 1996). In circumstances 
where informal rules are used to enforce a contract, the contract is said to be self-
enforcing.  
Trust and reputation are linked as repeat interactions with the same supplier leads to 
increased information about the supplier (Fafchamps, 1996:432). The existence of positive 
past interactions between supplier and buyers can affect future interactions and vice versa. 
In circumstances where informal rules enforce contracts, the contract is said to be self-
enforcing. 
Regardless of the positive benefits of informal sources of trust promoting exchange, 
Fafchamps (1996:444) notes that repeat interactions between two parties to an exchange 
which do not affect the relationship between the partners and others participating in the 
chain may make it difficult for reputation to be used as a contract enforcement mechanism. 
The ability to develop a sector or attract new entrants into the sector is limited because 
partners must incur high search costs to find new reliable partners. Thus, exchange is likely 
to be more effective when both macro and micro levels of trust are in existence.  
The preceding discussion implies that other actors (apart from those directly engaged in an 
exchange) may also impact asset specificity, uncertainty and information asymmetry in the 
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chain. They can do so through their actions (or inactions), whether intentionally or 
unintentionally. For instance, an objective of making smallholders more capable of 
participating in global value chains may require them to engage in horizontal cooperation. 
The extent to which this can be achieved is partly contingent on the objectives of other 
actors, such as the state or government and development agencies. These actors may have 
to make investments to strengthen the capabilities of chain actors. But such investments 
may not be made at all or only partially implemented. The contributing actors may not see 
the need to do so; they may not have adequate human and financial capital; or they may 
prefer to maximise their own self-interest. For example, while suppliers may need financial 
interventions or an enabling business environment, the government may seek to maximise 
its political ambitions and thus institute policies and strategies which reward political 
patronage (the practice of benefitting from supporting a government in power rather than 
on merit). 
By putting together, the GVC framework and insights from the EC approach, the 
conceptual framework of this study suggests that governance of a local (national) value 
chain is co-determined by the interaction of global and local conditions. The restructuring 
of value chains at the local level is shaped by the interaction of changes in the 
characteristics of the item exchanged, the characteristics of the actors and local conditions. 
Significantly, it postulates that how production and exchange relationships are configured 
and/or reconfigured to determine benefits to participants and the development of the 
chain depends largely on local conditions. This idea is visually captured by the study’s 














3.4.2 Application to the Ghanaian pineapple value chain  
The transaction under consideration in this study is the production and exchange of 
pineapples for export. The Ghanaian pineapple export value chain consists of the item 
produced (pineapple); actors (those directly engaged in the exchange of the produce e.g. 
farmers or producers, exporters, processors); those not directly connected (e.g. the state or 
government, development agencies and retailers); and the local conditions which structure 
production and exchange.  
Identification of local conditions: Integrating smallholders into value chains is an 
important part of the development strategy pursued by developing countries. Changes in 
global governance however have put their integration at risk. Key to this study is how 
global governance (that is, the power of retailers) interacts with the rules which structure 
production and exchange in the Ghanaian context. To be able to account for this, this 
study makes two adjustments to the EC approach. First is how actors are classified: and 
second is how local conditions are grouped. A distinction is made between how actors are 
classified in both the EC approach and GVC studies on one hand, and this study on the 
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other hand. In GVC studies, actors in the chain are either internal or external. Internal 
actors are those who directly handle the product (e.g. global retailers, manufacturers, 
exporters); while external actors include the state and collective action organisations. The 
actions of internal actors will therefore be endogenous and those of external actors 
exogenous. The same line of thinking prevails in the EC approach, where the actions of 
actors who directly participate in a transaction are endogenous, while others are exogenous. 
The actions of the state, for example, are treated as endogenous only when it directly 
participates in the transaction (Section 3.3.5). However, from the perspective of a national 
boundary, factors outside the control of the country are exogenous to the chain and vice 
versa (Table 3.2). Thus, this study classifies internal actors as those within the confines of 
the country and external actors as those outside.  So, the actions of the state, for example, 
are endogenous while that of the retailer is exogenous (Table 3.2). Also, there are two sets 
of actors within the group of internal actors (i.e. those who directly engage in the 
transaction and those who do not).  
Table 3.2: Forces responsible for changes in governance in value chains  
 Endogenous Exogenous 
Intended Policies, strategies and 
tactics of farmers, 
exporters, processors, 
the state and 
development agencies. 
Strategies and tactics of 
retailers, and 
international trade 
policy directly targeted 
at the value chain. 
Unintended Loops or feedbacks in 
systems of exchange 
Shocks, strategies, 
tactics and policies not 
directly targeted at the 
value chain 
Source: Author 
Local conditions impose constraints and offer opportunities in the form of ‘rules’ for 
actors to act on (Cornelisse and Thorbecke, 2010:7). To identify these conditions, this 
study relies on secondary sources of data and interviews conducted with chain participants. 
Notably, local conditions prevalent in the Ghanaian agriculture sector include the land 
tenure system, infrastructure, access to and affordability of finance and business norms. 
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Although the general local circumstances identified by the EC approach are instructive, the 
export-oriented nature of the study's sector means that two other circumstances or 
situations - financial and organisational- must be emphasised. The organisational context is 
the private actors who are organised to pursue a common purpose or interest e.g. trade 
unions, donor agencies and producer associations are included in the study. Donor 
agencies, for example, play an important role in the interaction between participants in a 
value chain, especially in developing countries. They provide services, such as technical 
assistance, and support the organisation of small producers.  
Also, the overall financial context of the local economy plays an essential role in 
agricultural producers’ access to finance. Financial services assist in the lowering of 
transaction costs in an exchange, increase economies of scale and improve resource 
allocation (Beck, 2011). The transactions may be conducted through formal financial 
organisations (e.g. banks) or informal individuals and agents (e.g. money lenders). The 
finance sector is usually regulated by the government, but regulation in the informal sector 
may be lax. Access to finance by the government, households, and non-financial 
organisations is generally through different tools and under different conditions. For 
example, firms and organisations may access finance through bank loans after satisfying a 
collateral conditionality, while the government usually accesses low-interest loans.  
For ease and convenience, I will reclassify local conditions (i.e. circumstances and actors) 
into the following broad groups; Economic, Social, Cultural, Political, Technological and 
Organisational. Economic conditions will include the country’s level of economic 
development, access to and affordability of finance, availability of agricultural inputs, 
property rights and availability of appropriate infrastructure. Social conditions include the 
availability of labour and its skill level (Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark, 2011:11) and cultural 
conditions include norms governing interactions (Mohan, 2016). Political conditions 
include government policies (e.g. subsidies, taxation). While Cornelisse and Thorbecke 
(2010) do not include innovations in crop variety in the technological domain, new varieties 
may allow firms to alter the structure of the market, thereby influencing production and 
exchange. This is evident with the MD2 innovation. Other technological conditions may 
include agriculture equipment and the level and use of information and communication 
technology (ICT). Finally, organisational conditions refer to the availability and strength of 
private actors, such as producer associations and development agencies, to influence the 




Interaction between Global governance and the Ghanaian local context: Ghanaian 
farmers and exporters participating in the global pineapple value chain are integrated into 
the chain through intermediaries. Small and medium-scale farmers are linked to exporters 
and processors, while exporters are linked to importers. Farmers, exporters and other chain 
participants have differences in resources (both tangible and intangible). Differences in 
resources generate divergences among producers and affect their bargaining power and the 
benefits of transacting (Cornelisse and Thorbecke, 2010:58). Linking small producers and 
exporters to markets therefore requires a reduction in transaction costs, increases in their 
productivity, assistance with standards compliance, and access to quality and affordable 
inputs, among others. 
In the Ghanaian setting, the new global rules entailed higher production and transaction 
costs. MD2 had agronomic needs which were different from those of the Smooth Cayenne 
variety, which Ghanaian producers were used to. Producers had to acquire information on 
growing MD2, and use more inputs (e.g. fertiliser and plastic mulch) to successfully 
cultivate it. Furthermore, standards requirements meant that economies of scale were 
integral to market access and participation in the chain.  
Typically, production and exchange between Ghanaian farmers and exporters are 
configured by challenges including: inadequate infrastructure, a large number of 
unorganised smallholders, little or no access to credit (finance), limited human capital, 
limited contract enforcement mechanisms, a complex land tenure system and weak inter-
firm networks. Such challenges increase transaction costs. From the 1980s till the early 
2000s, smallholder farmers, who are usually defined as cultivating between 2-10 hectares of 
land (Nagayets, 2005; Morton, 2007; Chamberlain, 2008), were responsible for about 40% -
60% of export volumes (Goldstein and Udry, 1999; Jensen, 2005; Whitfield, 2011). They 
were however largely unorganised, lacked access to market information and credit. 
Exporters were also small, lacked access to credit and highly mistrusted each other. Local 
conditions, such as high interest rates, lack of collateral and inadequate commitment of 
government and development agencies, also impacted the relationship between internal 
chain actors. Effectively, relations were governed under the market governance structure. 
The introduction of new product characteristics meant that both the complexity and 
codifiability of information increased; at the same time, the capabilities suppliers needed to 
participate in the chain also increased.  The outcome of such a situation is the preference 
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for interactions with large producers who could readily meet and fulfil market demands. 
Exclusion from the chain was a very likely possibility for Ghanaian farmers and exporters. 
Although exclusion from the chain has implications for poverty reduction in the country, 
inclusion in the chain does not necessarily mean that development occurs in the chain. It is 
up to local conditions to negotiate or mediate the impact of changed product 
characteristics on actors and the chain’s development. How this was done in the Ghanaian 
pineapple export sector is the focus of this study.  
3.5 Concluding Remarks 
In the GVC literature, dynamic movements in a value chain’s governance structure are 
determined by movements in the variables determining governance-complexity of 
information, codifiability of information and capabilities of suppliers. How these variables 
are actually tackled in the local setting in which value chains are located is not dealt with. 
Building on theoretical insights of NIE, Cornelisse and Thorbecke (2010) have created a 
framework which emphasises the notion that production and exchange take place in a 
configuration shaped by the economic, social, political, technological and cultural contexts 
of a society. These conditions can impact both the characteristics of the item exchanged 
and actors; and interactions between actors and hence influence the form and content of 
transactions. Based on these ideas, I set out a framework in which governance of a value 
chain is determined by the interaction of actor characteristics, characteristics of the item 
exchanged and local conditions. The framework is applied to the Ghanaian pineapple 
export value chain to account for the evolution of governance from market to captive 
and/or hierarchy from the mid-1980s to 2013. Before applying the conceptual framework 
to the case study, Chapter 4 of this thesis will discuss the international pineapple value 




Chapter 4 Situating Ghana in the Global Context 
4.1 Introduction: The Global Pineapple Market 
World production of fruits and vegetables from 1999-2001 increased by 49% over the 
period 1989-1991 (FAO Statistical Yearbook 2004:70). In 2003, production amounted to 
1.3 billion tonnes (FAO Statistical Yearbook 2004:70) and increased to over 1.7 billion 
tonnes in 2013 (Freshplaza.com, 2014), an annual rate of 3% per annum (FAO Statistical 
Yearbook 2013: 138). In tandem, international trade in fruits and vegetables has also 
increased rapidly, with fresh fruits and vegetables representing 10% of total agriculture 
exports in 2013 (FAO Statistical Yearbook, 2010; WTO 2014). 
Pineapple (Ananas comosus) together with bananas are the two most traded fruits globally 
(Kleemann, 2011). Pineapple is native to Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay and is cultivated in 
tropical and sub-tropical locations in Africa, Latin America and Asia. There are over 100 
varieties, but only 8 are commercially viable.38 Also, out of the 8, only 4 varieties (Smooth 
Cayenne, MD2, Queen Victoria and Sugar Loaf) are traded extensively (Figure 4.1 and 
Table 4.1). Pineapples thrive in well-drained soils with pH between 4.5 and 6.5 (FAO, 
2005b; USAID, 2011) and can be harvested between 12 – 18 months after cultivation. It 
takes between thirty and sixty days for the plant to flower, and ripe fruits are available one 
hundred and thirty-five days after flowering (MAG, n.d.).39 The weight of the fruit depends 
on the following factors: variety, climate, density and crop husbandry. A ratoon fruit (i.e. 
second or third fruit) may occur after the first harvest, but the fruits are generally smaller in 
size, sweeter and less acidic than those of the first harvest (Paull and Duarte; 2011; 
Krigsvold, 2000:9).40 Pineapples can be eaten whole (fresh) or processed (cut, juice, 
concentrate).  
Fresh pineapples are marketed along two channels; conventional and niche (e.g. organic, 
Fairtrade, speciality).41 The most important consuming countries are developed nations, 
especially the United States (US) and countries in the European Union (EU). Prior to the 
early 2000s, Costa Rica was a relatively minor exporter of fresh pineapples to the EU 
                                                 
38 Pineapple, UNCTAD Commodity profile 2012  
39 Available at http://www.mag.go.cr/biblioteca_virtual/bibliotecavirtual/tec-pina.pdf 
40 The fruit of the mother plant is known as a plant crop (Paull and Duarte, 2011). 
41 ‘Organic Agriculture as a production system that sustains the health of soils, ecosystems and people; relies 
on ecological processes, biodiversity and cycles adapted to local conditions, rather than the use of inputs with 
adverse effects; and combines tradition, innovation and science to benefit the shared environment and 
promote fair relationships and a good quality of life for all involved (IFOAM, 2016; 
https://www.ifoam.bio/en/our-library/organic-basics#What is OA) 
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though it dominated the US market. Currently, it dominates both the EU and US markets, 
due to the introduction of the MD2 variety by the multinational company, Fresh Del 
Monte Produce. 
Over a long period of time, the Smooth Cayenne variety was the only variety that could be 
exported fresh and/or canned (ISH, 2009; Loiellet and Paqui, 2012; CBI 2014b). However, 
this changed in the late 1990s when the MD2 variety took over the fresh export market. 
Data in this chapter spans the period 1989 to 2013, because of limitations in accessing 
consistent and accurate date prior to 1989. The years 1995 and 2005 are also focused on, 
because they refer to the immediate years prior to the introduction of MD2 and the 
domination of MD2 on the EU market, respectively.  
This chapter gives an overview of the evolution of the international pineapple market, 
situating Ghana in the chain. Particular attention is paid to Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire and 
Ghana which were the three top exporters of pineapple to the EU until the mid-2000s. The 
early sections of the chapter will focus on the international pineapple market and value 
chain, and the latter sections will focus on the structure of the Ghanaian pineapple value 
chain from the mid-1980s to 2004. The data and value chain described in this chapter is 
based on the SITC commodity code, 05795, for fresh and dried pineapple.  
Figure 4.1: Extensively traded varieties of pineapple 
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4.2 Production and Trade 
4.2.1 Production 
In a period of 25 years (1989-2013), world pineapple production has increased from over 
11 million tonnes to over 24 million tonnes (Faostat, 2016), representing an average annual 
growth rate of 3.3%. The dominant producing area is Asia, accounting for over 11 million 
tonnes (44.7%) of production in 2013 (Figure 4.2). Although there are over 80 producing 
countries listed by Faostat, the top 10 producers in the world contribute over 70% of 
output (Table 4.2). However, most of their produce is domestically consumed as only 
about 13% is exported (CBI 2014d; Dawson, 2016). 
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The main producing countries are Thailand, Philippines, India and Indonesia in Asia; 
Nigeria and Kenya in Africa and Costa Rica, Brazil and Mexico in the Americas (Table 4.2).  
 
Figure 4.2: World Production of pineapples by area (1989-2013) 
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Table 4.2: World Production of pineapples by country in tonnes, 1989-2013 
Country 1989 1995 2005 2013 Share of 
production 
in 2013 
Costa Rica     455,000      424,480   1,605,237 2,685,131 11% 
Philippines  1,178,750   1,646,268   1,788,218 2,458,420 10% 
Brazil  1,241,840   1,426,361   2,292,470 2,483,831 10% 
Thailand  2,005,390   2,087,707   2,183,280 2,209,351 9% 
Indonesia     215,405     703,300      925,082 1,837,155 7% 
China     510,954     539,408      848,902 1,386,361 7% 
India     787,000  1,060,000   1,278,900 1,571,000 6% 
Nigeria     741,000     800,000      890,000 1,420,000 6% 
Mexico     434,822     281,180      551,672   771,942 3% 
Ghana       10,000       20,000        70,000   636,540 3% 
Kenya     212,330     475,117      401,729   128,944 0.5% 
Côte 
d’Ivoire 
    179,480     209,628      195,294    72,000 0.3% 




72% 73% 72% 70%  
Note: Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana are not significant producers but rather significant exporters. 
Source: Faostat (2016); Author analysis 
4.2.2 Imports 
The main end markets for pineapples are the EU and the US. Import quantity and value 
have more than quadrupled since 1989 (Figure 4.3). The demand for pineapples on the EU 
and US markets is satisfied by imports from non-EU countries.42 Though Hawaii in the US 
produces pineapples, a shift in production overseas by MNCs has led to imports catering 
for demand.43  
                                                 
42 Portugal is the only European country which produces pineapples but its tonnage is small and aimed at the 
internal market (Pay, 2009:4). 
43 Rising land and labour costs led Del Monte to move to Costa Rica in the 1970s and Dole to Thailand in 
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Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show the rapid growth in imports of pineapples to the EU market. 
From 1989 – 1995, extra-EU imports were consistently below 250,000 tonnes.44 However, 
by 2005, imports had more than doubled to over 500,000 tonnes (i.e. an average annual 
growth rate of 10.8% from 1996-2005). The volume of imports peaked in 2008 recording 
over 900,000 tonnes but slowed thereafter because of the world financial crisis. From 2006 
– 2013, import volumes grew at a rate of 4.7%. 
The initial increase in imports is attributed to increased consumption because of the 
popularity of the new MD2 variety and falling prices (CBI, 2014d; Dawson, 2016).45 
Average consumption per capita in the EU in 2013 and 2008 was 1.8 and 1.7 pounds, 
respectively, a significant increase from 0.45 pounds in 2005.46  From 2008-2013, Germany 
was the EU’s top consumer of pineapples followed by the UK, Italy, France and Spain 
(CBI, 2014d). Peak seasons for the consumption of pineapples in the US and EU are 
during the Easter and Christmas seasons. In the US market, per capita consumption of 
pineapples has increased to almost 7 pounds in 2013, up from 2 pounds in 1989 (Figure 
4.7) 
By country, the four largest importers of fruits and vegetables in the EU are Germany, the 
United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands, with supplies dominated by Costa Rica (see 
Figure 4.6 and Appendix Chapter 4).47 Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire are also important 
suppliers though they have lost significant ground since 2000.  Imports to the US market 
are dominated by Latin American countries (Figure 4.8) with Costa Rica commanding an 
88% share of the market in 2013, up from 82% in 2001. Recently, countries in Eastern 
Europe, the Middle East and China have increased their consumption of pineapples 




                                                                                                                                               
1974. 
44 Extra-EU ‘refers to transactions with all countries outside of the EU: the rest of the world except for 
the European Union (EU).’ Intra-EU ‘refers to all transactions occurring within the EU.’ (Source: Eurostat 
statistics explained, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:Extra-EU) 
45 As of 2009, over 75% of pineapple fruits sold in the EU market were of the MD2 variety (Pay 2009:4). 
46 Consumption per capita = Total supply/Population. Total supply = Total production + total imports-total 
re-exports. 
47 The Netherlands and Belgium are major re-exporters of pineapples to the EU because their seaports serve 
as the main arrival port for large banana carriers (Source: CBI, 2015).  
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Figure 4.3: Total world imports of pineapple by quantity and value (1989-2013) 
 
Note: Faostat 2016 data for years 1989, 1995. Trade Map figures for 2005 and 2013 
Source: Faostat (2016) and Trade Map, International Trade Centre, 
www.intracen.org/marketanalysis  
 
Figure 4.4: Imports of pineapple into the EU by quantity and value, 1989-2013 
 
Note: EU 12 from 1989-1994; EU 15 data from 1995-1998; EU 27-extra from 1999-2013  
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Figure 4.5: Average annual growth (%) of EU pineapple imports by value and  
volume, 1989-2013 
 
Source: Eurostat Comext (2016); Author Analysis 
 
Figure 4.6: Share of top importers of pineapple by country (2001-2013)  
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Figure 4.7: US imports and consumption of pineapples 1989-2013 
 
Source: ERS/USDA (2015) 
 
Figure 4.8: Supply markets for US imports of pineapple (2001-2013) 
 
Source: Trade Map, International Trade Centre www.intracen.org/marketanalysis 
 
4.2.3 Exports 
Out of approximately 24.8 million tonnes of pineapples produced in 2013, 3.4 million 
tonnes, representing 13.7% were exported (Figure 4.9). Trade in pineapples takes place 
across two separate market channels, fresh and processed. Examples of processed 
pineapple products are pineapple juice, puree and concentrate.  According to the ITC 

























































































































































Costa Rica Mexico Honduras Guatemala Ecuador Panama Colombia Thailand
96 
 
Globally, fresh pineapple exports have grown by an average annual rate of 7.91% over the 
last 25 years (1989-2013). Between the seven-year period of 1989-1995, exports grew by 
5.5%. After the introduction of the new pineapple variety to the European market in 1996, 
exports grew by 11.3% from 1996-2005. The growth in exports has however slowed down 
to 5.83%.  Exporting nations are in Africa, the Americas and Asia. The Americas, propelled 
by Costa Rica, account for over 50% of export volumes since 2005 (Figure 4.10). Africa’s 
share in total world exports of pineapples has consistently declined over the 25-year period, 
due to the loss of market share by its main exporters to the EU, Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana. 
Overall, the growth in exports to the EU market over the last 25 years has been 
characterised by three main phases, discussed below. 
Figure 4.9: Total world exports of pineapples by quantity and value (1989-2013) 
 
Note: 1989 and 1995 data from Faostat, 2005 and 2013 data from Trade Map 
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Figure 4.10: Share of exports by region, 1989 - 2013  
 
Source: Faostat 2016; Author analysis 
 
4.2.3.1 Early 1980s to mid-1990s: The dominance of Côte d’Ivoire 
Côte d’Ivoire was the number one supplier of pineapples to the EU from the 1960s to the 
mid-1990s (Figure 4.11) after the supply of pineapples shifted from the Mediterranean area 
(Barret and Brown, 1996 in Takane, 2004:29; Dawson, 2016). Pineapple production in Côte 
d’Ivoire began in the 1940s, mainly for processing i.e. canning and juice (Vageneron, Faure 
and Loeillet, 2009; Colin, 2015).48 The Ivorian industry shifted to the export of fresh 
pineapples in the 1980s when (a) Thailand expanded its exports of processed pineapples, 
leading to an increase in its market share and a decrease in world prices and (b) economic 
reforms in the early 1980s led to the reduction in state subsidies for production (Minot and 
Ngigi, 2004; Gorman and Webber, 2010). The success of the Ivorian industry over the 
period was attributed to (a) increasing demand for fresh fruits and vegetables in the EU (b) 
short distance between the EU market and SSA (c) SSA governments’ policy of 
encouraging non-traditional exports and (d) state involvement in production and export 
(Minot and Ngigi, 2004; Takane, 2004; Vagneron, Faure and Loeillet, 2009). For example, 
the Ministry of Agriculture regulated the quality of pineapple produced in terms of shape, 
colour and brix level. The state also actively encouraged large-scale farming by licensing 
plantations which could export at least 800 tonnes of fruit per year, provided credit and 
inputs and disseminated technical assistance to producers through the parastatal Société 
pour le Développement des Fruits et Légumes (Vagneron, Faure and Loeillet, 2009:439). 
Thus, in 1985 Côte d’Ivoiré commanded a 93% share of total EU pineapple imports 
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(Figure 4.12).  
Figure 4.11: Share (%) of EU imports of pineapple, 1985-2013 
 
Note: Data for 1985 sourced from USAID/Guinea, 2006. All others from Eurostat Comext 
Source: USAID/Guinea, 2006; Eurostat Comext 2016; Author analysis 
4.2.3.2 Late 1990s to early 2000s: The rise of Costa Rica 
In a period of 5 years, from 1989 – 1993, the total area under pineapple cultivation in Costa 
Rica, increased by 49% from 4,700 hectares to 7,000 hectares (Jansen et al.,1996:20). 
However, a more significant increase in area under cultivation occurred between 1998 and 
2008, when cultivated area increased from 9,300 hectares to 16,445 hectares, a 76% 
increase (SEPSA, 2004:51), as demand for Costa Rica’s pineapples increased. The increase 
in demand and area cultivated was due to two factors; (a) innovation by Del Monte and (b) 
a consistent and determined state policy aimed at promoting non-traditional exports. In 
1990, the share of Côte d’Ivoire in the EU imports of pineapple was about 68%. By 1995, 
the volumes from Côte d’Ivoire had declined by 25% and its EU market share had fallen to 
52%, while Costa Rica had emerged as the second top exporter to the EU with a 21% 
market share (Figure 4.11 above). The decline in Côte d’Ivoire’s market share was a result 
of several factors, including the withdrawal of the state from production. First was an 
appreciation of the national currency, the CFA franc. In 1985, US$ 1 was worth 499 CFA. 
This value fell to between 272 and 319 CFA francs from 1988 to 1991, making Ivorian 
exports more expensive (Ridler, 1993:307). A devaluation of the currency in 1994 helped to 
boost exports, but matters worsened from 1996 when Côte d’Ivoire experienced political 
instability, culminating in a civil war in 2002.  
1985 1989 1995 2005 2013
Others 5.41 11.12 21.41 16.73 10.83
Costa Rica 0.64 14.48 21.57 59.52 82.52
Cote d'Ivoire 93.02 71.91 51.85 16.36 2.98
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Pineapple production in Costa Rica began in colonial times (González, 2004). Two varieties 
were produced for commercial purposes for the domestic market; the Monte Lirio and 
Smooth Cayenne (den Hass, 1993; González, 2004).49 The export arm of the sector did not 
take off until the late 1970s when the Pineapple Development Company (PINDECO), a 
subsidiary of Fresh Del Monte Produce (hereafter, Del Monte), set up operations in 
Buenos Aires de Puntarenas (in the southern part of the country) producing Smooth 
Cayenne for exports (Quijandria, Berrocal and Pratt, 1997).  Accordingly, the total area 
under pineapple cultivation in Costa Rica increased from 4,700 hectares in 1989 to 7,000 
hectares in 1993, with yields of 20 tonnes per hectare (Jansen et al., 1996: 20). Even then, 
Costa Rica was not a significant player on the world stage. 
Costa Rica’s economy was heavily dependent on banana and coffee exports in the 1960s 
and 1970s (INCAE, 1989; Clark, 1995; Cordero and Paus, 2008). Prior to the 1980s, the 
country, like other Latin American countries pursued an Import Substitution 
Industrialisation (ISI) Strategy.50 From 1980 – 1982, Costa Rica experienced economic 
turmoil and adopted SAP policies in 1985.51 In the 1980s and 1990s, the government’s 
agricultural policy was known as ‘Agriculture of Change’ (Hansen- Kuhn, 1993; Botella 
Rodríguez, 2014). Being highly dependent on coffee revenues, a key component of its SAP 
policies was export promotion and diversification of exports. The Costa Rican Coalition 
for Development Initiatives (CINDE), established in 1982 is a private, not-for-profit 
organisation with the main objective of attracting investment (FDI) into the NTE sector 
(Clark, 1995; Paus, 2005; Cordero and Paus, 2008).52 It was successful at doing so through 
the establishment of offices in the US, Europe, Japan and Hong Kong (Clark, 1995:2001).53   
Also, it was well staffed by workers from the USAID and other donor organisations In 
addition, by the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) of 1983, Costa Rica’s 
                                                 
49 Monte Lirio was the domestic variety. 
50 The economy benefitted from ISI policies as it grew in the 1960s and 1970s at rates of 5.9% and 6.4% 
respectively (Paus, 2005:137). 
51 International events such as the oil crisis of the 1970s and declines in world price of Costa Rica’s main 
export, coffee led to economic difficulties. Debt service reached 9.8 percent of GDP while external debt was 
59.5 percent of GDP (Lanza, 1995:6) 
52 Lanza (1995) and Clark (1997) note that the Costa Rican government had established an export promotion 
agency, known as Centro de Promocion de Exportaciones e Inversiones (CENPRO) in 1968. It was aimed at 
promoting and attracting FDI into the NTE sector.  CENPRO was however viewed as a failure because it 
did not possess the human, institutional and technical capabilities to see to a successful export promotion 
strategy. The USAID refused to work with it. 
53 CINDE (Coalición Costarricense de Iniciativas para el Desarrollo) was formed by Costa Rican private 
bankers, industrialists, top economists and the USAID. Its board of directors actively lobbied the state for 
many of the incentives given to the NTE (Clark, 1995:190). 
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exports to the US increased substantially.54 The consensus on the performance of the 
country with respect to export promotion and diversification is that it has been extremely 
successful at diversifying its export base, especially with the attraction of FDI into the non-
traditional export sector in the early 1990s (Clark, 1995; Paus, 2005; Ferreira and Harrison, 
2012).55 
In 1996, Del Monte introduced a new variety of pineapple, MD2, onto the market. MD2 
(Millie Dillard 2) is a hybrid of two other pineapple varieties and is marketed as extra sweet 
or sweet golden. It was developed in Hawaii by the Pineapple Research Institute (PRI) with 
funding from several large fruit companies, including Del Monte, Maui Pineapple 
Company (MPC) and Dole Food Company Inc. (hereafter, Dole). When the PRI was 
dissolved in 1975, several cultivars were given to the Maui Pineapple Company and the 
fruit companies.56 In 1993, Del Monte managed to get a 10-year patent for MD2 by arguing 
that they had sole rights to it. Although the other partners, Dole and MPC contested this 
right, Del Monte succeeded in preventing competitors and other producers from accessing 
MD2 for some time. The events of 9 September 2001 in the US forced Del Monte to look 
for new markets for its produce and thus it turned to Europe (NRI, 2010; Section B, p.21). 
Del Monte conducted an intense marketing campaign in Europe, promoting the advantages 
of MD2 over Smooth Cayenne (Danielou and Ravry, 2005; Fold and Gough, 2008; 
Kleemann, 2011). It succeeded in penetrating the European market.   
The advantages of MD2 over the other varieties include; (a) a higher sugar content, better 
colour and can be harvested earlier than Smooth Cayenne (b) a lower fibre and acidity 
content and (c) a longer post-harvest shelf life of 30 days, compared with 21 days for other 
varieties (Pineapple: UNCTAD Commodity Profile 2012; Jaeger, 2008).57 Finally, Del 
Monte in 2003 withdrew its case of patent infringement against other producers 
(Vagneron, Faure and Loeillet, 2009).  Through PINDECO the introduction of MD-2 
propelled Costa Rica, which was hitherto, an insignificant producer of pineapples, to the 
leading producer and the world’s topmost exporter to both the EU and US markets. 
                                                 
54 CBERA was an Act by the US which encouraged the production and exports of non-traditional produce 
from Central American and Caribbean countries, into the US. 
55 According to Barham et al (1992:43), non-traditional exports refer to (a) a product not previously produced 
in a particular country (b) a product traditionally produced for the domestic consumption but now exported 
(c) a new market for a traditionally produced product   
56MD2 was named after the wife of the general manager of the Maui Pineapple Company. (ISH, 2009 and 
http://www.chfusa.com/pineapples_md2.htm) 
57 MD2 however has a lower juice content than Smooth Cayenne making Smooth Cayenne the preferred 
variety for juicing purposes. 
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Pineapple cultivation in Costa Rica takes place in three areas; Huetar Norte (the largest 
producing region), Huetar Atlantica and Region Pacifico. As noted earlier, the state actively 
pursued a programme to attract FDI into the non-traditional export sector. In addition to 
economy-wide incentives such as exchange rate liberalisation, CINDE worked to promote 
several export incentives for the NTE sector.  These incentives were enshrined in three 
export regimes: (a) export contract (b) free trade zones (c) draw backs (Clark, 1995: 195). 
All three regimes gave a 100% tax exemption on imported machinery and intermediate 
inputs to be used in the production of goods for exports. Under the export contract, 
specific incentives included the Certificados de Abono Tributario (CAT), tax credit 
certificates which entitled exporters of anything other than traditional exports, such as 
banana and coffee, to claim a refund of up to 30% of the export value of produce (Paus, 
2005). In both the export contract and draw back regimes profits were 100% exempt from 
tax, while in the free trade zone, profits were non-taxable for the first eight years and at 
50% for the next four years (Clark, 1995:195).58 Although these incentives were extremely 
successful in attracting investment in NTEs, the CAT scheme, for example, was phased out 
from 1992 and totally discontinued in 1999, because it increased the fiscal burden of the 
state and was highly skewed in favour of large exporters. PINDECO alone received almost 
50% of the certificates; and corrupt practices, such as over-invoicing and fictitious exports, 
were undertaken by some exporters (Aragón and Kreyns, 1994; Clark, 1995; Paus, 2005).  
The state actively encouraged smallholder participation in the production of pineapples for 
export. In the 1990s, the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAG) and CINDE 
provided technical assistance, especially to small producers (Aragón and Kreyns, 1994; 
Clark, 1995; González, 2004).  For example, the MAG embarked on the Programa 
Nacional Sectoral de Piña (The national pineapple programme). Under this programme, in 
the San Carlos canton (Huetar Norte region), pineapple cultivation was introduced to 
smallholder farms. In the district of Pital, over half of the agricultural land was under 
pineapple cultivation in 2007 (Piñeiro & Díaz Ríos, 2007). MAG provided a technology 
package as a guide to producers on pineapple production. It had information on the 
recommended levels of fertiliser application available for small producers (den Daas, 
1993:7), while CINDE ran training programmes and funded conferences to provide new 
                                                 
58 According to Clark (1995:183), these incentives worked together with a well-educated workforce and good 
infrastructure to be successful. 
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information on technology, marketing and quality control to exporters (Clark, 1995:183).59 
In addition, years of producing bananas for exports in Costa Rica contributed to the ease 
of transferring knowledge on production processes in the pineapple sector. According to 
Incae (1989:6) familiarity with banana harvesting processes enabled pineapple producers to 
apply that experience to pineapple, ensuring the best quality produce. 
Organisation of producers: Production was carried out by small, medium-size and large 
producers. However, only PINDECO, out of the 20 producing firms at the time, could be 
classified as large scale because it cultivated about 4,000 hectares of land while the others 
ranged between 150 and 240 hectares (Quijandría, Berrocal and Pratt, 1997:5-6). Small scale 
participation, however, depended on the production location. In the south, where 
PINDECO dominated production, there were only 17 small producers (Quijandría, 
Berrocal and Pratt, 1997). Comparatively, in the Huetar Norte area there were about 630 
small producers, cultivating about 1,330 hectares of land because the state had encouraged 
settlement in the area and participation in pineapple cultivation (Quijandría, Berrocal and 
Pratt, 1997).   
Initially, though PINDECO produced much of its own pineapple, it also contracted with 
small and medium size farmers and provided technology and machinery (Incae, 1989). 
Other producers in the sector in the early 1990s included Frutas Tropicales, Piña Tica and 
Improtsa (Quijandría, Berrocal and Pratt, 1997:6).  







Note: EU12 data from 1989-1994; EU 15 data from 1995-1998; EU27 data from 1995.  
Source: Eurostat Comext (2016) 
                                                 
59 Small and medium scale producers in the North Atlantic Zone however complained about not having 
sufficient knowledge regarding fertiliser application protocols (Jansen et al., 1996:30). This can be attributed 
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Table 4.3: Growth of exports of pineapple to the EU by top 3 exporters, 1985-2013 




Volume 15.52% -5.57% 11.93% 




Volume 11.76% -2.47% 22.23% 




Volume 23.09% -0.36% 17.16% 




Volume 9.34% -14.79% -3.50% 
Value 5.93% -14.77% -4.04% 
2013 share of 
the market by 
volume 
 83% 3% 4% 
Source: Eurostat Comext (2016); Author analysis 
4.2.3.3 Mid-2000s – 2013: The dominance of Costa Rica 
Costa Rica has come to dominate both production and exports of pineapple. The annual 
growth in pineapple production from 2004 to 2005 was 49%. From 2005, Costa Rica has 
consistently placed within the top 5 producers of pineapple worldwide, reaching first place 
in 2013, with 11% of total world production (see Table 4.1).60  
Production has been spurred on by exports as Costa Rica has totally dominated the entire 
international pineapple market since 2005. Overall, in 2013 Costa Rica had a 61% share of 
total world exports of pineapple, up from 47% in 2005 (Figure 4.13).  In value terms, Costa 
Rica’s pineapple exports have almost tripled from US$328 million in 2005 to 
US$821million in 2013 (Figure 4.14). Contrasted with Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, the share 
of both countries declined (see Figure 4.11) as average annual growth rates of exports from 
                                                 
60 In annual average growth terms, production growth has slowed from 15% (1996-2005) to 8% (2006 – 
2013). The president of Canepep in an article published in La Nación in 2010 had commented that growth 
rates will slow as there was a shortage of land for growing pineapples (La Nación, 16 August 2010).  
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2006 -2013 for both countries significantly fell (Table 4.3).  
Figure 4.13: Share of world exports of pineapples by volume, 2005 and 2013 
 
 
Note: Includes re-exporting countries 










Figure 4.14: Costa Rica’s pineapple exports by quantity and value, 1989 – 2013  
 

















































Figure 4.15: Share of countries in Costa Rica exports of pineapples, 2008 and 2013 
 
Source: PROCOMER 2009 and 2014 
The organisation of producers in Costa Rica had begun to change by 2004. In 2005, 75% 
of producers were smallholders in Huetar Norte cultivated land sizes between 0.5 and 10 
hectares (Piñeiro and Díaz Ríos, 2007: 62). This percentage had increased to 98% in 2007 
and they contributed 5% of exported fruits (MAG, 2007). However, large scale producers 
came to dominate the sector partly because of the high initial cost of investment, US$9,900 
per hectare, required to get into pineapple production (Piñeiro and Díaz Ríos, 2007:62) and 
the high costs of certification for small producers (MAG, 2007). Furthermore, there was 
low demand for fruits by small producers because no price differentiation existed for fruits 
produced by different scale producers (MAG, 2007).  
In the Huetar Norte zone, large producers sold their produce to multinational companies 
such as Banacol S.A. (Gonzaleź , 2004:13). By this time also, PINDECO had stopped 
contracting with small producers. It rather had contracts with other large producers such as 





institutions such as the Consejo Nactional de Producción (CNP) and MAG encouraged the 
formation of farmer cooperatives which it saw as (a) a way to bypass intermediaries and 
gain more value for the farmers and (b) a way in which to direct credit and technical 
assistance to producers (Aragón and Kreyns, 1994; Fasciani, 2014).  The assistance and 
attention given to small producers meant that as early as 2003, some cooperatives had 
begun cultivation of MD2 cultivars and had their own packing plants by 2004 (Fasciani, 
2014: 69-70).61 Such cooperatives are further assisted in marketing their products to buyers 
in Europe through the Asociación de Productores Usuarios del Programa de Desarrollo 
Agroindustrial de la Zona Norte (ASOPROAGROIN) (Fasciani, 2014: 69-70). 62 
Out of a total of 45,000 hectares of pineapple cultivated by 2013, the Chamber of 
Pineapple Producers and Exporters (CANEPEP) reported that its 550 members cultivate 
38,000 hectares of land with 17,860 hectares in the Huetar North region, 11,780 hectares in 
the Huetar Atlantica region, and 8,360 hectares in the Pacifico region (Figure 4.16). The 
entire pineapple sector in 2013 had 170 pineapple exporters, 61 packing plants, 1300 
smallholders and is said to provide 26,600 direct jobs (CANAPEP 2013).63  




                                                 
61 One such plant was shut down in 2007 due to its inability to meet GLOBALGAP requirements (Fasciani, 
2014:70). 
62 ASOPROAGROIN was an association of small and medium producers sponsored by the Programa de 
Desarrollo Agroindustrial de la Zona Norte (PROAGROIN) – (Fasciani, 2014:70). 
63 Available at http://canapep.com/estadisticas/ 




The supply and demand of pineapples on the international market are the main factors 
influencing prices received by exporters; thus, price fluctuations are common. In peak 
demand periods of Christmas and winter, prices are relatively higher than in the low 
demand period of the summer season, when other fruits are available on the EU market. 
Also, weather conditions such as drought in the top exporting country, Costa Rica, 
influence prices. For example, increasing pineapple prices in 2013 were caused by drought, 
which led to poor harvest in Costa Rica. Other factors that affect price are quality and 
origin (CBI, 2008). Sea-freighted pineapples from Costa Rica, for example, receive a price 
premium over those from Ghana because of their consistent volumes and quality 
(Fieldwork Interviews, 2013). 
In the late 1990s to mid-2000s, pineapples exported from Costa Rica generally commanded 
higher prices than those of other countries. Import unit values at the aggregate EU level 
show that the price of Costa Rican exports of pineapples peaked at more than €1 per kg in 
2003 (see Figure 4.17) and  Costa Rica’s price premium over other exporters could be as 
high as 49% (Table 4.4), because other exporting countries had not yet made the move to 
the cultivation and export of MD2.65 According to USAID/Guinea (2006:8), the 27% 
average price differential in prices at the time was not attributable to poor quality or 
conditions of Smooth Cayenne but rather the market preference for MD2, as prices of 
Smooth Cayenne exported by air and sea from other African countries were comparable to 
Côte d’Ivoire’s.  
After the withdrawal of Del Monte’s patent claim, leading EU importers increased their 
demand for MD2 (Klemann and Effenberger, 2010:2) and supply from other exporting 
countries began to rise, causing prices to begin to fall (see Figure 4.17). Pineapples which 
were once marketed as an exotic or luxury item (NRI, 1988) became very common. From 
2007, oversupply had resulted in the convergence of import unit values of pineapples 
(Figure 4.17).  Falling prices were further worsened by declines in the quality of MD2 
exports as supplies had increased and the 2008 world financial crisis had caused a decrease 
in fruit demand (ITC Market Insider, 2013). Also, as more countries switched to MD2 
production, the share of Smooth Cayenne exports declined, along with a decline in price. 
In Côte d’Ivoire’s total pineapple exports, for instance, the share of Smooth Cayenne 
                                                 
65 The process of obtaining consistent historical data on wholesale prices of fresh pineapple exports for Costa 
Rica, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire proved extremely difficult and tedious. 
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decreased from 49% in 2001 to 13% in 2005 (Vagneron, Faure and Loeillet, 2009:441).  
Figure 4.17: European Union import unit values, euro per kg (1995-2013) 
 
Source: Eurostat Comext (2016); Author analysis 
Table 4.4: Monthly Wholesale Price (Euro/ kg) of MD2 and Smooth Cayenne at the 
Rungis Wholesale market, 2004 – 2005.66 





Costa Rica Price 
Premium 
2004 
October 1.07 0.80 34% 
November 1.25 0.84 49% 
December 1.22 0.84 45% 
2005 
January 1.19 0.81 47% 
February 1.39 1.08 29% 
March 1.37 1.08 27% 
April 1.33 0.96 39% 
May 1.06 0.85 25% 
June 1.00 0.85 18% 
July 0.85 0.86 -1% 
August 0.93 0.82 13% 
                                                 
66 The Rungis Wholesale market is located in Paris, France. In 2012, it was composed of 1,204 companies 
with 11, 683 employees. 338 out of the 1,204 companies trade in fruits and vegetables. Total turnover in 2012 
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September 1.01 0.72 40% 
October 0.98 0.78 26% 
November 0.80 0.78 3% 
December 0.89 0.81 10% 
Average 1.09 0.86 27% 
Average per 
container 
17.99 14.19  
Source: USAID/Guinea (2006:8) 
Niche markets: There are no official statistics on the production and/or import volumes 
of organic pineapples although the EU is the largest market for organic pineapples. It is 
estimated that the majority of organic pineapple fruits in the EU are from Ghana 
(Kleemann, 2011:5), but increasingly also from Costa Rica (CBI, 2008; 2014). Supplying 
certified organic fruits is said to be more profitable than participating in the conventional 
market, as farmers receive a premium (Bolwig, Gibbon and Jones, 2009; Maertens and 
Swinnen, 2009). Organic pineapple exports from Ghana may suffer a decline, as one of the 
main producer-exporters (who also contracted with smallholders) decided to cease to 
operate as a pineapple producer and exporter in 2015, citing the difficulty in competing 
with Costa Rica (Personal conversation, 2015). He is now going into the cultivation and 
export of Stevia, a plant used in the production of sweeteners (Personal conversation, 
2015). 
Previously, the EU organic pineapple market was characterised by high prices, high quality 
and low volumes (Krigsvold, 2000; Eosta/ICCO, 2010). This was partly because the 
chemical ethylene, which is used in ‘forcing’ of pineapples, was prohibited by the EEC 
Regulation No.2092/91.67 This rule was reversed in 2007. Large growers and MNCs who 
had anticipated the change in EU regulation began investing in organic pineapple farms 
around 2003 (Eosta/ICCO, 2010:8). Over time, these firms have increased their 
participation in the market, raising concerns that the organic market will eventually mimic 
the conventional market. From 2007, prices in the conventional pineapple market had 
begun to converge at low values. The niche market followed suit with low and highly 
                                                 
67 The practice of 'forcing' fruits ensures that flowering occurs earlier than under normal conditions, so as to 
produce fruits sooner. Forcing is done using the chemical ethylene, ethephon or calcium carbide.  These 
chemicals are labelled as pesticides, because ‘pesticides include substances intended for use as plant growth 
regulators, defoliants, desiccants or agents for thinning fruit or preventing the premature fall of fruit, and 
substances applied to crops either before or after harvest to protect the commodity from deterioration during 
storage and transport (FAO Statistical Yearbook, 2013:16) 
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fluctuating prices, excessive supplies, declining quality: all reinforced by events on the 
conventional market (ITC Market Insider, 2013).  
In 2009, in response to farmer complaints about low prices, Fairtrade increased the 
minimum prices for pineapples by an average of 14% worldwide (FLO, 2009b).68 Since 
80% of Fairtrade pineapple volumes are from Costa Rica and Ghana, they have country-
specific minimum prices and premiums (FLO, 2009b; Table 4.5).69 
Table 4.5: Price (USD per kg) of pineapples on the Fairtrade organic and conventional 
markets  




Ghana Organic FOB 0.75 0.05 
Conventional FOB 0.60 0.05 
Costa Rica Organic FOB 0.83 0.05 




Organic FOB 0.72 0.05 
Conventional FOB 0.60 0.05 
Source: FLO (2009a), prices valid from 1 October 2009 
 
4.3 The Global Pineapple value chain 
Based on the value chain of fresh fruits and vegetables, the global pineapple value chain 
can be divided into five stages: Input supply, Cultivation/Production, Packing and Storage, 
Processing, and Marketing and Distribution (Figure 4.18).  
 
 
                                                 
68FLO minimum prices refer to ‘the lowest possible price that a buyer of Fairtrade products must pay the 
producer. The price is set based on a consultative process with Fairtrade farmers, workers and traders and 
guarantees that producer groups receive a price which covers what it costs them to grow their crop. When the 
market price is higher than the Fairtrade minimum price, the trader must pay the market price.’ 
(www.fairtrade.org.uk/en/what-is-fairtrade/faqs) 
69 A FLO premium is ‘an additional sum of money paid on top of the Fairtrade minimum price that farmers 
and workers invest in social, environmental and economic developmental projects to improve their 
businesses and their commodities’ (www.fairtrade.org.uk/en/what-is-fairtrade/faqs) 
112 
 
Figure 4.18: The Global Fresh Fruit and Vegetables value chain 
 
Source: Fernandez-Stark, Bamber and Gereffi (2011:12) 
4.3.1 Governance of the Global pineapple industry 
Governance of the pineapple value chain involves different players at both the global and 
national levels. At the global level, retailers (supermarkets) are the lead firms, as they 
determine what to produce, how and when. Such retailers include: Carrefour in France, 
Royal Ahold in the Netherlands, Tesco, Asda and Marks and Spencer in the UK. Globally, 
the pineapple value chain is buyer driven. Increasing concentration of retailers, control over 
consumer trends, quality-based competition amongst retailers and the enormous 
purchasing power of lead firms have shifted control of the value chain to retailers vis-à-vis 
importers and producers (suppliers) (Gibbon 2001a; Lee, Gereffi and Beauvais, 2012). In 
the UK, supermarkets controlled as much as 70-90% of fresh produce from Africa by 1999 
(Dolan, Humphrey and Harris-Pascal, 1999:7).  
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Still, importers play a key role in the chain by acting as intermediaries between retailers and 
suppliers. Increasingly, actual buying responsibilities have shifted to importers. This is in 
response to increased competition in the retail sector and increased costs of managing fresh 
fruit and vegetable value chains, as these chains have volatile prices, fragmented suppliers 
and laborious quality control processes. Certain high volume importers who are usually 
highly-vertically integrated along the entire chain (e.g. Del Monte, Dole, Standard Fruit, 
Chiquita and Banacol) are equally major players in the chain, because of their ability to 
innovate (CBI, 2014a). The high mutual dependence between the two parties leads the 
pineapple value chain to be best described as a bilateral oligopoly.70  
Restructuring of the global fruit and vegetable value chain, in response to increased 
competition, product differentiation, consumer demands and trade liberalisation in 
developing countries, has led to the need for more coordination between retailers and their 
suppliers. Product and process standards (or simply standards) have become the main tool 
of achieving the desired level of coordination. Standards (both public and private) point to 
a perception of high quality of the produce: thus ‘standards are agreed criteria’ or, as 
Hawkins states, ‘external points of reference,’ by which a product or service’s performance, 
its technical and physical characteristics, and/or the process and conditions under which it 
has been produced or delivered can be assessed’ (Nadvi and Wältring, 2004 in Humphrey 
and Memedovic, 2006:15).  
In the 1990s, food safety became a topical concern, following food scandals in Europe and 
the US such as Salmonella in eggs and cantaloupe in the late 1980s and 1990s (Lee, 2006; 
Knowles, Moody and McEachern, 2007; Narrod et al., 2009). To protect the population, 
regional bodies, such as the European Union (EU), imposed some laws to govern the 
imports and sale of food, including fruits and vegetables.  Legislation specific to food 
includes (a) The General Food Law (Regulation (EC) 178/2002) (b) Hygiene of food stuff 
(Regulations (EC) 852/2004; 853/2004, 854/2004). Those relating to pesticide use and 
contaminants; include (a) Maximum Residue Levels (MRL) (Regulation (EC) 396/2005) (b) 
Microbial contamination of food stuffs (Regulation (EC) 2073/2005) (c) Contaminants in 
food (Regulation (EC) 1881/2006) (c) Certificate of Conformity (d) Certificate of Industrial 
Use. Specifically targeting the fruits and vegetable sector is the quality standards for the 
                                                 
70 ‘A bilateral monopoly/oligopoly is a situation where there is a single (or few) buyer(s) and seller(s) of a 
given product in a market. The level of concentration in the sale or purchase of the product results in a 




marketing of fresh fruits and vegetables regulation (Regulation (EC) 2200/96). Rules on 
packaging include (a) Materials coming into contact with food (Regulation 1935/2004) (b) 
General requirements on packaging (Directive 94/62/EC). These mandatory public 
regulations inspired ‘voluntary’ private standards at both the industry-wide and retailer 
specific levels, since national and EU laws made retailers responsible for food safety (Busch 
and Bain, 2004; Jaffee and Henson, 2004; UNCTAD, 2007; Henson and Humphrey, 2009). 
For example, the UK's Food Safety Act of 1990 legislated that any person who sells food 
for human consumption which does not meet the requirements of the law is guilty of an 
offence and liable for any financial losses. Hence, retailers and wholesalers could be liable 
for an offense caused by others e.g. farmer, exporter or the importer.  
Types of standards: Private standards can be grouped into individual firm standards or 
collective standards. They have evolved over the years from the tangible or visible 
characteristics of a good or product to intangible characteristics, such as taste (Gibbon, 
2008:40). According to Henson and Humphrey (2010), private agri-food standards are 
usually developed by commercial entities, enforced by third party certification and are 
voluntary. However, since they are adopted by most retailers or developed by them, it 
becomes necessary to have the certification in order to export to these retailers (i.e. 
participate in the value chain). Agri-food standards generally are in relation to pesticide 
residues, traceability and field and packhouse operations (Lee, 2006; Narrod et al., 2009).71 
Traceability involves the ability to track a fruit from its origins and thus requires constant 
monitoring and documentation from the pre-farm activities to post-harvest and finally 
consumption. Pesticide residues communicate the maximum amounts of pesticide residues 
legally permitted in a fruit, while field and packhouse operations involve activities such as 
the appropriate temperature at which to keep fruits from post-harvest to consumption.  
These standards, though voluntary, are much stricter than EU laws; because they go 
beyond what is required by national governments to cover various topics like labour, food 
safety, environment and ethics. For example, British Retail Consortium (BRC) and 
International Food standards cover food safety; IFOAM covers organic production 
methods and GLOBALG.A.P. covers multiple topics including food safety, processing, 
                                                 
71 The British Food Safety Act (1990) and the EU food law (2008), for example, require the retailer to ensure 
that the food it sells is safe for consumption and can be traced from production to consumption.   
115 
 
environment and labour.72   
The most important private standard in the fresh fruit and vegetable industry for 
participation in the European market is GLOBALG.A.P.  It is a pre-farm standard that 
seeks to harmonise good agricultural practices all over the world. It is recognised in over 
100 countries and is made up of more than 50 international retailers and producers from 
countries such as Germany, Japan, Netherlands, the UK and France. The standard applies 
to activities along the entire production chain, including land preparation, soil management, 
post-harvest handling, packing, storage, quality control, pest and weed control, etc. Since 
GLOBALG.A.P. is not a marketing tool, producers do not earn a premium from 
subscribing to it, unlike the Fairtrade standard. Since the mid-2000s, GLOBALG.A.P. has 
become a pre-requisite to access the European market and, as at 2006, GLOBALG.A.P. 
retailers controlled 85% of Western Europe's fresh produce market (Lee, 2006:13).  
Producers who desire GLOBALGAP certification must have a Quality Management 
System (QMS) which is benchmarked to the control points in Table 4.6. Adherence to the 
QMS is audited by a certified third-party.73 Certification can take place through four 
channels:  
● Option 1: Individual producers with single or multiple sites of production 
● Option 2: Producer groups. This option makes it possible for small and medium-
scale farmers who cannot achieve certification on their own due to monetary and 
technical requirements, to form groups in order to achieve certification. All 
producers in this group must adhere to an internal QMS which governs the 
production of products to be certified.  
● Option3 and 4: Individuals and producer groups that are certified using local 
standards benchmarked to GLOBALG.A.P. 
 
Other international standards applicable to pineapple production are the Hazard Analysis 
Critical Control Points (HACCP) and ISO 9000. HACCP is a risk management tool which 
applies to food processing companies worldwide. It ‘identifies specific hazards and 
establishes control systems that focus on prevention rather than mainly on end-product 
testing’ and must be adapted to the specific situation of each production firm (Lee, 
                                                 
72 GLOBALG.A.P. was formerly known as EUREPGAP. 
73 Only one firm (SGS Ghana), is certified as a GLOBALGAP certification body in Ghana.  
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2006:9).74 One of the most important control points in the HACCP is the temperature at 
which food should be handled, prepared, transported and stored. All producers and 
exporters of packed fresh fruits and vegetables to the UK, must in addition, meet the BRC 
standard. The BRC is generally based on HACCP and ISO 9000 principles. On top of the 
above-named industry-wide standards, specific standards set by retailers, such as Tesco's 
Nature's Choice, Marks and Spencer's from Farm to Fork and Carrefour's Filiere Qualite, 
must be met by their suppliers.  
Table 4.6: Examples of GLOBALG.A.P. product and process quality requirements  
Control Point Compliance Criteria and Level 
Soil Management and 
Conservation: Have soil 
maps been prepared for 
the farm? 
The types of soil are identified for each site, based on a soil 






traceable back to and 
trackable from the 
registered farm (and other 
relevant registered areas) 
where it has been 
produced and, if 
applicable, handled? 
There is a documented identification and traceability system 
that allows GLOBALG.A.P. registered products to be 
traced back to the registered farm or, in a farmer group, to 
the registered farms of the group, and tracked forward to 
the immediate customer (one step up, one step down). 
Harvest information shall link a batch to the production 
records or the farms of specific producers. Produce 
handling shall also be covered if applicable. 
Level: Major Must 
Fertilizer Application: 
Are recommendations for 
the application of 
fertilizers (organic or 
inorganic) provided by 
competent and qualified 
persons? 
 
Where the fertilizer records show that the technically 
responsible person determining the quantity and type of the 
fertilizer (organic or inorganic) is an external adviser, 
training and technical competence shall be demonstrated via 
official qualifications, specific training courses etc., unless 
employed for that purpose by a competent organization 
(e.g. official advisory services) 
 
                                                 


















Applied fertilizer types? 
Where the fertilizer records show that the technically 
responsible person determining quantity and type of 
fertilizer (organic or inorganic) is the producer, experience 
shall be complemented by technical knowledge (e.g. access 
to product technical literature, specific training course 
attendance, etc.) and/or the use of tools (software, on farm 
detection methods, etc.) 
Level: Minor Must 
 
The exact dates (day, month and year) of the application are 
detailed in the records of all fertilizer applications. No N/A. 
Level: Minor Must 
 
The trade name, type of fertilizer (e.g. NPK), and 
concentrations (e.g.17-17-17) are detailed in the records of 
all fertilizer applications. No N/A. 
Level: Minor Must 
Pre-Harvest: Quality of 
water used on pre-harvest 
activities 
A written risk assessment of microbiological quality of the 
water is conducted. It includes water source, proximity to 
potential sources of contamination, application timing 
(growth stage of the crop), application method, and 
placement of application (harvestable part of the crop, other 
parts of the crop, ground between crops, etc.). 




Have workers received 
specific training in 
hygiene before harvesting 
and handling produce? 
There shall be evidence that the workers received specific 
induction and annual training regarding the hygiene 
procedures for the harvesting and product handling 
activities. Workers shall be trained using written (in 
appropriate languages) and/or pictorial instructions to 
prevent physical (e.g. snails, stones, insects, knives, fruit 
residues etc.) microbiological and chemical contamination 
of the product during harvesting. Training records and 
evidence of attendance shall be available. 
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Level: Major Must 
Sanitary facilities: Are 
there suitable changing 
facilities for the workers? 
The changing facilities should be used to change clothing 
and protective outer garments as required. 
 
Level: Recommended 
Pest Control: Is there a 
system for monitoring 
and correcting pest 
populations in the 
packing and storing areas? 
Producers shall implement measures to control pest 
populations in the packing and storing areas appropriate to 
the farm condition. No N/A. 
Level: Major Must 
Source: GLOBALG.A.P. (2016) 
Impact of standards: The widespread use of standards has led to debates on whether they 
are barriers to entry for producers, especially small producers (Lee, Gereffi and Beauvais, 
2012) or whether they may boost the competitiveness of developing countries and improve 
upon their export performance through the reduction of transaction costs (Jaffee and 
Henson,2007).  
On the one hand, standards impose considerable financial, information and physical costs 
on producers and suppliers, increasing the risk of exclusion of those who are unable to 
meet these costs.  For small exporters and producers, costs of compliance with standards 
are high and risky as investment returns require a minimum threshold of production to be 
profitable. Thus, many smallholder producers and small exporters in developing countries 
could be driven out of the market, because of their limited access to credit and other 
resources. (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; Jensen, 2005; Maertens and Swinnen, 2009; 
Graffam et al., 2007, cited in Henson and Humphrey, 2010).  
On the other hand, standards have reduced transaction costs by making available the 
necessary information required to produce and trade in value chains. A report by the 
OECD in 2007 on the impact of standards on the Ghanaian pineapple sector showed that 
respondents perceived that they were more efficient in their business operations as they 
now knew exactly what to do and not to do. Admittedly, uncertainty about the quality and 
quantity of produce leads to increased real costs of production; hence knowing exactly 
what to do and how to do it would lead to a reduction in costs. In Senegal’s fresh fruits and 
vegetable export sector, export earnings have increased since the quality of the products 
119 
 
has increased (Maertens and Swinnen, 2008).  
4.3.2 The structure of the Global pineapple chain 
Production for exports: Within countries, the production node is characterised by a 
concentration of producers, with the majority of volumes produced on plantations owned 
by fruit and vegetable MNCS, such as Dole, Del Monte, Banacol, Compaigne Fruitere and 
Flyffees, or their contracted independent growers in a number of countries (ILRF, 2008; 
CBI, 2015). Del Monte in Costa Rica accounts for over 50% of the country’s exports, while 
Dolefil (Dole’s subsidiary in the Philippines) dominates the Philippine market. These 
MNCs operate across all the stages of the value chain.  
SSA's participation in the value chain largely focuses on the cultivation (production stage) 
of pineapples. Activities carried out include: planting, harvesting, cleaning, packaging and 
storage. Whereas before 2004 smallholders and outgrowers dominated production, 
production is largely currently done by large scale producers or MNCs.  
Imports: The organisation of the import market has evolved over the past few years. 
Previously, wholesalers were the main actors; however, in recent years the retail market 
(super/hypermarket) has become increasingly concentrated. For example, over 80% of 
horticultural produce is sold by seven supermarkets in the UK, and 96% of all freshly 
prepared fruit was sold by supermarkets in Europe (World Bank, 2011a:54). Concentration 
and more stringent buyer requirements have led retailers to establish direct contact with 
importers (mainly MNCs) who ship directly to them (CBI 2014a; 2015). Thus, on the EU 
market, the imports of pineapples are dominated by a few highly-integrated fruit and 
vegetable MNCs which supply high volumes at low prices (Rohrbach et al., 2003 in Wilson, 
2010; CBI, 2015). Importers have three types of buyers; retailers, wholesalers and other EU 
countries (re-exports). 65% of MD2 pineapples are sold by retailers, 10-15% by wholesalers 
and 20-25% is re-exported (CBI, 2014a). 
Pineapple fruits are classified into three quality categories; Extra class, Class 1 and Class 2 
(CBI, 2015). The requirements for classification are given in Table 4.7. Extra Class fruit 
sizes are 1.5 kg and above, Class 1 sizes are between 1.1kg and 1.5 kg, and Class 2 sizes are 
less than 1 kg. The European market prefers small sized fruits hence majority of the fruits 
sold on the EU market are classified as Class 1 (CBI, 2015).  
Transportation is through two avenues; sea or air. Over 99% of MD2 pineapples sold in 
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the EU are transported by sea, together with banana imports (CBI, 2014b; 2015).  100% of 
MD2 exports from Latin American countries are by sea, compared with 90% for African 
exporters (CBI, 2014a).  The remaining 10% is air freighted.75 Air freights also occur for 
Sugar Loaf and Smooth Cayenne varieties and processed pineapple e.g. fresh cut.76 To keep 
the products fresh and improve their shelf life, pineapples are transported in refrigerated 
containers at an optimal temperature between 8˚ and 10˚Celsius.77 Transit time from West 
Africa to Europe is between 10 and 15 days (approximately two weeks). Sea vessels which 
undertake transportation include Delmas and AEL. When imports arrive in the destination 
country, a quality inspection is carried out before they are transported to the importer’s 
own warehouse or the retailer’s. 
Since sea freighting requires substantial volumes, transportation is controlled by large 
players: importers (e.g. Dole, Del Monte) and the supermarkets (e.g. Asda, Sainsbury, and 
Tesco). Small players are practically non-existent here and to transport their produce, they 
must come together. For example, Ghanaian pineapple producers put together their 
volumes to buy space on a vessel controlled by the only MNC in the Ghanaian pineapple 
industry.  
When pineapple, is air freighted, it is transported by passenger airplanes, such as KLM, 
British Airways and Air France, or cargo planes. Approximately 70% of the pineapple that 
is air-freighted is of the Smooth Cayenne variety and is targeted at niche markets which pay 
a price premium for it (CBI, 2014a). Wholesalers are the main actors here, selling up to 







                                                 
75 Ghana is the only African country which exports some amounts of MD2 by air (CBI, 2014a) 
76 Côte d’Ivoire is the only country still exporting Smooth Cayenne by sea (CBI, 2014) 
77 Temperatures below 8˚-10˚Celsius cause bruising to the fruit. 
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Table 4.7: Requirements for the classification of pineapples 
Minimum requirement 
for all classes 
Intact, with or without crown. If present, the crown may 
be reduced or trimmed. 
● Sound; produce affected by rotting or 
deterioration, such as to make it unfit for 
consumption is excluded. 
● Clean, practically free of any visible foreign 
matter 
● Free from pests 
● Free from damage caused by pests affecting the 
flesh 
● Fresh in appearance, including the crowns 
● Free if abnormal external moisture 
● Free of any foreign small and/or taste 
● When a stalk is present, it shall not be longer 
than 2.5 cm measured from the shoulder of the 
fruit and the cut must be transversal, straight and 
clean. However, during transportation, 
pineapples with longer stem are excluded from 
this requirement. 
● The development and condition of the 
pineapples must be such as to enable them 
withstand transportation and handling. 
‘Extra’ Class If the crown is present, it should not exceed 150% of 
the length of the fruit. 
● It must be fresh and not discoloured 
● Flesh must be perfectly sound 
● Fruits must be free from defects with the 
exception of very slight superficial defects, 
provided these do not affect the general 
appearance of the produce, the quality, the 
keeping quality and presentation in the package 
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Class 1 The crown, if present, must be single and with no side-
shoots and should not exceed 150% of the length of the 
fruit. It may be: 
● Slightly damaged 
● Slightly discoloured 
● Slightly curved with a maximum inclination not 
exceeding 30˚ from the longitudinal axis of the 
fruit. 
● Flesh must be perfectly sound. 
However, the following slight defects may be allowed if 
they do not affect the general appearance of the 
produce, the quality, the keeping quality and 
presentation in the package: 
● A slight defect in shape 
● Slight defects in colouring including 
discolouration caused by the sun 
● Slight skin defects not exceeding 5% of the total 
surface area 
● Slight bruises 
Class 2 Fruits in this class do not qualify for classification in the 
higher classes but satisfy the minimum requirements 
presented above. 
● Flesh must be free from major defects 
The following defects may be allowed if they do not 
affect the general appearance of the produce, the quality, 
the keeping quality and presentation:  
● Defects in shape, including a double crown 
● Defects in colouring, including sun-scorch 
● Skin defects not exceeding 10% of the total 
surface area  
● Bruises 




Marketing and Distribution: Majority of sea freighted pineapples meant for Europe are 
docked in ports in Belgium and the Netherlands (CBI, 2014a).  These countries re-export 
about 65% of the pineapples imported into the countries, and approximately 20-25% is 
sold internally (CBI, 2014a).  
As noted in the section above on governance, the topical issue in the marketing and 
distribution of fresh fruits and vegetables, including pineapples, is food safety. Thus, 
retailers and importers only contract with producers who can meet the stringent quality 
requirements set out by national and/regional regulations and retailers. As competitive 
pressures, have increased in retail markets, retailers have been bypassing importers to 
contract directly with producers (CBI, 2012; 2014a).  
Recall from section 4.3.1 that there has been a shift in the role of retailers as buyers to 
importers. Though, ultimately, buying decisions lie with the retailer, importers have become 
category managers performing the buying function. In this regard, a buyer is no more ‘a 
specific sector expert, experienced in procurement and tolerant of the sector-supply 
characteristics’ (World Bank, 2011a: 173), but rather a category manager whereby ‘each 
category is managed as a business unit, with its own set of financial targets and marketing 
strategies’ (World Bank, 2011a:173). A category of fresh fruits e.g. Tropical Fruits may 
consist of pineapples, mangoes, kiwis, pomegranates, dates, avocados, among others. The 
aim of the category management is to maximise the turnover of the entire group of 
categories and not just the individual products (World Bank, 2011a; IGD website).78 The 
market power of retailers (supermarkets) enables them to increase competition among 
suppliers. Supermarkets have preferred suppliers (importers), with whom they engage in 
long-term contracts. Within these contracts, exact volumes and prices are agreed upon a 
week or two before shipment (CBI, 2009). Some supermarkets require importers to send in 
price quotes in advance every week or two. Through this practice, supermarkets can force 
prices downwards by playing suppliers against each other (CBI, 2009). Importers also then 
transfer the price pressure on to exporters and producers. The example of Ghanaian 
exporters is indicated in Chapter 7. 
The power of retailers allows them to take the largest share of the value of pineapples 
                                                 
78  The Institute of Grocery Distribution (IGD) defines category management as ‘the strategic management 
of product groups through trade partnerships, which aims to maximize sales and profits by satisfying 





produced and exported.  In a study in 2010 by Consumers International (a worldwide 
federation of consumer groups) it was shown that for a pineapple produced in and 
exported from Costa Rica, a typical European retailer captures the largest value, 41%, 
compared with 4% (in the form of wages) for workers on pineapple farms (Figure 4.19). 
Figure 4.19: Value capture by different participants in the international pineapple market  
 
Source: Consumers International (2010) 
4.4 Background to Ghana’s Pineapple Export Sector  
'There is considerable official and popular excitement about pineapples in Ghana these days…’ (Daddieh, 
1998:101) 
Cultivation or production of pineapples takes place in the southern part of the country, 
mainly in the Eastern and Central regions, and to a limited extent in the Volta region 
(Figure 4.20). Pineapple production in Ghana began in the 1930s in the village of Samsam 
(Ampadu-Agyei, 1994; Abbey, 2005; Suzuki, 2014). However, it was for local consumption 
and not exports as the variety did not have the quality (particularly, colour) preferred by 
importers (Whitfield, 2010b: 15). During World War II pineapple cultivation was revived, 
but it declined after the servicemen left. In the late 19th century German missionaries 
introduced the Smooth Cayenne variety of pineapple to farmers in Aburi in the Eastern 






Figure 4.20: Administrative map of Ghana  
 
Source: GSS (2002).  
The beginnings of a booming pineapple export sector in Ghana were borne out of the 
ERP/SAP reforms implemented by the Rawlings-led government in the mid-1980s. The 
main variety of pineapple traded on the international market from the 1980s to the early 
2000s was the Smooth Cayenne variety. This variety was well known to Ghanaian farmers, 
as they had been cultivating it for a long period of time. They were therefore well versed in 
its agronomic requirements. Also, it required relatively minimal fertiliser application and 
had a low cost of post-harvest activities. In fact, Whitfield (2010b:31) claims that the 
Smooth Cayenne variety produced good fruits even when good agronomic practices were 
not followed. 
Initially, retailers marketed pineapple in the EU market as an exotic crop (NRI, 1988; Fold 
and Gough, 2008); thus, imports (and thereby exports) of pineapples increased 
exponentially (Figure 4.4). In Ghana, export volumes had generally been modest until they 
exceeded 10,000 tonnes in 1991 (Figure 6.1). From 1985 to 1994, pineapple export 
volumes grew at an average annual rate of 44%.  By and large, fluctuations in demand 
occurred during the summer period when other fruits were available; but demand was high 
during festive periods, such as Christmas.  Ghanaian exporters accessed the low price-low 
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quality niche market in the EU (Danielou and Ravry, 2005): so even though it was a 
significant exporter to the EU it did not threaten the competitive position of its rivals, 
Costa Rica and Cote d’Ivoire (Jaeger, 2008). 
Pineapple exports form an important part of NTAEs from Ghana. Although horticulture 
exports are less than 1% of the total export receipts of Ghana, they are important in terms 
of the ability to create employment and lower the incidence of poverty in the country 
(MoFA, 2007; NDPC, 2014). 
 
4.5 The structure of the Ghanaian chain (mid-1980s -2004) 
In this section, I will outline the structure of the Ghanaian pineapple export value chain. A 
more comprehensive analysis of the chain during this period is carried out in Chapter 6. 
Figure 4.21: Ghanaian pineapple export value chain (mid-1980s – 2004) 
 
 
Note: Processors also process other fruits e.g. mango and passion fruit 




Input supply: Planting materials such as suckers were not difficult to obtain. Suckers were 
available on the farms of smallholders or small-scale farmers and also available to buy from 
nearby farms throughout the year (Danielou and Ravry, 2005).  There was also no shortage 
of land for pineapple cultivation in the production areas (Takane, 2004), although acquiring 
land for large-scale farming could be time consuming and complex because of the land 
tenure system. Pineapples generally respond well to applications of fertiliser, especially 
nitrogen and potassium, which directly impact the fruit size and quality (Paull and Duarte, 
2011; USAID, 2011). Although the quantity of nitrogen required is between 225 and 350 
kg/ha (Paull and Duarte, 2011:350) amounts for the other fertilisers are best evaluated 
using soil analysis (Malezieux and Bartholomew, 2003 in Paull and Duarte, 2011). In the 
first few months of cultivation (2-4 months), fertiliser requirements are low. After the fifth 
month, the requirements increase. For ratoon crops (subsequent fruiting from the same 
mother plant) more fertiliser is needed since the existing nutrients in the soil have been 
removed by the mother plant (Paull and Duarte, 2011:350).79 Fertilisers were easily available 
in the country but what was likely a problem was affordability. The fertiliser market had 
been liberalised as part of the SAP reforms, but farmers’ credit constraints meant that most 
could not afford the input.  
 
Land and labour were also relatively available. Land had to be accessed through the local 
land tenure system (Takane, 2004; Fold and Gough, 2008; Whitfield 2010b) which could 
sometimes be complex and frustrating. Labour was also said to be relatively available as the 
boom in exports led to the return of youths (Yeboah, 2005).  
Cultivation (Production): The principal area for cultivation of pineapple for export was 
the Akwapim South District in the Eastern Region (Figure 4.22). With no accurate data on 
the number of participating small scale producers due to the large number who entered the 
market as and when they deemed it profitable, the NRI (2010; Section B, p.20) estimated 
that the sector consisted of as much as 10,000 small scale producers cultivating 0.2ha to 10 
ha of land, 40 medium scale producers cultivating between 20 and 150 ha and 12 large 
producers cultivating between 300 and 700 ha of land.  
 
                                                 
79 Costa Rica harvests a ratoon crop but Ghana does not as the suckers borne by the mother plant need to be 
used as planting materials for the next season. 
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Figure 4.22: Principal Pineapple Production Districts in Ghana 
 
Source: Industry expert 2 (Fieldwork interview, 2013) 
Areas of pineapple cultivation are within a 60-km radius of Accra, the capital city, and are 
less than 2 hours away from the sea and the airport in Accra by road. Production is labour-
intensive, and harvesting can be done throughout the year, with a peak period in March to 
July in Ghana. It matures between 12 and 18 months after planting and is very sensitive to 
very cold and high temperatures. Producing areas in Ghana are characterised by high daily 
temperatures, an average of 25˚ - 28˚ Celsius, and high humidity (Table 4.8). These 
conditions reduce the ability to produce 'quality' pineapples for the international market 


















Rain Forest 9,500 2,200 800-2,800 March-July Sept.-Nov. 
Deciduous 
Forest 
66,000 1,500 1,200-1,600 March-July Sept.-Nov. 
Transitional 
Zone 
8,400 1,300 1,100-1,400 March-July Sept.-Oct. 
Coastal 
Savannah 
4,500 800 600-1,200 March-July Sept.-Oct. 
Guinea 
Savannah 
147, 900 1,000 800-1,200 May-Sept.  
Sudan 
Savannah 
2,200 1,000  May-Sept.  
Source: FAO (2005a:3) 
Packing and storage: In the export of fruits and vegetables, ‘packaging is not only a 
question of containment but also of protection and market presentation’ (Voisard and 
Jaeger, 2003: 38). Also, CBI (2016) notes that 'the condition in which your shipment arrives 
at the customers’ premises is just as critical in the order procedure as any other activity 
undertaken to satisfy them.'80 Packing and storage equipment used by Ghanaian farmers 
and exporters were rudimentary. Fruits were packed out in the open and transported to the 
exit ports without cooling. Consequently, Ghanaian pineapple fruits were of low quality. 
Exports: A relatively good number of local exporters participated in the sector at any point 
in time during the period. However, these exporters had low volume capacities, thus no 
economies of scale. Some exporters had their own farms and could be termed as producer-
exporters (e.g. Bomarts Farms Ltd., John Lawrence Farms and Jei River Ltd., Koranco 
Farms), while others relied exclusively on smallholders (e.g. Prudent Farms). There was no 
MNC participation in the chain until 2004. Due to political instability in Cote d’Ivoire, 
Compagnie Fruitière relocated its production to Ghana and registered a company under the 
name Golden Exotics Limited (GEL).   
                                                 
80 All fruits in a carton should have the same size, shape and colour. 
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Processing:  As output of pineapple increased, so did the volume available for the domestic 
market; thus, in the 1990s and early 2000s, a number of local fruit processing companies 
sprang up to process fruits which were deemed not exportable. For exports, Blue Skies 
Ghana Ltd (owned by a British national) exported fresh-cut pineapple while   Athena 
Foods exported pineapple concentrate. 
Marketing and distribution: There were no Ghanaian firms involved in the marketing 
and distribution of fruits on the EU market. Ghanaian exporters shipped fruits to 
importers who handled marketing and distribution to supermarkets and wholesalers. 
Whitfield (2010b:18) notes that early on Ghanaian exporters accessed EU buyers through 
friends and family. Another channel for making contact was through participation in 
international fruit fairs. 
4.6 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has looked at the evolution of the global pineapple value chain over the last 
25 years. The changes in trade patterns in the global pineapple value chain have mainly 
been a result of competitive strategies pursued by Del Monte and global buyers. These 
changes have created both opportunities and challenges for all other actors in the chain. 
Participation in the fruit and vegetable value chain can be beneficial, but the stringent 
standards requirements may be a barrier to participation and possibly result in the 
marginalisation of small producers and exporters. 
Unfortunately, in the restructuring of the global chain, both Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana lost 
considerable market share to Costa Rica.  Although both countries significantly participated 
in the global chain in the 1980s and 1990s, their inability to innovate and quickly adjust to 
changes on the international scene thereafter led to their decline. The organisation 
(structure) of production and exchange in the Ghanaian chain is the topic of discussion in 
Chapter 6. This lays the foundation for our analysis in Chapter 7, of how the embedding of 
the chain supported or hindered its response to the MD2 innovation and the use of 





Chapter 5 Research Methodology 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the procedure, methods and techniques used in carrying out the 
research. This study is a qualitative research. Qualitative research is applicable when ‘an 
existing theory fails to adequately explain a phenomenon’ (Merriam, 2009: 15). The 
methodology used in this qualitative study was a single case study.  A case study answers 
the question of ‘how’ and ‘why’ as it seeks to explore, explain or describe a phenomenon 
(Berg, 2004). Both institutional economics and GVC research frequently use the case study 
methodology. It offers the opportunity for an in-depth understanding of a phenomenon, 
which can then be compared with other cases. It is also beneficial due to the ability to 
accommodate multiple sources of evidence. Since the study involved looking at a 
phenomenon which clearly divided the history of the sector into before and after periods, 
the period before was analysed mainly using secondary data in documents, reports and 
articles.  The second period made use of secondary data and interviews with current 
participants in the sector. Hence, the processes discussed in this chapter primarily refer to 
these interviews. Before going into how the data was collected, the first section of the 
chapter shows the current structure of the Ghanaian value chain.  The second section 
explains how the research topic was chosen and the research design at the pre-empirical 
stage. In the third section, the actual research design is described. It includes how the 
sample population was selected, the data collection process, data analysis and the validity 
and reliability of the research. The last section draws attention to the challenges faced in 
the study. 
5.2 The Ghanaian pineapple value chain (2005-2013) 
5.2.1 The pineapple value chain 
Currently, three varieties of pineapple are cultivated in and exported by Ghana; MD2, 
Smooth Cayenne and Sugar Loaf. Small and medium-scale producers are largely excluded 
from MD2 whole fruit exports and are integrated into the chain by producing all three 
varieties for processors (Figure 5.1). Domestically, the preferred varieties are Smooth 
Cayenne and Sugar Loaf which can be purchased in supermarkets, local markets and by the 
roadside (Figure 5.2). Sugar Loaf has little international demand as it was only recently (in 
the last 5 to 6 years) introduced to the EU market (CBI, 2014a). It was formerly 
aesthetically unappealing to EU consumers because of its dark green colour even when ripe 
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and short shelf life (Sefa-Dedeh, 2005). The prospects for integrating smallholders back 
into the chain has improved since 2009 as Smooth Cayenne demand on the international 
market has begun to rise (Whitfield, 2012; ACDI/VOCA, 2015) although the demand is 
comparatively much lower than it used to be. Currently it is only in the Sugar Loaf strand 
that a small number of smallholders are linked to exporters. Any fruit not deemed 
exportable is sold on the local market to local processors (e.g. juice firms) or to traders. 
Figure 5.1: The Ghanaian pineapple export value chain (2005-2013) 
 
 






Figure 5.2: Sugar Loaf fruits on sale in a supermarket in Ghana 
 
Source: Author 
Input supply: Suckers for cultivation are usually available from the farms of producers. 
There is also a tissue culture lab operated by Bomarts Farms Limited (currently the second 
largest exporter) for the propagation of suckers.  Fertilisers and agro-chemicals are freely 
available. To assist producers with the high costs of pineapple production, all producers 
currently access the government’s fertiliser subsidy programme. 
Cultivation: The principal areas for cultivation of pineapples for export are the Akwapim 
South District in the Eastern Region and the Gomoa, Ekumfi and Mfantseman districts in 
the Central Region (see Figure 4.22). Production is labour-intensive with activities such as 
weeding done by hand. Sugar Loaf cultivation is mainly organic; hence many smallholders 
rely on manure instead of fertiliser. It is the only variety produced by farmers in the Central 
Region while farmers in other areas many grow all three varieties.  Smallholders are 
excluded from the whole fruit (fresh) pineapple stand of the chain and are only included in 
the Sugar Loaf strand. Most small and medium-scale producers are integrated into the 
chain as producers for processors. Currently, pineapple production is comparatively more 
costly than before but more rewarding due to guaranteed prices.  
Packing and Storage: Unlike the previous period where infrastructure was lacking, 
exporters have now invested in cold chain facilities including packhouses where the sorting, 
grading and packaging of fruits take place and reefers (refrigerated trucks) for the 
transportation of pineapples to the air and sea ports. MD2 fruits are transported by sea 
while Smooth Cayenne and Sugar Loaf is by air. After sorting and grading, the products 
with the medium to highest quality are exported while those of relatively lower quality are 
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sold to processors (fresh cut, juice) operating in the sector. There are rules related to 
packaging and labelling that must be adhered to by exporters. These rules are both EU 
specific and retailer specific. 
Processing: It was mentioned in Section 4.5 that several processing firms sprang up to 
take advantage of the large amount of fruits not exported. However, with the decline in 
exports and reduction in production of pineapples, many of these companies did not 
survive.   
Currently, two large-scale processors who export their produce operate in the sector; Blue 
Skies Ghana Ltd. and HPW Fresh and Dry.  Processors require MD2, Smooth Cayenne 
and Sugar Loaf. Blue Skies produces fresh-cut fruit salad for a number of retailers in 
Europe including Sainsbury and Waitrose in the UK, Albert Heijm in the Netherlands and 
Czon in Switzerland. It also produces fruit juice which was formerly exported but is now 
100% sold on the domestic market because of increased local demand and a decline in 
European demand in 2009 due to the financial crisis (Ross, 2009; Fieldwork Interviews, 
2013). These processors contract with small and medium-scale producers, and according to 
the NRI (2010: Section B, p.7), opportunities exist with the country’s capacity to process 
40,000 tonnes of pineapples and 30,000 tonnes of citrus annually.  
Marketing and distribution: The EU market continues to be the main destination of 
pineapple exported from Ghana. Although on the international pineapple market there’s 
been an increasing trend, whereby super and hyper markets bypass importers and 
wholesalers, Ghanaian whole fruit exporters generally still access the EU market through 
importers (Fieldwork Interviews, 2013). Processors on the other hand (e.g. fresh cut) 
contract directly with supermarkets. 
 HPW AG, a Swiss company, is the largest importer of Ghana’s pineapple to the EU. HPW 
AG markets the fruits of about five companies, including BFL, Jei River Ltd. and 
Georgefield farms, predominantly to the UK. 50% of Ghana’s fruits to the EU market 
enter through the port of Antwerp in Belgium and 30% through port Vendres in France 
(Gatune et al., 2013:20; Figure 5.3). In southern Europe, Ghanaian pineapple fruits are 
usually sold under the brand name of Compagnie Fruitere, because the sea carrier AEL no 
longer makes a trip to Northern Europe (World Bank, 2011a:13). Another exporting firm, 
Milani Ghana Ltd., markets its fruits through the Milani Fairtrade GmbH, based in 
Switzerland (Fieldwork Interviews, 2013). Access to other buyers is commonly through 
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participation in international fruit trade fairs, such as the Fruit Logistica held annually in 
Germany. Currently, Ghanaian whole fruit exporters have made inroads into other markets 
such as Turkey and the UAE. In 2013, Turkey and the UAE had a 4% and 3% share of 
Ghana’s pineapple exports, respectively (Author’s calculations based on Faostat 2016 data).  
Figure 5.3: Port Destination of Ghana’s pineapple exports to the EU 
 
Source: Gatune et al (2013:19) 
 
5.2.2 Profiles of Some Companies 
Below are profiles of some exporting firms in the chain and their share of exports in 2009 
and 2013 (Table 5.1). All exporting companies are GLOBALG.A.P. and Fairtrade certified 
in addition to fulfilling the various buyer-specific certifications required. Some are also 
organic certified. All packhouses are HACCP and ISO 9000 compliant. 
a) Golden Exotics Company Limited (GEL)  
GEL was established in Ghana in 2003 by Compagnie Fruitière (of which Dole 
owns 40%). In 2007, GEL accounted for 40% of the export market for pineapples 
and about 88% for the export market of banana, making it the largest exporter.81 As 
at 2013, it accounted for 25% of pineapple exports, with the fruits marketed under 
the brand name SCB Anadou. It has a pineapple plantation of 6,000 hectares 
(Gatune et al., 2013) and harvests about 10,000 tonnes of fruit per year.82 The 
company employs over 2,400 people. 
b) Bomarts Farms Ltd. 
                                                 
81 Jaeger, 2008 














It was established in 1985 by a Ghanaian national but is now a private limited 
company, 85% Ghanaian-owned and 15% owned by a Swiss partner. It began 
exporting in 1998 and currently employs about 650 people (Gatune et al., 2013). It 
was the first company to introduce the MD-2 variety into the country (Jaeger, 
2008:11). It is currently the second largest (15%) exporter of pineapples. It 
currently relies on production from its own 3,000-hectare plantation though it 
formerly contracted with outgrowers. It has also diversified into the processing of 
dehydrated fruits (e.g. mangoes). 
c) Jei River Ltd 
Established in the 1980s, it was the country’s topmost exporter (18%) before the 
change in variety (NRI, 2010). Currently, it relies on its own production, employing 
about 450 workers and exports about 3,500 tonnes of pineapples.83  
d) Milani Ghana Ltd.  
It was established in 1993. It operates its own plantation of over 1500 hectares but 
also has an outgrower group (Fieldwork Interviews, 2013). Its fruits are marketed 
under the brand name Delighana. The processing arm of the company formerly 
produced fruit juice for the domestic market but it no longer operates. 
e) Blue Skies Ghana Limited was established in 1998 to produce pre-packed fresh 
fruit for the European market. It was the first pineapple exporter in Ghana to be 
GLOBALG.A.P. certified in 2001. In 2007, it exported about 5,000 tonnes of cut 
pineapples (the equivalent of 15,000 tonnes of whole fruits) (World Bank, 
2011a:33). It also exports coconut, mangoes and papaya. The company initially 
started operations in Ghana but now has operations in Brazil, Egypt and South 
Africa.  As at 2010, it was contracting with 34 growers to complement its own 
supply World Bank, 2011a:104); however, it now totally relies on small and 
medium-scale producers for pineapples (Fieldwork Interviews, 2013).   
f) HPW AG is a Swiss company which began operations in Ghana in 1997. It has 
expanded to Egypt and South Africa. HPW AG acts as an importer for some of the 
exporting firms.  




g) Athena Foods: It was established in 1990, and produces fruit juice and concentrate 
for export to Europe and other regional markets (e.g. Nigeria). 
Table 5.1: Share of exporter in total pineapple exports, 2009 and 2013 
Name of Exporter Volume exported 
in 2009 (tonnes) 
Share of exports in 
2009 
Share of exports in 
2013 
GEL 9,172 29.1% 26% 
BFL 4,607 14.6% 15% 
Milani Ltd 4,100 13% 14% 
Gold Coast Fruits 1,880 6.0% 8% 
Georgefields Farms 2,218 7.0% 5% 
Prudent exports 2,136 6.8% 6% 
Pioneer Quality 
Farms 
300 1% - 
Jei River Limited 1,760 5.6% 12% 
Koranco Farms 1,944 6.2% 7% 
Bio Exotica Co. Ltd 643 2% n.a. 
Chartered Impex 274 0.9% n. a 
Unifruits Ltd 188 0.6% n. a 
Mashaco Farms 118 0.4% n. a 
Volta River Estates 
Ltd 
60 0.2% n. a 
Greenspan Farms 84 0.3% n. a 
Others 2,083 6.6%  
Note: n.a. refers to share not available 
Source: MOAP (2010) and Gatune et. al (2013) 
 
5.3 Research Process and design 
5.3.1 Research Process 
Globalisation produces both winners and losers. The idea for this study started with an 
interest in exploring how globalisation impacts labour in developing countries. Specifically, 
how it is affecting informal work in Ghana, where it is estimated that up to 80% of 
employment is in the informal sector (Osei-Boateng and Ampratwum, 2011). However, 
limitations, including the likely challenge of accessing a representative sample, led to a 
streamlining of the potential research topic to the impact of globalisation on structural 
transformation in developing countries.  Readings on the theme of globalisation and its 
possible effects on labour and the transformation of the economy (e.g. Nissanke, 2009; 
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Nissanke and Thorbecke, 2006; McMillian and Rodrik, 2011) led me to the question of the 
impact of globalisation on the pineapple sector in Ghana. At a workshop in 2009, I had 
learnt about the decline of Ghana’s pineapple sector as a result of changes in the preferred 
variety and standards. The reason given for this decline was the inability of exporters to 
acquire technological capabilities. As the sector was situated in a GVC, where the ability to 
upgrade is primarily due to interactions with buyers, I became interested in the relationship 
between the value chain and the territorial context in which exporters operated. 
At the beginning of my research on the role of the institutional dimension in GVCs, I 
discovered not much had been written about it in the GCC/GVC context, apart from a 
few, such as Gellert, 2003 and Selwyn, 2008. On the other hand, economic geographers in 
the GPN literature were very interested in the subject (e.g. Neilson and Pritchard, 2009). 
These studies, together with the institutional economics literature, served as a guide for the 
identification of potential research questions, the research method, the relevant factors in 
the evolution of the national value chain and their interrelation with each other. 
5.3.2 Research design 
The design of a research is ‘the plan for how the study will be conducted’ (Berg, 2004:31) 
and must be guided by the issue under investigation. Based on the researcher’s 
understanding of the research topic and literature on institutional change, it was realised 
that the complex and context- dependent nature of institutional change, meant that a 
qualitative research approach would be best suited to the research, as the case study 
approach allows the analysis of ‘a phenomenon in a single social setting’ (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994:27). A case study involves ‘systematically gathering enough information 
about a particular person, social setting, event, or group to permit the researcher to 
effectively understand how the subject operates or functions’ (Berg, 2004:251).  
An explanatory single case study was applicable to this research, because it represented a 
longitudinal case i.e. ‘studying the same single case at two or more different points in time’ 
(Yin, 2009:49). The study sought to explain the role of local conditions in the governance 
of the Ghanaian value chain, which was marked by significant changes since 2005.  
Under the broad heading of qualitative research are some methods to elicit answers to 
research questions. These include interviews, case studies, focus groups and ethnography 
(Punch, 1998; Flick, 2002; Berg, 2004; Silverman, 2010). The advantage of a case study is 
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that it can easily be used in conjunction with other methods, including interviews, 
documents and participant observations (Berg, 2004; Yin, 2009). This advantage also makes 
it easier for ‘triangulation’ since it can accommodate multiple sources of evidence by 
corroborating and augmenting the evidence collected (Yin, 2009). Nonetheless, the 
disadvantage of a case study is that it may not allow for generalisation (Yin, 2009; Merriam, 
2009).84  
The study was broken down into two parts. The first part (the mid-1980s to 2004) involved 
a historical analysis and relied mainly on document analysis. The second part (2005 – 2013) 
included interviewing current participants in the sector, and the process is described in the 
sections below.   
5.4 Actual Research Design 
5.4.1 Sampling strategy 
Sampling can take the form of a probability or non-probability. To choose the sample of 
respondents, a non-probability sampling method known as purposive sampling was used. 
From Chapter 4, we note that the number of actors in the Ghanaian pineapple export 
sector has significantly declined. Hence the sample available to the researcher was very 
limited. Purposive sampling assumes that ‘the investigator wants to discover, understand, 
and gain insight and therefore must select a sample from which the most can be learned’ 
(Merriam, 2009:77).  
5.4.2 The sample of producers 
Based on literature in the pre-fieldwork stage, the Akwapim South District in the Eastern 
region was identified as an area to find respondents (Figure 5.4).85 The district lies in the 
deciduous agro-ecological zone (Figure 5.5), characterised by an average temperature of 
24˚Celsius (GSS, 2014b:1) and climatic conditions described in Table 4.8.  The district is 
well known for Smooth Cayenne production and, recently, MD2. It is a peri-urban area, 
about 20km from the country’s capital, Accra (GSS, 2014b:1) and less than 90 minutes by 
road from both the seaport in Tema and the Kotoka International Airport in Accra. The 
recently refurbished Nsawam-Accra road has also made the area much more easily 
accessible. A processor and a number of pineapple exporting farms are located close by as 
                                                 
84 Denzin (1993) in Punch (1998:154) argues that generalisation should not be the objective of all research 
since some cases may be unique. 
85 Alternative spelling of ‘Akwapim’ is ‘Akuapem’ or ‘Akuapim.’ 
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well as one of the country’s oldest canneries, the Nsawam Cannery.  
Samples in case studies ‘…can evolve once fieldwork begins’ (Miles and Huberman, 
1994:27). When the researcher embarked on fieldwork, she discovered the number of small 
and medium-scale producers participating in the pineapple export sector in the district had 
significantly declined. Second, the researcher discovered that producers of the Sugar Loaf 
variety had been integrated into the export value chain. Thus, producers in the Ekumfi 
district in the Central Region (Figure 5.6) were added to the study’s sample.86 This district 
lies in the coastal savannah agro-ecological area (Figure 5.5) and is characterised by average 
temperatures between 24˚ and 34˚ Celsius (GSS, 2014c:1). 
Unlike the Akwapim South District, the study areas in the Ekumfi District cannot be 
classified as peri-urban, although, they are located along the Trans-ECOWAS highway 
linking the Greater Accra Region to Takoradi in the Western Region.87 A processor 
facilitated access to farmers in Fotobi, Pokrom, Obodan and Oboadaka (all in the 
Akwapim South District); while the development agency (GIZ) did so for farmers in 
Esuehyia, Ekumfi Asaman and Ekumfi Nanaben (in the Ekumfi District). Sugar Loaf 
pineapples cultivated by one of the cooperatives interviewed in the Ekumfi District is sold 












                                                 
86 The Ekumfi district was formerly part of the Mfantseman Municipality. It was carved out as a district in 
2012 (GSS, 2014c:1). Another district well-known for sugarloaf production is the Komenda-Edina–Eguafo-
Abirem District (KEEA), also in the Central Region. 
87 The capital Accra, lies in the Greater Accra Region and there is a seaport in Takoradi. 
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Figure 5.4: Akwapim South District map  







Figure 5.5: Agro-ecological zones of Ghana 
  
 
Source: Germer (2005)88 
 
Figure 5.6: Ekumfi District map  
 
Source: GSS (2014c:2) 
                                                 
88 Available at https://www.uni-hohenheim.de/respta/climate.php 
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5.4.3 The sample of exporters 
The first point of call to find exporters to take part in the research was the website of the 
exporter association, SPEG. About 30 exporters were listed on the website. However, a 
research by Gatune et al. (2013) had identified that less than 15 exporters consistently 
exported throughout the year, and that the exports of eight firms made up 93% of the 
country’s total pineapple exports in 2013. The researcher then made it a priority to 
interview these exporters.  
Access to the exporters was relatively challenging for an independent researcher. Exporters 
seemed wary of researchers not aligned to known international organisations and/or 
research institutions.  I had access to this group through a former chief executive officer 
(CEO) of a pineapple exporting firm, who currently is an agriculture consultant. Nine (9) 
exporters were contacted but only five agreed to take part in the survey (Table 5.2). It was 
estimated that the five exporters who took part in the study had a 70% share of the 
country’s total pineapple exports in 2013. 
Table 5.2: Ownership type, acreage and varieties grown by the sample of exporters 
Export
er 
Ownership type Acreage (in hectares) Varieties cultivated 
A Limited Liability 1,759 MD2, Smooth Cayenne 
and Sugar Loaf 
B Limited Liability 2,000 MD2 and Sugar Loaf 
C Limited Liability 1600 MD2, Smooth Cayenne 
and Sugar Loaf 
D Limited Liability 6,000 MD2 
E Limited Liability 3,237 MD2, Smooth Cayenne 
and Sugar Loaf 
Source: Author, based on fieldwork interviews 
5.4.4 The sample of processors 
The term processor is used here to refer to a firm which exports one of the following; pre-
packaged ready-to-eat cut fruits, packaged dehydrated fruits or pineapple concentrate. Two 
main large-scale processors and a small number of artisanal processors operate in the 
export sector.  The large-scale processors were the object of this study, particularly as one 
large-scale processor controls over 90% of the processed fruit export market in Ghana. I 
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interviewed one large-scale processor as well as a domestic processor.89 
5.4.5 The sample of importers 
Exporters regularly avoided identifying their buyers whenever asked to do so during 
interviews. Through secondary data, some importers were identified as purchasing 
pineapple fruits from Ghana. Four (4) such importers were contacted through emails. 
However only one agreed to participate in the study. 
5.4.6 Other stakeholders 
Other stakeholders who took part in the study were a representative of an industry 
association, public officials, representatives of financial institutions, and industry experts. 
Interviews with industry representatives and industry experts were to obtain an overview 
and insight into both the past and current situation of the pineapple sector and also to seek 
information on possible respondents. For other stakeholders, the information gained from 
interviews with exporters, farmers, industry experts and industry representatives informed 
questions during interviews. Hence a questionnaire as such was not produced but rather 
the researcher had some specific questions which were the basis of the conversations.  
All other stakeholders except for representatives of financial institutions, were interviewed 
face-to-face in their organisations, although the majority declined to have the interview 
recorded. A representative of a financial institution was interviewed by phone while the 
others were through email correspondence. In all cases, respondents were first made aware 
of the conditions of confidentially and anonymity underlying the study. 
In total, 68 persons were included in the study. A complete list of respondents is found in 
Appendix 5.2. 
5.5 Data Collection 
5.5.1 Data collection methods 
Interviews can be structured, semi-structured or unstructured. A structured interview 
consists of a set of pre-established questions with pre-established response categories; 
while in an unstructured interview, questions follow out of the conversation and there are 
no pre-established response categories (Punch, 1998:175-176).  A semi-structured interview 
falls in between the two examples above.  The study primarily conducted face-to-face 
                                                 
89 Domestic processor refers to a processor who produces fruit juice for the domestic market.  
145 
 
interviews, using semi-structured questionnaires. Interviews with exporters, farmers, 
processors, public officials, industry experts, representatives of industry associations and 
financial organisations took place over a period of six months from May - November 2013.  
Within exporting and processing firms, access to respondents was first through a phone 
call to either the managing director or CEO. I first identified myself as a student and gave a 
brief detail about the research and its objective. At this stage, the contact either tentatively 
agreed to participate in the study or declined participation. When tentative approval was 
given, an introduction letter which was specifically addressed to the firm and the research 
questionnaire were emailed to the contact (A copy of the general introduction letter is 
found in Appendix 5.1). After a series of email correspondence, a date was set for the 
interview with the designated respondent. In certain cases, it took as long as a month for 
the contact to approve participation.  Respondents were two CEOs, two production 
managers, one general manager, an export manager, two agronomists and a quality control 
officer. Interviews lasting approximately one hour were conducted in the respondent’s 
organisation.   
The questionnaire for farmers was reviewed by an industry expert who suggested changes 
in the wording of certain questions and also additional questions. For example, a question 
had asked of land sizes in hectares, and I was advised to change it to acres since that is 
what farmers are used to. Also, a question on access to knowledge was updated to include 
certification and record keeping. During the data collection period, questions were 
reviewed to reflect the circumstances on the ground. This involved the removal of 
redundant questions and the rephrasing of others.  
The majority of farmers in the Akwapim South district were interviewed on a one-on-one 
basis at their farms.  I was introduced to the farmer by an agronomist of a processing firm. 
This was followed by a brief explanation of the study and a request to participate in the 
study. Although interviews took place in the presence of the agronomist from the 
processing firm, there was no issue with farmers not being able to talk freely. They interact 
on a daily basis with the agronomist and had built up a rapport. Focus group interview was 
used to gather data when a cooperative was interviewed in the district. The cooperative was 
formed in 1992, and none of the members interviewed owned the land they farmed on. 
Rather they had access through leaseholds ranging from a minimum of 3 years to a 
maximum of 30 years. 
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All responses from farmers in the Ekumfi district were elicited through semi-structured 
questionnaires in focus groups. Focus group interviews were used instead of one on one 
interviews due to time constraints. Farmers could only spare time for me on Fridays, since 
they did not go to farm on this day. Even on the designated day, the farmers could only 
spare time early in the morning (before 9 am), because several farmers in the area are 
Muslims who must visit the mosque: also, generally, social activities including family 
meetings, funeral meetings and visitations in the towns were scheduled on this day.  All 
participants in the three focus groups consented to the recording of conversations. The 
advantage of focus group interviews is that it facilitates discussion among the participants 
(Flick, 2002; Berg, 2004) by allowing them to make clear ‘their views, perceptions, motives 
and reasons’ (Punch, 1998:177).  However, it may also suffer from the ‘group culture and 
dynamics’ (Fontana and Frey, 1994 in Punch 1998:177), which may hinder the diversity, 
breadth and depth of responses. 
Interviews with other stakeholders took place in 2013, aimed at confirming or refuting the 
evidence provided by earlier respondents and also seeking out new lines of enquiry and 
evidence. The information gathered in 2013 was reviewed and analysed resulting in the 
need to seek out important respondents, such as importers. An importer was finally 
interviewed in 2016 through a Skype video call.  
The questionnaires used in the study is found in Appendix 5.4. 
5.5.2 Language used 
The languages used for the research were English and Twi. All the questionnaires used 
were written in English, but during interviews with some producers (especially small and 
medium-scale farmers) the questions were read out in the Twi language. Twi (or Ashanti 
Twi) is one of the three literacy dialects of the Akan language. The Akan people are found 
in southern Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire. Twi is the most popular language in Ghana, easily 
spoken and understood by a majority of the population. In the Akwapim South District, 
the indigenous language is Akwapim Twi (the second literacy dialect of the Akan language). 
This posed no problems with communications as both parties could communicate in Twi. 
In the Ekumfi District, the indigenous language is Fante (the third literacy dialect of the 
Akan language). Although my ability to speak the Fante language was limited, my 
knowledge of Twi together with the respondents’ ability to express themselves in a fair 
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amount of English and to leave out complex Fante words made communication easy. 
5.5.3 Characteristics of the Sample  
In the sample of exporting firms, the majority of respondents were aged between 36 and 45 
years and all had tertiary levels of education. Apart from the agronomists who had between 
1-5 years’ experience in the sector, the CEOs, production and general managers, 
individually, had over 15 years’ experience. 
Out of the total sample of farmers interviewed (Table 5.3), 96% were male and 4% female. 
The farmers range in age from 23 to 74 years. The majority of farmers had low levels of 
education, with over half of the sample having only primary and junior secondary level of 
education (Table 5.4). Apart from 3 farmers who had other jobs as a civil servant, an auto 
spare parts businessman and a poultry keeper, all the others were full-time farmers.  
Smallholders generally cultivate other crops, such as maize and cassava for subsistence. 
However, 23% of the sample produce these crops for sale on the domestic market. 
Table 5.3: Small and Medium-scale farmers interviewed in the study 
Producer Number 
interviewed 
Smallholders cultivating Smooth Cayenne, MD2 
and Sugar Loaf varieties 
11 
Smallholders cultivating Sugar Loaf variety only 31 
Medium-scale producers cultivating Smooth 
Cayenne, MD2 and Sugar Loaf 
6 
Total 48 
Source: Author, based on fieldwork interviews 
Table 5.4: Educational level of farmers 
 Akwapim South 
district 
 





1 27 58.3% 




2 0 4% 
Source: Author, based on fieldwork interviews 
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Two land tenure systems operate side-by-side in the country; customary and statutory.90 
Although the customary system operates in the study areas, land was accessed through two 
main arrangements (Table 5.5). In both districts, pineapple is grown as a monoculture. 
Smallholders cultivate a range of land sizes from a minimum of 1 - 2 acres to a maximum 
of 15-20 acres.  None of the farmers owned the land they farmed. In the Ekumfi district, 
smallholders accessed land through the rental system which involved an agreement 
between the farmer and landowner(s) to use the land for a number of years. Farmers made 
yearly payment for the use of the land, spread over the agreed number of years. Although 
this could possibly lead to exorbitant yearly charges, due to the informality of the 
agreement, farmers did not indicate it as a problem hindering their access to land. The 
farmers could not give accurate data on rental costs; however, an industry expert indicated 
that rental costs for an acre of land, for approximately 10 years, is between GHC200 and 
GHC300 (i.e. between US$90 and US$136).91 This equates to between 8% and 12% of the 
costs of producing an acre of pineapple (GHC2,500). However, as the amount is spread 
over a number of years, it is likely to be a very small percentage of the annual per acre cost 
of production.  
In fact, most of the farmers had access to more land than they cultivated. For instance, a 
cooperative in the Ekumfi District cultivated only about 40% of the total land size available 
to members. In the Akwapim South District, the majority of both small and medium-scale 
producers had access through leaseholds. Medium-scale producers, for example, had 
leaseholds which ranged from a minimum of 25 years to a maximum of 35 years. Both 
small and medium-scale farmers were of the opinion that having control over the land over 
a relatively long period of time indicated the farmers’ willingness to stay on in the sector.  
 Pineapple yield per hectare in 2010 in the Akwapim South district was 62 metric tonnes, 
down from 64 metric tonnes in 2009 (MoFA, 2016). Overall, potential pineapple yields in 
Ghana is given as 72 Mt/ha but the current yield is about 60 Mt/ha, far less than Costa 
Rica’s 120mt/ha (MoFA, 2013a; Gatune et al., 2013).  
 
 
                                                 
90 In the customary system, land is held by stools, families or chiefs and access is first by lineage. 
91 Exchange rate of GHC 2.2 to US$1 (BoG 2014). 
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Table 5.5: Means of access to land for cultivation 
Type of 
Ownership 
Number Proportion of sample 
Leasehold 14 29.1% 
Rental 33 69% 
Family Owned 1 2% 
Source: Author, based on fieldwork interviews 
5.5.4 Ethical Issues 
Given the limited number of participants in the export value chain, it is easy to identify 
firms and farmers. To protect the confidentiality and anonymity of respondents, 
participants were asked to sign an informed consent form before the interviews began (see 
Appendix 5.3). The consent form indicated that the identity of respondents (names and/or 
organisation) would not be revealed in the research results, asked permission for the 
interview to be recorded and indicated that the interviewee could stop the interview at any 
point during the process. In the event where a respondent stopped the interview, his 
responses would not be included in the study’s results. For respondents who could not 
fully comprehend the English language, I orally explained in the Twi language what was 
contained in the consent form and asked for permission to record. When respondents were 
in groups, a group member signed the form to indicate their understanding of the contents 
of the form and granting of permission for the interview. A copy of the signed consent 
form was then given to the respondents. 
A recent common practice when doing research in Ghana is ‘paying’ respondents for the 
time spent answering research questions.92 Thus, some farmers expected to be ‘paid’ for 
their time. In one instance, when I was bluntly asked what benefit their time spent with me 
was to them, I politely responded that they were contributing to my education. An answer 
which was well received. In another instance, the respondents asked for freshly baked 
bread, a request which I obliged.  
5.6 Data Analysis 
Qualitative data can be analysed in three interactive steps; data reduction, data display, 
drawing and verifying conclusions (Figure 5.7).  Data reduction is the process of ‘selecting, 
focusing, simplifying, abstracting and transforming the data that appear in written-up field 
                                                 
92 This practice has been attributed to development agencies.  
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notes or transcriptions’ (Miles and Huberman, 1994:10). This involved the researcher 
transcribing the interviews verbatim into the qualitative data analysis software known as 
NVivo (http://www.qsrinternational.com). The use of NVivo was primarily to make the 
data easily accessible to the researcher, preserve the quality of transcription and to organise 
the data. The transcription was detailed to include pauses, mispronounced words and 
incomplete sentences (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  
Based on the literature, the study used pre-determined categories of the institutional 
environment and themes in GVCs to build the research questions asked in the interviews.  
The first stage of analysis thus involved comparing the responses of the transcribed 
questionnaires and noting common patterns under the categories and themes. Further 
investigation of the text data by repeatedly listening to recordings and/or going over field 
notes lead to further sub-categorisations where required and also to further questions 
concerning interactions and strategies of respondents. I then strived to address these 
additional questions or seek insights when interviewing other respondents.  
The second stage of data display was less used in this study. It includes the use of graphs, 
charts and matrices to understand the data collected. The final stage, drawing and verifying 
conclusions involves making causal relationships between the categories. To identify causal 
relationships which existed within the Ghanaian pineapple chain, I did the following: (a) 
most of the questions were structured around relationships between and among actors in 
the chain (b) conclusions were crosschecked with industry experts and documents.  
Figure 5.7: Components of data analysis 
 




5.7 Reliability and Validity of the research  
Validity is another word for truth’ (Silverman, 2004:275). A critique levelled at qualitative 
research is that it gives too much leverage to the researcher’s interpretations (Flick, 2002; 
Yin 2009). Some researchers do not think the issues of validity and reliability apply to 
qualitative research since they are attributes pertinent to the positivist approach in 
quantitative research (Silverman, 2004; Merriam, 2009). Nonetheless, they are attributes 
which a qualitative research must strive for in order to be relevant and acceptable.  
According to Morse et al. (2002), reliability of research does not have to occur at the end of 
the research but rather it refers to the use of mechanisms during the research process 
which increases the rigor of the study, hence a number of strategies can be used to improve 
the validity and reliability of research (Silverman, 2004; Merriam, 2009). The validity and 
reliability of qualitative research are tested based on the following bases: internal and 
external validity and credibility (Merriam, 2009:213). 
Internal validity ‘deals with the question of how research findings match reality’ (Merriam, 
2009: 213). Internal validity can be increased through triangulation. Types of triangulation 
include investigator, method, data and theory triangulation (Silverman, 2004; Merriam 
2009).93 This study achieved internal validity by triangulating its findings with document 
analysis and interviews with other stakeholders in the sector such as public officials and an 
importer. 
As case studies seek to interpret events and not to generalise them, their replication should 
not be the aim of research, since the social context is assumed ‘to be in flux, multifaceted, 
and highly contextual…’ (Merriam, 2009:222). However, research must be reliable. 
Reliability of research is related to the ‘degree of consistency with which instances are 
assigned to the same category by different observers or by the same observer on different 
occasions’ (Silverman, 2004:290). This thesis addressed the issue of reliability by asking 
questions relating to both the past and present experiences of the respondents. 
Furthermore, the use of the NVivo software allowed the researcher to categorise responses 
systematically and consistently under themes.  
External validity or transferability relates to the ability to generalise a study (Miles and 
                                                 
93 For example, investigator triangulation involves the use of a number of researchers collecting and analysing 
the data, and theory triangulation involves using different theories to test the same hypothesis (Silverman, 
2004; Merriam, 2009).  
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Huberman, 1994; Merriam, 2009). Transferability is achievable by using ‘rich thick 
description’ (Merriam, 2009: 227). Lincoln and Guba (1985 in Merriam, 2009: 227) 
underscore the importance of: ‘thick description of the sending context so that someone in 
a potentially receiving context may assess the similarity between them and … the study.’ 
This thesis sought to achieve transferability through the detailed description of chain 
participants and the presentation of evidence in the form of quotes taken directly from the 
research participants and documents.  
5.8 Challenges of the study 
Exporters were notably secretive about some of their interactions and activities, particularly 
in response to questions about their buyers and past and current firm strategies. Thus, they 
were not always fully prepared to explain the reasons for some behaviours or, in some 
cases, either overlooked such questions or gave general answers. Also, the need to identify 
farmers through the processors and/or exporters they worked with meant that, without 
permission from the exporter, some potential respondents were inaccessible. Finally, the 
inability to record all interviews means that it is likely some information was lost in the note 
taking process. 
5.9 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has explained the research methodology used in this study. First, it gave the 
background to the researcher’s interest in the research topic. Second, it elaborated on the 
research design, by explaining the rational for the sampling method and how the sample of 
farmers, exporters and other respondents was chosen. Third, it explained the data 
collection methods, the language used and some ethical issues of the research. Fourth, it 
introduced the data analysis methods used. Finally, it highlighted challenges of the study. 
The next chapter is the first analytical chapter of the thesis: it discusses the Ghanaian 
pineapple chain with regard to both the study’s framework developed in Chapter 3 and the 
available documents and reports on the sector.  
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Chapter 6 The Smooth Cayenne Exchange Configuration 
6.1 Introduction 
Ghana’s main horticultural export products are pineapple, banana, mango, yam and 
vegetables. Although horticulture exports were not a significant contributor to the foreign 
exchange earning of Ghana in comparison with traditional exports like gold and cocoa, 
their potential was on the rise, as significant growth occurred in the horticultural subsector 
during the 1990s and early 2000s. Within a 10-year period (1992-2001), growth in the 
subsector’s contribution to the nation’s foreign exchange earning was over 200% (AfDB, 
2005).94 NTAEs such as pineapple, yams and bananas significantly contributed to this 
growth: between 1994 and 1999 24% of the growth in horticulture export volume was 
attributed to them (World Bank, 2001a:11).  In this same period, pineapple earnings 
contributed as much as 42% of the total NTAEs earnings (World Bank, 2001a:11). In 
2004, pineapple exports were valued at US$ 22million (MoFA, 2011:40). Through its 
impact on income generation and employment, the role of horticulture in the export 
diversification and poverty reduction goal of the country is also substantial (NRI, 2010; 
NDPC, 2014). 
 
Smallholder farmers played a dominant role in pineapple production during the mid-1980s 
to 2004. Exporters, many of whom did not have their own farms, relied on these farmers 
for their supplies. An illustration of the chain from the mid-1980s to 2004 is given in 
Figure 4.21. The main pineapple importing countries of Ghana were EU countries; 
including Switzerland, Belgium, Germany, the UK and the Netherlands.  Ghana increased 
its exports of pineapples throughout the 1990s and attained a 10% market share of EU 
pineapple imports in 2004; but its share of the market declined significantly from 2005. 
This was a result of a new pineapple innovation, MD2, and the application of product and 
process standards to pineapple production and export.  
 
The main goal of this chapter is to set out the configuration in which production and 
exchange of pineapples took place in the Ghanaian setting. It details (a) the local rules (or 
circumstances) which shaped production and exchange and (b) the responses or actions of 
actors (e.g. smallholders, exporters and the government). This contribution forms the basis 
                                                 
94 Horticultural exports earned the country US$6.77 million and US$ 26.85 million in 1992 and 2001, 
respectively, making up 40% of all earnings from NTAEs (AfDB, 2005: ix) 
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upon which the impact of changes in global governance on the chain will be discussed in 
the next chapter. I will, therefore, conduct a historical analysis spanning the period 1986 – 
2004. A historical approach supports the specification of the causal mechanisms that led to 
the observed governance structure and laid the foundation for changes in the future. Also, 
the year 1995 in the review period marks a significant point of departure in the organisation 
and structure of the pineapple sector in Ghana.  Prior to 1995, export of pineapple to the 
EU market was by air-freight on cargo planes and passenger airlines. From 1995, sea-
freight became the main transportation channel, due to limited air-freight capacity and 
improvements in sea-freight technology.  
 
The first section of the chapter discusses the characteristics of the item traded, actors and 
local conditions. In the second and third sections, I show how the interaction of the three 
exchange elements resulted in a market governance structure for the chain. The fourth 
section discusses the consequences of market governance for the chain, while the fifth 
section compares the chain with that of Costa Rica. The final section concludes the 
discussion. 
6.2 The Smooth Cayenne configuration  
In this section, I describe the characteristics of the product, actors and the prevailing local 
conditions of the pineapple value chain for the period 1986 – 2004. The discussion of 
characteristics of actors is limited to those directly involved in the exchange (i.e.  exporters, 
smallholders and middlemen). 
6.2.1 Characteristics of the item exchanged 
Pineapple is a high-value agricultural commodity. Smooth Cayenne was highly perishable 
but highly demanded on both the international and local markets. In the global pineapple 
market, barriers to entry were generally low, because international trade regimes and 
regulations for the export of fresh fruits and vegetables had minimal product requirements.  
Retailers did not impose strict process requirements, e.g. worker rights and safety, on their 
suppliers. Quality of the fruit was restricted to two basic tests; Aesthetics and Brix level 
(Fieldwork Interview, 2013). The aesthetic component was based on (a) Size (b) Colour 
and (c) Appearance (bruising). Lack of bruising was the minimum standard for export, and 





Domestically, Smooth Cayenne cultivation entailed low production costs, since suckers 
were freely available and the farm tools needed were rudimentary. Furthermore, Whitfield 
(2010b:31) suggests that Smooth Cayenne yielded good output even when the agricultural 
practices applied were not up to standard. Thus, it is possible that the variety was well 
suited to the soil in the producing areas. The aesthetic test for pineapple fruits led to a 
boom in the local fruit processing industry, as any fruit not deemed exportable was sold to 
local processors. Unfortunately, pineapples exported from Ghana were said to be of low 
quality due to inconsistencies in colour, size, and freshness of the fruit at delivery.  
 
6.2.2 Characteristics of Actors 
6.2.2.1 Characteristics of Smallholders 
The product characteristics identified in Section 6.2.2 meant that a large number of farmers 
(producers) participated in the sector in any given year. There is no accurate data on the 
number of smallholders who participated in the value chain. Wilson (2007:42) estimates 
that about 600 smallholders participated in the value chain; but the NRI (2010: Section B, 
20) estimated that in 2003-2004 the number of producers was about 10,000 smallholders 
(0.2-10ha), 40 medium-scale farms (20-150ha) and 12 large-scale farms (300-700ha).   
The characteristics of smallholders discussed here relate to their access to factors of 
production; including land, labour, credit, organisation and attitude to risk. There is no 
consensus on whom a smallholder is, (Nagayets, 2005; Morton, 2007; Chamberlain, 2008): 
however, smallholders are defined in terms of certain characteristics, such as land size 
cultivated, vulnerability to risk, wealth, use of and access to resources. When a smallholder 
is defined in terms of land size, it is commonly quoted as 2 -10 hectares. Yeboah (2005:81) 
sees them as cultivating less than 50 acres of land; however, in fact, most smallholders in 
Ghana in the pineapple sector cultivate less than 20 acres of land (Chamberlain, 2008). 
Regardless of the small land sizes cultivated- an average of 1-10 acres (Trienekens, 2003 in 
Jensen, 2005:15) - production of pineapples for export was dominated by smallholders who 
supplied 40% to 60% of export volumes (Goldstein and Udry, 1999; Jensen, 2005; 
Whitfield, 2011).  
Smallholders had low educational levels and their access to land was based on the land 
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tenure system described in Section 5.4.3 or through inheritance and as gifts (Ampadu-
Agyei, 1994; Whitfield, 2010). Leasehold arrangements were popular because the traditional 
shareholding practice of ‘abusa’ could not be successfully applied to pineapple production 
in view of the length of time it takes to mature and the fact that it can be harvested at any 
time in the year.95 Although smallholders had access to land, they did not have title to the 
land and hence could not use it in accessing credit from financial institutions.  
Inputs needed for cultivation were suckers and agro-chemicals, such as fertiliser, pesticides, 
and herbicides. Although suckers and agro-chemicals were freely available, producers 
lacked knowledge, especially, on how to effectively and efficiently apply fertiliser in 
cultivation. Also, most smallholders relied on internal sources of credit, as both access to 
and affordability of external finance was challenging due to local economic and social 
conditions.  
Overall, smallholders could be classified into two groups; organised and non-organised 
(Trienekens and Willems, 2007:48). Organised smallholders included outgrowers and the 
smallholder company known as Farmapine. It was founded in March 1999, as a limited 
liability company based on the Farmer Ownership Model (FOM), and began operations 
immediately (World Bank, 2001b; Jensen, 2005; Yeboah, 2005; World Bank, 2011a).96  It 
was supported by the World Bank under the ADP with a loan of US$1.4million, repayable 
over seven to ten years at a 7% interest rate and an additional one year’s working capital for 
the associated cooperatives (World Bank, 2001b; Jensen, 2005; Yeboah, 2005; World Bank, 
2011a). It consisted of five farmer cooperatives and two pineapple exporters (Trienekens 
and Willems, 2007; NRI, 2010; Whitfield, 2011). The cooperatives had 80% share of the 
company and the exporters the remaining 20% (Jensen, 2005:18).  A board, consisting of 
representatives from the farmers, TechnoServe, the bank through which the loan was 
administered, and others, was in charge of the company’s affairs (Whitfield, 2011:21).97 The 
five cooperatives had a total number of 164 farmers and total acreage of the company 
increased from 365 acres in 1999 to 460 acres in 2001, with a projection to reach 600 acres 
                                                 
95 In the Abusa system, proceeds from farming are divided into three. The smallholder’s portion was one-
third, while the landlord’s portion was two-thirds. A portion of what accrued to the landlord was payment for 
grant of use of the land (Amanor and Diderutuah, 2001)  
96 Farmapine was based on the FOM which was originally developed in Zambia (World Bank, 2001b:45). 
97 Prior to becoming a company, the cooperatives were receiving technical assistance from Technoserve, an 
international non-governmental organisation based in Ghana (Jensen, 2005:18). 
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in 2002 (World Bank, 2001b; Rottger, 2004).98 The farmers were initially cultivating an 
average of 1.9 acres per farmer (World Bank, 2001b:45); but later on Yeboah (2005) states 
that Farmapine farmers cultivated an average of 5 acres (2 hectares) of land, on which they 
were able to consistently achieve exportable yields of 65%, an increase from 30% and 40% 
in 2001 and 2002, respectively (Rottger, 2004: 29).  
The main objectives of Farmapine were stated as ‘promoting the cultivation of pineapples 
to meet stringent standards of quality and size with minimal chemical residues in 
accordance with acceptable international standards; supporting member farmers with the 
required production inputs, financial assistance and recommended technology; and 
coordinating the purchase and marketing of pineapple with the prime aim of ensuring 
competitiveness in the international market’ (World Bank, 2001b:45). There was an 
immense remunerative incentive to the farmer to produce under Farmapine’s institutional 
arrangements, because the farmers were able to access the production inputs, credit and 
much needed technical assistance which were severely lacking in the agricultural sector at 
the time.99 Initially 100% of the credit requirements for production by farmers were met by 
the company; technical assistance was provided with assistance from the Directorate of 
Agricultural Extension Services; and fertiliser and agro-chemical access was arranged by the 
company (Rottger, 2004:29-30). Accessing these inputs meant that these farmers could 
overcome some of the quality problems faced by the entire chain and, with knowledge of 
potential volumes, could also access and effectively participate in the EU market. 
Farmapine members were said to have a higher fruit quality in comparison with non-
organised producers and earned about US$1,000 per acre compared with US$500 for non-
organised producers (Yeboah, 2005: 83).  In 2003 Farmapine was the second largest 
exporter of pineapple from Ghana with 4,854 tonnes valued at US$1.52million (Yeboah, 
2005; Jaeger, 2008) as against 3,500 tonnes in 2000 (World Bank, 2011a:97): and over 50% 
of the sales of the company was in Germany and the UK (World Bank, 2011a:98).  
However, the incentives provided could not be sustained as early as 2001. This was partly 
due to factors outside Farmapine’s control, but also to management issues. Due to the 
depreciation of the Cedi, the national currency, farmers faced increased prices of inputs, 
and this affected their ability to adopt improved production techniques (World Bank, 
                                                 
98 The initial number of farmers in the cooperatives is uncertain as different authors have quoted either 164 
or 178 (World Bank, 2011a:97). 
99 As part of the ERP/SAP reforms, the government had cut down its extension services in agriculture.  
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2001b: 46). In 2002, the company ceased the practice of providing credit to the farmers, 
because of delays in payments by buyers abroad; on the other hand, the farmers could not 
access finance from local commercial banks because of unreliable payment schedules by 
the company (Rottger, 2004:29 - 30). The company also assessed the weights of the fruits 
visually (Rottger 2004:30), a practice which could have led to conflicts between the 
company and the farmers, since actual pricing is based on the weight of the fruit. 
Furthermore, the company had management problems. First, with a staff of over 80 people 
managing about 170 farmers, salaries formed a major part of the company’s disbursements. 
Second, management had kept poor records of receivables, which had resulted in 
outstanding payments from buyers in the EU (World Bank, 2011a).100 Last, farmers were 
said to have no respect for the board (Rottger, 2004:30). It is no wonder that Farmapine 
collapsed in 2007.  
Outgrowers were farmers who regularly supplied pineapple fruits to a larger farmer who 
had contracted with exporters and independent farmers (Danielou and Ravry, 2005; 
Trienekens and Willems, 2007). In some cases, exporters encouraged smallholders to form 
outgrower groups and supplied them with inputs, such as suckers and credit for 
production, in return for first access to fruits (NRI, 2010: Section B:20).  
Nonetheless, the largest group of producers was non-organised smallholders who engaged 
in oral contractual agreements, produced primarily for the local market and sold to anyone 
willing to buy from them. Another characteristic of smallholders was their attitude to risk. 
Smallholders are generally risk adverse partly due to their other characteristics, for example, 
lack of access to and affordability of credit and small land sizes.  
6.2.2.2 Characteristics of Middlemen 
The next set of actors in the sector were traders or medium scale farmers who either 
exported on their own or had agreements with exporters to supply fruits. They purchased 
fruits from smallholder farmers who faced difficulties in accessing the export market, 
mainly because their output was too low. The price of fruits sold to the middlemen is low 
since the market structure relating the middlemen and the smallholder is an oligopsony i.e. 
few buyers and many sellers. The middlemen were thus able to significantly influence the 
purchasing price.   
                                                 
100 An amount of €120,000 was recovered from EU buyers when the managing director of the company was 
replaced in 2005 (World Bank, 2011a:98) 
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6.2.2.3 Characteristics of Exporters 
The characteristics of exporters discussed here relate to their size, access to credit, 
knowledge on market trends and professionalism and provision of technical assistance to 
outgrowers and smallholders. According to Whitfield (2010a; 2010b) the first Ghanaian 
exporters in the pineapple chain were businessmen who needed foreign exchange for their 
main businesses or professionals from diverse backgrounds, such as teachers and civil 
servants, who saw an opportunity to earn extra income given the country’s economic crisis 
at the time. They therefore accessed the EU market through friends and family. This 
manner of access and the incentive to participate in the sector to access funds for other 
concerns meant that, on a yearly basis, there was variability in the number of exporters. 
From 1988 to 1996, the number of registered exporters in the pineapple sector fluctuated 
between 50 and 75 members (Zinnah, 2000:41).  As at 1988 there were 53 registered 
exporters in the industry, exporting 4,907 tonnes of fruit (Zinnah, 2000:41). The number of 
registered exporters increased to 73 in 1996, exporting 26,750 tonnes (Zinnah, 2000; 
Faostat, 2016).  By 2002, the quantity exported had increased to 49,700 tonnes (SPEG) 
with 56 registered exporters (Voisard and Jaeger, 2003:10), while 65 exporters participated 
in the export of 71,000 tonnes in 2004 (OECD, 2007; MoFA, 2011). Also, initially, 
exporting firms were wholly Ghanaian owned; however, from the late 1990s the sector 
became fairly desirable as to attract a few foreign investments through partnerships and 
equity investments.   
Pineapple cultivation requires huge investments in land, labour and equipment. Although 
exporters could acquire land through leasehold arrangements (about 30-50 years) or 
outright purchase, the transaction costs associated with negotiating the lease were generally 
high. The customary land tenure system made acquisition of land for large-scale agriculture 
complex and time consuming (World Bank, 2001a; Barrientos et al., 2009; World Bank, 
2011a) as consent, for example, from a number of landlords or families is needed for large 
tracts of land because contiguous land may not belong to the same family (Fieldwork 
Interviews, 2013). Suzuki (2014:102) tells of an exporter’s farm which had a portion of land 
in the middle left uncultivated because they could not find the rightful owner to grant 
permission. 
Just like many smallholders, exporters were also credit constrained as both working and 
fixed capital was extremely difficult to come by. Though there had been financial sector 
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reforms to improve upon credit flows in the economy, they did not achieve the desired 
results (see Chapter 1). Minimum and maximum bank lending rates were consistently 
above 20%, making it inaccessible to pineapple producers and exporters (World Bank, 
2001; Table 6.1).  






Export Sector Manufacturing 
Sector 
1997 35 – 49 35 – 49 39 – 49 
1998 30-42 31 – 45 32 – 45 
1999 30-39.75 31 -39.75 32.5 – 40 
2000 39 -55 39 – 55 39 – 55 
2001 35 – 53 35 – 53 35 – 53 
2002 27 – 50 27 – 50 27 – 50 
2003 27.5 – 42.25 27.5 – 42.25 27.5 – 42.25 
2004 23.5 – 37.5 23.5 – 35.5 23.5 – 37.51 
Source: MoFA (2011) 
Last, the managerial and technical capabilities of exporters were low. NRI (2010: Section C, 
p.3) notes that senior management in exporting firms did not have ‘sufficient skills’ to 
install a culture of innovation and professionalism.’ These capabilities were needed to 
successfully participate in a changing international environment. While EU buyers required 
high and constant quality of produce delivered in significant quantities and at regular 
intervals, Rottger (2004:31) asserts that Ghanaian exporters demonstrated a lack of 
business attitude to production; for example, a laid-back attitude to meeting schedules.  
This attitude is rampant in the Ghanaian culture, where punctuality in any event or under 
any circumstance is rarely observed.  Also, exporters did not have staff in charge of 
improving on-farm yields and marketing strategies (NRI, 2010: Section C, p.3). 
6.2.3 Characteristics of the local context  
6.2.3.1 Political conditions 
Policy (1983-1990): The ERP/SAP reforms are credited for the emergence of the sector, 
though some authors (e.g. Daddieh, 1998; Whitfield, 2011) suggest that the growth of the 
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pineapple sector was not planned but rather accidental, since there were not targeted 
policies for the crop.  As observed in Chapter 1, the SAP reforms implemented in the 
country under the auspices of the World Bank and the IMF were to revive productive 
sectors of the economy. As part of the SAP reforms of the early 1980s, non-traditional 
exports were introduced to diversify the country’s exports and reduce reliance on gold and 
cocoa. Economy-wide incentives were implemented, e.g. an exchange proceeds retention 
scheme was put in place (see Chapter 1 for details). It had the effect of motivating 
entrepreneurs to get involved in the export of pineapples because they could acquire 
foreign exchange for their main businesses (Jebuni et al., 1992; Daddieh, 1998; Takane, 
2004; Kastner, 2005; Whitfield, 2011). These entrepreneurs took advantage of the 
incentives and Ghana’s relatively lower cost of air-freight transportation, in comparison 
with Côte d’Ivoire (Dixie and Sergeant, 1998), to build up the sector.  
The Ghana Export Promotion Council (GEPC) was established as part of the 
government’s strategy of export diversification.101 The agency however ‘lacked knowledge 
about horticulture production and marketing’ (Whitfield, 2011:19), had inadequate capacity 
and lacked funds to functionally operate and achieve its objectives (Addo and Marshall, 
2000; Whitfield, 2011). The Horticulture Development Unit (HDU) in MoFA was 
established in the early 1990s as part of the Agriculture Diversification Project. It was 
responsible for developing and executing policy aimed at the horticulture subsector, but it 
was also not adequately financed or staffed and had to rely on funding by development 
agencies (Whitfield, 2010b:26). 
Policy (1991-2004): Donor driven and fragmented  
'Most agricultural projects depend on donor sources for funding. For example, in the 2002 budget of 
MOFA, the Government of Ghana’s contribution was 33 percent and the remaining 67 percent was 
expected to come from donor sources. Donor funding is used largely to implement projects, while 
government’s contribution is used to mostly pay staff salaries, wages, travel allowances and other 
emoluments' (FAO 2005:37) 
After the macroeconomic stabilisation and economic growth period of the mid to late 
1980s, government’s economic policy with regards to the agriculture sector moved from 
liberalisation of agricultural prices and markets to ‘developing and implementing 
agricultural policies and programs, building institutions including markets’ (AfDB, 2002: 
                                                 




The sectoral policy in agriculture in the 1990s and 2000s was geared towards making the 
private sector the engine of growth (World Bank 2001b; Ghana Trade Policy 2005). In 
continuation of this vision, in the 2000s the sector policy, the Accelerated Agricultural 
Growth and Development Strategy (AAGDS, 2001), was implemented. It focused on ‘(i) 
promotion of selected products through improved access to markets, (ii) development and 
improved access to technology for sustainable natural resource management, (iii) improved 
access to agricultural financial services, (iv) improved rural infrastructure, and (v) enhanced 
human resource and institutional capacity.’ The implementation of strategies outlined in the 
AAGDS was embodied in the Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy (FASDEP 
I, 2002-2007) and Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy (FASDEP II, 2007-
2015).102  
6.2.3.2 Economic conditions  
Within the economic conditions in which the chain was located, infrastructural and finance 
stand out. 
Infrastructure: Two specific conditions relating to infrastructure stand out in this period; 
inadequate post-harvest infrastructure and high costs of transportation. Pineapple is a non-
climacteric fruit, meaning that it never gets more ripened than when it is harvested 
(Takane, 2004; Paull and Chen, 2014). Its flesh is easily bruised and must be kept at a 
temperature between 8˚ and 10˚ Celsius to ensure it freshness after harvesting. Hence, 
post-harvest handling must be kept to a minimum. Unfortunately, producers and exporters 
did not invest in the necessary infrastructure to keep and/or improve upon the quality of 
fruits exported. At the farm level, there were no pack houses or refrigerated vehicles to 
transport the fruits. Fruits were exposed to high levels of humidity, because harvesting and 
packaging were carried out in the open field. Also, fruits were packaged on the farms and 
taken straight to the airport in any vehicle which could transport them (OECD, 2007:8; 
Fieldwork interviews, 2013). Suzuki (2014: 60) writes: ‘One exporter who operates on 1,000 
hectares of land today, could not initially afford to purchase a vehicle and started his 
pineapple-exporting business by hiring a taxi to collect fruit from smallholders and sending 
                                                 
102 FADSEPII became necessary due to limitations in FASDEP I. For example, FASDEP I was criticised for 





it to the airport.’  
At both the air and sea ports, there were no infrastructure (e.g. no cooling facilities) to 
preserve the quality of the fruit.  The Perishable Cargo Shed at the airport was just a basic 
shed. In times of delayed aircraft take-off, the fruits were kept in the trucks until the 
aircrafts were ready to leave (AfDB, 2005). At the sea-port, the facility for fruits and 
vegetables (Shed 9) was poorly ventilated, and in some cases, the indoor temperature could 
rise to a temperature of at least 5˚Celsius more than the outside (Voisard and Jaeger, 2003: 
10). These conditions caused a further deterioration in the quality of fruits. 
Comparatively lower air transportation costs prior to 1995: In the decade before 1995, 
the volume of exports increased from 1807 tonnes to 14,954 tonnes in 1994 (Takane, 2004; 
Faostat, 2016). This represented an annual average growth rate of 44% and was partly due 
to comparatively lower air freight costs, which gave Ghana a cost advantage over its rival 
Cote d’Ivoire.   
 Comparatively higher sea-freight transportation costs: From 1995, however, limited 
air-freight capacity and improvements in technology made sea-freighting the preferred 
method of transportation. SPEG managed to procure the services of a French transporter 
((Union Bananiere Africaine) which plied the route from Cameroon to Côte d’Ivoire 
enroute to France. A minimum of 230 pallets was required to induce the vessel to stop 
over at the Tema port (Voisard and Jaeger, 2003:3) but low volumes and high service 
charges made the costs of sea-freighting from Ghana higher than that of neighbouring 
Côte d’Ivoire.  
Access to and affordability of credit: Shortage of finance to fund pineapple production 
and export was one of the most influential local conditions affecting the sector. Both 
smallholders and exporters were restricted in their ability to access credit, because of their 
lack of collateral, high lending rates (Table 6.1) and the lack of innovativeness of 
commercial banks. To access loans from financial institutions, smallholders and exporters 
required collateral in the form of assets, such as titled land, buildings and farm equipment. 
These assets can be seized in case of loan default.  However, the majority of smallholders, 
for example, do not own the land on which they cultivate fruits. Many banks found it more 
profitable and less risky to lend to the government, lacked expertise to deal with 
horticultural products and were also more used to financing traditional crops (NRI, 2010; 
Section B, page 1). Hence, finance, if made available to the private sector, was generally 
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short term with an exorbitant interest rate. Given the long maturity period of pineapple (i.e. 
at least 12 months); and short-terms loans at exorbitant interest rates, both exporters and 
producers were priced out of credit transactions. Terms of sale also limited access to credit. 
In certain cases, producers had to wait as long as 4 months after supplying produce to be 
paid.  Consequently, both parties generally relied on retained earnings or informal credit 
sources, such as friends and family.  
It seemed that exporters’ access to finance was to be alleviated when in 2002, the 
government established the Export Development and Investment Fund (EDIL) (later 
renamed Export Development and Agricultural Investment Fund (EDAIF) in 2011). It 
was to provide funds on concessionary terms to producers in the agriculture sector. It is 
funded by a 0.5% tax on non-petroleum imports. The funds are made available to 
designated local financial institutions for disbursement. No penalties exist for late 
repayment of loans and financial institutions bear full credit risk.  EDAIF is primarily 
targeted at new entrants to the market, and has faced the challenge of non-repayment of 
loans. 
6.2.3.3 Organisational conditions 
Absence of an organisational network: Organisations are recognised as relevant in the 
development of economies (North, 1990). Also, the concept of ‘embeddedness’ by 
Granovetter (1985) articulates that economic action is affected by a network of relations in 
society (i.e. by local conditions). The importance of both concepts in the effective and 
efficient functioning of value chains is suitably captured by the notion of ‘institutional 
thickness.’ Institutional thickness gives credence to the impact that different organisations 
(e.g. firms, financial institutions, trade associations, government agencies) engaging in high 
levels of efficient interactions can make in a value chain through a sense of common 
purpose (Amin and Thrift, 1994:14-15).  
In the pineapple chain, a network capable of providing knowledge on production and 
processing, new technologies and innovation, assembling and distribution of market 
information, assurance of and uniform quality of fruits, tracking prices or a list of 
smallholders and exporters who reneged on contracts, did not exist. There were limited, if 
any, relations between various public and private organizations, such as the Ministry of 
Food and Agriculture (MoFA), the GEPC, SPEG, research and financial organisations. 
MoFA’s involvement in the sector was limited to regulation, and horticultural research was 
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limited to research on papaya (Danielou and Ravry, 2005:26). Although the GEPC could 
be said to be the agency in charge of NTEs in the country, its financial dependence on a 
state seemingly promoting NTEs from afar meant that it was inadequately financed to 
effectively promote the growth of the sector. The GEPC at the minimum provided 
exporters with training on good practices in export trade and assisted exporters to 
participate in international trade fairs. Market information, for example, had to be acquired 
by the exporters themselves, who in many cases did not have the financial resources to do 
so and/or did not see the need for it.103  
This situation was in contrast with services provided in the cocoa sector by divisions of the 
Ghana Cocobod.104 Cocoa beans from Ghana earn a premium based on their high quality 
compared with those of other countries. The Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana (CRIG) 
oversees research into technologies for cocoa production: The Quality Control Division 
(QCD) ensures the best grades of cocoa are sold on the international market. The quality 
of cocoa is checked both at the farm level and before it is exported, and the Cocoa 
Marketing Company (CMC) oversees marketing cocoa abroad. All local buying companies 
which deliver cocoa below a grade two standard to the CMC are fined 50% of their margin 
(Shepherd and Onumah, 1997 in Williams, 2009 and Granleese, 2009).105   
Lack of horizontal coordination among exporters: The lack of depth of interactions 
also extended to exporting firms. Two exporter associations operated in the sector; the Sea-
Freight Pineapple Exporters of Ghana (SPEG) and the Horticultural Association of Ghana 
(HAG). The Sea-Freight Pineapple Exports of Ghana (SPEG) was formed in 1994 and has 
since then become a valuable organisation in the development of the sector. Studies in the 
cluster literature have shown that an important factor for development of sectors is 
horizontal collaboration or cooperation among firms. As (USAID, 2003:38) notes 
‘cooperation with other producers and exporters has traditionally been an alien concept in 
Ghana’s private sector.’ While Ghanaian pineapple exporters were clustered in the same 
geographic area, cooperative activities were non-existent. An interviewee in this study 
                                                 
103 The GEPC provided a platform to connect exporters to the external market but this was limited to 
putting buyers and sellers in contact with each other. 
104 The state still plays a critical role in the cocoa value chain due to the partial liberalisation of the sector 
rather than the full liberalisation programme requested by the World Bank. Ghana Cocoa Board (Cocobod) 
was established in 1947is a semi-autonomous state-agency for all things cocoa in Ghana. 
105 Grades and quality standards for cocoa are found in ITC UNCTAD/WTO (2001) 
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noted that exporters ‘viewed each other as rivals' and hence could not come together as a 
collective whole.  
6.2.3.4 Social conditions 
Land tenure system: As indicated in section 5.4.3, two land tenure systems operate in the 
country. For access to agricultural land, it is the customary system which must first be 
satisfied since most land is vested in families or chiefs. Access to land in this way is first 
based on lineage, with decisions regarding access, availability and use in the hands of clan 
or family heads.  
Availability of labour and skills: Pineapple production is a labour-intensive job involving 
land preparation, crop husbandry and harvesting.   However, it does not require highly 
trained labour: so much of the work on the farms could be done by casual labourers. 
Sources of labour used were family and hired (local and migrant) labour (Ampadu-Agyei, 
1994; Barrientos et al, 2009).  Labour supply was generally abundant in the producing areas, 
though shortages occurred in the months of January to April because land preparation on 
pineapple farms coincided with the harvesting of cassava and maize (staple crops) on 
family farms (Ampadu-Agyei, 1994:24).  
6.2.3.5 Technogical conditions 
As noted above, the inputs for production were freely available in the country. There was 
no indication that access to suckers was a problem in this period, as they were readily 
available from producers’ own farms or from other farms. Agro-inputs were relatively 
easily accessible, since the producing areas are located near urban areas (Danielou and 
Ravry, 2005:18).  However, what was likely a challenge was affordability and the knowledge 
on how and when to apply these inputs. Pineapples are known to respond favourably to 
fertiliser application in the right amounts and at the right time. From the 1970s, the 
government of Ghana subsidised the price of fertiliser to promote fertiliser use; but as part 
of the economic reforms in the 1980s, these subsidies were removed. For example, 
Asenso-Okyere et al, (1991 in Hutchful, 2002:73), observe that in the 1970s and early 
1980s, fertiliser was subsidised by about 80% of the price. By 1989, this had dropped to 
15% and to 0% in 1990. Consequently, the removal of the fertiliser subsidies led to a 
drastic increase in the price of fertiliser such that fertiliser prices more than doubled after 
the subsidy was removed (Kherallah et al., 2000:15). The impact of the price increase on 
the cultivation of crops was a decline in fertiliser use from 7.7kg/ha to about 3.8kg/ha in 
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1990 (Jebuni and Sein, 1992 in Hutchful, 2002:73): but it has recently increased to 7.4kg/ha 
(Benin et al, 2013:38). What’s more, there were no organisations to assist in the transfer of 
knowledge to producers. Government extension services had been greatly scaled back per 
SAP/ERP reforms; hence the ability to transfer knowledge to producers was relatively low. 
6.3 The form and content of transactions in the Smooth Cayenne configuration 
‘Actors take in information about the relevant exchange elements, process it and then, 
most important of all, take decisions and, thus, breathe life into transactions.’ (Cornelisse 
and Thorbecke, 2010:124).’ The configuration within which transactions were determined 
in the Ghanaian pineapple export sector in the period 1986-2004 is given by the 
characteristics presented above. Within this configuration, transactions were governed 
under the market system, mainly to minimise transaction costs.  
6.3.1 Organisation of producers and exporters 
As noted earlier on, smallholders supplied as much as 40% of the fruits exported by the 
Ghanaian chain. Unlike other agro-export crops, where exporters need to first provide 
incentives to farmers to grow the crop, Smooth Cayenne was already being produced and 
marketed to the local market. Hence, with the opening up of export opportunities, i.e. the 
comparatively higher export price and low entry barriers, a relatively large number of 
farmers were attracted to participate in the chain.  The participation of smallholders was 
further aided by (a) social conditions which made access to land for commercial purposes a 
difficult and tedious process (Sarpong, 2002); (b) lower costs of production in comparison 
with other producers, i.e. 22% lower than that of large scale farmers, probably due to 
reliance on their own-labour (Obeng, 2004, cited in Takane, 2004:36); (c) higher returns 
from pineapple farming compared with other crops and (d) their ability to get good yields 
because of a long history of cultivation.  
Despite these favourable conditions, smallholders were largely unorganised. Historically 
farmer groups have not been encouraged. The large number of farmers meant that 
exporters could easily find partners and consequently, the search cost of identifying a 
pineapple farmer was low. However, a hidden component of the search cost which most 
likely was of more significance to the exchange relationship was the high cost of 
ascertaining the reputation of the exchange partner. The large transactional costs (discussed 
in the sections below) associated with investing in smallholders discouraged exporters and 
encouraged market governance as the coordination mechanism. In addition, exporter 
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relations with each other were characterised by a lack of trust, partly due to their relatively 
similar sizes which promoted a competition based on price for the chain’s limited 
resources.106   
6.3.2 Production and Marketing of Fruits  
Ghanaian exporters gained the status of second largest African supplier of pineapples to 
the EU after Côte d’Ivoire. During the 1980s and early 1990s, Côte d’Ivoire was the main 
supplier of pineapple fruits to Europe, but lower air-freight costs gave the Ghanaian chain 
a competitive advantage over Côte d’Ivoire. Consequently, Ghanaian exports obtained a 
60% share of the European pineapple air-freight market (Dixie and Sergeant, 1998). The 
lower air-freight cost was due to three factors; (a) availability of freight capacity (b) variety 
of destinations resulting from diversity of airlines operating from the country107 (c) efficient 
and predictable ground handling services (Danielou and Ravry, 2005:11). This was in 
comparison with Cote d'Ivoire which was limited to the use of Air France and SN Brussels 
airlines only (Danielou and Ravry, 2005:11). 
In the early 1990s, Côte d’Ivoire shifted its focus to French importers and left a demand 
opportunity in North Western Europe which was filled by Ghanaian exporters (Dixie and 
Sergeant, 1998: 31). This led to increased production among both smallholders and 
exporters, some of whom had begun to purchase land for their own production 
(Technoserve, 2004 in Whitfield, 2010b:22). Smooth Cayenne had a comparatively high 
local demand, and traditionally, farmers in Ghana can sell whatever they produce whenever 
they want to, because of the way local markets are structured. Local markets are 
characterised by spot market transactions which indicate a lack of communication between 
producers and buyers (e.g. wholesalers, market women) on varieties grown, planting 
schedules, harvesting schedules, and production processes, among others.   
As exports increased in the 1990s (Figure 6.1), one may think that it generated linkages 
between farmers and exporters which displaced this traditional way of production and 
marketing. Producing for an export market involves interacting with a potentially different 
set of consumers with different (sometimes more complex) demands. Thus, knowledge 
requirements will extend beyond what the local market demands to include knowledge on 
current and future supply, inputs used and production practices. 
                                                 
106 None of them at the time could be classified as large until Golden Exotics entered the market. 
107 Advantages (a) and (b) resulted from the liberalisation of the air transport industry in the early 1980s. 
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Figure 6.1: Ghana’s pineapple exports by quantity and value (1989-2004) 
 
Note: Value and quantity data; 1989-1999 from Faostat (2016), 2000-2004  
from MoFA (2010). Data for 2004 differs for MoFA and international sources. 
Source: Faostat (2016) and MoFA (2010) 
 Unfortunately, such information was lacking. There was no organisation at the national or 
sector level responsible for collecting data on the acreage and varieties cultivated; and there 
was no indication that exporters influenced the quality, quantity or timing of the cultivation 
of pineapples. Exporters were not involved in, for example, advising farmers on which 
inputs to use, how to use the inputs or in monitoring and supervising production (Yeboah, 
2005; Conley and Udry, 2008). As indicated in Section 4.5, pineapples respond well to the 
application of nitrogen and potassium fertiliser and although inputs for production were 
widely available, it was likely that affordability and knowledge on how much to apply were 
challenges. For example, smallholders were said to know which fertilisers to use; however, 
they were given no guidelines by exporters on how much to apply. The only time that 
exporters intervened in the production process was near harvest time when they inspected 
the fruits before the application of the chemical ethephon, which hastens the rate of 
ripening, and later carried out harvesting themselves (Whitfield, 2010b; Fieldwork 
Interviews, 2013).   
It cost US$1,228 to produce one acre of Smooth Cayenne in 2004 (NRI, 2010: Section B, 
p.22). This amount is by no means easily affordable by many smallholders and exporters, as 
access to credit (finance) was extremely challenging for both.108 The relative ease of access 
to land by smallholders did not translate into ease of acquiring credit, since most 
                                                 
108 Whitfield (2010b:23) notes that exporters made much profit from air-freighting their produce but did not 
invest in improving the quality of their fruits because they saw their closest competitor, Côte d’Ivoire, doing 































smallholders do not have title to the land and therefore cannot use the land as collateral for 
bank loans. Financial institutions not only viewed agriculture as risky (hence interest rates 
were high) but also they choose to lend to government.  Furthermore, some smallholders 
and exporters had been given finance but were unable to pay back, and this reinforced the 
negative perception of agriculture as a risky venture to fund.    
In the absence of external finance, smallholders had to rely on their own incomes or 
borrow from friends and family. The likelihood that the amounts of finance generated 
from these sources was enough to fully cover production is debatable. Yeboah (2005: 83) 
notes that agro-chemical inputs costs were the largest variable costs faced by farmers, 
leading to the Farmapine company advancing credit in that area to its producers. High 
input costs reduce the smallholders’ profit margins and therefore incentivise the farmer to 
cheat on the application of inputs. It is therefore likely that pineapple producers who were 
cash constrained did not apply as much fertiliser as is needed, or in other cases, applied too 
much (due to inadequate knowledge), creating quality issues in both cases.   
High marketing cost was a characteristic of the interactions between exporters and buyers 
(importers); hence the marketing strategy of Ghanaian exporters targeted the low quality-
low price segment (wholesalers and corner shops) of the EU market in the UK, Germany, 
Italy, Switzerland and Belgium (Danielou and Ravry, 2005). The comparative advantages 
gained by air-freighting produce began to decline in the mid-1990s because of restricted air 
capacity and improvements in sea-freight technology.  This pushed Ghanaian exporters to 
ship their produce; and since then sea-freighting has become the main mode of 
transportation of pineapple fruits (Figure 6.2).  





























Sea-freighting began in 1995 and its impact on the chain was the eroding of the 
transportation cost advantages the chain had over Côte d’Ivoire (Dixie and Sergeant, 1998; 
Whitfield, 2010b) because of the associated high marketing costs.  As sea-freighting of 
pineapple required a sizeable and consistent volume throughout the year and individual 
exporter volumes at the time would be inadequate for any sea vessel to agree to transport 
the fruits to the European market, a new organisation, SPEG, was formed in 1994 with the 
support of the USAID and the Ghana Export Promotion Authority (GEPA). Its objective 
was to coordinate the transport of fruits from Ghana.  
Low volumes and inefficiencies in port services increased per unit cost of transportation 
(AfDB, 2005:11). With a vessel in place to transport fruits, exporters were required to pay 
for the space allocated on the vessel even if weekly volumes were not enough. In peak 
seasons, exporters could export as much as 1,200 pallets per week (Voisard and Jaeger, 
2003:3); but, generally, volumes were low.109 Initially, the vessel called once a week. This 
increased to twice a week with increases in the quantity exported.  Transportation costs 
were as much as 40% of total costs of production (AfDB, 2005:11); hence, the rate of 
shipping from Tema in Ghana was about US$72 more expensive per pallet than from 
Abidjan in Côte d’Ivoire (AfDB, 2005:11). This restricted the growth in Ghanaian exports 
in comparison with other competitors (Figure 4. 8).   
Low volumes were an outcome of two factors; low capacity of exporters and poor fruit 
quality at arrival. Despite the relatively large number of exporters, the volume of exports 
was concentrated as most exporters were small i.e. had low capacities. Dixie and Sergeant 
(1998:31) observes that only two exporters had capacities over 2,000 tonnes (the minimum 
output required for exporters to be profitable). Low capacity had further worsened by 2004 
when only 12 out of 65 exporters had export volumes of more than 1,000 tonnes per week 
(OECD, 2007:9).110 Most exporters (about 60%) had capacities of less than 25 metric 
tonnes per week (NRI, 2010, Section D, p.1).  In 2000 and 2002, the top five exporters 
accounted for 72% and 57% of exports, respectively (Voisard and Jaeger, 2003; Danielou 
and Ravry, 2005).  The low volume capacities were indicative of lack of economies of scale 
and thus the inability to sustain the supply of fruits on a regular basis. 
Lack of infrastructure also affected the competitiveness of the chain. After harvesting, 
                                                 
109 A minimum of 4,000 pallets was required to lower the costs of transportation (AfDB, 2005:11). 




pineapple bruises easily, must be kept at a certain temperature to maintain its appearance 
and also keep its freshness. The lack of post-harvest infrastructure both on-farm and at the 
ports of exit (Section 6.2.3) greatly affected the quality of fruits exported. Fruits rejected 
because of poor post-harvest handling accounted for as much as 30% - 40% of produce 
(Fieldwork interview, 2013). In addition, in periods of high demand, producers harvest 
immature fruits for export, further impacting the reputation of pineapples from Ghana. 
Immature fruits have low brix levels, are more likely to be bruised and do not develop a 
good taste (Rohrbach and Paull 1982; Paull and Chen 2003; both in Paull and Chen, 
2014:1).  When fruits are air-freighted, they arrive in the importing countries in less than 8 
hours after leaving the farm, ready for consumption. With sea-freight, it takes between 10 
and 15 days; thus, any quality defects, such as bruising, are amplified by the time they get to 
the consumer (Dixie and Sergeant, 1998).   
While Ghanaian exporters then filled a gap left by Côte d’Ivoire, the quality of fruits was 
questionable. Local conditions critically impacted the quality of fruits (i.e. consistency in 
size, shape and colour) exported and the reliability of supplies. Crucially, exporters needed 
to define the attributes of the product and ensure that farmers complied with these 
attributes. Exporters were unable to do this. In addition to being credit constrained 
because of low profit margins and local financial conditions, exporters (a) lacked the 
necessary skills and knowledge themselves (b) had small volumes and (c) any investments 
made to raise the quality of fruits on-farm would be futile without corresponding 
investments in sector-wide infrastructure. Whitfield (2010b:23) mentions that only one 
exporter (BFL) had built a packhouse with complete cooling facilities as at 1995. In 
transportation, all pineapple from Ghanaian exporters (including Bomarts) were loaded 
into the same hatch, diminishing the effect of pre-cooling and making futile the logic of 
investing in packhouses.  
 Swinnen (2006:13) notes that uncertainty over product quality or reliability of supplies 
leads to contractual relations. Contract farming is prevalent in agriculture and usually 
involves access to technical assistance, inputs and credit by the farmer (Glover, 1984; 
Minot, 1986; Baumann, 2000). The little evidence of contract farming in the chain during 
the mid-1980s to 2004 is given by Goldstein and Udry’s (1999). In their field survey of 
pineapple producers in the villages in four clusters in Nsawam and Aburi (in the Eastern 
Region of Ghana), they noted that there was little evidence of contract farming i.e. 
interlinked contracts specifying production and credit. Nonetheless, Deb and Suri 
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(2013:271) provide evidence that some form of interlinked contractual relations had taken 
hold from 2001. Although the contracts involved the provision of credit (finance), 
indicated a guarantee purchase price and a promise to buy the farmer's entire produce, they 
were informal and verbal. The credit given was either in-kind (e.g. provision of fertiliser 
prior to cultivation) or in-cash (i.e. cash advances for emergencies such as school fees and 
health problems). In a few cases, inputs such as fertiliser and suckers were agreed upon 
(Danielou and Ravry, 2005; Deb and Suri, 2013). At harvest, the exporter/processor 
deducts the cost of inputs supplied from the total amount owed the farmer and takes the 
fruits (Danielou and Ravry, 2005; Deb and Suri, 2013). It is interesting that for a product 
where quality (i.e. consistencies in size, colour) and reliability of supply were important, 
contractual relations were not more forthcoming. The provision of input, credit and 
guaranteed prices would have assisted exporters to exert control over the quantity and 
quality of pineapple produced and exported.   
Apart from the important credit-constrained characteristic of exporters, a major reason 
why strong contractual relations did not evolve in the Ghanaian chain was the lack of 
contract enforcement mechanisms and its incentive to actors (Section 6.3.3). As mentioned 
earlier, exporters competed on price. Profit margins for exporters was low and continued 
participation in the chain required that they kept their costs of production low (Dixie and 
Sergeant, 1998:32). This implied that any extra increases in cost, for example, by investing 
in farmers, must generate substantial benefits. However, the potential for such an outcome 
was limited as contract enforcement mechanisms were virtually non-existent. In the study’s 
conceptual framework, it was noted that informal rules (e.g. trust and reputation) can be 
used to structure exchange. Trust and reputation are reinforced when there are means for 
sanctions. Unfortunately, in the Ghanaian chain, no mechanisms existed to collect 
information about the past actions or behaviours of both exporters and smallholders who 
defaulted on their promise to pay a particular price, collect fruits contracted for, sell fruits 
at the contracted price, or make the contracted quantity available. Little or no access to 
such information precluded the use of reputation as an enforcement mechanism. On top of 
this, the characteristics of the smallholder and of the legal system meant that sanctions 
were ineffective. The legal system was underdeveloped to deal with breaches of agricultural 
contracts. Effectively, breach of contracts, even if written, never makes it to the court of 
law because (a) smallholders generally do not have any assets which can be relied on to 
repay debts (b) the perception of long delays and (c)costs of using the legal system. The 
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inability of local conditions to enforce contracts encouraged opportunistic behaviour by 
both parties and they highly mistrusted each other.  
6.3.3 Distribution of risk  
High transaction costs in the chain did not discourage the participation of either 
smallholders or exporters in the chain. Even in the face of high risks of participation, the 
potential income to be earned by a farmer was much higher than what could be earned 
selling pineapple or staples on the local market.  For example, Goldstein and Udry (1999) 
found that the median profit per hectare for pineapple farmers was 1.7 million cedis 
(US$1062.5 or US$708) more than that of those who cultivated food crops like maize and 
cassava.111 In 2004, MoFA, using gross margin calculations, also found that pineapples were 
more profitable (46.92%) than other food crops such as maize (49.94%) and cassava 
(59.76%) (MoFA, 2004 in Abbey, 2005).112  
From the 1990s, most exporters in the chain endeavoured to produce the bulk of their 
fruits on their own farms, thus they were less reliant on smallholders. They however still 
bought from them to make up export volumes and diversify market risks. Although 
exporters plan their production ahead of time, the long time lag between production and 
harvest could cause changes in plans.  For example, bad weather might result in less than 
estimated fruits, exceptionally good weather might cause an oversupply of fruits and buyers 
in the EU can change their orders. Generally, an exporter confirmed his order with an EU 
buyer about a week before shipping was due. If he has enough fruits on his own farm to 
fulfil the order, he does not purchase fruits from smallholders. However, if he did not have 
enough, the exporter or middlemen would visit known pineapple farming communities to 
purchase fruits directly from farmers or in some cases to collect fruits already contracted 
for. 
Although Smooth Cayenne had a high local demand, it was inaccurately priced (Danielou 
and Ravry, 2005:14). Unlike the case of Costa Rica (Section 6.6), where there were 
established wholesale market and mechanisms for collecting and monitoring production 
data and prices in the sale of fruits and vegetables, there was no such mechanism on the 
                                                 
111 Goldstein and Udry (1999) conducted a field study of 4 villages in Nsawam and Aburi (in the Eastern 
Region of Ghana). The median profit per hectare was calculated as the value of output minus the costs of 
purchased inputs and value of family labour inputs. Over the study period (18 months), the US$-Cedis 
exchange rate changed from US$1=1600 Cedis to US$ 1=2400 (Goldstein and Udry (1999:26). 
112 Gross margin was calculated as the ratio of the total cost of producing a particular crop to the revenue it 
generates multiplied by 100. The lower the gross margin, the more profitable the crop is (Abbey, 2005:37-38). 
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Ghanaian market.  Fruits were priced based on a visual assessment and hence the income 
earned might fall short of production costs. Typically, farmers produced pineapple and 
waited for a buyer to come to them (Personal communication, 2015). At that moment, they 
negotiate with the buyer over price, presumably with the domestic market price as a 
benchmark. What is known is that prices of Smooth Cayenne sold to an exporter by 
smallholders and outgrowers were higher than those sold to the domestic market (for 
example, US$0.10/kg to exporters compared with US$0.01-0.04/kg on the domestic 
market (Yeboah, 2005:83). It was only the Farmapine company which instituted a pricing 
mechanism with prices set at the beginning of the growing season and reviewed every so 
often to reflect market conditions (Yeboah, 2005:83). 
When faced with a risk, it can be avoided, mitigated, coped with or transferred (Miller et al., 
2004; World Bank, 2011b). Smallholders faced production risks in the form of both price 
and credit risks. Production risk was high because it was possible for an exporter to 
completely renege on his contractual obligations (Harou and Walker, 2010). Additionally, 
an exporter would pay a lower price than expected or agreed upon especially in times of 
oversupply of fruits or when market conditions in the European market turn unfavourable 
(Fold and Gough, 2008; Suzuki, Jarvis and Sexton, 2011; Fieldwork Interviews, 2013). This 
meant that the producer received much less revenue than expected.113 If a producer has 
accessed finance for production, the likelihood of delayed payment for supplied produce 
(Takane, 2004) meant that there was a possibility that loan repayment would be difficult. 
As the farmer’s main objective was to sell without making a net loss, smallholders’ 
response to a price risk they encountered was to avoid or mitigate it by selling to the 
highest bidder regardless of prior agreements with other exporters. This practice, known as 
‘side-selling’, was extremely prevalent in the sector.  Another response was to contract with 
a number of exporters and/or processors at the same time. All exporters interviewed for 
this study had experiences of smallholders indulging in opportunistic behaviour by selling 
produce to other buyers who offered a higher price (per kg) at the time of harvest.  
In relation to farmers, exporters bore two types of risk: supply and financial. A supply risk 
may feedback into a financial risk and/or reputational risk. Supply risk, i.e. the inability to 
deliver contracted quantities at a set time and/or withdrawal from the market, was plausible 
                                                 




if a contracted smallholder sold all or part of his produce to another exporter, leading to 
less than expected quantities for export. On the other hand, the exporter could transfer his 
supply risk to the smallholder in times of abundant supply, by not showing up to collect 
fruits agreed on or offering a lower price than previously agreed upon.   
In relation to wholesalers or buyers, exporters bore price and transportation risks. Prices 
were negotiated between exporters and buyers. Price risks arose from the perceived quality 
of the fruit at delivery, a drop in consumer demand at certain times of the year, e.g. in 
summer, and excess supply of fruits. In such times, buyers reneged on earlier promised 
prices. Furthermore, lower than expected prices translated into financial risks as the 
expected income from supplies was reduced.  Exporters could, and did, transfer these risks 
to producers as indicated above.  
Transportation risks are enhanced when commodities are easily perishable (Jaffee, 
1995:31). Due to the reputation of Ghanaian pineapple exports as being of low quality, 
exporters were forced to ship to buyers on Free on Board (FOB) basis. When an item is 
shipped FOB, the owner of the goods is liable for any damages that may occur during 
transportation. Exporters unfortunately did not have agents in Europe to confirm the 
details of the state of their fruits when they arrived. This made it feasible for risks to be 
transferred to the exporter. An exporter shared anecdotal evidence of how he received an 
email from a buyer in the Netherlands after dispatching some fruits. He was told that the 
quality of the fruits was not up to standard and he would have to bear the costs. 
Fortunately for him, he was in the Netherlands on a private trip, so he asked to verify the 
condition of the fruits himself. Upon disclosing this information, he was told that he would 
no longer be liable for costs of the fruits. He later found out that the fruits had arrived on a 
public holiday and the buyer had delayed transfer from the port (Personal conversation, 2015) 
6.4 Role of other actors  
Within the period under consideration, the Ghanaian pineapple export sector commanded 
less attention and support from the government in comparison with traditional crops such 
as cocoa. This was despite the rhetoric of horticulture exports being a tool for export 
diversification and the potential foreign exchange earnings to be derived from the 
pineapple sector. According to Addo and Marshall (2000:359) the commitment made by 
the government in 1983 to diversify the country's export base was 'a major shift in the 
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focus, emphasis and pattern of national economic development policy.'114 However, it will 
be shown in this section that such a 'major shift' did not actually occur in reality because 
government policies were broad based rather than pineapple sector specific.  Government 
prioritised the stability of the economy; hence, although government incentives promoted 
entry into the NTE sector and increases in export volumes occurred, an incoherent strategy 
and macroeconomic instability meant that key factors such as infrastructure and finance to 
sustain the competitiveness of exporters were not realised.   
Through sheer determination, local entrepreneurs had propelled the pineapple industry 
forward. However, with competitive pressures from other global fresh produce countries 
such as Costa Rica and Côte d’Ivoire, the competitiveness of the Ghanaian industry was 
declining. Cornelisse and Thorbecke (2010:190) suggest that government interventions are 
aimed at the form and content of transactions. As discussed earlier on, a significant local 
condition which negatively impacted the chain was the lack of infrastructure. It is therefore 
surprising that, until the mid-2000s, the government did not intervene in improving 
infrastructure. 
From the mid-1980s to 1990, there was a lack of targeted government interventions at the 
sector, even though the pineapple sector had become the most important sector in the 
NTAE sector of the economy. NTEs were grouped into three: (a) agricultural products: 
e.g. pineapple, yam, cassava, beans, okra, rubber, tuna, medicinal seeds and plants (b) 
Processed and semi-processed items: e.g. canned tuna, plywood, veneer, aluminium 
utensils, canned fruits and vegetables (c) handicrafts: e.g. textiles, ornamentals (e.g. beads 
and jewellery), wood carvings (Addo and Marshall, 2000; World Bank, 2001a). 
Development plans to achieve the objective of the government were set out. Two 
development plans were implemented; the 3-year Non-Traditional Export Development 
Plan, 1988-1990 (NTEDP, 1988-1990) and the 5-year Medium Term Plan for Non-
Traditional Export Development, 1991-1995 (MTP-NTED, 1991-1995). The objective of 
both plans was to increase and diversify the export base of the country. The 3-year plan 
resulted in the increase in NTE earnings from 3.2% of total export earnings in 1986 to 
7.0% in 1990 (Kastner, 2005:26), but this fell short of the targeted 15% of total export 
earnings.  The 5-year plan was then implemented with the objective of increasing the share 
                                                 
114 Bond and Milne (1987:98) define export diversification as 'an increase in the number of distinct products 
in the export base, combined with a reduction in dependence on any one product as a source of foreign 
exchange earnings'  
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of NTE earnings in total earnings to 15% and the doubling of the number of registered 
exporters from 1000.  
The GEPC was the lead institution and the criteria for selecting products to be paid 
attention were: '(a) low import content (b) overall contribution to export earnings, (c) 
existence of a limited organized production base (d) the potential for immediate export 
expansion (e) the degree of value- added (f) linkage effects on other sectors or projects (g) 
the availability of ready external market' (Addo and Marshall, 2000:361).115 The main 
outcome of these development plans was the establishment of Export Production Villages 
(EPVs), jointly financed by the government of Ghana and the United Nations 
Development Project (UNDP). According to Ampadu-Agyei (1994:22), incentives given to 
the EPVs included sponsorship, assistance in sourcing of credit and extension services; and 
EPVs producing yams, wood carvings, black pepper and rattan products were in place as of 
December 1993 (Addo and Marshall, 2000:361).116  
It is interesting that there were no specific and concrete measures towards pineapple 
export, because it met at least three factors in the criteria for setting up EPVs. By 1986, 
pineapple exports had become the number one horticulture export of the country, with 
85% share of horticultural exports (World Bank, 1990:11). Also, volumes were over 4,000 
tonnes as at 1988 (Takane, 2004:31). Two reasons could be put forward for the perceived 
disregard of the pineapple sector; (a) the main aim of the reforms from 1983-1986 was 
macroeconomic stabilization and economic growth.  It was the belief that the invisible 
hand of the market would costlessly allocate goods and services consistent with relative 
prices, thereby ‘getting prices right’ through instruments such as the exchange rate and 
liberalisation of agricultural input and output. By 1991, the fertiliser market, for example, 
had been fully liberalised and all subsidies on agriculture inputs removed (AfDB, 2002). 
(b) The unwillingness and/or inability of policymakers in the GEPC to look outside the 
course of action pursued by the government. According to Addo and Marshall (2000:361), 
the GEPC’s development planning process was controlled by politicians who 
‘unconditionally endorse macroeconomic policies formulated within the context of the 
ERP.’ 117 
                                                 
115 The GEPC was set up in 1969 but remained relatively dormant until it was rejuvenated in the 1980s. 
116 Products include cashew, chillies, mushrooms (Addo and Marshall, 2000:361). 
117 It is highly plausible that policymakers at the time were constrained because they served under a military-
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Specific to the pineapple industry, only one programme, the Pineapple Production 
Expansion Programme (PPEP), was initiated and implemented. This was done at the 
request and individual influence of the Secretary of Trade and Industry from 1987-1990 
(Whitfield, 2011:29). The minister and the head of the GEPC decided to intervene after 
surveying market opportunities in Europe and realising that pineapple production in Ghana 
was hampered by supply side constraints (Whitfield, 2011:29).  The main objectives of the 
programme were: (a) To expand the production of pineapples for the export market; (b) 
To provide soft loans and assistance in accessing planting material from Ivory Coast; and 
(c) To assist in the production and marketing of Ghana's pineapples (Whitfield, 2011:29, 
46). Since the programme could not be financed through the country's budget, the 
secretary of Trade and Industry raised capital himself through informal means (Whitfield, 
2011:29). This assistance afforded pineapple exporters came to an end in 1988 when the 
minister lost his position in the government. 
The attempt by the Secretary of Trade to intervene in the pineapple chain is akin to what 
an individual (Mohammad 'Bob' Hasan) managed to do in the Indonesia Timber Industry 
(Gellert, 2003). Hasan, however, managed to have the buy-in of the state, resulting in the 
structuring of the Indonesian timber chain to ensure that domestic firms and the country 
benefitted from participating in global trade.118   
Throughout the mid-1990s to early 2000s, the government had a more specific role to play 
through the provision of infrastructure, finance, research and extension. Unfortunately, this 
role was left to donor funded programmes which were planned with little input from 
industry participants and were so heavily focused on achieving the objectives of donors.  
Interventions by donor agencies were heavily focused on export-led growth, i.e. increasing 
the number and volume of production, that the quality of production was largely an 
afterthought. Though efforts were made to equip producers and exporters with knowledge 
on quality, it was spread thinly over a number of products, producers and exporters. Table 
6.2 and the discussion below show some of the industry specific policies implemented by 
development agencies in the pineapple sector. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
led government which could arbitrarily develop and implement rules and regulations. 
118 Hasan's personal and working relationship with the president of Indonesia at the time, President Suharto, 




Table 6.2: Donor Interventions targeting the pineapple sector (late 1980s into 2000s) 





The Pineapple Production 
Expansion Programme 
1987 1990 Government of Ghana (GoG) 
Agriculture Diversification Project 1991 1999 World Bank 
Trade and Investment Programme 
(TIP) 
1993 1998 USAID 
Horticulture Export Industry 
Initiative (HEII) 
2004 2006 World Bank 
Trade and Investment Reform 
Programme (TIRP) 
1998 2004 USAID 
Trade and Investment Programme 
for Competitive Export Economy 
(TIPCEE) 
2004 2009 USAID 
              Source: Author from various sources 
Agriculture Diversification Project (1991-1999): In the government’s statement of 
Agricultural Policy, 1987, the need to widen the focus of the country’s diversification 
efforts to include crops in which the country had comparative advantage was identified 
(World Bank, 1990:1). Hence the main aim of the Agriculture Diversification Project was 
to ‘revitalize and expand the cultivation of non-cocoa tree crops and horticultural crops, 
which can be efficiently and competitively cultivated in Ghana for export and import 
substitution’ (World Bank, 1990:16). 
For the first time, pineapples were specifically targeted with the aim of the plan to ‘provide 
technical, marketing and infrastructure support for the export of horticultural produce, 
especially pineapple’ (World Bank, 1990: iii). The GEPC initially implemented the 
horticultural produce component of the plan, but implementation power was later 
transferred to the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA). It was financed with funding 
of US$16.5 million from the World Bank.  
Specific aims of the project included: 
● Increase in pineapple production from 7,000 tonnes per annum to 20,000 tonnes in 
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5 years.  
● The creation of a Horticulture Unit within MoFA. 
● The development of marketing infrastructure through the strengthening of the 
GEPC to identify market channels and introduce Ghanaian exporters to reliable 
buyers. 
● Organisation of smallholders into cooperatives for export production.119 
● Increased access of all types of producers (large, medium and small) to technical 
production inputs through direct contact, use of extension staff from MoFA and 
published materials.  
● Rehabilitation of roads in pineapple producing areas. 
 
Trade and Investment Program (TIP): This was implemented by AMEX International 
from 1993 to 1998 with funding of US$80millionfrom the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID). The programme was aimed at accelerating non-
traditional export growth through an improvement in the enabling environment and the 
capacity of the private sector.  This was to be achieved by (a) ‘strengthening the policy and 
institutional framework necessary for the private sector to significantly increase investment 
and exports (b) improving the financing and incentives available to the private sector (c) 
improving the capacity of individual firms and entrepreneurs to export’ (USAID, n.d). 
Commodities focused on included pineapples, salt, prawns and shrimps, furniture and 
other wood products.   
It involved (a) the provision of support to industry associations (b) provision of technical 
training and support to improve institutional capacity of state institutions in the non-
traditional exports sector and (c) support to individual enterprises in horticulture. Under 
the TIP programme, foreign exchange control measures requiring NTE exporters to 
surrender part of their foreign exchange earnings were totally abolished (Laryea and 
Akuoni, 2012:20) and exporters in the pineapple industry were encouraged to come 
together to form the Sea Freight Pineapple Exporters of Ghana (SPEG).   
Trade and Investment Reform Programme (TIRP): This was a continuation of the 
TIP programme, but it had a greater focus on private enterprise performance. It was 
implemented by AMEX International and a consortium including Technoserve and CARE 
                                                 




International from 1998 to 2004. Funding of $60million was provided by USAID. The 
focus on the private sector was to increase the capacity of business associations and link 
small farmers into export production and marketing. A notable impact of the programme 
was the identification of processing opportunities in the pineapple sector, leading to the 
establishment of Blue Skies Company in Ghana (Whitfield, 2010b:14) 
Agricultural Services Support Investment Program (AgSSIP) - Horticulture Exports 
Industry Initiative (HEII)  
In 1993, the Agricultural Sector Investment Program (ASIP) by the World Bank focused 
on collaboration with the private sector. However, a report by Voisard and Jaeger in 2003, 
commissioned by the World Bank to evaluate the horticulture sector in Ghana, necessitated 
a restructure of the program. The Agricultural Services Support Investment Program 
(AgSSIP) HEII component had infrastructure development as its key focus. AgSSIP was 
implemented by the Horticultural Development Unit (HDU) in MoFA from 2004 to 2006 
with a US$9.5million funding from the World Bank’s IDA credit. Though targeted at the 
horticulture sector, the main activities under this programme were geared at the pineapple 
sector and included: 
● Improvements to infrastructure used for shipments of pineapple (Shed 9 at the 
Tema port). This included the installation of cold storage facilities at the shed. 
● Construction of a perishable cargo centre at the international airport. 
● Sourcing and development of MD2 cultivars for distribution to farmers. 
● Construction of packing sheds for smallholders and exporters in order to 
consolidate exports. 
● Provision of strategic support to participants i.e. stakeholders and smallholders in 
order to promote integration.  
● Research and development. 
● Food safety and quality management training, including pesticide regulations, 
certification and Good Agricultural Practices. 
 
Trade and Investment Program for a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE): This 
was a five year (2004-2009) US$30million project funded by the USAID. Its main objective 
was ‘to promote economic growth by enhancing productivity and sales of non-traditional 
agricultural exports and improving the enabling environment for private sector growth’ 
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(USAID, 2009:2). It was implemented by a Chemonics consortium including CARE 
International and TechnoServe Ghana.   
Shortcomings of sector-specific interventions  
Over the years, development agencies and the MoFA implemented a number of 
programmes aimed at improving infrastructure, skills, access to credit and market linkages 
of horticulture producers. However, the outcomes were of very limited success especially 
with regards to the main horticulture product, pineapple. From this, it can be concluded 
that the incorporation of the horticulture sector into the development plans of the country 
was not done strategically. The interventions rolled out in the horticulture sector did not 
really address the issues at the heart of the industry; finance and infrastructure. To a limited 
extent, the interventions had managed to provide business management skills and some 
research and development; but, overall, the interventions were not strategic and had rather 
played ‘catch up’ as the horticulture sector, and especially the pineapple sector, advanced 
economically. 
Whitfield (2011) is of the view that interventions in the pineapple sector have been mostly 
donor driven because of the inability of the ruling elite to extract political rent from it, 
unlike, for example, in the timber sector. This suggests that as the sector moved into a 
phase requiring long-term capital investments, the non-alignment of pineapple exporters to 
any political interests meant that there was little political capital to gain from building up 
the sector. This may be true: however, it would also appear that the state dogmatically 
pursued its vision of private sector led development in agriculture without ensuring that an 
enabling business environment generally prevailed.  
From the mid-1990s, the pineapple sector was achieving considerable export volumes. The 
key issues in the sector no longer related to how to increase export volumes; but rather 
policy, infrastructure and investment to increase and maintain the quality of fruits exported 
in terms of consistency in size, shape and taste. The interventions implemented achieved 
some of the aims and made improvements in the sector; but the key factors necessary for 
developing competitive advantages were not given the necessary attention until the mid-
2000s when the MD2 variety had made significant inroads to effectively erode the 
comparative cost advantages of Ghana’s pineapple exports. The following are some of the 
reasons why the pineapple sector was largely left untouched.  
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a) Lack of political commitment: Despite the rhetoric of export diversification, the 
interests of the ruling elite were not in alignment with the interests of the pineapple 
sector (Whitfield, 2010b; 2011). According to Whitfield (2011), apart from the 
HDU lacking funds, the unit lacked influence in the MoFA, as only one of the four 
chief directors was in support of horticulture. Further proof of lack of state interest 
or support is found in reviewing the annual budget statements which set out the 
government's economic policy for the entire year.  From 1990 to 2003, there was 
hardly any mention of horticulture. This is in comparison with the cocoa sector, 
which in every year’s budget continued to receive direct and indirect support from 
the state.  In the 2004 budget statement, horticulture featured prominently, most 
likely because of the HEII focus on acquiring MD2 cultivars for the sector.  
b) Lack of funding: Macroeconomic instability in the early 1990s, because of the 
government’s expansionary policies in 1992, meant that the economy suffered from 
high inflation rates (between 30-40%), real exchange rate appreciation and high 
interest rates (World Bank, 2001a; Leith and Söderling, 2003).120  Consequently (i) 
the government was unable to provide its part of funding for projects. The HDU, 
for example, was never adequately financed and depended greatly on donor 
projects to carry out its objectives (ii) the primacy of the private sector as the 
medium for export promotion and diversification could not be achieved because 
the private sector was unable to access funding, while those that managed to do so 
had much difficulties (World Bank, 2001b:5). 
c) Interventions carried out in the sector focused on donor objectives (World Bank, 
2001b; Korboe, 2011). It was the objective of donor assisted projects to increase 
diversification of NTEs; hence the number of producers and volume of output was 
what was focused on. For example, TIP had an objective of decreasing the share of 
the 12 leading non-traditional exports from 85% to 70% by the end of the project 
(USAID, n.d). Hence, assistance to private sector groups under the project was said 
to be spread over a wide number of products.  This made it unable to devote 
enough resources for investment in a specific group (USAID, 2003:63). A 
dissertation by Korboe (2011) on the impact of development (donor) agencies 
interventions in the pineapple sector research found that USAID donor support in 
                                                 
120 In 1992, the country transitioned from military rule to democratic rule. President J.J. Rawlings, who was 
the military government leader, won the first general elections held in 1992. 
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the horticulture sector was geared to fit into ‘… their overall development 
objectives using experience gleaned from other regions and not specifically tailor 
made to meet our peculiar environment’ (Korboe, 2011:49). Though donors 
generally agreed that interventions had to be in line with the sectoral policy 
governing agriculture, donors emphasized different aspects of the policy, because 
they have different interests and areas which are usually determined by 
policymakers outside the country.  
d) Lack of organisational interaction: USAID (2003:9) for example, found that the 
TIRP had no formal mechanism in place for coordinating with other organisations 
playing a role in trade and investment. It was not until the MD2 threat that 
collaboration between the industry, development partners and the research 
institutions occurred.  For example, a tissue culture plant (Bioplantlet Ghana 
Limited) was established as a joint venture between SPEG, the Ghana Export 
Promotion Council, the Biotechnology and Nuclear Agriculture Research Institute 
(BNARI) and the Ghana Atomic Energy Commission (GAEC) with support from 
the USAID.  
e) Financial Intermediation targets were not met by the interventions. These targets 
were premised on a stable macroeconomic environment. However, with instability 
in the nation’s finances, e.g. high government borrowing, inflation, depreciation of 
the Cedi, negative feedbacks were transmitted to financial institutions, which then 
resorted to less risky lending to the government rather than the private sector. The 
government thus crowded out the private sector (USAID, 2003:62). 
Horizontal cooperation among exporters: Effective coordination of value chains 
requires cooperation among chain actors, and cooperative behaviour is driven by a 
common goal. The high transaction costs in the chain could be minimised with the creation 
of incentives for asset specific investments. Horizontal coordination is one way to do this 
(Poulton and Lyne, 2009: 158). Unfortunately, Ghanaian exporters could not seem to find 
a common goal to coalesce around. HAG, made up of relatively small exporters, was 
dominated by rivalry between the two largest exporters and this undermined their ability to 
cooperate (Whitfield, 2011:29). SPEG, which was composed of relatively larger exporters, 
only seemed to cooperate on the transportation of produce. Non-cooperative behaviour is 
historic among Ghanaian producers and buyers (Section 6.2.3.3), but Whitfield (2012) 
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attributes the lack of horizontal coordination to the mind-set of entrepreneurs who first 
engaged in the sector. She states: ‘The early investors who became the key industry actors 
in the 1990s are described by some industry observers as ‘cowboys’ practicing a form of 
‘bootstrap entrepreneurship’. They zapped up opportunities, but they were individualistic 
in their approach and short term in their outlook. Business was good for them individually, 
and the expectations and standards of business success in Ghana were very low; pineapple 
exporters saw themselves as doing well by Ghanaian standards, which led to complacency. 
Lastly, a large portion of pineapple exporters sought mainly to make quick money in hard 
currency’ (Whitfield, 2012:315).  
In my view, this is true: but, in addition, the inability of exporters to source supplies to 
meet their small volumes also further influenced the behaviour of lack of cooperation. So 
long as demand existed and supply could meet this demand, each exporter acted 
individualistically. During the study’s field work interviews, a respondent revealed that 
exporters greatly mistrusted each other because they ‘viewed each other as rivals.' An intense 
rivalry underlined by price competition meant that any form of cooperation or sharing 
information was tantamount to giving out your trade secrets. An exporter interviewed in 
the study commented: 'People will find out who you sell to and will go behind you to offer fruits at a 
much lower price.'  It is interesting that exporters did not realise that they could provide a 
united front to bargain for better or stable prices which would be beneficial for all of them.  
The inability to cooperate had implications for (a) the ability of exporters to institute a 
sector-wide quality system which would have forced producers and exporters of low quality 
fruits to either upgrade or exit the chain and (b) their ability as a group to pressure 
government to improve the functioning of the entire value chain. 
 
6.5 Outcomes of the Smooth Cayenne exchange configuration  
Transactions in the Ghanaian chain were basically governed by price (i.e. market form of 
governance) and the  form and content of transactions discussed above had a significant 
negative impact on the development of the chain, especially its ability to guarantee reliable 
supply, improve upon the quality of fruits, foster learning and knowledge transfers and 
balance the allocation of risks.  
An outcome of the general prevalence of opportunistic behaviour and the lack of 
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knowledge on acreage under cultivation was an increase in the unreliability in both the 
quantity and quality of supplies. This impacted on the ability of Ghanaian exporters to 
access the high quality-high price market i.e. supermarkets.121 On top of low prices, buyers 
in the low quality-low price segment had erratic demand. Nonetheless, Ghanaian exporters 
continued to participate in this segment to gain market entry or retain their market share 
(World Bank, 1990:12). 
To keep their market share, exporters marketed their produce on consignment (spot 
market) basis. Marketing on consignment basis involved buyers making payment after the 
produce had arrived, been verified as meeting the buyer’s quality standards, accepted by the 
buyer and sold on the market. Exporters used sales agents located in Europe who indicated 
(a) the final selling price (b) the quantity discarded due to low or poor quality and (c) the 
expenses made for quality inspection, labelling, storing, and trucking (AfDB, 2005:12; 
Fieldwork interview, 2013). After the fruits have been sold, the buyer (retailer/wholesaler) 
deducts his costs and commission and the remainder is paid to the exporter (TAC, 
2004:73).122  
Improvements in quality partly depend on income flows (prompt payment and stability of 
prices). The consignment basis of payment implied that an exporter’s funds are tied up 
with the buyer until the goods are sold and then payment is made. In some cases, exporters 
could wait for up to 3 months or more before they were paid (Takane, 2004).  Also, since 
exporters were price takers, they were forced to accept any price given to them by the 
buyer.  Unstable income flows further entrenched the perception that agriculture is risky, 
thus affecting the ability of exporters and farmers to access finance to make the necessary 
quality improvements. 
Strong contractual relations in the chain could have: (a) smoothened income flows by 
offering guaranteed prices (b) promoted the reliability of supplies (c) reduced opportunistic 
behaviour and (d) encouraged investment and knowledge transfer to smallholders. 
Reliability of supplies and reduction in opportunistic behaviour would likely have opened 
up new export markets, which then allow exporters to increase their volumes and diversify 
risks. Poulton and Lyne (2009:158) note that, although power relations play out in 
negotiating the form and content of contracts, a contract may provide benefits to both 
                                                 
121 This is not to say that all Ghanaian exporters were not accessing the high-priced market but rather most 
were not. 
122 The sales agents charged a commission of between 5% and 7% of the net selling price (AfDB, 2005:12) 
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parties which go beyond the minimisation of transaction costs. This was applicable in the 
Ghanaian chain as strong contractual relations would have negatively impacted on the 
ability of both exporters and farmers to use a contract as a risk management tool. For 
example, Sexton and Jarvis (2011) in their study of the Ghanaian pineapple sector found 
that exporters who also contracted with smallholders were usually more efficient at 
producing pineapples themselves but by engaging in contractual relations with smallholders 
they could transfer risks they faced in relation to buyers (importers). The strategies pursued 
by both exporters and smallholders to minimise or deflect risk fed back into the chain and 
further deteriorated the chain’s competitiveness.  
 
6.6 Comparative Case: Costa Rica's pineapple industry (the 1980s to early 2000s) 
In comparison, although the Costa Rican pineapple chain started with local conditions 
similar to Ghana’s; for example, promotion of NTEs for export diversification and 
participation of smallholders (section 4.2.3.2), the chain was more formally organised and 
embedded in a network of relations. Hence, apart from the revolutionary role played by 
Del Monte, the role played by agricultural policies and organisations at the regional and 
national levels must be emphasised.123   
From 1982 to 1988, the value of pineapple exports grew to more than US$31million, up 
from US$1million (USAID, 1989:36). The decisive role of MAG and CINDE especially in 
providing technical assistance to smallholders enhanced access to markets and information 
(see section 4.2.3.2). Smallholders were given guidance on the application of fertilisers (den 
Daas, 1993:7) and CINDE regularly provided training to exporters on technology, 
marketing and quality control (Clark, 1995:183).124 Also, the absorptive capacity of the 
chain was boosted by knowledge gained from participating in the global banana value 
chain. This certainly enabled them to easily transfer knowledge to pineapple producers 
(Incae, 1989:6). 
Just like in the Ghanaian sector, small producers had difficulty accessing finance because of 
                                                 
123 Clark (1995:205) notes that ‘the initiation of Costa Rica’s non-traditional export program coincided exactly 
with the establishment of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) in the United States. Indeed, President Reagan 
intended this Initiative to foster political stability in the Caribbean region through stimulating economic 
growth via the establishment of new export industries.’ 
124 Small and medium scale producers in the North Atlantic Zone however complained about not having 
sufficient knowledge regarding fertiliser application protocols (Jansen et al., 1996:30). This can be attributed 
to the fact that producers in this zone were new to pineapple production. 
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high interest rates and the need to provide collateral, in certain cases for up to 80% of 
production value (Hansen-Kuhn, 1993; Aragón and Kreyns, 1994). However, this problem 
was solved with finance provided by the governments of Canada, Germany, Netherlands, 
Spain and Norway for organized producers to access medium-term loans at low interest 
rates (Aragón and Kreyns, 1994:6, 10). 
The local production structure also played a role in the distribution of risks. In Costa Rica, 
there were organised systems for marketing fruits, including pineapple. Fresh fruits and 
vegetables could be marketed in a number of ways on the domestic market. One was the 
wholesale market known as CENADA (Cenri Nacional de Abastecimiento y disribucion de 
Alimentos) and the other Feria. CENADA had a well-developed infrastructure, including 
the daily publication of maximum, minimum and average prices for products, and 
publication of reports on market trends (Jansen et al., 1994:46). In this market, there was a 
fixed selling price for all the products and wholesalers and producers developed well-
established relations (Jansen et al., 1996:47). However, it had the disadvantage of the 
producer having to bear the transportation costs to the market and the likelihood of 
receiving a low price for fruits in times of over supply (Jansen et al., 1996:47). The Feria is a 
farmers’ market, dominated by middlemen (den Daas, 1993; Jansen et al, 1996). Prices of 
pineapples sold on the Feria were twice as high as on the CENADA; however, the quantity 
sold on the Feria was much lower (den Daas, 1993).  
For the export sector, on the other hand, marketing of pineapple fruits was done by large 
producers or intermediaries known as Packers. In the beginning, small and medium 
producers could expect their produce to be sold at prices between what existed on the 
CENADA and Feria. Small and medium producers signed long term written contracts with 
large producers, such as PINDECO and Tico Fruits. These contracts had conditions like: 
(a) agreeing to produce only pineapple (b) selling only to the contracting firm and (c) not to 
sell, rent or mortgage land during the contract period (Hansen-Kuhn, 1993:13). The weight, 
colour and condition of the crown determined fruit quality (den Daas, 1993; 10).  Fruits for 
exports were generally classified according to their weight. Class A refers to fruit sizes 
greater than 1.5kg, Class B between 1.1 and 1.5kg and class C between 0.9 and 1.1kg (den 




6.7 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I show the importance of local conditions in shaping local actors’ 
engagement with each other and in their ability to effectively participate and benefit from 
the global pineapple value chain. Even though Ghanaian exporters and producers were 
integrated into the low end of the value chain, they needed to maintain a minimum quality 
threshold and consistency in supplies to effectively participate in the value chain. Given the 
relatively high income to be earned, low costs of entry, low production costs and history of 
cultivation of Smooth Cayenne, smallholder participation in the chain was dominant. 
However, transaction costs were high due to the production structure and information 
asymmetry. Such costs necessitated a form of coordination which involved closer relations 
between smallholders and exporters, but local conditions prevented this from happening.   
 
A dearth of information relating to quantity and quality requirements persisted in the chain. 
There was therefore the need for information dissemination in order to reduce risks and 
uncertainties. A reduction in risks and uncertainties would have translated into incentives 
which would positively impact the competitiveness of the chain. Sadly, both exporters and 
smallholders failed to perceive that they were dependent on each other, and thus needed to 
forge a common goal. The sourcing of fruits mainly through oral or unwritten contracts, 
which provided no support in the form of technical assistance, finance or inputs to 
smallholders, encouraged opportunistic behaviour by both parties. The outcomes of 
interactions fed back into the system to perpetuate inefficiencies. 
 
The actions or interventions of two other key actors could have impacted chain 
governance. First was the government. To the extent that entrepreneurs took up the 
challenge to produce and export pineapple, the government could have played a more 
facilitating role. Although government policies incentivised entry into the chain, mainly 
through economy-wide incentives, policies targeted at the chain should have evolved to 
facilitate exporter innovation as the export volumes blossomed. A more holistic approach 
to NTE promotion was required. Government investment in sector-wide infrastructure 
would likely have had an impact on exporters’ on-farm infrastructure and in smallholder 
farms. Conducting research and disseminating knowledge to farmers would have increased 
smallholders’ capabilities and provided an incentive for exporters to establish more stable 
relations with them. The Costa Rican government, which established and pursued a 
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coherent and structured programme, presented a sharp contrast to the Ghanaian case. 
Second was the exporter association. Horizontal cooperation would have assisted with 
successfully lobbying government, as well as establishing sector-wide quality and contract 
enforcement mechanisms.   
On the global market, demand for Smooth Cayenne began to fall in 1999 because Del 
Monte, with its lower costs and superior organisational skills, was offering MD2 at ‘a better 
price/quality ratio’ (Whitfield, 2010b:28). Even though exports from Cote d’Ivoire had 
begun to decline from 1995 (Section 4.2.3) and this most likely helped with Ghana’s rise, 
the impact of local conditions on chain actors reinforced the country’s image as a supplier 
of low quality fruits. When the Smooth Cayenne market completely collapsed in 2005 and 
the application of standards favoured tighter coordination between buyers and suppliers, 
the Ghanaian chain was substantially impacted. The impact of global governance on the 
characteristics of the item exchanged in the Ghanaian chain; and the role of local 
conditions in negotiating or mediating the impact is discussed in Chapter 7.    
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Chapter 7 The MD2 Exchange Configuration 
7.1 Introduction 
The MD2 innovation and global standards raised challenges and opportunities for all 
suppliers in the global pineapple market. For suppliers in the Ghanaian chain, it presented 
major challenges because of the way they were embedded in local conditions. In 
overcoming the challenges and taking advantage of opportunities, there has been a 
transformation of the governance of the chain from market to hierarchical and/or captive 
governance. 
This chapter of the thesis investigates how actors in the Ghanaian chain actually engaged 
with the new rules of participation imposed by lead firms. Instead of accounting for a 
change in governance through the lens of the characteristics of the transaction at the global 
level only (as the GVC framework does); I do so by focusing attention on how the global 
forces of change impacted certain characteristics of the local exchange configuration and 
subsequently affected the form and content of transactions in the chain. By doing so, I 
broaden the understanding of governance to include the power or influence of local 
conditions (individually and in combination with each other), which actively shape 
governance in value chains through their impact on the characteristics of suppliers and 
suppliers’ interactions. 
How the local chain responded to the exogenous forces of change is analysed in two parts. 
The first is the immediate period (2005-2008) following the conversion to the MD2 variety; 
and the second is the period from 2009 to 2013. The analysis for the second period is 
mainly done using information gathered from fieldwork interviews (carried out from mid-
May to mid-November 2013), personal conversations with value chain participants and 
industry experts and secondary data.  The words producer-exporter, exporter and exporting 
firm are used interchangeably and also smallholder and small scale producer. Although 
MD2 is the main variety exported, included in the discussions in this chapter are exports of 
the Smooth Cayenne and Sugar Loaf varieties. As mentioned in Chapter 5, typically, 
pineapple farmers in the Akwapim South District (Eastern Region) cultivate all three 
varieties, while those in the Ekumfi District (Central Region) cultivate only the Sugar Loaf 
variety.   
This chapter is organised as follows: the first section provides an overview of the initial 
response of Ghanaian exporters to the threat of the MD2 innovation. The second section 
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identifies the forces of change (both endogenous and exogenous) which influenced the 
restructuring of the chain. In the third section, changes in the characteristics of the item 
exchanged, due to the influence of the exogenous forces of change, are detailed. The fourth 
and fifth sections focus on the strategies and tactics of internal (endogenous) chain actors 
in relation to the changed characteristics of the item exchanged, and how their actions 
impacted the form and content of transactions in the chain in the period 2005 to 2008. 
Based mainly on the study’s fieldwork (see Chapter 5), the sixth and seventh sections 
discuss the current form and content of transactions (2009-2013) and their developmental 
impact on the chain. A summary of the impact of the interaction of the exogenous forces 
of change with the local chain concludes the chapter in the eighth section.   
 
7.2 The decision to convert to MD2   
The inroads made by MD2 on the EU market led to two choices for Ghanaian exporters; 
diversify to MD2 or continue producing Smooth Cayenne. Even though some exporters 
had begun efforts to diversify to MD2 in the early 2000s (Voisard and Jaeger, 2003), most 
Ghanaian exporters did not think of doing so until the demand for Smooth Cayenne 
suddenly and totally collapsed in 2005 (Whitfield, 2012). Prior to 2005, some European 
importers had been unable to participate in the MD2 market because of the premium MD2 
was earning. With the resolution of the patent dispute this premium drastically declined as 
supplies increased (Jaeger, 2008; Whitfield, 2010a; Whitfield, 2012).  
Reacting to changes takes time and usually involves a three-stage learning process: (a) 
identifying that an opportunity exists to participate in the chain and then making the 
decision to exploit it; (b) procuring the necessary raw materials; and (c) being efficient in 
production by accessing the required knowledge and infrastructure (Whitfield, 2010b). The 
response of the Ghanaian chain (strategies and tactics of exporters, the state, development 
agencies) to (a) is discussed in this section while the responses to (b) and (c) are discussed 
in section 7.5.  
The initial prevalent perception or view among Ghanaian exporters, despite the major 
advances being made by MD2, was that they could maintain and even increase their market 
share by continuing to export Smooth Cayenne (Whitfield 2010a; Fieldwork Interviews, 
2013; Personal conversation, 2016). To have confidence in this view, an understanding of 
consumer demand was essential.  A report by Sefa-Dedeh (2005) seemed to indicate that 
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Ghanaian exporters could still sustain trade in Smooth Cayenne: ‘In an attempt to promote 
the sale of Ghanaian pineapples in the EU market consumer studies were conducted in 8 
countries on sugar loaf, smooth cayenne and MD2 pineapples. While MD2 was found to 
be the preferred variety in one country, the smooth cayenne variety was preferred at the 
same rate as MD2 in 6 countries. In one country, smooth cayenne was preferred over 
MD2. The study showed that while Ghana looks at the introduction of MD2, the other 
varieties should not be abandoned’ (Sefa-Dedeh, 2005:16). The report recommended that 
exporters either (a) promote a competitive strategy to continue Smooth Cayenne exports 
while learning MD2 production protocols or (b) convert to MD2 production (Personal 
conversation, 2016).  
Unsurprisingly, Ghanaian exporters lacked a competitive strategy to succeed. Kay (2014:3) 
defines a competitive strategy as ‘trying to achieve some kind of advantage over 
competitors...this generally involves trying to achieve some form of cost or differentiation 
advantage over competitors’ with a successful strategy based on a ‘unique source of 
advantage.’ There seemed to have been no effort made to come together to coordinate 
efforts, if any, at maintaining their Smooth Cayenne market share.  
The persistence of lack of cooperation, although there had been significant changes in the 
characteristics of the item concerned, could be attributed to the fact that there was no clear 
leader in the chain. The majority of exporters were all relatively small and exporting low 
volumes. Also, established exporters had the volumes to meet Smooth Cayenne demand 
and thus continued to behave individualistically (Personal conversation, 2016). One may 
wonder why SPEG as an association did not present a unified strategy. Jaeger (2008:151) 
notes that ‘trade associations can be powerful, but only when the members need them.’  A 
report on the TIRP project indicated that exporters, especially in the fruit and vegetable 
industry, do not share information on trends, practices or opportunities with their 
association (USAID, 2003:38). Thus, for an association that depended on financial 
contributions by its members to operate, it is possible that the information and knowledge 
capabilities of the association were limited.  In reference to the way exporters handled the 
situation, a respondent commented: ‘We were not proactive. When I sit back now, I realise that we 
could have done it more professionally than how we did it because there were signs on the wall in the late 
1990s but we thought, oh, this could not be something that could put us off-ground, but it did happen. All 
of a sudden we lost our market share in the EU’ (Fieldwork interview, 2013). 
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7.3 Main forces of change in the Ghanaian pineapple value chain 
From 2005, retailers in the global pineapple value chain began demanding the MD2 variety 
from Ghanaian exporters while also specifying the way it was to be produced (Table 7.1). 
The GLOBALG.A.P. standard is the minimum standard applied: but other retailer-specific 
standards and requirements, for example, a consistent supply of high quality fruits at short 
notice and reliability of delivery, are also applied.  GLOBALG.A.P. is both a risk 
management standard and a product differentiation standard (see section 4.3.1); focused on 
both food safety and process attributes such as worker rights. Another standard which 
applies to all exporter packhouses and processing firms is the HACCP. The adoption of 
MD2 and standards entailed significant production, knowledge and infrastructure costs 
which had consequences for how transactions were governed in the Ghanaian chain. 
Endogenous chain actors must respond to exogenous forces of change. Hence, their 
strategies and tactics also influence the governance of the chain (Table 7.1). 
Table 7.1: Specific institutional change forces in the MD2 configuration 
 Endogenous Exogenous 
Intended Individual and corporate decisions 
by exporters, farmers and 
processors (e.g. investments in 
infrastructure, knowledge 
acquisition and transfer) 
 
Policy, strategies and tactics by the 
government and development 
(donor) agencies 
MD2 innovation  
 
Introduction of product and 
process standards by international 
fruit and vegetable retailers 
 
Unintended Feedbacks from decisions taken by 
actors above  
None 
Source: Author  
7.4 Changes in the characteristics of the item exchanged (product 
characteristics)  
The first aspect of the Ghanaian pineapple exchange configuration which was impacted by 
the exogenous intended forces of change identified in Table 7.1 was the characteristics of 
pineapple required from Ghanaian farmers and exporters. No longer was the aesthetic 
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characteristics of pineapple (Section 6.2.1), its most important attributes, but rather more 
intangible attributes such as traceability and low levels of pesticide use.125   
Both forces of change increased asset-specificity in the chain. On one hand, MD2 led to an 
increase in human asset specificity (investments to be made in upgrading the knowledge of 
producers) because it required Ghanaian smallholders and exporters to learn to grow 
pineapple under agronomic practices different from what they were used to before. In fact, 
the World Bank (2011a: 125) states, ‘MD2 was found to be a more sensitive crop requiring 
better production management, careful harvesting, and rapid cooling within one to three 
hours of harvesting.’ 
 
The application of product and process standards further increased physical and intangible 
asset specificity by requiring investments in infrastructure, packaging and a reputation for 
producing and exporting comparatively high quality fruits. Other retailer-specific 
requirements, e.g. the adoption of JIT practices by retailers, piled on the pressure by 
increasing temporal asset specificity.126   
 
7.5 Negotiating the (re)integration of the Ghanaian chain into the global chain 
(2005-2008) 
Henson and Jaffee (2008) and Selwyn (2008) note that local conditions to an extent 
determine the ability of a country or firms to integrate into or maintain their position in a 
value chain.  The local conditions (economic, political, technological, social, organisational) 
influence how and who responds to global changes. In this section, I detail the strategies 
and tactics of Ghanaian chain actors from 2005 to 2008. These responses impacted market 
access and participation, production relations and the organisation of producers; and had a 
further impact on the chain from 2009 to 2013.   
7.5.1 Procurement of planting materials  
After deciding to move to MD2 production, the first challenge to exporters was how to 
access the raw material, i.e. MD2 suckers. Pineapple reproduction is done using the crown, 
                                                 
125 In 2001, the EU reduced the MRL for ethephon, the chemical used in ‘forcing’ pineapples, from 2mg/kg 
to 0.5mg/kg. Shortly after, it was discovered that a shipment of pineapple fruits from Ghana had MRL 
exceeding the minimum stipulated (Gogoe, Dekpor and Williamson, 2001). 
126 Temporal asset specificity is usually linked with perishability. However, it is increased in cases where there 
is a possible time lag between production and delivery especially when 'prompt performance is critical' 
(Masten, Meehan and Synder, 1991:9). 
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slips or the suckers. The sucker (or the shoot) is the new plant found between the leaves of 
the mature pineapple on the mother plant. The slips are located at the base of the fruit, and 
the crown is at the leafy top of the plant. The suckers are the most preferred method of 
propagation (Sauls, 1998; Department of Tropical Plant and Soil Sciences, 2002) because 
sucker-grown plants usually fruit earliest at around 16 months, slips may take 24 months 
and a crown can take up to 28 months (Sauls, 1998).  
In the Smooth Cayenne configuration, suckers were freely available from producers’ own 
farms or others at the cost of US$0.01-US$0.06 (World Bank, 2011a: 125). MD2 suckers 
on the other hand had to be sourced from outside the country. The cost of sourcing 
suckers was exorbitant and unaffordable to many. Individually, most exporters were 
financially constrained due to low profit margins and local conditions (Chapter 6); hence 
procurement was a challenge.  One exporter, BFL, reportedly purchased suckers at the cost 
of US$1.5 million (NRI, 2010, Section B, p.21).  It survived the industry crisis and currently 
has a 15% share of the Ghanaian fresh pineapple export market.  
The government and development agencies also made strategic moves to influence the 
ability of exporters and farmers to convert to MD2 production. In the 2004 national 
budget, the government made available a grant of US$2million to finance the provision of 
MD2 suckers to producers (MoFEP, 2004:218).  The action of government, which 
formerly had seemed oblivious to the problems of the chain, could have stemmed from 
concerns about government revenue; ‘government is worried about this development 
because of the significant contribution of the pineapple sector to Ghana’s non-traditional 
exports…’ (MoFEP, 2004:218). Also, smallholders were the dominant producers in the 
chain and agricultural development policies extensively stressed smallholder production as 
a means of poverty reduction. 
The change in the characteristic of the item also impacted the interaction between the 
indirect internal actors of the chain. For example, to make more suckers available, the 
government in collaboration with exporters, research institutions and development 
agencies, constructed a tissue culture laboratory. The laboratory was completed in 2006 and 
began propagation of MD2 cultivars (MoFEP, 2006: 88,139).  However, the propagation 
process was costly and could not be quickly done to satisfy the growing and urgent 
demand; so another propagation method known as gouging was also implemented (Pine 
News, May 2007:2-3). The gouging method led to defects in the suckers including multiple 
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crowns and spiny leaves (Pine News, May 2007: 2-3), possibly decreasing the number of 
suckers available for cultivation. 
7.5.2 Accessing knowledge and infrastructure 
Bridging knowledge gaps is also essential to participation in the global chain (Selwyn, 
2008). Aside the costs of procuring suckers, the agronomic needs of MD2 were different 
from that of Smooth Cayenne (Fieldwork Interviews, 2013). For example, the process of 
inducing MD2 plants to flower is different from that of Smooth Cayenne (USAID, 
2009:17). MD2 is also more prone to the Phytophthora disease than Smooth Cayenne 
hence a chain used to cultivating Smooth Cayenne would initially struggle with producing 
quality MD2 fruits. To overcome knowledge gaps, exporters need to bear some costs. 
Since MD2 was a new variety, expertise in producing the crop was lacking (COLEACP, 
2005). Producer-exporters who were relatively financially better off acquired knowledge on 
production processes by bringing in experts from Costa Rica (Whitfield, 2010b; Fieldwork 
Interviews, 2013).  
The NRI (2010) notes that the total volume of fruit exported from 2005 – 2007 (Figure 
7.1) hide the true extent of decline of the chain.  One must bear in mind that MD2 was 
‘manufactured’ for a particular climatic condition and so anyone else cultivating it had to 
adapt it to the specific locality. In 2007, GEL was responsible for as much as 15,000 tonnes 
of export volume (World Bank, 2011a:13), representing 37% of the total amount exported: 
but even GEL, a subsidiary of an MNC, struggled to learn how to cultivate quality MD2 
fruits in the Ghanaian climate Whitfield (2012:316-317).  Producer-exporters cultivated 
MD2 largely on trial and error basis and ended up losing much of their working capital 





                                                 
127 Although currently the knowledge base of producers has increased, reliance on experts from outside the 
country still goes on from time to time. One producer-exporter at the time of this study’s fieldwork had 











Note: 2005-2012 data from MoFA (2013a), 2013 data from Trade Map 
Source: MoFA (2013a) and Trade Map, International Trade Centre 
www.intracen.org/marketanalysis 
 
Unlike in the case of Smooth Cayenne where producers could get away with lax agronomic 
practices (Whitfield, 2010b), MD2 requires the application of certain inputs e.g. fertiliser in 
a specific manner, specific quantity and at specific times, to consistently get good yields and 
high quality fruits: ‘MD2 requires strict adherence to protocols of fertilisation. So, if it says you need 
NPK, Sulphate of Ammonia, every ten days or every two weeks, you make sure you provide it and at the 
right time and quantities till the end’ (Fieldwork Interview, 2013). An acre of pineapple 
consumes about 12 - 15 bags of fertiliser (COLEACP/PIP, 2011; Fieldwork Interviews, 
2013) and ‘… each plant should receive exactly the same rate of fertiliser in order to obtain 
the most uniform fruit size, shape, weight, sugar content and nutrient content’ 
(COLEACP/PIP, 2011:20). To know the right inputs and apply them in the right 
quantities requires that producers have a certain level of absorptive capacity. Given the low 
level educational characteristics of smallholders (and outgrowers), exporters were of the 
view that 'Outgrowers may not be able to meet statutory requirements or good agricultural processes' 
(Fieldwork Interviews, 2013). To use smallholders, improvements in their skills must be 
made.   
Both MD2 and standards application also required investments in physical infrastructure 
on and off-farm, supervision and monitoring of the entire production process in order to 
decrease information asymmetry and uncertainty. MD2 required investments in cold chain 































over the other variables was partly attributed to the ability to keep it at the ideal 
temperature required for pineapples after harvest. In the work plan for the HEII 
programme, the author’s remark; ‘indeed, MD2’s superior quality and sugar content is as 
much tributary to a continuous cold chain, efficient distribution and promotion than 
specific genetic characteristics’ (GoG, 2004:5). Gogoe (2004) noted that over 50% of 
GLOBALG.A.P. protocols applied to the correct use of chemicals during crop production 
and post-harvest handling of the produce. At the national regulatory level, the Ghana 
Standards Board (GSB) oversees pesticide quality and residue analysis; however, its 
facilities were not adequate to conduct the needed analysis (World Bank 2011a).   
The role of indirect internal actors was crucial to accessing knowledge and infrastructure. 
Development programmes proved constructive in integrating exporters and smallholders 
into the global chain; but, in some cases, delayed timing of programmes was responsible 
for the inability of some exporters and farmers to integrate into the chain. From the mid-
2000s, the participation of development agencies evolved from the provision of incentives 
for private enterprises to participate in the market to investments in infrastructure and 
extension services, among others. The change in development agencies strategies can be 
attributed to the fact that, globally, it was thought that participation in a value chain was a 
tool for poverty reduction; thus, value chain development was key to the efforts of such 
organisations (Altenburg, 2007; Meyer-Stamer and Wältring, 2007; Humphrey and Navas-
Alemán, 2010).128  
Generally, development agencies’ programmes had components targeted at (a) Enhancing 
Production and Productivity (b) Improvement in Infrastructure (c) Promotion of export 
marketing and (d) Farmer training among others (AfDB,2005; USAID, 2009; MiDA 2013). 
These programmes spanned the period 2004-2013 and made considerable investments in 
the chain. Examples of specific programmes targeted at the pineapple value chain from 
2004 – 2013 included: (a) The USAID’s TIPCEE project, 2004-2006 (see Chapter 6 for 
details). It had two main components; Enabling Environment (EE) and Export Business 
Development (EBD). (b) Market – Oriented Agriculture Programme (MOAP), 2004-2013, 
implemented by GIZ together with MoFA, was targeted at improving the competitiveness 
                                                 
128 Wolter (2008:13) commenting on the Ghanaian horticulture sector noted: ‘The horticultural sector has 
emerged as a favourite target of donors and the GoG. The examination of several large projects reveals that 




of actors in the agriculture sector on the national, regional and international market. 129 It 
focused on the promotion of selected value chains including the sugar loaf pineapple chain 
in the Central Region of Ghana. It also supported both public sector and private sector 
organisations involved in agriculture. (c) Export Marketing and Quality Awareness 
Programme (EMAQP), 2007-2011. The US$28.4million EMAQP, financed by the 
government of Ghana and the African Development Bank (AfDB) was the successor to 
the HEII programme with the overall objective to ‘improve quality, increase quantity and 
build confidence in the agriculture export sector ' (AfDB, 2005:2). Among its specific aims 
was to increase the volume of MD2 suckers to farmers and (d) The Millennium Challenge 
Account (MCA) compact programme, 2007-2012. The MCA compact programme by US’s 
Millennium Challenge Corporation's (MCC) was a US$547million programme in three 
areas; transportation, rural development and agriculture. In the agricultural sector, it was to 
raise the incomes of farmers through the expansion of commercial agriculture among 
farmer based organisations (FBOs), improvement in credit services for investments on-
farm and in the value chain and the provision of infrastructure, among others.  
The EBD component of the TIPCEE programme proved key to improving the 
technological capabilities of both farmers and exporters in the pineapple sector during the 
MD2 crisis. It was at the forefront of making available MD2 suckers and disseminating 
knowledge on production processes to farmers. It taught them how to select suckers, about 
forcing and degreening of pineapples as well as cultural practices which would ensure high 
yields (USAID, 2009:10, 19).  
The changed characteristics of the item exchanged also succeeded in changing the nature of 
interactions: (a) among development agencies and (b) between development agencies and 
the government. For example: The EMAQP as a successor to the HEII used the 
infrastructure that had been already built (Wolter, 2008); (b) TIPCEE and MOAP 
programmes collaborated to enable exporters participate in the Fruit Logistica trade fair in 
Germany (USAID, 2009); (c) MoFA, SPEG, GIZ, and TIPCEE assisted with the 
certification of farmer cooperatives (USAID, 2009:10); and (d) GIZ, in partnership with 
COLEACP, also assisted farmers become compliant with EU pesticide residue 
requirements (Danielou and Ravry, 2005:27). 
                                                 
129 Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) was formerly known as the German 
Government Agency for International Co–operation (GTZ) 
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7.6 The form and content of transactions (2005-2008) 
7.6.1 Scale of adoption of MD2 
Availability of an input does not mean that it is affordable, and this was the case in the 
chain.  The scale of adoption of MD2 was significantly reduced, by first, the cost of suckers 
and second the total costs of production. Although government and development agencies 
had made suckers available, the costs of acquiring the suckers were high. In fact, MD2 
suckers were individually priced at between US$0.70 and US$0.80 (World Bank, 2011a; 
Fieldwork Interviews, 2013) compared with US$0.01-US$0.06 for Smooth Cayenne (World 
Bank, 2011a: 125). The challenges with local propagation of MD2 suckers and the high 
selling price led AfDB (2005:20) to state that 'the supply of suckers is still limited and cost-
prohibitive, for the large majority of out-growers and other smallholders.' Furthermore, 
one new input, plastic mulch (Figure 7.2), increased the cost of production per acre by as 
much as US$300-400 (World Bank, 2011a:125). The brix level (sugar content) of MD2 is 
one of its selling points. The amount of moisture pineapples need during cultivation is 
critical in the development of the right brix level. In the Akwapim South District of Ghana, 
rainfall per annum is 1700mm and mean annual rainfall is 1250 mm per annum (MoFA, 
2016), comparatively lower than the 3000-4000mm received in the Costa Rican producing 
areas (Tonjes, 1994; Eosta/ICCO, 2010). Inadequate rainfall and lack of irrigation on 
Ghanaian farms necessitated the use of plastic mulch.  
Figure 7.2: Pineapple planted on beds covered with black plastic mulch 
 
Source: Author (2013) 
For the smallholder, the benefit of cultivating MD2 and participating in a stringent market 
was the potentially high income to be earned. All producers were required to make 
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improvements in on-farm infrastructure (e.g. construct toilets, chemical sheds), keep 
detailed accurate records of farm inputs and practices, use only agro-chemicals (i.e. 
fertilisers, pesticides, chemicals) which were authorised for the cultivation of fruits, among 
others130. These improvements were required for certification purposes. Certification costs 
can be grouped into two, recurring and non-recurring. Recurring costs are the yearly audit 
assessment costs which must be borne upfront, while non-recurring costs are investments 
in on-farm infrastructure such as toilets, chemical stores and upgrading of packhouses.131 
Henson and Jaffee (2008) suggest that certification costs are high in the short-term but in 
the medium to long term, they fall.  










Outgrower 18 17,000 500 65 
Outgrower 20 20,000 450 50 
Outgrower 60 80,000 18,000 3,000 
Producer-exporter 400 550,000 65,000 5,000 
Producer-exporter 1500 1,400,000 75,000 13,000 
Producer-exporter 1800 1,600,000 100,000 10,500 
Source: OECD (2007:30) 
In the short-term, the cost of making these improvements was high for smallholders and 
small exporters (Table 7.2).132 Non-recurring costs were significant for smallholders and 
exporters who had already lost much of their working capital and were highly indebted 
since exporters had failed to turn up to either buy Smooth Cayenne fruits or pay them for 
supplies made (Jaeger, 2008; Fold and Gough, 2008; Whitfield, 2012). They were also not 
in the position to either access or afford credit from financial institutions.  In addition, the 
Ghanaian chain had to bear an extra cost to bring in foreign certifiers as there was no 
                                                 
130 Sourcing of approved fertilisers and chemicals in some cases meant that exporters had to import their own 
supplies from Europe. 
131 The time lag between the decision to comply and actual certification is approximately two years (OECD, 
2007; Fieldwork interviews). 
132 Similarly, in Kenya the cost to a smallholder farmer meeting one aspect of GLOBALG.A.P. certification 




approved local agency (OECD,2007:19).133  
Small exporters also had problems adopting MD2. Small exporters with the Horticulture 
Association of Ghana (HAG) complained that ‘some donors provide a lot of training but 
the members lack the resources to implement any of the knowledge gained from the 
training’ (NRI, 2010:11).  
Even if one can finance production, it is expected that the income earned will be 
commensurate with the effort made. However, in 2007 one MD2 sucker cost 3000 cedis 
(US$0.3) although the fruit was sold for 1700 cedis (US$0.17) (Fold and Gough, 
2008:1693).134 This served as a disincentive for smallholders to continue participating in the 
chain. 
Generally, MD2 production costs were significantly higher for all producers but more so 
for the smallholder. The smallholder’s total cost of producing MD2 was over 170% higher 
compared with the total cost of producing Smooth Cayenne (Table 7.3).  Also, the per kg 
cost of production was much lower for large-scale producers (Table 7.3), suggesting that 
MD2 is more suited to large-scale commercial farming and requires a minimum level of 
economies of scale to be profitable. Hence, the NRI (2010: Section A, p.10) estimated that 
a smallholder required 16 hectares (40 acres) and outgrowers, a minimum of 54 hectares 









                                                 
133 Currently, a local based company, SGS Ghana Ltd. is approved by GLOBALG.A.P. to carry out 
certification assessments.   
134 GHC1=US$0.9704 at the end of 2007 (BoG, 2008:15) 
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Table 7.3: Comparative Costs of per acre Smooth Cayenne production by a smallholder (in 
2004) with that of MD2 for small and medium-scale producers135  
 Smooth 
Cayenne 
MD-1 MD2-2 MD2-3 
Plant 
population 
20,000 20,000 20,000 30,000 
Exportable 
yield per kg 
9,023 26,047 28,500 36,503 
Labour costs 
(US$) 
466 649 1,208 735 
Input costs 
(US$) 
531 2,595 1,976 2,168 
Fixed cost 
(US$) 
231 U115 Not given 141 
Total cost 
(US$) 
1,228  3,359 3,184 3,044 
Cost per kg 
(US$) 
0.14 0.13 0.11 0.08 
Source: World Bank (2011a:124) 
Despite the efforts made by development agencies (see section 7.5.3), the final report of 
the TIPCEE project, a project widely praised for its efforts in the pineapple export value 
chain, noted that while it achieved considerable success by making available MD2 suckers 
to as many as 7,000 smallholders (USAID, 2009), 'exporters did not pursue a growth 
strategy for the popular MD2 variety on the scale expected … many of the targeted 
exporters and growers, who formerly served the fresh-export market, now choose a lower-
risk option with a vibrant fruit processing industry ' (USAID, 2009:3).  
7.6.2 Production Relations and the exclusion of smallholders 
In synthesizing research from over 40 case studies on how the restructuring of agri-food 
chains can include and benefit small producers, Vorley and Proctor (2008:12) note that key 
to the integration of small producers in a value chain are: (a) ‘farmers who are trained, 
organized, empowered to deliver quantity and quality in a consistent and cost efficient way 
(b) a public sector with a conducive business environment including infrastructure, contract 
                                                 
135 MD2-1, MD2-2, MD2-3 refer to the different types of producers. MD2-1 is a smallholder, MD2-2 is an 
outgrower and MD2-3 is a large grower. 
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enforcement mechanisms, financial intermediation (c) a receptive business sector.’ 
Furthermore, there must be an actor who assists and connects or links small producers to 
firms or businesses.  
The overarching goal of all the development programmes implemented in this period was 
the establishment of effective agriculture–industry linkages (AfDB, 2005; USAID, 2009). 
Contract farming is usually proposed as the way to integrate farmers into export value 
chains; but it must make business sense for exporters to contract with smallholders. Would 
integrating smallholders into the chain lead to competitiveness or decrease in operational 
costs? On the contrary, integrating smallholders into the chain would not have increased 
exporters’ competitiveness or decreased their operational costs. Most exporters who 
managed to make the conversion to MD2 had relied on their little savings, but they needed 
more (Whitfield, 2010b:31). Access to and affordability of finance was however, still limited 
as lending rates to agriculture were still high (Table 7.4) and could be much higher for 
pineapple producers and exporters who had acquired debts from their inability to sell 
Smooth Cayenne and, in some cases, had failed to repay earlier loans given. The risk averse 
nature of financial institutions to invest in the chain had been boosted up a bit more. 
Table 7.4: Bank Lending rates (minimum and maximum) in %, 2005-2009 
End of Period Agriculture, Fishing 
and Forestry 
Export Sector Manufacturing 
Sector 
2005 26.00 – 28.75  26.00 – 28.75  
 
26.00 – 28.75  
 
2006 24.25 – 26.00  24.25 – 26.00  
 
24.25 – 26.00  
 
2007 14.83-33.50 15.00 – 33.50  
 
15.00 – 33.50  
 
2008 23.75 – 27.25  23.75 – 27.25 24.25 – 27.25 
Source: MoFA (2013a) 
Also, Ghanaian exporters began exports of MD2 in 2006 (Pay, 2009). However, between 
2006 and 2008, they faced the two challenges of low volumes and low prices (Gatune et al., 
2013) which resulted in low incomes. Low volumes were due to their ‘beginner’ status in 
the chain while low prices were mainly because the quality of their fruits was lower than 
that of their competitors, as they were now learning the agronomics of the variety (ISH, 
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2007; Kleemann, 2011; Gatune et al., 2013). Although it is extremely challenging to access 
consistent and accurate data on wholesale prices of exported Ghanaian pineapples, Figure 
7.3 shows that Ghanaian exporters received very low prices for their fruits, especially in 
2007.  Thus, although estimates of unmet demand for Ghanaian MD2 exports in 2007 
amounted to 40,000 tonnes (GoG/World Bank, 2007:19), Ghanaian exporters were not in 
a position to offer a market opportunity to smallholders. 
Figure 7.3: Average monthly wholesale prices of pineapples exported from Ghana  
(2001-2009) 
 
Source: Kleemann and Effenberger (2010:7)136 
 
The majority of exporters who managed to survive in the global chain, between 2005 and 
2008, did so because a significant portion of their exports were either Fairtrade or organic 
certified fruits (about 20%) earning a premium which was 20% higher than the 
conventional market price (World Bank, 2011a; NRI, 2010; Gatune et al.; 2013; Fieldwork 
Interviews, 2013). This ensured that exporters managed to stay in the value chain. Hence, 
Ghanaian pineapple exports to the EU had a higher unit value than their competitors, 
Costa Rica and Côte d’Ivoire (Figure 7.4). 
 
 
                                                 
136 Based on price data extracted and complied by Linda Kleemann from International Trade Center (ICT) 
and other reports. 
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Figure 7.4:  Unit value (€/tonne) of pineapple exports 2005-2008  
 
Source: Author, based on Eurostat Comext (2016) data 
Apart from the costs of production, the high level of mistrust between exporters and 
smallholders due to past experiences of opportunistic behaviour meant that a third-party 
had to establish a contractual linkage between exporters and smallholders. After the 
contractual relationship had become functional and structures to maintain it were in place, 
the two parties could be left to work on their own.  Unfortunately, interventions by 
development agencies did not serve as an effective linkage between exporters and 
smallholders. Development agencies had greatly made available suckers and transferred 
knowledge to both parties in the hope that it was enough to encourage cooperation 
between the two parties. According to Ouma (2015:180), the TIPCEE and HEII projects 
were of the subjective perception that with the projects taking up 70-80% of the cost of 
suckers; smallholders would be able to reintegrate into the chain. However, according to 
USAID, ‘TIPCEE underestimated the lack of trust within the private sector. The difficulty 
in finding win-win situations among exporters, among producers, and between producers 
and buyers was formidable, and continues to hinder development of the sector’ (USAID, 
2009:55). 
It is difficult to say why the lack of trust in the chain was so entrenched. Nonetheless, in 
my view, the missing pieces to bridging the trust gap and integrating smallholders into the 
chain were the lack of contract enforcement mechanisms and financial conditions. Recall 
that the study’s conceptual framework acknowledged three sources of trust; macro, meso 
and micro. Since meso and micro level sources were not applicable in the chain, macro 
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short-term. Without ways of ensuring that returns on investments are safeguarded, 
providing smallholders with suckers and knowledge on the production process were 
inadequate to entice producer-exporters to contract with them. 
Indeed, efforts were made to provide finance to smallholders (Whitfield, 2010a). Such 
efforts, however, failed due to reasons including the timing of loan disbursements and the 
subjective belief that loans from projects aligned with governments are gifts or free money. 
A component of the MCA project was the Agricultural Credit Program (ACP). The project 
favoured working through FBOs with an average of 50 farmers.  Farmers could only access 
the ACP fund after they had finished MiDA’s Commercial Training Programme which 
included the presentation of a business plan to a participating financial institution for 
assessment (MCC, 2013:84).137 Though this condition was well-intended, Whitfield 
(2010a:30) explains that the FBO model was not suited to pineapple farmers. Since most 
pineapple farmers were not part of any farmer group, they had to be combined with other 
farmers, e.g. food crop farmers in the same locality to form an FBO.138 The financial needs 
of a pineapple farmer were much higher than that of a food crop farmer. Finance was 
provided by financial institutions which were participating in the ACP and bore 50% of 
risk default (MiDA, 2013:85). It is therefore possible that pineapple farmers who could 
have accessed the ACP if evaluated on their own merit or together with other pineapple 
farmers could not access the facility or accessed amounts lower than what would have 
made a significant difference in their operations.  
Although the MCA programme started in 2007, smallholder pineapple producers were not 
able to access the ACP credit scheme until 2009. This was possibly due to organisational 
and operational problems faced by the scheme and its participating institutions, resulting in 
late disbursements of funds. In the programme's final report, it noted the following 
operational problems: (a) the lack of offices of the supervisory agent, the Bank of Ghana 
(BoG), in the areas where FBOs were located meant that there would be difficulties in 
collecting, validating and processing the reports of borrowers; (b) the BoG lacked adequate 
technical and supervising capacity in agriculture credit; (c) funds were disbursed to 
participating financial institutions, far in excess of what their balance sheets could absorb; 
and (d) the termination of the contract of one of the consultants in charge of the ACP 
                                                 
137 A farmer classified as trained must have completed 50% of each of the two training sessions. An FBO 
classified as trained must have 80% of its members undergo the training (MiDA, 2013:29) 
138 Whitfield (2010a:30) claims that personnel involved with designing the FBO training programme admitted 
that horticulture producers should have been assessed under a different model. 
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credit scheme (MiDA, 2013:85-87). The scheme was back on track in mid-2009; but by 
then, exporters had already been exporting their own produce and did not re-establish 
market linkages with outgrowers and/or smallholders. Thus, it is very likely that 
smallholders who accessed funding in 2009 would not have a market for their produce in 
2010 or 2011. 
On the subjective perception of loans being free, a mid-term review of the MCA Ghana 
compact in 2011 stated: ‘From the onset, most farmers believed that the money was free 
from the American government. Subsequently, when they realized that they will be given 
loans, they also believed that the only condition for securing the loans was by attending 
MiDA’s sponsored training. When the farmers were again faced with the reality of meeting 
credit requirements (FBO business plans and credit worthiness) and a loan interest rate 
(32%) that is comparable to other commercial lending rates they were disappointed in 
MiDA’ (IMPAQ, 2011: xiv). The subjective belief that money provided under projects 
aligned with government is free money lies in political patronage practised in Ghana.139 The 
report goes on to identify this as one of the reasons why farmers joined FBOs (IMPA1, 
2011: 19-21) and that ‘No amount of sensitization has really changed this mindset for 
farmers’ (IMPAQ, 2011:16). 
With initial limited capital and skills, the increased financial outlays and skills required to 
produce MD2 to meet retailer’s specifications put smallholders and outgrowers under 
serious threat. The choice of exporters to vertically integrate into production was due to a 
combination of the characteristics of the actors and the local conditions described above. 
By this choice, exporters gained control over fruit quality and reliability of supplies, the 
essential factors required in accessing the chain, maintaining or improving their position 
and also benefitting from the chain.  
7.7 The form and content of transactions (2008-2013) 
Currently, the MD2 exchange configuration in Ghana is characterised by captive and/or 
hierarchical governance. For most small and medium-scale producers, the impact of the 
new product characteristics on their participation in the chain were insurmountable. They 
had no other alternative than to quit the sector. Consequently, small and medium scale 
producers are virtually non-existent in the whole fruit (MD2 and Smooth Cayenne) export 
                                                 
139 Political patronage refers to the practice of benefitting from supporting a particular government in power 
rather than on merit. 
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strand of the chain and production is concentrated among producer-exporters (Figure 5.1; 
Table 7.5).140 In the processed pineapple strand of the chain, small and medium-scale 
producers participate as suppliers to large-scale and artisanal processors. Smallholders act 
as suppliers to producer-exporters only in the Sugar Loaf strand of the chain (Figure 5.1). 
Currently, members of SPEG control over 90% of the Ghanaian pineapple export market. 
A look at the SPEG website in 2013 revealed a list of over 30 registered members. 
However, less than half of them consistently export pineapples throughout the year. Out of 
fourteen (14) exporters who consistently export throughout the year, eight (8) exporters 
account for 93% of export volumes (Gatune et al., 2013) and 41% of the 93% of exports 
are from two companies, GEL and BFL (Gatune et al., 2013; Fieldwork Interviews, 2013). 
Most of the small exporters who made up HAG have exited the sector. 
Out of five producer-exporters interviewed in this study, only one indicated that it 
currently used outgrowers - 14 farmers picked and sponsored by a bank in Switzerland.141 
The exporter provides all inputs and forcing chemicals: packaging and harvesting are done 
by the company. Thus, 60% of produce is from the company’s own farms, while 40% of 
produce is from the outgrowers (Fieldwork Interview, 2013).  
Another exporter used to contract with outgrowers. After MD2 had been introduced, the 
MCA project supported the company’s outgrowers to acquire the necessary skills of MD2 
production. However, most the outgrowers were not successful due to the high capital 
outlays and husbandry skills required. The producer-exporter expressed the intention to 
bring on board the successful ones who still wanted to continue in the pineapple industry; 
however, he could not tell exactly when (Fieldwork Interview, 2013). Two other producer-
exporters who were identified as contracting with a small number of smallholders declined 
participation in the study. In 2015, one exited the pineapple industry to grow a plant 
sweetener known as Stevia (Personal conversations with the exporter, 2015). 
During the study’s fieldwork interviews, efforts were made to assess whether exporters 
were likely to re-establish outgrower relations. The consensus among interviewees was that 
it was unlikely because they were financially constrained: 'We can't finance our own production, 
how can we finance others' (Fieldwork Interviews, 2013).  
                                                 
140 There is no accurate data on exactly how many smallholders continue to participate in this strand of the 
chain, but the consensus is that very few do. 
141 I was not given access to these farmers as the export firm claimed that permission could only be granted 
by the bank in Switzerland. The name of the bank was also not made available.  
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Table 7.5: Acreage and staff strength of some pineapple exporters  
Company Acreage (in hectares) Number of Workers 
Golden Exotics Gh. Ltd 6,000 1,200 
Bomarts Farms Limited 3,000 650 
Milani Ghana Ltd. 1,759 200 
Jei River 3, 237 450 
Chartered Impex 2,000 192 
Koranco Farms 2,500 230 
Georgefields Farms 2,600 250 
Prudent Farms Ltd. 2,000 160 
Bio Exotics Ltd. 1,000 80 
Volta River Estates Ltd. 1,000 100 
Note: Acreage refers to the total land size available to the exporter 
Source: Author's Fieldwork Interviews, 2013; Gatune et al; 2013 
7.7.1 Post-harvest handling of fruits  
The government and development organisations embarked on sector-wide and national 
infrastructure projects to complement the individual efforts of exporters. At the regulatory 
level, the HEII improved the laboratories of the GSB to conduct pesticide residue analysis, 
and publish requirements and guidelines for several crops, including pineapple (Whitfield, 
2010a; World Bank, 2011a). Two primary objectives of the World Bank funded HEII 
programme (see Chapter 6) were to increase the income of horticulture industry 
participants through the development of cold chain infrastructure and the introduction of 
the MD2 variety (GoG, 2004:3). Thus, the fruit export shed (Shed 9) at the Tema port was 
upgraded into a cold storage facility able to accommodate up to 1,360 pallets (World Bank, 
2011a: 17).142 In 2012, MiDA completed the construction of a Perishable Cargo Centre 
(PCC) at the country's international airport, Kotoka International Airport (KIA).143 The 
PCC is a 1,200-metre square facility with a 200-metre square cold room, shaded packing 
area of 350-metre square and work room of 600-metre square.  
In 2009, it cost US$838,370 for a cold chain (Lopez-Ventura and Miller, 2009 in NRI, 
2010), an amount out of the reach of many exporters in the Ghanaian pineapple chain. 
                                                 
142 Its upgrading however resulted in the delay of developing other infrastructure such as the perishable cargo 
shed at the Kotoka International Airport (KIA) for air-freighting of fruits and vegetables.  
143 It was originally scheduled to be completed in 2009. 
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Under the MCA programme, SPEG was given a revolving grant of US$2.1million for 
onward lending to its members to install cooling facilities, generators and pack lines at their 
production sites (MiDA, 2013:68).144 Six exporters benefitted from this grant (MiDA, 
2013:66). Exporters invested in cold chain infrastructure such as reefers (refrigerated 
trucks) and packhouses.  All exporters (100%) interviewed in this study had in place highly 
automated packhouses which are air-conditioned, have water purification systems and 
other standards of hygiene, such as the wearing of gloves and covering of hair.  80% of 
exporters interviewed had reefers (refrigerated trucks) which transported the fruits from 
the farm to the port. The one exporter who did not have a reefer at the time of the study 
indicated that it had broken down and he was in the process of acquiring a new one.  
Other infrastructure developments carried out include the construction of roads by MiDA.  
This has ensured that at least two exporting firms and one processing firm interviewed in 
this study cut down on their costs of production. The production manager of the 
processing company interviewed in the study admitted that the road had greatly reduced 
the time it takes to transport packaged cut fruits to the airport, resulting in fewer events of 
missing scheduled flights, thus making them more reliable and cost efficient.  
Despite improvements in infrastructure at the sea port, the cost of transporting fruits from 
Ghana is still relatively high. Handling charges at the Tema port are comparatively higher; 
US$15.5 in Tema and $12 in Côte d’Ivoire (World Bank, 2011a:18). The AEL sea carrier, a 
sister-company to Compagnie Fruiterè, still makes two stops per week to transport fruits to 
Antwerp, Port Vendres and Vado (all in Europe).145 Exporters and a senior official of 
SPEG commented that they view transportation fees paid as expensive. However, due to 
the relatively low volumes of pineapple exported, it is not feasible for a second sea vessel 
transporter to be enticed into the market.  
7.7.2 Exchange interactions between producers and processors  
7.7.2.1 Nature and content of contracts 
In Chapter 6, it was observed that the use of oral or unwritten contracts served the 
interests of both producers and exporters. It allowed exporters to pass on risks arising 
from pricing and market demands to smallholders and vice versa. Given the new global 
                                                 
144 The initial grant amount was US$5.4million; but due to funding challenges this was reduced to 
US$2.1million (MiDA, 2013:68) 
145 AEL was formerly known as Union Bananiere Africaine (UBA) 
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governance conditions, this relationship was unsustainable. Currently, written contractual 
agreements underlie the relationship between producers (smallholders and medium-scale 
farmers) on one hand and processors or exporters on the other hand.  
The experiences of farmers cultivating MD2 is relatively recent. Over 80% of farmers 
interviewed started MD2 cultivation in 2008 and they were usually requested to do so by a 
processor. A medium-scale producer, for instance, was given a loan of €3000 by a 
processor to begin cultivation. The tenuous contractual relations between producers and 
buyers in the Smooth Cayenne configuration, have given way to strong contractual 
relationships between processors and producers on one hand and a nascent but promising 
relationship between exporters and Sugar Loaf farmers on the other hand.  
Producers indicated that having experienced a lack of demand for their Smooth Cayenne 
fruits and/or the financial losses endured due to the inability of exporters to pay for 
purchased produce, they were forced to reflect on how they were integrated into the 
pineapple supply chain. Since 2008, written contracts have usually formed the basis of 
relationship between producers and exporters or processors. The majority of small and 
medium-scale producers, as well as cooperatives interviewed for this study, indicated that it 
is the minimum requirement for them to produce for export; and without it they do not 
take the exporter or processor seriously. The only exception is in respect to the production 
of the Sugar Loaf variety where producers in both the Akwapim South and Ekumfi 
districts said they would produce without a contract since it has a significant local market 
demand. Other reasons for insisting on a written contract are; market access, guaranteed 
prices and avoidance of opportunistic behaviour.   
The following condition must, however, be first met at the start of the relationship. Small 
and medium producers in the conventional pineapple market producing MD2 and Smooth 
Cayenne must at the minimum be GLOBALG.A.P certified. In the Sugar Loaf strand, 
certification for the niche market is required (i.e. organic and Fairtrade certification). 
Producers for GLOBALG.A.P. are certified under Option 2 (see Section 5.3.1). All 
exporters and producers interviewed (100%) who participated in the conventional 
pineapple market were at the minimum GLOBALG.A.P. certified. In the niche chain, three 
cooperatives were interviewed; one cooperative was both Fairtrade and organic certified, 
the other was organic certified and the third was in the final stages of certification. The 
contracts are production contracts, generally in the form of a Memorandum of 
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Understanding (MOU). The contracts commonly agree on the following: (a) quality (e.g. 
size, brix level) (b) quantity per week (c) price per kg (d) contract duration and (e) payment 
terms and (f) technical assistance.  The contracts are however incomplete, as they fail to 
address all possible contingencies such as how to terminate a contract in the event of 
breaches or non-performance and terms for conflict resolution when necessary.   
Certification, though costly, is a must for participation in the international value chain. It 
was estimated that in 2013, the total cost of certification was €10,000 (Gatune et al., 2013). 
Fortunately, small and medium-scale producers in the study do not bear the full cost of 
certification. In fact, they were unable to provide information on the non-recurrent lump 
sum cost of certification because processors, exporters and/or donor agencies are 
responsible for this cost. Processors and exporters bear this cost because the fruits are 
exported under their brand name and maintaining a good reputation is essential for further 
exports to already existing markets or new ones. For donor organisations, it is part of their 
broad objective of integrating farmers into global value chains (Fieldwork, 2013).  
Small and medium-scale producers are directly responsible for recurrent costs like the cost 
of recommended fertiliser and agro-chemicals, workwear and administrative costs e.g. 
record keeping (for traceability). The involvement of development agencies which assist 
producers under a programme with definite term dates, raises the question of whether such 
producers would be able to pay for the costs of certification on their own. A cooperative 
indicated that in the initial stages of MD2 cultivation, TIPCEE trained and paid for its 
group certification. Presently, the TIPCEE programme has ended, and the group would 
have had to pay for its own certification.146 Fortunately, as the cooperative now contracts 
with a processor, the processor bears the cost.  
The contractual relationship however is characterised by a limited use of inter-linked 
contracts specifying finance (credit). An interlinked contract is ‘a contractual arrangement 
between two parties that combines transactions across multiple markets’ (Koo, Huang and 
Kan, 2012:350). The crucial role of interlinked contracts in the literature on agriculture 
development has been emphasised by some authors e.g. Bardhan, 1980; Bell, 1988; Bell, 
Srinivasan and Udry, 1997. As an institutional arrangement, interlinked contracts are likely 
to cause improvements in productivity and efficiency of farmers as they have the power to 
                                                 
146 USAID Ghana however still supports the cooperative by providing training for a member of the group to 
help renew its certification. 
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reduce search costs, monitoring and contract enforcement costs (Baumann, 2000; Eaton 
and Shepherd, 2001). Woodend (2003:6) notes that interlinked contracts are suitable for 
cash crops and high-value fruits and vegetables and not staples because of their low value.  
The literature on contract farming also supports the use of interlinked contracts especially 
when the contracted crop has a long gestation period.  
The financial situation of many small and medium-scale producers in the chain has been 
laid out in the sections above and in Chapter 6. In 2013, the cost of producing one acre of 
pineapple was GHC5200 (US$2,363) while potential revenue was GHC12, 312 (US$5596) 
(Tables 7.6 and 7.7). On the face of it, participation is extremely lucrative and should 
encourage more farmers to enter the chain. However, given the lingering challenges with 
accessing and affording credit and the lack of contracts specifying credit, entry is a 
challenge.  
Table 7.6: Cost of production per acre in 2013147 
Item Unit Total cost (GHC) 
Suckers 24,000 1,200 
Manual Labour for land 
preparation 
 150 
Tractor for clearing land 1 60 
Fertiliser at subsidised rate 15 bags 750 
Labour for other activities  750 
Plastic mulch 3 rolls 1,050 
Ethylene gas 4 litres 60 
Others (e.g. pesticides, other 
labour costs, herbicides) 
 1,180 
Total Cost  5,200 
Note: (a)Others include costs of labour for spraying, weeding, water, which varies from farmer to 
farmer (b) Suckers are usually produced by the farmer hence it is a cost that they save (c)Permanent 
labour is increasingly used. It is estimated that farmers hire 5 permanent workers although some 
(medium-scale farmers) hire as many as 32.  
Source: Author, based on fieldwork interviews 
 
 
                                                 
147 Based on data provided by farmers in the Akwapim South district. 
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Net yield:  
Average fruit weight  
Average selling price 








Revenue GHC 12,312 
Profit GHC 7,112 
Note: Average selling price based on prices for both conventional and Fairtrade pineapples 
Source: Author, based on fieldwork interviews and conversations with industry experts 
Although contractual relations have become the backbone of the relationship between 
producers and exporters or processors, the contracts usually only specify technical 
assistance. In the few cases where contracts specify credit and inputs, it is dependent on the 
characteristics of the producer.  Processors selectively and infrequently provide credit (low 
or no-interest loans), to their contracted farmers because of past experiences with 
financially assisting producers. A production manager recounted the story of providing 
finance to a farmer with whom they had repeated interactions and thought was loyal to the 
company. On receipt of the funds, the farmer stopped farming and travelled abroad 
without informing the company of his decision. Based on such experiences, the company 
no longer funds production for all its producers: rather 'the firm gives a soft loan to one particular 
farmer who sells all his output to the firm' (Fieldwork Interview, 2013). One farmer indicated that 
he accesses soft loans (formerly interest-free but now charged 10% interest per annum) 
from the processor who has the right to purchase all the fruits he harvests on his 250-acre 
farmland (Fieldwork Interview, 2013). Another medium-scale producer with 35 acres of 
land concurred that the processor used to provide financial assistance but had not done so 
for the last three years due to farmers’ defaulting. The processor acting as a guarantor was, 
however, assisting with formal finance from a financial institution (Fieldwork Interview, 
2013).   
For other producers, accessing finance is extremely challenging. Access to finance can be 
defined in terms of the ‘ease with which an individual can use financial services if they 
want’ (Ellis, Lemma and Rud, 2010:1). Frequently, accessing finance from formal financial 
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institutions by agricultural producers is difficult. Bank lending preferences, the cost of 
credit and collateral requirements are some of the factors limiting farmer access. A 
smallholder farmer interviewed summed it up in this way: Apart from the big time farmers, it is 
very difficult for a small farmer to get a loan. You can’t get it from anywhere.’ (Fieldwork Interview, 
2013).  
Financial institutions (both bank and non-bank) explain that financing the pineapple sector 
is difficult because; (a) It is a highly perishable crop (b) It has lots of restrictions i.e. 
standards to adhere to (c) It has a long maturity period (12-18 months) (d) Past experience 
of non-payment of credit by both exporters and producers has made financial institutions 
weary. According to a representative of a microfinance institution (MFI), a primary 
condition of any smallholder or medium-scale farmer looking for finance, is 'a guaranteed end 
market' hence 'there first needs to be a contract with an exporter or processor who has made an 
undertaking to buy the produce' (Fieldwork Interview, 2013). However, it was found that MFI’s 
just like commercial banks, rarely provided value chain finance to small scale producers 
even if they met this condition.  
Prior to the thesis’ fieldwork, I had been informed that an MFI provided financing to 
pineapple farmers (in cooperatives) who had a guaranteed market for their output. During 
the fieldwork, the researcher found that it no longer did so. Discussions with a 
representative of the institution revealed that MFIs, just like other financial institutions, had 
been slow to innovate financing in value chains and thus preferred to finance trading 
activities which they perceived yielded interest and profits quickly: 'The long gestation period of 
pineapple i.e. one year and over, makes it difficult to finance. Assuming you give a moratorium of even four 
(4) months, you lose some money as the same amount of money given to a trading business will yield interest 
and profit over the same period' (Fieldwork Interview, 2013). 
In other value chains where MFIs participate in value chain finance, it is due to the 
involvement of a buyer: 'Currently in Ghana, any MFI actively engaged in value chain financing is 
most likely to be based in the Northern sector of the country. Financing of millet and barley is due to 
partnerships with brewery companies e.g. Guinness Ghana' (Fieldwork Interview, 2013). A caveat to 
the provision of finance by MFIs to pineapple producers is that small scale producers 
generally choose not to access finance from MFIs even if they could. Although the 
collateral requirements by MFI’s are much lower in comparison with commercial banks, 
their interest rates are higher. For example, the rate is 3.5% per month (i.e. 42% per annum 
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in the case of one MFI). while commercial banks average around 36%.  Two medium-scale 
producers interviewed in this study accessed funds from an MFI because its collateral 
terms were favourable: ‘The micro-finance institution will take any form of collateral. I gave them a 
plot of land’: in the other’s case, the collateral demanded included furniture (Fieldwork 
Interviews, 2013).   
About 87% of the study's sample producers would want to access finance from financial 
institutions. However, several obstacles prevent them from doing so, most importantly the 
lack of collateral and the high interest rates charged on the loans. Below are some 
responses by small scale producers on their ability to access finance for production. 
'Here, we don’t have collateral in our buildings and all those things because the banks will be asking you 
for collateral. Here, maybe putting up your building is on family land so there’s no collateral, no documents 
on it.’   
‘Even if you are a customer to any of the financial institutions, if you go there its pure commercial loans. 
Now the pineapple suckers is about 13 to 15 months and then commercial loan is 12 months. Imagine! 
And then the interest rate is as big - 30% [minimum of 25%]. How can you manage that? You won’t 
even get a loan with an interest rate of 25%. It’s very serious.’ 
 ‘With the work we do [pineapple production], the high interest rate is not advisable. Getting a commercial 
loan will not allow you to work’ 
‘It is difficult to get it from any bank. Turning you up and down. So many frustrations, you the farmer will 
regret.’ 
For small scale producers who could but chose not to access finance from MFIs, their 
reasons included (a) the loan amount offered was too little to fund their pineapple 
production and (b) repayment schedules were not favourable to them. Their views of the 
payment schedules of MFIs were poignant: ‘They are very dangerous. They will give you today and 
you have to start repayment tomorrow with a higher interest rate. You are better off with a commercial 
loan.’ 
‘Their terms are also not favourable. It is favourable for the women who sell little things [petty trader] but 
not a farmer like me as I cannot make weekly repayments.’ 
An MFI representative conceded that loan repayment methods used may deter farmers 
from accessing finance:  'the experiences of others [not necessarily in farming] due to their inability to 
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pay back loans and the actions taken by MFIs to recover monies, turn off people in close-knit communities 
in rural areas, to access finance. There is shame associated with not being able to pay back loans or being 
indebted, which makes others unwilling to access finance even though their circumstances may be different' 
(Fieldwork Interview, 2013) 
A solution to the financing needs of smallholders is vital to their continued participation. 
Smallholders expressed the view that the government should provide their financing needs. 
However, even the government’s Microfinance and Small Loans Centre (MASLOC) 
scheme, like other microloan schemes in the country, is geared towards the provision of 
small loans for other professions, such as taxi drivers and petty traders. Fortunately, 
smallholder financing needs are being addressed by the government to an extent through a 
fertiliser subsidy programme (FSP) (discussed below). Pineapple exporters registered with 
SPEG and small and medium-scale producers registered as suppliers to an exporter or 
processor can access the FSP for their production needs.  
In the case of the Ekumfi District, sugar loaf producers can use their contracts to secure 
finance from a commercial bank. This is however made possible by the GIZ under the 
MOAP. The commercial bank advances credit to the cooperative based on their contract 
with a known exporter. When fruits are delivered to the exporter, he deducts a portion of 
the price paid and pays directly to the bank before paying the farmers. Also, the bank 
prefers to deal with a group of farmers rather than individuals to encourage repayment. 
The interest rate charged is 23.19% and although the loan amount is less than half (about 
US$ 545) the cost of production of one acre of pineapple there is a long moratorium 
period of one year. After that, farmers have six months within which to pay back the loan. 
The longer moratorium period ensures that smallholders can harvest and deliver the crop 
to the buyer before loan repayment begins. Since credit is provided to individuals in a 
group, there is both a remunerative and normative incentive for the farmer to honour his 
obligations. The onus is on the farmers to pay back on time to increase the chances of 
approval of subsequent loan applications by the entire group. At the time of the thesis 
fieldwork the model was being piloted with the intention to roll out on a larger scale.  
The way finance is accessed feeds back into the chain to affect the ability to expand supply: 
‘You’re not able to cultivate large areas. Assuming you have GHC2000 at the beginning of the cycle, you 
use it to start. If you have fruits from an earlier cycle, you sell those and use the revenue to continue with the 
plot you’ve started’ (Fieldwork Interview, 2013). Smallholders in one cooperative assist each 
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other financially by lending to one another, although they admit it is not the best way: 
‘Internally, we help each other. When someone has sold some fruits and receives his money, he can lend it to 
another member of the cooperative’ (Fieldwork Interview, 2012). 58% of producers in the 
Akwapim South district indicated that they could not expand production because of how 
they finance their production. One producer further noted that reliance on his own finance 
and/or exorbitant interest rates on loans have led to the situation of him being ‘unable to 
complete my building for the last three years’ (Fieldwork Interview, 2013).  
7.7.2.2 Enforcement of Contracts 
Interactions between producers and processors can be characterised under captive 
governance since the producers are highly dependent on the processors for market access, 
assistance with certification and extension. Under captive governance, producers face 
significant switching costs, and opportunism is controlled through the dominance of lead 
firms. However, this thesis finds that opportunism in the captive governance relation is 
curtailed primarily by the influence of local conditions which make contracts relational and 
thus self-enforcing.  
Since the 1990s, a history of repeated interactions between processors and producers in the 
Akwapim South district has built up some amount of trust between the two parties. 
Pineapple cultivation in the Akwapim South District began long before exporting and 
processing firms moved to the location. A cooperative in the district (which has been in 
existence since 1992) was introduced to the processor in the late 1990s by the MoFA.  In 
other cases, individual farmers themselves went to the processing firms and availed their 
services or were recommended by friends.  Shared values, trust, reputation, loyalty and 
norms have come to define the interaction between processors and producers: in the words 
of one small scale producer, ‘As long as they operate, we operate’ (Fieldwork Interview, 2013). 
Producers interviewed indicated that processors continued to purchase Smooth Cayenne 
from them during the MD2 crisis. This gave them some market access in a time when no 
one else wanted their fruits. To an extent, this relationship assisted in lessening the full 
impact of the crisis on them.148 The production manager and agronomy team of a 
processor admitted that they sourced pineapples from small and medium-scale producers 
because they were more efficient at growing it. Though the processor has farms which 
cultivate other fruits, e.g. passion fruit, an attempt to cultivate pineapples on their own 
                                                 
148 The main buyers of pineapple were exporters. 
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farms failed because of the attitudes of farm workers (e.g. lateness to work, lack of 
attention to details) resulting in high supervision costs. Also, pineapple fruits sourced from 
the processor’s farm were very small and did not meet the required brix level. This 
admission indicates that small and medium-scale producers still have some advantages and 
opportunity to participate in the chain.  
Currently, interdependence in the form of transactional dependence, i.e. dependence on 
one or a few buyers or producers (Pietrobelli and Saliola, 2008), is a major determinant of 
contractual compliance. The low number of buyers and sellers has served as a major factor 
eliminating the incentive to behave opportunistically. 53% of the study sample contracted 
with two processors, 47% with only one processor and 5% with both an exporter and a 
processor. Processors contract with both exporters and small and medium-scale producers. 
Poulton and Lyne (2009:149) posit that a low number of buyers and/or sellers in markets 
leads to increased asset specificity ex-post, and this could likely cause hold-up problems. In 
the Ghanaian case, the likelihood of hold-up problems is greatly reduced by: (a) the lack of 
local market for MD2 pineapples, (b) a comparatively lower demand on the local market 
for all three pineapple varieties, (c) lack of access to formal finance and/value chain 
finance, (d) the terms of the contract itself (e.g. guaranteed prices), (e) the actions of the 
processor and (f) comparatively higher incomes from the chain. How these conditions 
influence compliance and exchange is detailed below: 
 Both parties to the exchange make relationship-specific investments whereby any 
breach of the contract will deliver significant losses on both sides. Processors pay 
for producers to get certified, train them and frequently visit production farms to 
ensure that certification processes are complied with, and problems with the quality 
of fruits are dealt with quickly. Producers also make financial and physical 
investments (i.e. learn about and apply processes) for a crop which has very limited 
local demand (MD2) or low or no standards requirements on the local market 
(Smooth Cayenne and Sugar Loaf).149 Remuneratively, except for Sugar Loaf, prices 
on the local market are lower than the export market and the volumes taken up by 
the local market are lower. Thus, there is little incentive to behave opportunistically. 
 
                                                 
149 International supermarkets, e.g. Shoprite, and hotels operating in the country require GLOBALG.A.P. 
standards when purchasing produce. They generally purchase from exporters and/or processors who they 
know adhere to such standards. 
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 Organisational practices of processors have also enhanced the reputations of 
processors as reliable contractual partners, increasing further the self-enforcing 
nature the contracts. Such organisational practices include prompt payment and 
flexibility in payment schedules. Recall that in the Smooth Cayenne period, 
producers had to wait for months before they were paid for produce delivered. The 
current organisational norm is that producers are paid through cheque payments 
made directly into their bank accounts, two weeks after delivery. According to the 
small and medium-scale producers interviewed, the processor has never reneged on 
this. Furthermore, it is possible to negotiate for your payment date to be moved 
forward if needed. Another processor pays 20% of the sales invoice amount 
upfront in cash on delivery of the produce. Hence, if a farmer supplies about 
10,000 fruits at GHC0.40 per fruit, 20% of the amount of money owed, GHC800 
(approximately US$363), is paid instantly.  Smallholders paid this way admitted that 
it enabled them to buy the needed inputs, e.g. fertiliser, for cultivation.  
 
 Producers are also incentivised to meet the processor’s requirements because of the 
terms of the contract. Small and medium-scale producers indicated that, in view of 
high production costs, the contract gave them a sense of transactional security. 
Contracts stipulate that the processor buys all the contracted fruits which meet the 
quality specified. 100% of small and medium-scale producers interviewed 
confirmed that the total quantity of pineapple on the market has never affected the 
price or quantity that has been contracted for. This is contrary to the former 
practice of exporters reneging on the promise to buy contracted produce in order 
to mitigate losses due to fluctuations in supply or the ALCOSA scheme in 
Guatemala where the company refused to purchase all the cauliflower contracted 
for in a season of oversupply by stating that the contract did not mandate full 
purchase of all the contracted produce (Glover and Kusterer, 1990:26).150  
 
 Failure to meet standards required will result in exclusion from the chain. In 
meeting these requirements, the producers continue participating in the pineapple 
export chain, which they value more highly in comparison with participating in 
food crop chains such as maize and cassava. In 2013, producers received GHC0.40 
                                                 




(18 US cents) for both MD2 and Smooth Cayenne fruits between 1.4 and 1.8kg and 
GHC 0.35 (16 US cents) for overweight fruits (Fieldwork Interviews, 2013). The 
known price is in comparison to the local market where traders (market women) 
buy the fruits based on a visual assessment of the weight. If the fruits are classified 
as small, the trader buys it at a low price.  
 
In the Sugar Loaf strand, market women pay a higher price than exporters. Grade 1 
fruits weigh about 2kg and in 2013 were priced at GHC1 on the domestic market 
(US$0.45).151 Grade 5 fruits weigh about 0.5kg and are sold at GHC0.50 (US$0.2). 
For the export market, processors and exporters prefer fruits weighing between 1.4 
and 2.5kg. Producers indicated that they prefer to sell to exporters because they 
purchase much more fruit and the contract provides them with a stable expectation 
of revenue. The remunerative incentives for participating in the export value chain 
described above and in Tables 7.6 and 7.7, are in line with findings of other authors 
e.g. Goldstein and Udry (1999), Abbey (2005) and Suzuki (2014) in their studies on 
the Ghanaian pineapple export value chain. Furthermore, medium-scale producers 
extended the higher valuation of participating in the pineapple chain to other cash 
crops e.g. cocoa and professions. A medium-scale pineapple producer who also 
cultivates cocoa said: ‘I get more money from pineapple than cocoa.  I will get 10 bags per acre 
for cocoa and earn GHC3,000 but for pineapple, I will earn GHC12,000 per acre' 
(Fieldwork, 2013). Another responded: ‘Yes, it provides better income than even a 
government job, because I don't have a high level of education’ (Fieldwork Interview, 2013). 
 
 Normative incentives serve as a backup or additional pressure for compliance when 
producers participate in the chain as a group. In addition to each farmer’s personal 
incentive to comply with the quality standards, the potential collective sanction of 
exclusion of the group from the export market discourages the members from 
yielding to incentives for short-term opportunistic behaviour. A cooperative in the 
Akwapim South District has what it calls a Marketing Committee. The 
responsibility of the committee is to search for markets for the group and also 
negotiate for better contractual terms. To ensure compliance with standards, the 
committee makes regular visits to the farms of members. In another cooperative in 
                                                 
151 Exchange rate of GHC 2.2 to US$1(BoG, 2014).  
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the Ekumfi district, the group leader described the normative incentive this way: 
‘Since we stand as guarantors for each other, repayment is as a group so we have to make sure we 
pay. If an individual is unable to repay his loan and it was not due to factors beyond his control, 
we will take control of his farm. If his non-payment was also due to laziness, we will remove him 
from the group after getting him to pay his debt. If he's unable to, we will go to his relatives’ 
(Fieldwork Interview, 2013). 
 
It is likely that reliance on small and medium-scale producers will increase due to recent 
declining supplies of Smooth Cayenne in Ghana. Processors have had to import pineapple 
from neighbouring countries, such as Togo and Benin.152 For one particular processor, 
10% of current pineapple supply is imported, causing an increase in costs of production 
since his team must travel there to check on the quality of the fruits before they are 
imported into Ghana (Fieldwork Interviews, 2013). The likelihood that small and medium-
scale producers can take up this opportunity is discussed in section 7.7.5.  
7.7.3 Financial transactions of producer-exporters  
Apart from the history of high level of debts exporters accrued, the study found that the 
local condition of limited innovation in agriculture finance was crucial to the financial 
transactions of producer-exporters. A question posed to exporters during the study's 
fieldwork, 'Which aspect of your firm's production requires the most funding?' elicited 
different responses. 60% answered cultivation; while 20% answered post-harvest handling. 
What they all agree on is the capital-intensive nature right from land preparation: ‘the 
pineapple business is capital-intensive, you need the right type of machinery, personnel, even equipment – the 
one you use for spraying, land preparation, things like that. If you don’t have enough capital, you can’t get 
the right type of machinery, you can’t do the work well, and it will affect your productivity level’ 
(Fieldwork Interview, 2013).  
Like the situation faced by small and medium-scale producers, exporters face high interest 
rates for borrowing funds from commercial banks. These rates are consistently above 30% 
and sometimes as high as 42% (Fieldwork Interviews, 2013). Financial interactions between 
exporters and financial institutions are also restrictive, because specialised programmes for 
financing, for example, equipment are limited: ‘When you go to the banks, they have short-term 
credit. If you want to buy tractor, 80-100 horse power, they can’t give you [credit]’ (Fieldwork 
                                                 




80% of respondents agreed that they are not able to access finance for this aspect of 
production. The one exporting firm which did not complain about finance indicated that 
for the past three years, it had not profited from its pineapple production but rather broke 
even. Two others had accessed commercial loans in which machinery and equipment were 
used as collateral. In all, exporters agree that what funding they manage to access is 
inadequate to meet their needs. One exporter indicated that he managed to access 'only 10-
15% of what I needed' (Fieldwork Interview, 2013). Another producer-exporter indicated that 
for equipment and construction of packhouses the company finances 40% of its needs 
from its own funds and the remaining 60% from financial institutions (Fieldwork 
Interviews, 2013). Thus (a) internal funds or retained earnings (b) owner's contribution or 
issued new equity shares were important sources of finance for the activities of exporters.  
Correspondence with representatives of two commercial banks interviewed in this study 
indicated that Letters of Credit are the most common way to finance exports of fruits and 
vegetables. Exporters and Processors, for example, need working capital, e.g. for 
equipment, as well as long-term capital investment, which cannot be financed by letters of 
credit.  
Regarding government financing, only one exporter at the time of the study was in the 
process of obtaining funds from EDAIF. In 2013, EDAIF funds were made available to 26 
banks including Ecobank Ghana Limited, Agricultural Development Bank and Ghana 
Commercial Bank at an interest rate of 2.5% p.a. for onward lending to beneficiaries at the 
maximum interest rate of 12.5% (NRI, 2010). There is an incentive to access EDAIF funds 
rather than commercial loans due to its comparatively lower interest rate (12.5%) compared 
with commercial banks (28-34%): ‘From time to time, we do fall on commercial banks for some loans.  
Generally, interest rate is high there but you may fall on them when there’s a critical need for funds: when 
you’re making some changes and funds are delaying’ (Fieldwork interview, 2013). Administrative 
challenges seem to limit access to EDAIF funds, as exporters generally complained about 
the complexity of the loan process: ‘It’s not very easy. It takes some time. You need to do a lot of 
paperwork, get your figures right. I mean it takes some time, but it’s money. Once you’re taking money, 
everyone wants to know that it is going to bring the required results’ (Fieldwork Interview, 2013). 
Furthermore, exporters subjectively perceived that since commercial banks bear the full 
credit risk of disbursing EDAIF funds, they intentionally increase the paper work required 
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and the length of time in order to frustrate beneficiaries and encourage them to rather use 
the banks’ own loans. This view was rejected by a representative of EDAIF, who claimed 
that the banks had to be extremely diligent in disbursing loans. As at 2013, the EDAIF 
scheme was undergoing reforms to make it more successful. 
7.7.4 Horizontal cooperation among producer-exporters 
The use of standards in the pineapple value chain induced adjustments in relations between 
farmers and exporters, in attitudes towards horizontal cooperation and in the functions of 
collective action organisations. SPEG, for example, had to reinvent itself to meet the 
challenges of participating in the global chain. The near-collapse of the pineapple sector has 
given it visibility and an ability to lobby the government for incentives for its members: 
‘We’re always able to get discounts, waivers and other things for them [our members]. For instance, when 
the VAT was introduced, it was also applied to imported packaging materials, so the members always had 
to prepay and you know reimbursement may take months or year so that was an issue that was disturbing 
our members. We had to take it up as an association. In 2004 thereabouts the government agreed to waive 
that for SPEG members and only upon our certification that this company is coming from SPEG and 
therefore it doesn’t have to pay upfront’ (Fieldwork Interview, 2013). Recently, it succeeded in 
lobbying for its members to be granted access to the FSP, citing the costs reduction 
potential (Fieldwork Interview, 2013).  
Although individual exporters made their own efforts at acquiring knowledge in producing 
MD2 and adhering to standards, SPEG also contributes to learning. SPEG’s efforts were 
facilitated by its interaction with international agricultural organisations like COLEACP. 
They complement the knowledge acquisition efforts made by individual exporters and 
SPEG from time to time and procure agrochemicals in bulk for distribution to its members 
(Fieldwork Interviews, 2013). By doing so, its members pay prices lower than the market 
price. A senior official of the association admits: 'We are doing things now, we should have done 
10 years ago' (Fieldwork Interview, 2013).  
Recently, as part of branding the country as a top supplier of quality pineapples, SPEG has 
initiated a group branding and marketing scheme. The scheme, under the brand name 
Sankofa began in March 2012. In 2013, eight exporters were participating in the scheme. 
The scheme also has the objective of assisting members in maintaining and/or increasing 
their market shares in export markets, penetrating new markets in, for instance, North 
Africa and the Middle East and promoting the acquisition of fruits of consistent quality in 
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high volumes. 1,400 metric tonnes of pineapples under the brand name were shipped to 
Italy, France, Denmark and the UK in 2012 (Gatune et al., 2013: 31).  
SPEG markets the product, identifies potential buyers and negotiates payment terms. 
Participating exporters who have committed to contribute pre-agreed quantities supply 
these to be traded under the brand name. SPEG’s technical team validates the quality of 
the fruit by visiting contributing exporters to check on quality procedures and 
recommendations (Gatune et al., 2013, Fieldwork Interviews, 2013).  Under a common 
brand, bulk purchases of inputs, e.g. cartons, and quality control decrease the transaction 
costs faced by exporters.  
The ability of the scheme to deliver its objectives depends on the buy-in it gets from the 
exporters. This study observed that allegiance to own brands might threaten the survival 
and success of the scheme. Some exporters interviewed did not participate in the scheme 
because they did not want their own brands to be overshadowed by a new ‘unknown’ 
brand.   
Formerly, in the export of traditional agricultural products such as coffee and cocoa by 
SSA countries, quality standards were the responsibility of the state. SAP reforms largely 
shifted this responsibility to buyers, and currently globalisation processes have given a role 
to third-party auditors in certifying the quality of produce.  In the Ghanaian cocoa value 
chain, the state maintained its responsibility of quality control. Thus, the country earns a 
premium on the cocoa beans produced, compared to her competitors.  
In the pineapple sector, the responsibility of ensuring that fruits meet the high standards 
set by buyers lies with the processor and/or exporter. Besides the quality control 
mechanisms individual exporters implement on and off-farm, SPEG attempted a sector-
wide quality control system. According to a senior official of SPEG, the objective was to 
ensure another level of quality control which would essentially lead to the export of fruits 
of a comparable high level amongst all exporters and raise the supplier status of its 
members and the country. The scheme was implemented for one year with an international 
inspection agency: ‘What we did at the time was that we selected companies that had packhouses so that 
we could have a place where we could also go and inspect. The independent inspectors we actually used was 
Bureau Veritas (an international inspection agency) and they had personnel who will go to the packhouses 
and do the inspection. And then at the ports of exit, they will be there. We agreed on the list of criteria we 
will use both external and internal. They will inspect that at the packhouses, provide the score and also at 
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the ports…At the end of the day, they will get a report back to us and the farmers so that the farmers will 
know where they are in terms of quality, so that they can make amends. After every departure of the vessel, 
the report comes out. We did that for 12 months. It was very useful and helped to get the awareness and the 
companies to institute proper measures to be able to ensure consistency in quality’ (Fieldwork interview, 
2013). 
SPEG was unable to fully implement the scheme, due to the lack of personnel and the 
financial costs: ‘Getting independent inspectors, i.e. inspectors not within. It means we have to engage 
people, pay them, provide logistics and others. It’s a lot of money, so we couldn’t do that. We had wanted to 
see whether we could use national institutions like the Ghana Standards Authority. They had limitations 
in terms of staff and understanding some of the issues of pineapple so I think the system we have now and 
the preparedness of the exporters to do the right thing is helping. No serious buyer will work with any 
company that has inconsistent quality in deliveries’ (Fieldwork Interview, 2013). 
Other forms of interactions taking place between producer-exporters are indicated in 
(Table 7.8). First, when an exporter has an order but his own production cannot meet the 
demand, other exporters are relied upon. This practice is governed by personal 
relationships among heads of exporting firms, the staff and the nearness of production 
sites. 40% of producer-exporters interviewed indicated that they have collaborated with 
other producer-exporters using personal relationships and distance from the production 
site. Secondly, inputs are sometimes commonly procured. All cartons in which pineapple 
fruits are packaged for export are imported into the country. The cartons cost about €1. 
Purchasing cartons together allow exporters to buy at a price lower than €1 and also reduce 
their transportation costs. Thirdly, producer-exporters have also started collaborating with 
each other in negotiating prices with the same importer. They discuss and agree on the 
ballpark price before they meet the importer.  
Table 7.8: Forms of horizontal cooperation in the sector 
 Informal Formal 
Horizontal Cooperation e.g. buying cartons 
together, negotiating 
prices together with 
importers 
e.g. Common quality 
check, common marketing 




7.7.5 Cooperation between and among public and private organisations  
Collaboration with external actors, for example, research organisations or universities, is 
extremely limited in the pineapple chain. Unlike in the Ghanaian cocoa chain where the 
CRI conducts research into cocoa, there is no such specialised body for the horticulture 
sector. In Brazil, two research institutions, the National Centre for Research on Grape and 
Wine (CNPUV) and the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA), 
undertake research and training for the grape and wine clusters (Selwyn, 2008; Gálvez-
Nogales, 2010). EMBRAPA for example conducts research into '...post-harvest 
technologies, and analysis of the changing biological and market conditions under which 
fruiticulture production takes place...' (Selwyn, 2008:386). Manteaw et al, (2014:73-74) 
reveal a paucity of researchers on pineapple in six scientific public institutions in Ghana. 
All exporters interviewed in this study had not collaborated with a research organisation, 
whether public or private, in at least the last two years and independently undertake 
agriculture trials on their own.153 BFL on its own operates a tissue culture laboratory which 
propagates cultivars for producers on request. It is interesting to note that it is the only 
exporter that has its own laboratory and successfully diversified into the production of 
dehydrated mangoes for export.154  
The recent shortages of Smooth Cayenne underscore the need for research into the 
changing conditions under which it is produced in the country. As indicated earlier on, the 
shortage has led to processors bringing in shipment of fruits from Togo, Benin and Cote 
d’Ivoire. The experiences of some smallholders interviewed indicated that the Smooth 
Cayenne suckers have grown resistant to diseases, do not respond well to fertiliser 
application and hence need to be ‘forced’ on average three times before it starts to flower, 
compared with once for MD2 (Fieldwork Interviews, 2013). They indicated their 
unwillingness to continue to cultivate Smooth Cayenne in the future as a result. Continuous 
shortages will likely imply that the percentage of fruits sourced externally will grow, putting 
small and medium-scale producers at risk of declining sales and maybe eventual exclusion 
from the sector. 
On the other hand, a senior official at SPEG indicated that the country would recover 
from Smooth Cayenne shortages in two to three years’ time. Producer-exporters, 
                                                 
153 The MoFA undertakes its own agriculture trials but respondents interviewed indicated that they had not 
collaborated with them in at least the past two years. 
154 All other exporters apart from GEL. 
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incentivised by the increased demand of Smooth Cayenne fruits locally, have increased 
their production; ‘Demand for Smooth Cayenne is very limited, so there’s no motivation for people to 
cultivate. However, because of shortages, the exporters are now going into Smooth Cayenne again. The 
export market is limited, but there’s a huge domestic demand. Now the large farms are all going back for 
that aspect of the market’ (Fieldwork Interview, 2013).  
Producer-exporters are also incentivised by the ability to use Smooth Cayenne sales as a 
cash flow management tool. When fruits are exported, the usual agreement indicates 
payment in about six weeks from the time of shipment. This can sometimes extend to eight 
weeks. When fruits are sold to processors, payment is made in two weeks. The increasing 
involvement of producer-exporters with economies of scale in Smooth Cayenne 
production further increases the risk of exclusion for smallholders if adequate measures are 
not taken.155  
7.8 Development of the chain 
7.8.1 Payment on minimum guarantee basis  
‘In the early stages, 1990s and early 2000s, most of the sales were under an arrangement called 
consignment basis. But over the years it has changed because some of the exporters have become reliable in 
consistent delivery of quality and competent in most areas’ (Fieldwork Interview, 2013). 
At the export level, backward integration into production had given exporters control over 
supply, reducing incidences of demand shortages and over supply, which had been 
detrimental to the growth of the chain. They can now agree with importers on expected 
supply quantities and hence better plan their production programmes. At the industry level, 
members provide SPEG with information on acreage and estimated volumes at the 
beginning of the year: 'Among ourselves we know that [….] has planted about 20million plants this 
year, and so we're able to know what is on ground but there should be a more scientific way' (Fieldwork 
Interview, 2013).156 Significant gains made in acquiring knowledge and in improving the 
infrastructure of the entire chain have also resulted in the production and supply of high 
                                                 
155 The development agency ACDI/VOCA in 2011 began reintroducing smallholder farmers to Smooth 
Cayenne production in response to increasing demand on the international market. 
156 A more scientific way was implemented by the TIPCEE project using a GIS system to encourage the 
building of strong capacity in commodity industries, associations, and the supporting GOG agencies to 
document, manage and monitor the various production systems' (USAID, 2006:36). However, information 




quality fruits and improvements in suppliers' reputations. These changes have made it 
possible for exporters to access the supermarket segment of the value chain by supplying 
fruits to buyers such as Tesco and Asda in the UK. Contractual relations have improved 
with longer contracts specifying payment on minimum guarantee basis rather than 
consignment basis. Minimum guarantee basis means that exporters are paid a minimum 
amount of money on receipt of the sales invoice by the buyer. This guaranteed payment, in 
turn, minimises the risk of financial constraints associated with waiting for payment for up 
to three months after delivery has been made, as discussed in Chapter 6.  
7.8.2 Government support  
Government support to the chain after the period 2005-2008 can be described as 
reactionary rather than proactive. In 2008 the Government of Ghana launched the 
Fertiliser Subsidy Programme (FSP) to combat rising food and fertiliser prices (Banful, 
2009:1).157 For example, in 2008 the price of NPK (15-15-15), a fertiliser used in pineapple 
production, increased by 66% over its 2007 price (Fearon, Adraki and Boateng, 2015: 
102).158 
All fertiliser used in the country is imported by private firms. There is no import duty and 
VAT on fertilisers (MoFEP, 2012:191-194). However, fertilisers are subject to 
administrative fees and levies such as an inspection fee (1% of CIF), a processing fee (1% 
of CIF for zero-rated products), an ECOWAS levy (0.5% of CIF), NHIL (National Health 
insurance levy) (2.5% of CIF) and EDIF Levy (0.5% of CIF) (MoFEP, 2012:713). The 
government was to take up these charges. Since the market is liberalised, the government 
negotiated the prices of fertiliser with the importing companies.159  
Initially, a voucher system where farmers obtained the subsidy in the form of fertiliser 
specific or region specific vouchers was used (Banful, 2009); but this was changed in 2010 
to a waybill system, as the costs of the programme were excessive on the economy 
(Angelucci, 2012; Imoru and Ayamga, 2015). In 2013, the total subsidy represented 21% of 
the market price of fertiliser (GNA, 2013), a reduction from as high as 49% for NPK (15-
15-15) in 2012 (Table 7.9). The decline in the subsidy rate was due to budgetary constraints 
                                                 
157 Another objective of the FSP is to increase productivity and boost the use of fertiliser in farming as the 
country tries to meet the African Union target of at least 50kg per hectare set at the Abuja declaration of 
fertiliser use by African Green Revolution (AU, 2006). 
158 NPK stands for Nitrogen, Phosphorous and Potassium 
159 Importing firms which initially participated included Yara Ghana Ltd, Dizengoff Ghana Ltd, Golden 
Stork and Chemico Ltd. Chemico Ltd was the only non-MNC subsidiary (Banful, 2009:6).  
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and rising world prices of fertiliser. The cost of the subsidy increased from 
GHC20.7million in 2008 to GHC120.3 million in 2012 (MoFA, 2013a:44).  
Table 7.9: Fertiliser subsidy in 2012 
Fertiliser Type Market price of 
fertiliser 
Subsidy paid by 
government 
(GHC) 





76 37 39 49 
NPK (15-15-
15) 
76 37 39 49 




53 18 35 34 
Source: MoFA (2013a) 
Since 2007, modernisation of agriculture has been one of the main objectives of the 
agriculture sector policy FASDEP II. As such, promotion of agriculture exports is a major 
focus of the policy. To modernise agriculture, farmers must have easy access to needed 
inputs, hence accessibility and affordability become key to the process. Initially, the FSP 
was solely aimed at food crop production. Producers of cash crops such as pineapple and 
cotton registered with recognised cooperatives and/or as suppliers to companies had to 
lobby to gain access to it.  To an extent, the financial burden of small and medium-scale 
producers is lessened by their access to the government fertiliser subsidy. 
Dorward (2009:4) calls attention to the fact that 'farmers are likely to apply inputs to the 
use from which they expect to get the greatest return.'  This statement indicates that 
farmers must have the right understanding of the benefit they will receive from applying an 
input like fertiliser, in addition to its accessibility and affordability. The consensus among 
small and medium-scale producers interviewed in the study was that fertiliser application 
was necessary to get the right sizes and quality of pineapples for exports. They also noted 
that the required fertilisers were locally available and meet the quality desired by buyers. 
Nonetheless, the price of fertiliser is sometimes a huge part of their costs of production 
(Fieldwork Interviews, 2013).  
Dorward (2009: 14) posits that subsidies will only be taken up by farmers if they lead to 
sufficiently large reductions in the prices of fertilisers. Giving pineapple producers access to 
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the subsidy diminishes the financial pressure on their working capital and encourages the 
use of recommended fertilisers in the right amounts and at the right time. At the subsidised 
rate, fertilisers represented 15% of the cost of production in Table 7.6. This means that at 
the unsubsidised rate, this would be a much higher proportion.  
Small and medium-scale producers spoke favourably about the FSP. However, they 
generally had concerns about the timing of the subsidy. They indicated that the subsidy was 
usually made available in mid-June when the pineapple season had already begun, thus 
forcing them to purchase unsubsidised fertiliser which increased their production costs. 
7.8.3 Learning in the chain  
Efficiently participating in the chain depends on access to flows and stocks of knowledge 
and information. A value that has become respected in the interaction between producers 
and processors is prompt communication by both sides. At the start of the production 
year, processors make available to their suppliers’ forecasts of demand and the supplies 
they need. A production manager commented: ‘For the whole year, we have a projection. We give 
that projection to the farmers to plant accordingly’ (Fieldwork Interviews, 2013). After cultivation, 
producers constantly update exporters and processors with records on planting times, 
fertiliser application and acreage planted and harvested: the agronomy team of the 
processor also frequently visits the farm. Producers said that if any circumstance arises 
which means that they will be unable to fulfil the quantity required of them, they promptly 
communicate it to the agronomy team for quantities to be adjusted or harvest times to be 
rescheduled, and vice versa. This norm in the business relationship creates a security of 
expectations to the benefit of both parties. 
 
Farmer training and provision of extension services  
‘Quality issues begin right from land preparation. The reason is that the selection of planting materials, 
kind of treatment you give to the planting material, has an effect on what will happen. The land preparation 
that you do, will it enhance moisture retention? All these have an effect on the type of fruits you will have at 
the end of the day’ (Fieldwork Interview, 2013). 
The most important knowledge transferred to smallholders and medium-scale producers is 
that related to production processes. This includes agronomic practices, new production 
techniques e.g. using plastic mulch, and meeting certification requirements through record 
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keeping and farmer safety. Traditionally, the agriculture economics literature gave a 
prominent role to the state in the acquisition and transfer of knowledge (Johnston and 
Mellor, 1961; Hayami and Ruttan, 1985). Shultz (1964 in Barrett et al, 2010) deemed 
smallholders as 'poor but efficient' because they have different capabilities to acquire, use 
and interpret new information (Schultz, 1980:644). What they needed was knowledge to 
improve upon their skills and use of technology. State research agencies acquired 
agriculture knowledge which was then transferred to farmers through extension officers.  
Given the fast-changing nature of information in high-value food chains such as 
pineapples, it is increasingly the processors themselves who impart knowledge to their 
suppliers. Hence for all the small and medium scale producers interviewed in the Akwapim 
South District, their first point of call for knowledge on production processes was the 
agronomy team of the processor. The information is transferred through instructions by 
way of training sessions organised by the processor and face-to-face interactions with the 
agronomy team. Small and medium-scale producers aligned with one processor attended 
on average 4 training sessions (seminars) organised by the processor in a year.    Producers 
in the sugarloaf strand were found to be extremely reliant on GIZ for knowledge. This is 
due to their status as new participants in the export sector; hence specific training is 
required to improve product quality, increase productivity and facilitate compliance with 
food safety and certification requirements. The use of demonstration farms served as an 
important means to observe exactly how production techniques being communicated 
would affect yields and productivity. They also rely on GIZ for access to finance and 
linkage to exporters. 
All producers interviewed in the study had a good knowledge of the appropriate agronomic 
practices involved in the production of high quality fruits, such as planting in rows and on 
raised beds, the timely application of fertiliser, the use of plastic mulch and de-greening. 
Raised beds, for example, increase the amount of topsoil available to the roots of the plant, 
improving aeration and drainage.  Farmers indicated that it was better to cultivate on raised 
beds covered with black plastic mulch as it helps to retain moisture on the soil surface and 
also acts to control weeds. Challenges occurred in areas such as meeting the required brix 
level because the farms were not irrigated and in land preparation since access to 
equipment was limited. In the Akwapim South district, producers complained that the 
government agricultural equipment hiring service had only one tractor available for the 




Government extension services to small and medium-scale pineapple farmers were 
observed to be supply driven and supplementary to services given by processors. A 
government agency official interviewed noted that government institutions were slow at 
acquiring and disseminating specialised knowledge or techniques for high-value agricultural 
products because of concentration on traditional commodities. Unlike the cocoa sector 
which has its own extension services personnel charged with transferring the knowledge 
developed by the CRIG, pineapple farmers have to rely on the general knowledge 
disseminated by extension officers at the district level.160 Furthermore, bureaucratic 
challenges and lack of personnel imply slowness in acquiring rapidly changing information 
in agri-food value chains: ‘In terms of experts who are knowledgeable enough to support these pineapple 
farmers and others, you when you get to the exporters, ask them how often they have teams from MoFA. 
Not much, sometimes I think nil. Not because they are not ready to help, but I think they don’t have the 
personnel who have the kind of background and training. That’s why the farms have their own technical 
officers who have gone through various trainings to be manning the farms with not much reliance on 
extension’ (Fieldwork, 2013).  When questioned about how often an extension officer visits 
the farms, the majority of small and medium-scale producers indicated they had not been 
visited in the past year. A medium-scale farmer cultivating 60 acres of pineapple and cocoa 
made this comment in relation to pineapple: 'They come around at the time for farmer awards. 
There was one who used to come once every two months but for the past 3 years, I have not seen one' 
(Fieldwork Interview, 2013).  
In sharing and exchanging information, search costs have declined for producers. 
Membership of a cooperative is key to farmers receiving assistance. A smallholder 
compared the situation now to the Smooth Cayenne era: ‘When there was no group, no one knew 
they had to come and teach us’ (Fieldwork Interview, 2013).  Cooperatives also serve as the 
main channel through which the MoFA extends services to pineapple farmers. It was 
observed that 88% of small and medium-scale producers receive some form of training, 
from the MoFA and donor organisations e.g. GIZ (for example, how to apply pesticides 
and management techniques) through their cooperatives.  On the other hand, producers 
admitted that cooperatives did not pass on much marketing information. This is to be 
expected, given the extremely low number of buyers in the chain. A cooperative in the 
                                                 
160 Agriculture extension services are decentralised (MoFA, 2016) 
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Akwapim South district has a marketing committee which is tasked with looking for 
markets for their produce. The effectiveness of the committee could not be independently 
verified, since the group sold their produce to two processors they have been interacting 
with since the late 1990s.  
Farmers in the Ekumfi district can acquire marketing information from their participation 
in Value Chain Committee (VCC) meetings. The idea behind a VCC, according to a staff of 
the GIZ, is to bring all stakeholders in the sugarloaf value chain together to discuss the 
functioning of the chain. Thus, a VCC consists of farmers, exporters, the staff of 
government agriculture agencies, processors, traders, donor organisations and research 
institutions (MOAP unpublished document, 2013).161  
Knowledge transfer on production processes has proven beneficial to producers as all 
indicated that they had seen visible increases in yields and/or eliminated production losses: 
'We used to plant a lot of suckers but we now know that you can limit it using the same plant population. 
We get more yield compared to large plot but limited yield' (Fieldwork Interview, 2013). Although 
yield variations occur because of dependence on rains or inadequate fertiliser application, 
data from MoFA (2016) indicates that pineapple yields in the area increased from 59 
Mt/hectare in 2008 to 62 Mt/hectare in 2010.  Other impacts of the knowledge acquired 
are captured by the comments below; 
 ‘We used to plant a lot of pineapples but the yield is just a handful. We have now learnt to limit it 
[cultivate a small portion of land] and get a higher yield. It has helped to reduce land wastage.’ 162 
‘Also, it helps us with labour which we previously needed lots of. We can now limit it.’   
 ‘When we didn’t know the market demand, we used the available chemicals instead of approved chemical 
or recommended one. You also have to know the rate and active ingredients.’  
'It [knowledge from pineapple production] helps the community also. We used to, after the day's work, 
wash our nap sacks and pour it into the water. Now we know that is wrong and can advise others we see 
do so.'  
‘There are people I work with who are not in the group. However, as I tell them what exactly to do, they 
acquire knowledge.’ 
                                                 
161 The research institutions and universities are usually not present at such meetings unless specifically 
requested (MOAP unpublished document, 2013). 
162 MoFA (2002) in Abbey (2005:13) estimated plant population per acre at 27,500-35,000. 
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7.8.4 Impact on labour and land use   
Participation in high-value agriculture production is a labour intensive process which offers 
opportunities for poverty reduction (Humphrey and Memedovic, 2006:3). Labour is 
required to carefully grade suckers before planting, to apply fertiliser at the right time and 
in the right quantities, and to carefully harvest fruits to avoid bruising, among others. 
Hazell et al. (2007) suggest that farmers in contractual relations with buyers will multiply 
the effects of contract farming by hiring labour and spending income in productive 
activities.  This suggestion is not borne out by 47% of small and medium-scale producers 
interviewed because they claim to use less labour than before. The use of standards such as 
GLOBALG.A.P. applies to how crops are planted, grown and harvested (Humphrey, 
2009:2). Historically, the pineapple sector has relied on hired casual labour for weeding, 
harvesting, fetching water, and applying of agro-chemicals. Nowadays, the impact of 
knowledge, on for example, how many suckers to plant on an acre of land, techniques such 
as planting on raised beds and the spacing of plants has made it easier to water the plants 
and to clear weeds. Consequently, the quantity of labour needed has declined. Likewise, 
due to the automation of most packhouses to ensure that fruits are handled less, it is 
possible that in terms of quantity of employment, this has a negative effect. Nonetheless, 
the quality of employment is likely enhanced as workers can access better employment 
packages which include monthly wages, social security, the right to form and join workers’ 
unions, access to paid leave, sick days and medical insurance.  
On the other hand, the quality-intensive nature of pineapple production and the need for 
traceability under certification rules have put pressure on small and medium-scale 
producers to employ the use of permanent farm workers. Now, small and medium-scale 
producers hire between 1 and 20 people as permanent staff (in one case, 32 people). 
Though causal labour is still used (paid a daily wage of GHC10/US$4.5), permanent staff 
are used to carry out farm activities such as the application of fertiliser and agrochemicals 
because one of the control points of the GLOBALGAP standard is a record of workers 
trained in the use and application of agro-chemicals. Using trained permanent staff reduces 
supervision costs: also, since they are paid monthly salaries, producers are better able to 
predict their costs of production.  
In the Ekumfi district, producers rely on contract labour (i.e. labour hired for a specific 
number of days to perform a specific activity). Usually, about 6 people are contracted to 
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perform an activity such as land preparation, harvesting or weeding for a number of days. 
A daily wage of GHC10 is paid and the duration of each activity is agreed upon by the two 
parties. The daily wage paid here is the same for that paid in the Akwapim South district, 
with no indication of differences in wages received by men and women. However, a norm 
associated with hiring contract labour is the providing food or paying extra for food. 
According to producers, provision of food for the worker is an incentive to boost morale, 
although they could not explain why this has been done over the years (Fieldwork 
Interviews, 2013), but it may help to increase productivity. Since pineapple farmers in the 
district have recently been integrated into the pineapple export value chain, it would be 
interesting to investigate later on, if any changes in labour use have occurred.   
7.8.5 Distribution of risk and risk management  
7.8.5.1 Smallholders and processors/exporters 
Power relations have a significant impact on the distribution of risk in the chain. In 
Chapter 6, the power relation in the interaction between producers and exporters can be 
said to have been balanced. However, it exposed both parties to financial risks and 
adversely affected the organisation of the value chain. In contrast, the use of written 
contracts in the MD2 configuration serves as a form of forward contracts for producers to 
hedge against price and financial risks. Respondents who contract with processors were 
asked whether they perceived the pineapple chain to be risky or stable: 65% said stable due 
to the consistency that market contracts provided, while 35% said risky due to the low 
number of buyers. In certain cases, the most effective risk diversification mechanism was 
selling to the domestic market.  
Based on the responses above, I sought to establish the power relations implicit in the 
contractual relationship and how it has affected the allocation of risks and/or risk 
management. The analysis is done in a qualitative manner due to the lack of data to 
quantify the risks objectively. The power relationship starts with the process of price 
determination. UNIDROIT (2014:2) defines price as ‘a remuneration for the product or 
services usually in a form of money (cash or otherwise) even if other possibilities exist’ and 
a price mechanism as ‘the method to form the price.’  On the surface, the price mechanism 
used - a fixed price per kilogramme - seems simple and straight forward. Processors meet 
with their suppliers and propose prices per kilogramme of fruits. A process of bargaining 
and negotiating ensues with each party stating its case for why a specific price is fair and 
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acceptable. The advantage of this price system is that it dispels uncertainty, allowing each 
party to have a reasonable idea of expected quantity and at what price (UNIDROIT, 
2014:5).  
Exporters and Processors generally require a fruit to weigh between 1.4 and 1.8 kg. 
Processors who export dried fruits can take fruit sizes above 1.8kg: but generally, any fruit 
above this weight is priced at 1.8kg, bought at a lower price or rejected altogether and sold 
on the domestic market.163 The quality standards demanded by processors and exporters 
are clearly outlined. Producers realise that a low quality product, e.g. not meeting the size 
required or brix level means that the produce will not be accepted for export and they will 
lose expected income. Thus, they put much effort into meeting the desired quality at the 
agreed price. Given the composed description of price determination, the researcher 
assumed all producers receive the same price per kg for their fruit. However, during the 
fieldwork interviews, slight differences were observed, indicating that (a) the process of 
negotiating prices did not end at the general meeting and/or (b) processors had preferred 
suppliers.  
Both small and medium-scale producers complained that prices had not changed much 
over the years. Also, it was observed that smallholders especially seemed to construe the 
contract condition of renewability as an expectation of regular changes in prices. One 
smallholder remarked: 'For the past 3 years the price has not changed though the contract is renewable.’ 
(Fieldwork Interview, 2013). The expectation of price adjustments is not unreasonable, 
given that costs of production are not stagnant and may increase yearly. Producers were 
paid the same price for their produce in 2013 as in 2012. 
While both small and medium-scale producers were absolute in their agreement that the 
buyer is the more powerful party in the price setting relationship, it was observed that 
individual medium-scale producers could exert a bit of influence over the processors’ 
pricing decision. Hence, while smallholders were convinced that, regardless of how much 
effort they put into negotiating with the processor, the processor always wins, a medium-
scale producer indicated his ability to bargain: 'Prices don't change much but your ability to haggle 
and tell the exporters why. I receive between 0.42 and 045 Euro cents per kg of fruit. Sometimes it goes as 
high as 0.47 Euro cents.’ (Fieldwork Interview, 2013). 
                                                 
163 Fruits less than 1.5kg or greater than 1.8kg can be exported based on the size requested by a specific 
buyer. Also, cut fruit processors prefer fruit sizes up to 1.8 kg because the equipment used to prepare the 
fruits is calibrated to this size. If the fruits are larger, there is more wastage. 
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From the above, it would appear that the characteristics of the producer have a bearing on 
the price he receives. The producer must have some assets, particularly market information, 
to use in bargaining. A processor admitted to paying a higher price to secure supplies from 
medium-scale producers because of economies of scale. It was observed that the high 
domestic demand for Sugar Loaf pineapples enables smallholders in the Ekumfi district 
who contract with exporters, to use the Esoko platform (a private electronic platform with 
price information for commodities on the domestic market) for their marketing needs. 
Prior to negotiating prices with an exporter, they track Sugar Loaf prices on the domestic 
market to form an idea of how much they should negotiate for.  
Some smallholders in the Akwapim South District did not take into consideration all 
pertinent variables in their cost of production. When questioned about how they calculated 
their costs of production, I observed that their own labour costs were not included. It is, 
therefore, likely that, generally, smallholders underestimate their costs of production and 
are unable to effectively argue for a better price.  
 
Risk Management: Formerly, a processor used to quote prices in Euros; with farmers 
paid the Ghana cedi equivalent. Recently, the processor began to quote prices in Ghana 
cedis only. Producers claim it was a unilateral decision taken by the processor without 
consulting or discussing with them. The advantage to producers of having prices quoted in 
US dollar or Euro was that it gave them a bit of cover against domestic inflation; although 
it did not provide them with a cover for exchange rate fluctuations. Despite this, the 
constant depreciation of the Ghana cedi against the dollar and euro meant that a weakened 
cedi resulted in a gain for the producer. In 2012, for example, the Ghana cedi depreciated 
by 17.5%, 18.4% AND 14.9% against the US$, pound sterling and euro, respectively (BoG, 
2013). Although a depreciation of the currency may lead to increases in inflation, the 
proportion of increase in inflation compared with the proportion of the gain from the 
exchange rate depreciation will determine, the proportion of gains or losses. On the other 
hand, the current practice of quoting prices in Ghana cedi only implies that the producer is 
fully exposed to an inflation risk and is also unable to gain from exchange rate depreciation. 
On the side of the processor, whose accounts are most likely denominated in US$ but 
operating costs are in Ghana cedi, the continuous depreciation of the Ghana cedi would 
mean that it is paying more per kg for the fruits it purchases. This affects its profitability. 
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Although not explicitly confirmed by the processor, the production manager indicated that 
fruit prices were reviewed when input prices rise and/or the Ghana cedi depreciates.  
It was noted previously in Chapter 3 that actors may seek to change the form and content 
of a transaction when they are not satisfied with it, but that it all depends on their 
resources, including the ability to act as a collective force. The prices for some producers 
are still pegged to the Euro indicating that the producers are unable to unite and act as a 
coherent unit. In the words of a respondent: 'each man fought for himself' (Fieldwork 
Interview, 2013). Similarly, Ouma (2015: 159-162) in his study of pineapple outgrowers in 
the Volta region of Ghana who supplied a fresh-cut exporter, noted the inability of farmers 
to organise themselves to protest when the company (Tongu Farms) stopped price 
adjustments, even though costs of production were rising. This was because the company 
was the only buyer they had: hence the farmers had to put up with the company or exit the 
chain.  
Another stage where power relations play out is the final delivery of fruits. Fruits can be 
rejected by the processor as not meeting the quality requirements when they get to the 
processor’s packhouse. On the field, the producer, together with the agronomy team of the 
processor, inspects the fruit, including the brix level, to assess its quality prior to harvesting. 
When fruits are harvested, they are taken to the processors packhouses where they are 
recorded.164 Another quality check however takes place and, usually, the farmer is not 
present. It is at this second stage that some fruits may be rejected because they do not meet 
the quality specifications, e.g. brix level.  
In such cases, the processor may penalise the producer by adjusting the quantity recorded 
as delivered. The farmer however is not informed of this decision until he is paid. This 
leads to misunderstanding and conflict because the farmers perceive any judgements made 
on the quality of the produce in their absence as biased and most likely in favour of the 
processor. They were of the view that if these fruits are really rejected because of quality 
issues, they should be allowed to view them before disposal and allude to the possibility 
that fruits might have been rejected in order to save the processor some costs. It is possible 
for producers to appeal against the decision of rejected fruits and be given some 
concession; ‘…I disputed it but later they paid a little amount. I asked for the criteria for reject and 
                                                 
164 The farmers transport their produce to the processor. Some medium-scale producers’ own trucks while 
others hire trucks.  
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stated that they should have informed me before payment’ (Fieldwork Interviews, 2013). This was 
from a medium-scale producer cultivating 80 acres of land. Smallholders seemed to accept 
the decision made without contesting it. 
7.8.5.2 Interactions between Exporters and Importers   
The main instrument identified in this study by which importers and/or supermarkets can 
have power over exporters is the price of the product. As mentioned earlier on in Chapter 
4, the global pineapple market has an oligopsonistic market structure with few buyers and 
many sellers. Retailers (supermarkets) have preferred suppliers (importers) with whom they 
engage in long-term contracts. In these contracts, exact volumes and prices are agreed 
upon a week or two before shipment (CBI, 2009). As some supermarkets require importers 
to send in price quotes in advance every week or two, supermarkets can force prices 
downwards by playing suppliers against each other (CBI, 2009). The exact process of price 
determination is unclear as the importer interviewed in this study declined to explain the 
process of price determination when asked. He only commented that the price paid to 
exporters took into consideration prevailing market prices and the cost of production. 
Reflective of the practice of constant adjustments in prices, an exporter commented that 
'Contracts are perfunctory' (Fieldwork Interviews, 2013) although they interact through written 
contracts. In some cases, an email correspondence between an importer and an exporter 
was enough to conclude on volumes and prices. Since the mid-2000s, pineapple prices have 
declined to erode the mark-ups which were earned at the beginning of the MD2 era. In 
Ghana, a senior official of SPEG commented: 'When the changeover came, because production was 
not much, those who were able to change over quickly had windfalls. At that time, I'm told a box of MD2 
of 12kg could fetch 18 or 22 Euros. Today, for a box of 6 if you get 4.5 then you're [well off], the margins 
are minimal. So, the efforts will be at reducing cost of production because the price levels don't change much 
except for specific periods in the year, maybe Christmas and Easter. Because of that exporters plan their 
production in such that their high volumes come in those specific periods. Their margins are certainly not the 
best now, and it's a reason why expansion is low now and there's always tension all over the place.' 
(Fieldwork, 2013). 
Compared with the price exporters were formerly receiving for Smooth Cayenne (Section 
7.6.2), the price of MD2 is lower (Figure 7.5).165   
                                                 
165 Due to the inability to find consistent and accurate data on wholesale prices of pineapples for Ghana and 
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Figure 7.5: Average monthly whole price of MD2 pineapples from Ghana (2009-2013) 
 
 
Note: Data refers to the Marseille Quai wholesale market 
Source: RNM France Agrimer 
 
Currently, slight variations in prices across producing countries are mainly a reflection of 
transport and domestic conditions of production. During the fieldwork period, exporters 
indicated that a box of pineapples from Ghana is sold at €3. The cartons are priced at €1 
each, meaning that exporters have only €2 in which to reduce costs and improve upon their 
profit margins. Transportation costs are fixed (and high) while reliance on external sources 
for packaging and inadequate access to finance further squeeze their profitability and 
opportunities for growth. Products from Costa Rica earn higher prices than Ghana: 'They 
[Costa Rica] will get higher, the reason being that they are known to be consistent in quality and volumes. I 
think last year the GIZ sponsored some of us to Germany. After the fair, we went to some companies in 
Germany to sell our products. Some of the places we went, their first [option] is Costa Rica before they will 
come and talk about Ghana and they are prepared to pay a little more for Costa Rica pineapple.' 
(Fieldwork, 2013). Prices of top brands (e.g. Dole, Del Monte) also command a premium 
over standard brands.  
Thus, the price Ghanaian exporters get for their produce depends on the quality, brand 
name and the retail outlet. Ghanaian exporters and buyers negotiate prices at the beginning 
of the year. Exporters indicated that though this price is supposed to be fixed for the year, 
buyers (supermarkets) are able to dictate or impose a price on the exporter: ‘You have some 
minimum levels that you require so you’re able to agree with the buyer on the pricing level in the course of 
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the year and payment terms but sometimes some of the market situations are such that for some periods and 
reasons, the negotiated terms have to be varied for some reason agreeable to both sides’ (Fieldwork 
interview). 
JIT practices of supermarkets enable them to easily switch supply whenever needed. In 
cases where (a) supermarkets are interested in keeping consumer prices stable or are 
offering promotional sales to consumers(b) there is an abundance of pineapple fruits (c) in 
the summer periods when other fruits are available they sometimes offer a take-it-or-leave-
it price (which is usually lower than the agreed contract price) to the exporter; ‘They may even 
tell you, from this time to this time, we will buy at this price’ (Fieldwork interview, 2013).  
The perishable nature of the produce, as well as the need to maintain a business 
relationship, tilts the balance of power away from the exporter: ‘Because they receive and sell, 
they control most of the power. Unlike you having this phone or whatever and you put it on a shelf in Paris 
and say €10 so you can sell, with fruits sometimes it is not pre-determined like that. The market situation 
dictates what happens. You might even have an arrangement that we’re selling to you at this price but the 
market conditions can change and sometimes you may not get what you want. The power is more on their 
side and because it’s fresh fruit [it needs to be consumed]…ahaa, and that’s the problem. If it were plastics 
then you could say ok, if the market is not good this week, keep it [laughs], but we don’t have that 
privilege’ (Fieldwork Interview, 2013). 
A combination of buyer strategies and asset specificity increases the cost of exporters 
switching from one buyer to the other though buyers can easily switch when they find an 
alternative lower-cost supplier. When questioned on the ease of switching buyers, a 
production manager responded: ‘In fact, the same country, it’s not easy unless they’re far apart. But 
most of the time, they wouldn’t want you to sell to another buyer in the same area. So, Switzerland for 
example, we are on only one supermarket chain. And then in Spain, we were dealing with two customers. 
Along the line one pulled out but even there we have to use two different labels. Even though [exporter’s 
name] is on them, one must be different. The colour and appearance is different.’   
 
7.9 Concluding Remarks 
The change in the characteristics of the item exchanged on the global pineapple market has 
caused a significant restructuring of the Ghanaian chain. The response of exporters and 
smallholders in Ghana’s pineapple export chain was mostly driven by local conditions. The 
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local economic condition is an important determinant of the development of value chains. 
From 2005 to 2008, local economic and political conditions were not conducive to the 
competitiveness of the chain. The chain’s competitiveness depended on its ability to 
respond efficiently and in a timely manner to changes in the characteristics of the item 
exchanged. This could only be achieved with the right supporting environment. Restrictive 
financial conditions constrained the ability of firms and smallholders to finance new 
investments and upgrade to global standards. Also, apart from the initial financial 
investment government made into suckers, no other financial incentives targeted at 
producer-exporters were forthcoming. The late implementation of development 
programmes by development agencies further added to the inability of most producer-
exporters and smallholders to quickly find their place in the global chain. The effect of 
these local conditions was an increase in already high production and transaction costs; 
diminishing the chain’s capacity to impact the entire economy as exporters turned to 
vertical integration rather than contracting with smallholders. 
In the period 2009 to 2013, governance of the chain has evolved to captive and/or 
hierarchy. Although small and medium scale producers operate under captive governance, 
the evidence presented in this chapter points to the significant effects of contractual 
relations on producing quality fruits, ensuring reliability of supplies and stable (if not) 
higher incomes for producers. Knowledge transfer is more structured in the chain, and 
there is evidence of unintended spill over of knowledge from pineapple cultivation to food 
crops like cassava and maize.  
 
Horizontal collaboration by exporters is reducing their cost levels as well as improving the 
reputation of the country as a producer of high quality pineapple fruits. It has also 
increased the visibility and voice of exporters, as indicated by their ability to lobby the 
government to grant them access to the government’s fertiliser subsidy scheme. Also, the 
study shows that horizontal collaboration has been key to the upgrading of farmers. The 
study finds evidence that through farmer cooperatives, farmers can access services which 
they were previously excluded from. Furthermore, self-monitoring by members of the 
group means that coordination costs in the chain are reduced, improving the growth and 
development of the entire chain.   
Overall, competitiveness of the chain is still stifled by local financial conditions and the 
seeming lack of long-term strategies to support horticulture research. Exporters, processors 
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and development agencies do their best to acquire and transfer knowledge; but if the 
country is to improve its position in the global chain, as well as diversify into other 





Chapter 8   Summary, Conclusion and Implications  
8.1 Introduction 
Governance in the GVC framework is essentially focused on what lead firms do and the 
outcomes for suppliers ‘moving up’ the global chain. However, this focus limits the 
explanatory ability of the framework when applied to governance and development of local 
or national value chains. The reason is that the institutional dimension of the framework 
(specifically the local context) is considered to be passive. To rectify this deficiency, value 
chains need to be embedded in their locations (Bair, 2005; Dussel Peters, 2008). 
This study takes up the call to embed value chains in their locations and aimed at 
contributing to the theoretical discussion on what governance is, what should be 
considered as the institutional dimension in GVCs and its role in governance.  In this 
study, it has been argued that the definition of governance can be broadened to include 
other rules and actors that exert power or influence over the actions and behaviour of value 
chain participants (Section 2.9.3). The institutional dimension can also be identified as local 
conditions or the local context. Lead firms’ conditions of participation in the global chain 
influence the characteristics of the item exchanged between suppliers at the local level. To 
link the global and local levels and characterise how changes in global governance actually 
play out at the local level, the study developed a conceptual framework which brings 
together the power of lead firms with the EC approach. This makes possible the 
identification and elaboration of how specific local conditions also affect the governance 
(form and content of transactions) and development of chains. 
 
Based on the case of the Ghanaian pineapple export sector, this study concludes that local 
chain governance is co-determined by the effect of both global and local conditions on 
production and exchange relationships in the chain. Also, the prospects for development of 
the chain crucially hinge on local conditions. The study came to these conclusions by 
investigating one overarching research question: ‘How, and in what way, do local 
conditions impact or influence value chain governance?’ 
Three secondary research questions were further examined to assist with answering the 
overarching research question. They are: 
Q1: How, and in what way, do local conditions shape or structure production and exchange relations 
between and among suppliers at the local level?  
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H1.1: Local conditions may impose constraints or create opportunities which directly and 
indirectly influence the behaviour of actors in their interactions.  
Q2: What impact do changes in global governance have on production and exchange at the local level? 
H2.1: Global governance alters the characteristics of the item exchanged (product 
characteristics) and elicits corresponding changes in the characteristics of actors in order to 
meet the new product requirements.  
H2:2: Given the existing structure of interactions, the new product characteristics may 
increase supplier’s production and transaction costs. 
Q3: How, and in what way, do local conditions negotiate or mediate the impact of new product 
characteristics on suppliers and the development of the chain? 
H3.1:  Local conditions may provide an enabling setting for the development of the chain 
by altering the rules underlying production and exchange in the chain.   
This last chapter of the thesis is divided into five sections. Following the introduction, 
Section 2 summarises the key findings and conclusions of the study and uses them to 
answer the research questions posed above; Section 3 discusses implications of the findings 
for both theory and policy; Section 4 identifies the limitations of the study; and Section 5 
presents an outlook for future inquiry. 
 
8.2 Key Findings 
In this section, I provide answers to the study’s main research question by presenting the 
key evidence found in Chapters 6 and 7 in response to the questions posed above. 
However, before I do so, I will summarise the chapters of the entire thesis. The thesis was 
structured into 8 chapters. In Chapter 1, the motivation for undertaking the research, the 
research questions and the possible contributions of the study were outlined. The GVC 
framework was discussed in Chapter 2, with the aim of understanding what governance 
means and how the local context could contribute to the explanatory ability of the GVC 
framework. A review of the empirical literature identifies actors such as, the state 
(government), public organisations, collective action organisations and even firms 
themselves, as influencing governance, its evolution and the development of the chain. 
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They do so through policies, strategies, and the provision of infrastructure, among others 
(Selwyn, 2008; Neilson and Pritchard, 2009; Oro and Pritchard, 2011).   
In Chapter 3 of the thesis, a conceptual framework to assist with answering the overarching 
research question was formulated. The conceptual framework, by combining GVC analysis 
and the EC approach, focused on the role local conditions play in GVC governance in 
interacting with global governance.  It was envisaged that lead firms could restructure the 
chains on which local suppliers operate (i.e. interactions in related exchange configurations 
can impact a configuration under examination). In the local configuration, the impact of 
global governance is experienced by suppliers through the altering of the characteristics of 
the item exchanged (product characteristics). With the new product characteristics (and 
therefore a change in the elements of the existing exchange configuration), suppliers in the 
chain must make decisions and choices concerning how they interact. Their decisions and 
choices are partly dependent on their characteristics. At the same time, local conditions can 
and do directly and indirectly impact the decisions and choices of internal actors. Local 
conditions constrain, support or enlarge the choice set available to the actors, thus playing 
a role in the governance and development of the chain. Chapter 4 discussed the evolution 
of the global pineapple value chain, especially the rise of Costa Rica and the decline of 
Ghana.   Chapter 5 outlined the research design and process. 
Based on the conceptual framework, Chapter 6 provided empirical evidence for Q1 and 
confirms H1.1. Local conditions that actively shaped production and exchange in the chain 
were: (a) government policy (b) strategies of donor organisations (c) informal norms in 
business interactions (d) incentives to spread risks (e) access to and affordability of capital 
and (f) market uncertainty. Economy-wide incentives for NTE promotion initially attracted 
exporters to participate in the chain; but as exports increased, existing marketing, 
knowledge and infrastructure gaps became more visible and pronounced. These negatively 
affected the consistent and reliable supply of quality fruits.  On one hand, certain local 
conditions, for example, high interest rates together with actors’ characteristics constrained 
the accessibility and affordability of finance for both smallholders and exporters. On the 
other hand, the lack of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms at the local level was an 
opportunity, for both exporters and smallholders, to use oral contracts as a risk 
management mechanism.  Significantly, the lack of influence by indirect internal actors (i.e. 
government, development agencies and SPEG) over the form and content of transaction 
was a crucial determinant of the competitiveness and development of the chain.  Lack of 
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cooperative behaviour by exporters meant that the chain could only compete on prices and 
not quality. Also, government’s failure to provide sector-wide infrastructure imposed 
constraints on the actions and choices of exporters. One significant way in which this was 
exhibited was the fact that without sector-wide infrastructure, any individual investments 
made to raise the quality of fruits on-farm would be futile off-farm. Overall, how 
transactions were governed in the chain confirm the embedding of the chain in a local 
context which did not have the (right) capacity to engage with the stringent rules of 
participation in the value chain that was later demanded by lead firms.  
 
Chapter 7 provided a detailed analysis of the evolution of governance in the Ghanaian 
pineapple export sector and its impact on the development of the chain. The analysis was 
informed by secondary data and interviews carried out with 68 participants of the 
Ghanaian chain in 2013. The information gathered was used to map out the current 
structure of the Ghanaian pineapple value chain (Figure 5.1). It was confirmed, regarding 
H2.1 and H2.2, that changes in the product characteristics, (i.e. the MD2 innovation, the 
application of standards and retailer’s requirements) increased both production and 
transaction costs in the chain. In Sections 7.3 and 7.5, MD2 and the application of 
standards increased human, physical, temporal, and intangible asset specificity in the local 
chain. Such increases in transaction costs favoured closer relationships between exporters, 
processors and smallholders or otherwise exclusion from the chain. Whichever way the 
chain was to go, depended on the characteristics of exporters and smallholders and the 
influence of local conditions on their interactions.  
In answering Q3, H3.1 was partly confirmed and partly refuted. The key findings on which 
this assertion is based are summarised as follows. First, although the initial trigger to 
upgrade the chain came from exogenous actors, the strategies and tactics of endogenous 
actors did more to encourage the ability of direct internal actors to (re)integrate into the 
chain and make quality products.  In the Ghanaian context, it involved a shared process 
which required the cooperation of all endogenous actors. Non-firm actors (i.e. the 
government and development agencies) were much more significant actors in accounting 
for the ability of exporters and smallholders to first (re)integrate into the chain in the 2005 
to 2008 period. Thus, they assisted with improving the quality of pineapples produced and 
cultivated through interventions which made available planting materials, infrastructure and 
technical assistance to both smallholders and exporters. 
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These interventions were however of limited significance to the integration of smallholders 
into the chain, because indirect internal actors did not address the issue of finance to 
acquire MD2 suckers and, more importantly, to implement the required standards.  The 
inability to access and afford finance was a major determinant of why smallholders exited 
the chain.  
Second, the study finds that in extremely low level trust situations it is extremely difficult to 
engender trust through policy interventions. Rather, repeated interactions and what the 
actors actually do are more important. Repeated interactions between small and medium-
scale producers and processors had laid the ground for cooperative behaviour. However, 
given the high costs of production and limited market outlets, the actions of processors 
have more impact on engendering trust. Flexible and prompt payments as well as frequent 
and open communication, engender trust in their relationship with small and medium-scale 
producers.  In addition, the use of contracts in the chain assisted small and medium-scale 
producers to improve the quality of their produce. Although this may not necessarily 
translate into higher prices for their produce, contracts provide a security of expectations 
and stability in incomes which previously was not the case in the chain.  
 
Third, aside from the standard idea of vertical relationships driving development in the 
chain, the evidence in the study confirms Selwyn’s view (2008) that horizontal relationships 
also matter for development. The inability of exporters to collaborate had a detrimental 
effect on their ability to lobby government to assist with the challenges in the chain. On the 
other hand, the current engagement of SPEG in marketing and branding activities can be 
conceived of as process upgrading. Also, smallholder participation in the chain using 
cooperatives allows them to have economies of scale and to access technical assistance and 
market opportunities. 
 
Fourth, price risk in the chain can be managed with developments in technology at the 
local level. Although the contracts used in the chain serve as a risk management tool, both 
the MD2 and Smooth Cayenne strands of the chain lack the mechanisms to collect data on 
prices which are essential to the bargaining power of smallholders. On the other hand, the 
use of mobile technology to gather information on domestic prices of Sugar Loaf serves as 




In general, the evidence provided in the study demonstrates that the opportunities 
presented by global governance to participants of a value chain are better exploited when 
there are local conditions which enable their inclusion and participation. On the other 
hand, the challenges presented by global governance are exacerbated when facilitating local 
conditions are missing or not fulfilled. Considering this, it is my view that the exclusion of 
small and medium-scale producers from the whole fruit strand of the chain was largely due 
to local conditions. 
 
8.3 Implications 
This thesis has investigated how the local context shapes chain governance. It represents an 
attempt to broaden the GVC governance literature’s exclusive focus on global 
characteristics in the determination of chain governance. The evidence presented in the 
thesis contributes to the theoretical and empirical understanding of the relationship 
between participation in GVCs and the development goals of agriculture value chains in 
developing countries.  
8.3.1 Implications for Theory 
The thesis makes two contributions to theory. First, analytically, it successfully embeds a 
value chain in the place where it is situated. By doing so, it coherently and systematically 
includes location specificity in the analysis of value chains and allows the GVC framework 
to give a more satisfactory account of why participation in GVCs may or may not lead to 
development.  
Second, the evidence provided by the study has implications for upgrading in GVCs. GVC 
upgrading theory assumes that suppliers and lead firms first have a relationship, and then 
lead firms impart knowledge for upgrading to take place. However, when suppliers do not 
contract directly with lead firms but through intermediaries, such as importers, the 
traditional notion of upgrading may not hold. In reality, product upgrading may serve as a 
means to access a chain. Suppliers may have to build up capabilities before they engage in a 
business relationship (Morrison, Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2008).  The capabilities to do so 
may depend on their own characteristics, but more importantly on favourable local 
conditions (Gibbon, 2008).  
The analysis in this study supports this view, and further extends it. The study 
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demonstrates that product upgrading, for example, may involve a series of steps which may 
not necessarily result in higher prices; in the short or long term. Product upgrading may be 
necessary just to ensure that market access is retained.  The MD2 innovation required that 
suppliers upgrade by first acquiring the raw material to make a completely new product, 
before they could (re)integrate into the chain. After making the necessary adjustments to 
procure MD2 suckers, they had to acquire knowledge and other capabilities.  Between 2005 
and 2008, exporters who had upgraded to MD2 production endured low prices; to 
maintain market access. Thus, upgrading may not involve ‘moving up’ the chain or 
enjoying higher prices.  
8.3.2 Implications for Policy 
First, the main objective of promoting NTEs in the Ghanaian context is to diversify the 
economy and promote poverty reduction (see Chapter 1). In the case of Ghana, the 
restructuring of the pineapple value chain shows the limitations of using non-traditional 
export agriculture as a rural development strategy; especially in the absence of consistent 
and committed strategies. Deliberate construction of incentives, can and must be used to 
achieve, maintain or increase competitiveness in global value chains. Although government 
policy is relegated to the background in the GVC framework, the example of Costa Rica 
(Sections 4.3.2.2 and 6.6) shows that policy is integral to the success of value chains. The 
embedding of the chain in a dense network which promoted knowledge transfer, research 
and financial assistance was the decisive factor in integrating smallholders into the chain. 
Lessons learnt from Costa Rica indicate that the government of Ghana must (a) identify 
and target key chains or sectors and (b) promote the formation of an organisational 
network of relations consisting of research organisations, government agencies, exporters 
and others.  
 
Related to the above is the fact that smallholders are integrated into the whole fruit strand 
of the chain through their participation in cooperatives. Cooperatives make possible the 
attainment of sufficient volumes to attract exporters and access to technical assistance. 
However, the cooperatives lack capabilities which can make them sustainable after the 
implementation of development interventions. Government must invest in the capabilities 




Second, the deliberate targeting of key chains or sectors is made more imperative by the 
current challenges facing Smooth Cayenne production. These challenges are occurring in 
the context of increasing global demand for Smooth Cayenne.  Steps must be taken by 
government to ensure that small and medium-scale producers who are extremely proficient 
in producing Smooth Cayenne, are not excluded from the chain. The role of government 
should be to undertake research and disseminate knowledge and information on how to 
address the agronomic challenges being experienced by producers.  
 
Third, local or regional market opportunities must be explored for Smooth Cayenne 
production. It is estimated that fruit juice capacity in the country is between 20,000 to 
30,000 tonnes but actual production is far lower: while fruit juice imports are about 21,000 
tonnes (World Bank, 2011a). These indicate that there are available opportunities in the 
fruit juice market that could be harnessed.   
 
Fourth, policies to integrate into value chains should focus not only on the smallholder, but 
also the exporter or processor. There are limitations to the use of NTEs as an export 
diversification and poverty reduction tool especially without the state playing an active role 
in linking them to markets, knowledge and technology. Interventions aimed at the export 
node of the chain may have a greater impact on all producers.  Exporters admitted that 
they had orders which they could not fulfil. Yet they do not contract with smallholders 
because they do not have the finances. Exporters must be incentivised to link up with 
smallholders through policies directly targeting their linkage with smallholders. Such 
policies and strategies will end up benefitting the exporter, the smallholder, and the state.   
Lastly, the evidence provided in this study shows that to ensure interventions by 
development agencies are more successful, there is the need to delve deeper into the 
characteristics of intended recipients. The failure of the MiDA Agriculture Fund shows that 
smallholders (especially those who cultivate different crops) have different characteristics, 
even if they are defined in terms of the land size cultivated or are in the same locality.  
8.4 Limitations 
The study has three limitations. First, some potential respondents could not be accessed 
because their identification and access depended on the granting of permission by the 
exporters they interacted with. Where the exporters declined to participate in the study, 
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such respondents could not be accessed. Second, the study was unable to empirically 
measure the extent to which contract is used as a risk reduction or risk management tool 
due to lack of data. Third, the fieldwork for the study was carried out in 2013, with the 
possibility that the structure and dynamics captured by the study may have changed. 
8.5 Directions for Future Research 
Based on the findings in this study, further research in four areas is relevant. First would be 
to apply the study’s conceptual framework to either a traditional agriculture export crop 
and/or a multiple case study, with a view to highlight how the same or different local 
conditions interact and impact the structure of governance and outcomes.   
Second, to deepen our understanding of the poverty reduction role of GVCs in developing 
countries, future research might focus on new patterns of labour use in the Ghanaian 
pineapple export chain, as these create both risks and opportunities for participants. 
Barrientos et al. (2009) investigated the use of migrant labour in the Ghanaian chain and 
noted that 45% were temporary and casual workers who worked all through the year but 
did not enjoy benefits associated with a permanent job. Currently, on small and medium-
scale farms, farmers have mainly shifted to the use of ‘permanent’ labour for certain 
activities which are crucial to their continued participation in the chain, while wage 
employment is used on farms owned by producer-exporters.  Do these new patterns 
influence productivity of labour and employment conditions such as the wage level and the 
length of employment? Insights into how labour is integrated into the chain, the conditions 
of employment and the impact on rural employment are important for poverty reduction 
goals of the country.   
 
 
Third, a more in-depth analysis of risk in the chain can be carried out, as risk allocation and 
risk management in value chains are often neglected.  As exporters no longer contract with 
smallholders and outgrowers, it would be interesting to investigate the mechanisms used by 
exporters and their effectiveness and impact on the development of the chain. Also, what 
could be the possible trade-off between income levels and sustainability of the chain, since 
smallholders and medium-scale producers have limited market outlets.  
 
Lastly, a study on the potential of farmers participating in both an export crop and 
domestic food crop value would be appropriate. Based on the finding of this study, food 
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security initiatives can tap into the knowledge that participation in the pineapple value 
chain brings to a farmer. Even though most farmers do not grow any food crops for sale 
or do so for subsistence, they indicated that they have transferred pineapple production 
knowledge to food crops such as maize and cassava and had noticed improvements in 
yields. In addition, farmers have access to more land than they currently cultivate and with 
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Source: Trade Map, International Trade Centre www.intracen.org/marketanalysis 
Appendix 4.2: Supply markets for Germany imports of pineapple (2001, 2005 and 2013) 
 
 
Source: Trade Map, International Trade Centre www.intracen.org/marketanalysis 
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Appendix 4.3: Supply markets for the Netherlands imports of pineapple (2001, 2005 and 
2013) 
 





Appendix Chapter 5 
Appendix 5.1 Introduction Letter 








Industry expert 1 Donor organisation First conversation on 
07/06/13. 
Subsequent follow up 
conversations 
Industry expert 2 Agribusiness consultant  First interviewed on 
13/06/13. 
Subsequent follow up 
conversations 
Processor A Production Manager 04/07/13 
Processor A Quality Control Manager  04/07/13 
Processor A Agronomist Informal 
conversations 
Representative of 
Exporter Association  
Senior Official 11/07/13 
Medium-scale farmer A  Akwapim South district 15/07/13 
Medium-scale farmer B  Akwapim South district 15/07/13 
Medium-scale farmer C  Akwapim South district 15/07/13 
Farmer Cooperative A (8 
members) 
Akwapim South district 16/07/13 
Medium-scale farmer D Akwapim South district 16/07/13 
Medium-scale farmer E Akwapim South district 16/07/13 
Medium-scale farmer F Akwapim South district 17/07/13 
Small scale farmers (2) Akwapim South district 17/07/13 
Farmer Cooperative B (10 
members) 
Ekumfi District 26/07/13 
Farmer Cooperative C (11 
members) 
Ekumfi district 26/07/13 
Local processor Akwapim South District 01/08/13 
Farmer Cooperative D (10 
members) 
Ekumfi district 02/08/13 
Commercial bank A Assistant Manager, Central 
Region 
02/08/13 
Representative of MFI Agriculture specialist 06/09/13 
Representative of MFI 
association 
Executive Secretary 09/09/13 
Government Agency A Head of Research 20/09/13 
Exporter A Agronomist 01/10/13 
Exporter A Export Manager 01/10/13 
Exporter B CEO 08/10/13 
Exporter C General Manager 29/10/13 
Exporter D CEO 07/11/13 
Exporter E Production Manager 14/11/13 
Government Agency B Finance Manager 19/11/13 
Representative of 
Commercial Bank B 




Commercial Bank C 
Accra Email exchange 
Industry expert 3 National Horticulture Task 
force 
20/06/16 





























Appendix 5.3 Interview Consent form 
 
Acknowledgement of Informed Consent for the project: 
“Emerging labour relations and institutions under globalisation: A case study of Ghana” (Working 
Title) 
My name is Nana Amma Afari-Gyan and I am a graduate student at the School of Oriental and African 
Studies (SOAS), University of London. I am inviting you to participate in my study on institutions and 
governance in the pineapple subsector in Ghana. Involvement in this research is voluntary so you may 
choose to participate or not. This sheet will explain the study to you. I will be happy to answer any questions 
that you may have. 
This study is attempting to gain a better understanding of the relationship between governance structures and 
the institutional environment in domestic value chains. The project will cover knowledge acquisition and 
transfer, risk, role of the state and collective action organisations, individual/collective behaviour and 
institutional dynamics. Should you choose to participate in this study, it will involve answering some 
questions that relate to your work in the pineapple subsector. I expect that the interview will last between 
forty-five to sixty minutes. This interview will also be audio-taped and the recordings used only for 
transcription and documentation purposes. Please keep in mind that the information you provide will not be 
linked to you in any way.  
A copy of this written consent form will be given to each participant in this study. All audio-taped recordings 
will be erased and written transcripts destroyed upon completion of this study. If at any point you feel 
uncomfortable with an aspect of this interview, we can either stop that particular line of questioning or we 
can stop the interview all together. In the event that you stop the interview all together, none of the 
information given will be used in the study. 
If you have any questions about this research project as a participant, please contact this project’s advisor, 
Prof. Machiko Nissanke, by phone at +44(0)20 7898 4542 or by email at mn2@soas.ac.uk. 
All of my questions have been answered. I acknowledge that I am over the age of eighteen years and agree to 
participate in this study. 
_____ I agree to be audio-taped 
_____ I do not agree to be audio-taped 
_______________________ ______________________________        ________________ 
(Signature of participant)                (Name of participant)                    (Date) 
 
 
_________________________    __________________________       ___________________ 
(Signature of researcher)        (Name of researcher)                   (Date)  






Appendix 5.4.1 Questionnaire for small and medium-scale producers 
EMERGING LABOUR RELATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS UNDER 




NANA AMMA AFARI-GYAN 
PhD Candidate 
Economics Department 





This questionnaire is designed to collect data for the purposes of analyses of decision-
making at the domestic level in Global Value Chains (GVCs). The project will cover 
knowledge acquisition and transfer, risk, role of the state and collective action 
organisations, individual/collective behaviour and institutional dynamics.  All responses 
will be treated as confidential. Results will be published on a ‘no-name basis’ and as 
aggregate and average findings as part of a PhD thesis and related papers.   
 
Supervisor: 





Section 1: Background Information 
1. Name 
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
2. Sex       3. Age                          4. What is your highest education 
level? 
        M                                           18 - 25        Primary 
        F                                             26 –35                              Secondary  
           36 - 45                               Technical  
                                                       46 - 55                               Polytechnic          
                                                      56 and above                      University 
 
5. (a)  Are you native to this locality? Y/N 
    (b)   If no to (a), are you a migrant? Y/N 
    (c) Are you married/single/ divorced/separated?        
    (d) Number of children: …………………………………………………………….. 
 
6. (a) Do you own any plot(s) of land?  Y/N                     
 (b) Do you control any plot(s) of land?   Y/N  

















ix. Other (please 
specify) 







     
     
     
     




   














































       
       
       
       
       
 
8. (a) Do you have another job aside farming?     Y /N 
        (b) What job is this?  ……..………………………………………………………… 












































      
      
      
 
 
10. (a) Are you a member of a pineapple cooperative/outgrower scheme?    Y/N                                                                     
Name (if yes): ……………………………………………………………………. 
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      (b) How long have you been a member? (in years) …………………………………. 





SECTION 2: (a) CONTRACTING 
11. (a) In the past three months, have you promised (oral/written) to sell your pineapple 
to anyone?    Y/N   
       (b) Who did you promise? ………………………………………………………… 
(c) Who will you sell it to?   Cooperative         Exporter          Market Queen         
Other (please specify) ……………………… ……………………………………. 
             
12. Who introduced you to the buyer (contractor)? 
         Cooperative           Friends      Donor Agency     Financial Institution            
          Family                 
         Other (please specify) ........................................................................................................... 
 
13. What are the main things usually agreed upon in the written/oral contract? 
 Contract duration     Conditions for termination of contract        Input Provision          
 Payment method       Time for payment    Risk sharing       Spraying         
Quantity         Terms of input provision         Transportation       Technical qualities of     
crop           Price           Finance 
 Other (please specify): ........................................................................................................................ 
14. What are the some of the specific details of the agreement reached in question 13  
above?  
(a) Inputs (which ones?) 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
(b) Contract duration and termination: 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
(c) Services (transportation, spraying): 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 







15. What are the main requirements of buyers when looking for producers? 
 
 ……………………………………………………………………………………… 







   
       
 










(b) Would you still produce pineapples if there was no contract (written/oral) 






17.  (a) Is it easier to access the market this way?   Y /N 
 















cooperative     
      
Friends       
Family       
Extension 
officers      
      
Exporter       
Financial 
institution 
      
Donor 
agency      




      
 





Finance Pricing Marketing Distribution 
Cooperative 
Meetings 
      
Training 
manuals    
      
Handouts       
Posters       
Contract 
agreement 
      
Other (please 
specify)] 




(b) Is the knowledge passed on useful to you?   




Finance Pricing Marketing Distribution 
Yes        
No       
 
20. What are some of the practices involved in getting the information? Are these 
interactions continuous or a one-off?  (1. continuous 2. discrete) 
(a) Contracting opportunities: 
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
















21. (a) Would you be able to access this information if you were not cultivating pineapple?  
            Y/N 
(b) Would you be able to access this information if you had no social relations with the 
informants? Y/N 
(c) Which of the interactions in question 20 above is most important to you and why? 
[a, b, c, d, e, f] 
 ……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 ……………………………………………………………………………………… 




22. (a) Are you able to influence the process of knowledge acquisition?  Y/N 
        (b) Are you able to influence the process of knowledge transfer?  Y/N 
 (c)How are you able to do so?  
 Knowledge acquisition: ……………………………………………………………… 
 ………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 Knowledge transfer:……………………………………………………………….. 
 ……………………………………………………………………………………….. 






23. What do you think are the challenges/advantages of acquiring knowledge and 




              
 
24. (a) How fast is the information transferred to you?  
(i) Contracting opportunities:      Very slow    1      2        3       4        5 Very fast 
(ii) Marketing:                               Very slow    1      2        3       4        5 Very fast 
(iii) Distribution:                          Very slow    1      2        3       4        5 Very fast 
(iv) Production Processes:            Very slow    1      2        3       4        5 Very fast 
(v)   Pricing:                                   Very slow    1      2        3       4        5 Very fast 
(vi) Finance:                                  Very slow    1      2        3       4        5 Very fast 
 
 (b) How timely is the information for you? 
(i) Contracting opportunities:   Not on time at all 1      2        3       4        5 Very timely 
(ii) Marketing:                           Not on time at all 1      2        3       4        5 Very timely 
(iii) Distribution:                      Not on time at all 1      2        3       4        5 Very timely 
(iv) Production Processes:       Not on time at all 1      2        3       4        5 Very timely 
(v) Pricing:                                Not on time at all 1      2        3       4        5 Very timely 
(vi)  Finance:                           Not on time at all 1      2        3       4        5 Very timely 
 
       (c) How reliable is the information?  
(i) Contracting opportunities:  Not at all reliable 1      2        3       4        5 Very reliable 
(ii) Marketing:                         Not at all reliable 1      2        3       4        5 Very reliable 
(iii) Distribution:                     Not at all reliable 1      2        3       4        5 Very reliable 
       (iv)Production Processes:        Not at all reliable 1      2        3       4        5 Very reliable 
(v) Pricing:                               Not at all reliable 1      2        3       4        5 Very reliable 
(vi)  Finance:                      Not at all reliable 1      2        3       4        5 Very reliable  
 




26. (a) Is the knowledge and information regarding product and process requirements  
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          applicable  to  any other crops? Y/N/Not Sure 
 (b)Which ones? ........................................................................................................................... 
 (c) If yes, how is it applicable? .................................................................................................. 
 ......................................................................................................................................................... 
(e) If no, why is it not applicable? ............................................................................................. 
 
 27. (a) Are you able to switch from one buyer to the other? Y/N 
      (b) How often are you able to do so? ....................................................................................... 
      (c) What factors motivate you to switch or stay with any particular buyer? (In order of 









 (b) FINANCING 
 
29. (a) Do you buy any inputs for your pineapple production?      Y/ N 
(b) What are the specific costs of inputs per hectare? 
Item Type Hectare of land Amount per 
hectare 
Cost (GHC) 
Suckers     
Fertiliser     
Pesticides     
Plastic 
Mulch 
    
Other     
 
30. What type of financing options do you use?  
a. Own finances    b. Loan from commercial bank           c. Loan from money lenders
  
d. Loan from family      e. Loan from micro-finance institutions      f. Loan from susu 
group            g. Loan from friends’         h. Interested in financing but no access to funds 
 
If you borrow from any source, please answer questions 31-34. If no loan, please go to question 35 
 










Family/Friends     
Commercial 
bank 
    
   
  





    
Susu group     
Other     
 
  









33. (a) Which factor(s) will make it easier for you to access a loan?   
 Larger plot of land        Access to export market      Stable income       
       Pineapple variety  
 Terms of loan repayment        Membership of a cooperative/outgrower  
 Other (please specify) 
……………………………………………………………………… 
 
 (b) Which factor(s) will hinder you from taking a loan?   
 Size of land           Lack of employment outside farming         Income stability               
 Terms of loan repayment        Non-membership of a cooperative/outgrower 
 Other (please specify): …………………………………………………………….. 
 
34. (a) Is the loan taken able to meet the needs of your production/ Y/N 
        (b) Please explain how it is able/not able to do so: ......................................................... 
 .................................................................................................................................................... 































37. In your opinion, is there anything that can be done by anyone to make access to 









38. (a) What is your usual yield per hectare? ………………………………………….  
(b) How consistent are your yields per hectare? ..…………………………………. 
(c) Has the yield increased over the last season? …………………………………… 
……………………………………..................................................................................... 
(d) Are you able to credibly forecast the amount of pineapple you will harvest in a 
season? Y/N 
(e) Is your farm irrigated and why? Y/N …………………………………………… 
(f) What are the challenges with yield and/or forecasting volumes? 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 






39. (a) How much were you paid for a kilogram of pineapple last season? …………… 
       …………………………………………………………………………………..  
      (b) How much are you going to be paid this season? ……………………………. 
           ……………………………………………………………………………….. 
       (c) Is the price agreed on before cultivation begins? Y/N 
       (d) Is it an oral/written agreement? ……………………………………………… 
 
40. (a) How do you agree on the price?      









41. (a) Is the price set to pay a premium for quality or buy all produce available?  
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
(b)Is the price you receive from an exporter, higher than what you will receive from 
selling to the domestic market?    Y /N 
 
(c) Why is this?............................................................................................................................ 
   
 
42. (a) How and when are payments made for pineapple cultivated?  Cash       Cheque  
 At harvest time       2 weeks after delivery        Other (please specify) ……………… 
 ……………………………………………………………………………………… 
        (b) Does the mode and timing of payment affect your ability to finance loans?  
 ……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
43. (a) In your opinion, is the price a fair reflection of what you should receive?     Y/ N 
 
 (b) Why? …………………………………………………………………………… 
  




(d) Why do you say so? 
 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
44. (a) In your opinion, is the most influential stakeholder able to convince other 
stakeholders for its own benefit?    Y/N 
 
 (b) Who are these other stakeholders?  
 ……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
        (c) Are you as an individual/ group able to influence any of the influential 
stakeholders?   Y/N 
 (d) If yes, how are you able to do so? 
 ……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 ……………………………………………………………………………………… 




45.  (a) Does the volume of pineapple produced by other smallholders affect the price  
             agreed upon?  Yes/No/ Not Sure/ Don’t Know 
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(b) Does price increase/decrease of fertiliser, suckers, affect the price agreed upon?  
     Yes/No/ Not Sure/ Don’t Know  
(c) Does weather conditions and disease affect the price agreed upon? Yes/No/ Not 
Sure/ Don’t Know 
       (d)  Does yield affect the price you receive?   Yes/No/Not Sure/Don’t Know  
       (e) Does government trade policy affect the price agreed upon?  Yes/No/ Not Sure/  
            Don’t Know 
 







(e) CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
47. (a) Have you ever had a dispute with a buyer?      Y/N 
 




48. (a) Was the dispute due to you? Y/N 
        (b) If yes, why were you unable to fulfil your part of the contract? 
(i) Inability to deliver the quantity agreed in the contract? 
(ii) Sale of produce to another buyer 





(c) What happens /happened when you are/were unable to fulfil your part of the 
contract? 
 Inability to 
deliver the 
quantity 












happen            






supplied       
    









    
Buyers of 
other crops 
will get to 
know about it 
 
    
My reputation 
will be affected  
    
Other (please 
specify)] 
    
 
       
(d) Is this the usual manner in which you settle such a dispute with the buyer and   
why?    Y/N 
……………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………… 




(f) Has this happened to someone you know/the cooperative told you/buyer told 
you/it is  




49. What happens if the buyer does not fulfil his part of the contract?  
 













happen, we are 
used to it 
    
The crop will 
be sold on the 
domestic 
market 
    
The crop will 
be sold to 
another buyer 





based on the 
terms of 
contract 
    
We never 
contract with 
the buyer again 
    
A complaint 




    
Other (please 
specify) 













(c) What do you believe are the advantages/disadvantages of the dispute mechanisms 

















51. (a) Did the cooperative/farmer association assist in solving the dispute? Y/N 
 





(c) In your opinion, did they intervene in a timely manner? Y/N 
 
(d) Was this role satisfactory? Y/N 
………………………………………………………. 
 
(f)Risk and Risk Sharing 
52. (a) Do you grow any food crops (e.g. maize) for sale? Y/N    
  ……………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 (b)If yes to (a), how much income do you earn from it? 
 
 (c) Compared with pineapple farming, how much more do you earn?  




(e) Does pineapple farming provide you with a better livelihood than growing food 





53.  (a) Do you view pineapple production as risky or stable?  Why?  









 (c) How do you manage the risk? Through: 
  (i)   Use of irrigation systems 
  (ii)   Marketing through GPS 
(iii) Crop insurance 
(iv)  Price setting in advance 
(v)    Access to credit (ex-post) 
(vi)  Investments to improve consistency of quality, handling and grading 
(vii)  Remittances 
(viii)  Diversification into other crops. Which ones?  
……………………………………………………………………………….. 
 




54. (a) Have you been offered a contract (by the same buyer/another) to produce any 
other export crop? Y/N            
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Name of crop: ...................................................................................................................................... 
 
 (b)  Did you accept and why? 
 ……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 ……………………………………………………………………………………… 








55. (a) What are the challenges of managing risks through the options used? 





(b) Does diversifying into other crops affect your ability to specialise in the production 
of pineapple?  
               Y/N 
       (c) Please explain exactly what happens ……………………………………………… 
 ……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 




 (g) Role of the state and collective action organisations 
57. (a) Does your cooperative have support from any public or private organisation?  
            Y/N/Not Sure 
        (b) If yes, is the partnership successful? Y/N 
        (c) Why do you say it has been successful or not? …………………………………… 
  ……………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
58. Does your cooperative have the ability (e.g. contacts, skilled personnel) to access 
knowledge and information on production processes, markets and inputs? Y/N 
 
        (b) Please explain your answer:  
 ……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 ……………………………………………………………………………………… 
(c) Does your cooperative have the ability (e.g. contacts, skilled personnel) to 
influence buyer’s decisions?  Y/N 
 





(d) Is your cooperative able to join together with other cooperatives to push for 
changes in the sector?              Y/N 
(f)Please explain your answer: 
……………………………………………………………………………....………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
       (g)Are you as an individual able to freely communicate your needs to the cooperative?  
           Y/N 
      (h) Please explain your answer: ………………………………………………………. 
  …………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
59.  (a) Are you a member of the Agriculture Workers Union of Ghana?      Y/N 
 
         (b) Is the union able to influence the decisions of buyers (contractors) regarding    
               prices, inputs? Y/N 
   (c) Please explain your answer:  
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 ……………………………………………………………………………………… 
        (d) Is the union able to influence the government in its policy towards the sector?  
             Y/N 
        (e) Please explain your answer:  
 ……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 ……………………………………………………………………………………… 
(f)Do you know about the Economic Partnership Agreement to be signed next year?  
Y/N 
(g) If yes, what do you know about it? 
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
(b) How will it affect you as a pineapple grower? ……………………………………. 
 …………………………………………………………………………………... 
 
60. To what extent have you learned from your cooperative: 
(a) New forms of production:                      Little   1       2        3       4      5 A lot 
(b) Knowledge about increasing yields:         Little   1       2       3        4      5 A lot 
(c) Knowledge about marketing your           Little    1      2        3        4      5 A lot  
product: 
(d) Managerial techniques:                             Little 1       2        3        4      5 A lot 
(e) Knowledge on better application of         Little 1       2        3        4      5 A lot 
(f) fertilisers,   pesticides  
(g) Post-harvest   techniques                          Little 1       2        3        4      5 A lot 
 
 
61. To what extent have you learned from government extension services:  
(a) New forms of production:                       Little 1       2        3        4      5 A lot 
(b) Knowledge about increasing yields:          Little 1       2        3       4      5 A lot 
(c) Knowledge on better application of         Little 1       2        3        4     5 A lot 
Fertilisers, pesticides                                                                





62.  (a) Has your buyer increased the amount of produce demanded from you since the  
             last season?  Y/N 
        (b) If no, why do you think so? …………………………………………………… 
 
 
63. (a) If yes, have you been able to meet the increased demand?  (please tick as many as  
           apply) 
 
(i) Increased knowledge on product and process quality 
(ii) Increased volumes through cultivating more plots 
(iii) Increased volumes through higher yields per hectare 
(iv) Use of fertilisers, pesticides, tractors, irrigation system etc. 
(v) Rescheduling of tasks and responsibilities of employees 
(vi)  Increase in formal education (employees & employers) 
(vii) Increased extension services 
(viii) Trial and error 
(ix) Other (please specify): 
…………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
(b) Please explain exactly how you have gone about it?   
(i) Increased knowledge on product and process quality 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
(ii) Increased volumes through cultivating larger plots 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
(iii) Increased volumes through higher yields per hectare 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
(iv) Increased volumes through better application of knowledge 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
           (v) Better use of fertilisers, pesticides, tractors, irrigation systems etc.  
………………………………………………………………………………… 
(v) Rescheduling of tasks and responsibilities of employees 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
(vi) Increase in formal education (employees & employers) 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
(vii) Increased extension services 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
(viii) Other (please specify): 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
64.  (a) From your experiences shared above, what are your expectations for the sector? 




        (b) Are you encouraged to continue in the sector? Y/N 
 (c) Why? 
  ……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 ……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 ……………………………………………………………………………………… 
(e) Who gains the most from how things are now? 
………………………………………… 
       (d) If no, what can be done to make you stay? 
 What: 
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 Who initiates: 
……………………………………………………………………………… 
 Who carry’s through: 
……………………………………………………………………… 
       (e)If yes, what can be done to improve upon your stay? 
 What: 
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 Who initiates: 
……………………………………………………………………………… 
 Who carry’s it through: 
……………………………………………………………………. 
 
65. (a) From your experiences shared above, are you encouraged to increase the quantity  
       of produce?  Y/N 
 (b) Why? 
  ……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 ……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 ……………………………………………………………………………………… 









66. (a)  From your experiences shared above, are you encouraged to improve the quality of  
              produce? Y/N 
 
67. (a) What in your opinion can be done by yourself, to improve upon your ability to  
            meet demand? 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 







68. (a) What in your opinion can be done by the 




(b) What factors/circumstances enable/hinder them from doing what you have said  




69. What else can be done by other participants in the sector to enhance the 
























Appendix 5.4.2 Questionnaire for processors 
 
EMERGING LABOUR RELATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS UNDER 





NANA AMMA AFARI-GYAN 
PhD Candidate 
Economics Department 




This questionnaire is designed to collect data for the purposes of analysing the contribution 
of the institutional setup to the governance structure of the pineapple value chain at the 
domestic level. The project will cover knowledge acquisition and transfer, risk, role of the 
state and collective action organisations, individual/collective behaviour and institutional 
dynamics.  All responses will be treated as confidential. Results will be published on a ‘no-
name basis’ and as aggregate and average findings as part of a PhD thesis and related 
papers.   
 






Section 1: Background Information 




● Age:   18 – 25            26 – 35          36 – 45            46 – 55        56 and above  
● Profession 
………………………………………………………………………………. 
● Job Title 
……………………………………………………………………………….. 
● Highest school level attended? 
……………………………………………………………………………….. 
● How long have you worked in your current role? 
……………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
       (b) Organisational Information 
● What type of product is exported? (Whole fruit, cut fresh fruit, dried fruit, 
concentrate) 
● How many hectares/acres of pineapple does the firm have?  Where are they 
located? Which variety of pineapple is cultivated?  
● What is the business organisation structure? (own farm, own farm and outgrower 
scheme, etc)  
● Why does the firm adopt this business structure? 
● Has the focus of the organisation changed over time and how?  
● Which countries are your primary export destinations?  
●  What percentage of sales is exported? What percentage is sold on the domestic 
market? 
Section 2: Contractual Relations 
Quality Control: 
● What are the main advantages of quality control in the internal market?  
● Does the function of quality control by the firm reduce the level of risk faced by 
buyers?  
● Who has responsibility in the case of quality failure?  
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● What is the buyer’s role in the quality control function?  





● How has the change from Smooth Cayenne to MD2 affected the firm’s provision 
of inputs to smallholders? 
● In your opinion, how has the importance of input and extension services to 
smallholders changed over the years? 
● What are the main challenges the firm faces in the provision of these services? 
● What mechanisms are used to ensure non-default by smallholders? 
● What level of participation do cooperatives/outgrower scheme members have in 
decision-making regarding contracting terms? 
● Can you make investments into the cooperative/outgrower schemes, confident that 
the members will not default?  
●      Do you have to expend many resources in competing for supplies with other 
firms? 
●      Are there any social norms or conventions which must be observed when 
contracting?  
●      Do these social norms or conventions enable/hinder the contracting process? 
● What happens /happened when a member of the cooperative/outgrower scheme is 
unable to fulfil his part of the contract?  
● 
● (b)Importer/buyer 
● Do you use the same importer for the different pineapple products you export?  
● What are some of the conditions of terms reached in the contract with the 
importer/buyer? [Price/conditions of termination of contract, etc.] 
(c)Input Supply 
● Do you import inputs on your own?    
● Which inputs are these? 
● Which inputs are sourced from the domestic market and who is the supplier? 
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● How the export price of pineapple exported is decided?  
● Is this how the process has always been?  
● How has it changed over time? 
● How does the export system of pricing benefit the firm? 
● Does the export price of products have any relationship with the domestic price 
offered to outgrowers for produce? 
Domestic Prices 
● On the domestic market, is the outgrower group/cooperative involved in 
determining the price per kilogramme of pineapple? 
● Who is the most influential stakeholder in the process? 
● Is this stakeholder able to influence other stakeholders?  
● Who are these stakeholders? 
● How does the system of pricing benefit the smallholder? 
 
Section 3: Linkages between Blue Skies and the international market 
● In your opinion, what are the main sources of Ghana’s competitiveness in the 
international market for pineapples? 
● In your opinion, what are the main sources of Ghana’s competitiveness in the 
international market for other fruits e.g. mango? 
● How has the firm’s relationship with international buyers changed since the move 
to MD2? 
● How do you products enter their export destinations? (e.g.  Importer, Retail agent, 
direct shipment to retailer) 
● Are you satisfied with the distribution channel of your products? 
(b)Marketing Opportunities: 
● How do you currently acquire knowledge on marketing opportunities?  
● Is this applicable to all the products you export? Y/N 
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● If No, what are the differences? 
● Is this how you expect to access the information and why?   
● Which factors enable /hinder you from acquiring marketing knowledge?  (e.g. 
Organisational characteristics, business practices and routines, government policy, 
etc.) 
● What are some of the advantages/disadvantages of using your current route? 
●  Which individual/organisation is the most influential stakeholder in the channel of 
sources    
            for marketing information?  
● Is this individual/organisation able to convince other stakeholders for its own 
benefit?     
● Who are these other stakeholders?   
●  Are you as an individual/ group able to influence any of the influential 
stakeholders?   
● If yes, how are you able to do so? 
● If No, what in your opinion must be done to ensure you are able to do so? 
 
(c)Competitiveness of the firm 
● Has the firm being able to increase exports of products over the last two years? 
● What is the percentage increase in volume/value? 
● What kind of information (e.g. consumer preferences, branding) enables the firm to 
have an advantage its domestic and international competitors?  
● How is this information accessed? 
● Does the firm provide feedback to the source on the timeliness and usefulness of 
information?   
● Which areas will you indicate as sources of delay/speed? 
● Do employees provide feedback to management on the timeliness and usefulness of 
information?   







● Please rate the following: 



















































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
● How do you add value to your products to buyers in order to enhance your 
competitiveness?   
● Have you tried mechanisms/methods which have failed in the last two years?     
●  Please give some examples of what you have tried. 
● Where in your opinion, lies your firm’s competitive advantage over other firms at the 
domestic level?  





Trade-offs between competitiveness and smallholder inclusion: 
● How is the firm able to manage the trade-off between lower production costs and 
inclusion of smallholders in the value chain? 
 
Section 4: Incentives for Processing 
● What are the main incentives to set up fruit processing facilities in Ghana?  
● What has been the main motivation behind recent attempts to increase processing 
capacity in the country?  
● Do you receive a premium on processed pineapple? 
● How has improvements in sourcing (GlS tracking), transportation and ICT in supply 
chain affected the incentive to process pineapple? 
● What role does the importance of traceability play in processing?   
● With shortages of Smooth Cayenne affecting the processing ability of domestic firms, 
what can be done to improve upon the situation? 
● What measures have you put in place to combat the problem? 
● Is there an ideal balance between exporting and domestic processing? 
Section 5: Linkages with other domestic stakeholders 
● Is there an understanding on who has responsibility for sections of the market? 
● Are the organisations responsible, able to carry out their functions? 
● How have the changes in the structure in the international market impacted upon the 
different sections of the domestic value chain? [Methods of transporting, packaging, links 
with input suppliers, contracting]  
● Has there been much improvement in the industry environment concerning: 
i. Transportation infrastructure 
ii. Information systems 
iii. Access to credit and inputs 
iv. Farmers attitudes to production 
● What role do other stakeholders e.g. Ghana Export Promotion Council (GEPC) play in 
the firm’s ability to market its products abroad? 
● In your opinion, what is the contribution of exporter associations to the development 
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of the competitiveness of firms? 
● In your opinion, what is the contribution of donor organisations and NGOs to the 
skills development of smallholders? 
● To what extent is Blue Skies able to collaborate with other processors to influence 
government policy in the sector? 
● What are the challenges faced in improving inter-firm relations? 
 
Relationship with outgrower groups 
● How would you describe your own company’s relationship with 
cooperatives/outgrower schemes? 
● How has this relationship developed over time? 
● What examples can you give of how this confidence has been gained?  
● What are the mechanisms of communication with outgrowers in terms of production 
processes, conflict resolution and negotiations? 
● Does a change in leadership of the cooperative have a positive/negative impact on the 
relationship? 
 
Section 6: Institutional Complementarities 
● Are you able to identify other organisations in the political, social environment, who 
share the organisation’s goals? Are you able to coordinate your goals with this organisation?   
● If you are to list in order of importance, five (5) institutional arrangements which will 
complement the growth of the pineapple industry, what will they be? 
● In what specific ways will they help the growth of the industry? 
● As an organisation, have you been able to carry any of this out on your own?  
● What factors/circumstances enable/hinder you from doing this? 
● Have you tried mechanisms/methods which have failed in the last two years?    
● Please give some examples of what you have tried and why you think they failed. 
 






Email address:  
























Appendix 5.4.3 Questionnaire for Collective action organisations  
EMERGING LABOUR RELATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS UNDER 
GLOBALISATION:  A CASE STUDY OF GHANA (Working Title) 
By 
 
NANA AMMA AFARI-GYAN 
PhD Candidate 
Economics Department 
School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London 
 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION ORGANISATIONS 
 
This questionnaire is designed to collect data for the purposes of analysing the contribution 
of the institutional setup to the governance structure of the pineapple value chain at the 
domestic level. The project will cover knowledge acquisition and transfer, risk, role of the 
state and collective action organisations, individual/collective behaviour and institutional 
dynamics.  All responses will be treated as confidential. Results will be published on a ‘no-
name basis’ and as aggregate and average findings as part of a PhD thesis and related 
papers.   
 
 
                                                                                           Supervisor: 






Section 1: BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
(b) Personal Information 
 
● Name: ....................................................................................................................................... 
● Gender:   M/F 





● Job Title: 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
● Highest school level attended?  Tertiary/Secondary 
…………………………………………………………………………………. 
● How long have you worked in your current role?  
............................................................................................................................................. 
 
Section 2: Function of the Organisation in the value chain 
Question 1: In your opinion, how important is the role of your organisation to the 
functioning of the export market? 
Question 2: What is the main incentive for exporters/producers to work together in an 
association? When and why did this develop?  
Question 3: Does the organisation actively encourage entry into the pineapple subsector?  
On what basis is this done?  
Question 4: What accounts for the declining number of exporters in the subsector? 
- Though about 30 exporting firms are listed on the SPEG website, information 
shows that only about 8 of the firms are fully functional throughout the year.  
Question 5: How do you ensure that the organisation does not contain inefficient 
members?   
Question 6: Does the number of members in the organisation, impact on the organisation’s 
efforts to develop the pineapple subsector in the country?  
- What is the impact of a smaller/larger number? 
- Is there an ideal number of members that will help the organisation function 
efficiently? 
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Question 7: Has there been a change in exporters’ relationship with international buyers 
since the change to MD2? What are these changes?  
Question 8: Why have pineapple exporters been unable to move into other fruit and 
vegetable value chains? 
Section 3: Value Chain dynamics 
(c) Quality Control 
Question 1: At what stage of the chain do quality problems frequently occur?  
Question 2: What are the key factors for maintaining consistency in quality of production?  
Question 3: How does the organisation/firm ensure that quality standards are maintained? 
Question 4: What mechanisms are used to communicate changes in quality requirements? 
Question 5: On what basis does a buyer assess the quality of product exported? 
Question 6: When produce is exported who bears responsibility in the case of quality 
failure? Producer/Exporter or Buyer or is it a shared responsibility? 
- How has this changed over time? 
Question 7: Where such a failure occurs, what is the process of investigation to find out 
why this happened? 
- To what extent can you determine where the problem comes from? 
- What kinds of information are required to do this? 
- Is the exporter able to seek redress? 
Question 8: The SPEG is trying to put in place an industry-wide quality control 
mechanism. What are the main advantages of having a uniform quality control mechanism 
for exporting firms?  
- Will the SPEG quality control mechanism integrate the different stages of the chain 
required to maintain consistent levels of quality? E.g. input provision, 
transportation, pack houses, etc. 
- How flexible is the mechanism being put in place, to quickly adapt to any changes?   
- If there is quality failure for any produce, will the SPEG be the organisation held 
responsible when the industry-wide standard is enforced? 
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- What sanctioning mechanisms will be put in place when quality standards are not 
met? 
(d) Input Supply 
Question 1: Which firms are responsible for supplying inputs such as suckers and 
fertilizers? 
Question 2: In your opinion, are the necessary inputs e.g. suckers, fertilizers for production 
of pineapple available in the country? 
Question 3: Some smallholders complain about the unavailability of inputs e.g. fertilizers. 
What mechanisms can be used to ensure that inputs required are available? 
- Do you consider the inputs available to be of acceptable quality? 
Question 4: Has there been a change in farmers’ attitudes towards the provision of inputs 
for production by exporters/processors? 
Question 5: Do you consider side-selling by farmers to be a result of predatory buying 
prices by other firms? 
Question 6: For firms who import their own inputs, what are the advantages and/or 
disadvantages?  
- Is the importation due to their status as a Free Zone Company? 
 
Question 7: In your opinion, is the local price of inputs e.g. fertilizers an obstacle to the 
production of quality pineapples for export?  
Question 8: What do you think are the main constraints to exporters and/or processors 
becoming more involved in the provision of inputs to farmers? 
(e) Extension services  
Question 1: How important are extension services to the production of quality produce? 
Question 2: Do the export firms provide this service to their outgrowers? 
- Is it an outsourced service? 
Question 3: Is there an active collaboration between organisations/departments 
responsible for input delivery and extension services? 
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- Examples of such collaboration 
Question 4: To what extent does the government provide extension services for pineapple 
production? 
 
- Is the government failing in its provision of service? 
 
Question 5: In your opinion, will exporters or processors be a viable solution to farmer 
training in the future? 
 
(f) Export prices and competition 
Question 1: What is the procedure for fixing export prices of pineapple exported from 
Ghana?  
- Has this process changed over time?   
Question 2: Is there a uniform price paid for exports from Ghana or there is a level of 
competition among the exporters? 
- What is the nature of this competition? 
Question 3: What are the advantages of a fixed minimum guarantee price over the 
consignment pricing?  
Question 4: Do buyers have an incentive to search among exporters for high quality when 
buying from the country?  
Question 5: How have profit margins changed since the use of guarantee prices. 
(g) Domestic Supply and Prices 
Question 1: A number of exporters also sell their output to processors in the local market 
(but who produce for export), what is the process of determining the price per kilogramme 
of pineapple? 
Question 2: Who is the most influential stakeholder in the process? 
Question 3: Is this stakeholder able to influence other stakeholders? Who are these 
stakeholders? 
Question 4: How does this pricing benefit the smallholder and/or exporter? 




(h) Relationship with financial institutions 
Question 1: What kinds of financial institutions are involved with the subsector? 
 
Question 2: In your opinion, what are the main incentives for financial institutions to 
become involved in the pineapple industry? 
 
Question 3: Are there a range of financial products available to support different sections 
of the value chain e.g. input supply, transportation and packaging? 
 
Question 4: Are efforts by the government to provide funding for investment e.g. Export 
Development and Investment Levy (EDIF) in the sector enough?  
 
Question 5: Is the SPEG able to influence the EDIF in its loan disbursements? 
 
Question 6: What are the avenues available for existing exporters to source finance? 
 
Question 7: What can be done by the government to improve upon funding to different 
sections of the value chain? 
 
Question 8: How are exporters liaising with financial institutions to solve the problem of 
lack of finance?   
(i) Incentives for Processing  
Question 1: What are the main incentives to set up fruit processing facilities in Ghana?  
Question 2: What has been the main motivation behind recent attempts to increase 
processing capacity in the country?  
Question 3: How has improvements in sourcing (GlS tracking), transportation and ICT in 
supply chain affected the incentive to process pineapple? 
Question 4: What role does the importance of traceability play in processing?   
Question 5: With shortages of Smooth Cayenne affecting the processing ability of domestic 
firms, what can be done to improve upon the situation? 
(j) Marketing Opportunities: 
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Question 1: How does the organisation currently acquire knowledge on marketing 
opportunities?  
- Is this avenue reliable and timely? 
-  
Question 2: Which factors enable /hinder you from acquiring marketing knowledge?  (e.g. 
Organisational characteristics, business practices and routines, government policy, etc.) 
Question 3: Which individual/organisation is the most influential stakeholder in the 
channel of sources    for marketing information?  
- Is this individual/organisation able to convince other stakeholders for its own 
benefit?     
- Who are these other stakeholders?   
-  Are you as an individual/ group able to influence any of the influential 
stakeholders?   
- If yes, how are you able to do so? 
- If No, what in your opinion must be done to ensure you are able to do so? 
 
Question 5: How is the common marketing scheme proposed by SPEG going to influence 
demand for the sector’s products? 
- What are some of the advantages of operating under a common marketing brand? 
 
Section 4: Linkages with other domestic stakeholders 
Question 1: Is there an understanding on who has responsibility for different sections of 
the market? 
 
Question 2: Are these organisations responsible, able to carry out their functions? 
Question 3: How have the changes in the structure in the international market impacted 
upon the different sections of the domestic value chain? [Methods of transporting, 




Question 4: In the last two years, has there been much improvement in the industry 
environment concerning 
v. Transportation infrastructure 
vi. Information systems 
vii. Access to finance 
viii. Access to inputs 
ix. Consistent supply of pineapples 
x. Farmers attitudes to production 
 
Question 5: In your opinion, what is the contribution of this organisation to the 
development of the competitiveness of member firms? 
 
Question 6: What role do other stakeholders e.g. Ghana Export Promotion Council 
(GEPC) play in exporters’ ability to market products abroad? 
 
Question 7: In your opinion, what is the contribution of donor organisations and NGOs to 
the skills development of smallholders? 
 
Question 8: To what extent is this organisation able to participate in decision-making on 
policy? 
- Collaborate with others to influence government policy in the sector? 
 
Question 9: What are the challenges faced in improving inter-firm relations? 
 
Section 5:  Linkages with the international market 
Question 1: Has the subsector being able to increase volume of exports over the last two 
years? Has this increase been as a result of increase in acreage or increase in yields or 
diversity of markets? 
- How has improvements in sourcing (GlS tracking) and infrastructure impacted on 
the supply chain?   
 
Question 2: In your opinion, what are the main sources of Ghana’s competitiveness in the 
international market for pineapples? 
Question 3: What processes have been upgraded to enable exporters increase their market 
shares? 
 
Question 4: How easy/difficult is it for exporters to switch buyers? 
- What are the factors affecting this? 
 
Question 5: How does the price paid for pineapple exports from Ghana, compare with that 




- Is the produce from Costa Rica paid a premium? Why? 
 
Question 6:  What kinds of information (e.g. consumer preferences, branding) enables the 
firm to have an advantage its domestic and international competitors? How is this 
information accessed? 
 
Question 7: How can this competitiveness be harnessed to increase export volumes and 
values? 
Question 8: Do buyers provide exporters with any form of assistance in the production of 
pineapples? 
- How reliable or timely are these forms of assistance? 
 
Section 6: Knowledge acquisition and transfer  
Question 1:  In your opinion, does your organisation have the necessary technical and 
professional personnel to ensure an efficient acquisition and transfer of knowledge to 
the members of your organisation?  
- Number of technically and professional personnel in the firm e.g. agronomists, 
marketers 
- Level of education and training 
- Number of years in the industry 
 
 
Question 2: Knowledge interaction system 
(a) What information/knowledge is usually shared in the cluster? 
 
(b) If you urgently need information on international production standards, who from 
the list below do you turn to? On a scale of 1= least, 3 = medium and 5 = high, 










Own employees     
International Buyers     
Horticulture 
Association of Ghana 
(HAG) 
    
GEPC     
Bomarts     
Golden Exotics Ltd     
Koranco Ltd     
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Combined Farms     
Bio-Exotica     
Jei-River     
Georgefields Farms     
Donor organisations 
e.g. USAID 
    
Horticulture Unit of 
MoFA 
    
International Agri-
business Consultant(s) 
    
Domestic Agri-
business consultant (s) 
    
Business Associations     
Other     
 
(c) Which of the following, in your opinion, has benefited from knowledge on 
international production standards provided from this organisation? Please indicate 
the importance, reliability and speed of the information you provided using the 
scale: 1 = least, 3 =medium, 5=high 
 






Own employees     
International buyers     
GEPC     
Bomarts     
Golden Exotics Ltd     
Koranco Ltd     
Combined Farms     
Bio-Exotica     
Jei-River     
Georgefields Farms     
Horticulture Unit of MoFA     
Donor organisations e.g. 
USAID 
    
Outgrowers     
Business Associations     
Other     
 
Question 4:  
(a) Who/What organisation outside the cluster (e.g. research institutes, consultants) is 
a source of knowledge for the organisation for the following activities? 
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Activity  Individual/Organisation (Please provide name) 
Contracting 
with buyers 
















     
Branding 
 




     
Finance      
Domestic 
trade policy 
     
International 
trade policy 
     
 
Innovation 
     
Other      
 
 
(b) On a scale of 1-5, where 1 stands for ‘no importance’ and 5 for ‘maximum 
importance’ please rate the following, for the table above: 
 
 






     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     




(c) What practices (both formal and informal) must be adhered to? (Please give examples) 
 
(d)  Are the interactions continuous or discrete?   
 
 
(e) Has this organisation collaborated with any of the organisations listed below for 
research into input quality, marketing, branding, innovation, in the last two years? 
 
Individual/Organisation Yes No Reason 
GEPC    
HAG    
FAGE    
Bio Plantlets    
Ministry of Trade and 
Industry 
   
Other (Please specify) 
 




(d) Feedback on knowledge acquisition and transfer 
Question 1: Does the organisation provide feedback to the source on the timeliness and 
usefulness of information?   
 
Question 2: Which areas will you indicate as sources of delay/speed? 
 
Question 3: Do employees provide feedback to management on the timeliness and 
usefulness of information?   
 
Question 4: Which areas do employees indicate as sources of delay/speed?  


















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The organisation 
undertakes its 









Section 6: Risk and governance of the value chain?  
Question 1: (a) What kind of risk exists in the sector?  
       (b) Can it be passed to others in the sector?  
Question 2: In your opinion, who or which organisation bears the greater part of the risk 
identified above?  
Question 3: In your opinion, how is risk identified managed?  
Question 4: (a) How is it transferred from one agent to another? 
                   (b) How is it passed from one node of the value chain to another?   
 
Question 5: What impact does the transfer of risk have on outsourcing relationships, 
consolidation of exporters and industry competitiveness? 
 
Section 7: Institutional Complementarities 
Question 1: Are you able to identify other organisations in the political, social environment, 
who share the organisation’s goals? Are you able to coordinate your goals with this 
organisation?   
 
Question 2: If you are to list in order of importance, five (5) institutional arrangements 
which will complement the growth of the pineapple industry, what will they be? 
Question 3: In what specific ways will they help the growth of the industry? 
 
Question 4: As an organisation, have you been able to carry any of this out on your own?  
 




Question 6: Have you tried mechanisms/methods which have failed in the last two years?    
 
Question 7: Please give some examples of what you have tried and why you think they 
failed. 
Question 8: Based on the level of interactions in the sector, in your opinion, what is the 
outlook for the subsector in terms of export volumes, value, profitability, diversification 
and sustainability? 
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Appendix 5.4.4 Questionnaire for Exporting Firms 
EMERGING LABOUR RELATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS UNDER 




NANA AMMA AFARI-GYAN 
PhD Candidate 
Economics Department 
School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London 
 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR EXPORTING FIRMS 
 
 
This questionnaire is designed to collect data for the purposes of analysing the role of the 
institutional environment in the governance structure of the pineapple value chain at the 
domestic level. The project will cover knowledge acquisition and transfer, role of the state 
and collective action organisations, individual/collective behaviour and institutional 
dynamics.  All responses will be treated as confidential. Results will be published on a ‘no-
name basis’ and as aggregate and average findings as part of a PhD thesis and related 
papers.   
Supervisor: 






Section 1: Background Information 
(k) Personal Information 
 
● Name: ....................................................................................................................... 
● Gender: M/F 
● Age:   18 – 25            26 – 35          36 – 45           46 – 55        56 and above  
● Firm/Company: ........................................................................................................................... 
● Profession: …………………………………………………………………………… 
● Job Title ……………………………………………………………………………… 
● How long have you worked in your current role? 1-5 years            6-10 years        
10-15 years         Over 15 years 
● Email address /Telephone number: ............................................................................. 
 
Section 2: Organisation profile 
1. (a) What type of product is exported? (Whole fruit, fresh cut fruit, dried fruit, 
concentrate) 
 

















Other (please specify) 
 
 
2. (a) What is the business organisation structure? (e.g. own farm, own farm and outgrower 
scheme) 
............................................................................................................................................................... 

















e. Variety of 
pineapple 
cultivated 
(SC, MD2, SL) 
 
 
    







    
 
 




3. (a) Why does the firm adopt this business structure? .............................................................. 
............................................................................................................................................................... 
............................................................................................................................................................... 
(b) Has the focus of the organisation changed over time and how?  
.............................................................................................................................................................. 
.............................................................................................................................................................. 
4.(a) Which countries are your primary export destinations?  
................................................................................................................................................................. 
(b) Which countries/regions are your secondary export destinations? 
............................................................................................................................................................... 
 
(c)  Volume of exports 
Variety 2009 2010 2011 2012 
MD2     
Smooth Cayenne     
Sugar Loaf     
 
(d) What percentage of this firm's sales were: 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Direct exports     
Indirect exports (sold domestically to 
other firms that exports products) 
    
Domestic market     
 
 
5.(a) During the last two years, has this firm introduced new or significantly improved 
products or services? Y/N 
(b) During the last two years, has this firm introduced any new or significantly improved 
methods of packaging products? Y/N 
(c) During the last two years, has this firm introduced new or significantly improved 
marketing methods? Y/N 
(d) During the last two years, did this firm spend on formal research and development 
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activities, either in-house or contracted with other export firms? Y/N 
(e) During the last two years, did this firm spend on formal research and development 
activities with exporter associations?  Y/N 
(f) During the last two years, did this firm spend on formal research and development 
activities with a government agency?  Y/N 
 
6. (a) Did buyers assist with the introduction of any of the following:  
Activity  What did the buyer 
do? 
What did the firm do on 
its own? 
Introduction of new 
/improved products 
 









Y/N   





7. In your opinion, which kind of knowledge allows your firm to be competitive in both the 
domestic and international market? (please tick those that apply) 
Branding Marketing 
techniques 








Other (please specify) 
 
Personnel 
8. (a) How many people does the firm employ? 
Production Staff   
Non-production staff (e.g. sales, administration)  
 




9. How many skilled professionals does the firm have in the following areas: 
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 Number Average number 
of years in the 
profession 
Average number 
of months of 




Agronomy    
Quality control    
Marketers    
Procurement    
 
Finance   
10. (a) Which aspect of your firm's production requires the most funding? (e.g. cultivation, 
packaging, transportation, marketing, other) 
............................................................................................................................................................... 
 
(b)  Are you able to access finance for this aspect of production? Y/N 
 
(c) In the last two years, has this firm purchased any new or used fixed assets (e.g. 
machinery, equipment, land)? Y/N 
 
(d) How was this purchase financed?  
 
Source Percent (%) 
Internal funds or retained earnings  
Owners’ contribution or issued new 
equity shares 
 
Borrowed from banks: private and 
state-owned 
 
Borrowed from non-bank financial 
institutions 
 
Purchases on credit from suppliers 
and advances from customers 
 





11. (a) Currently, does this firm have a line of credit or a loan from a financial institution?  
Y/N 
  (If No to 11(a) please go to question 12) 
    (b) What activity of production is it for? ................................................................................ 
    (c) What type of financial institution granted this loan? (please tick) 
Private commercial bank State-owned bank 
Government agency Non-bank financial institution 




  (d) What type of collateral was required for the loan to be approved?  
Land, buildings under ownership of 
the firm 
Machinery and equipment including 
movables 
Accounts receivable and 
inventories 
Personal assets of owner(s) 
Formal contractual agreement with 
international buyer 
Other (please specify) 
 
(e) Is the loan amount adequate for the activity for which it was intended and why? Y/N 
  (If No to (d) above, please explain why) 




12. Currently, does the owner or owners of this firm have any outstanding personal loans  
that are used to finance this firm's business activities? Y/N 
 
13.(a) In the last year, did this firm apply for any loans or lines of credit? Y/N 
          If No to 13(a), please go to question 13(c) 
(b)  Was the application successful? Y/N 
(c) Why was no application made? (please tick) 
High collateral requirement No need for a loan as the firm has 
enough capital 
Complex application procedures High interest rates 
Size of loan was inadequate Loan maturity date was insufficient 
Did not think it would be 
approved 
No financial products suitable for activity 
which required funding 
Other (please specify) 
 
(d) In your opinion, do financial institutions offer financial products tailored to the 
activities you require funding for? Y/N 
(e) In your opinion, what are the challenges financial institutions face in tailoring financial 






14. (a) Has there been much improvement in the following since the change to MD2?  
xi. Transportation infrastructure: Y/N 
xii. Information systems: Y/N 
xiii. Access to credit and inputs: Y/N 
xiv. Farmers attitudes to production (e.g. side-selling): Y/N 
xv. Exporters attitudes to meeting deadlines: Y/N 
xvi. Government's interest in promoting the sector: Y/N 
352 
 
xvii. Other (please specify): ....................................................................................................... 






15. To what degree do the following elements of the business environment represent an 











Access to land 1 2 3 4 5 
Access to finance 1 2 3 4 5 
Inadequately trained 
workforce 
1 2 3 4 5 
Access to International 
Marketing Opportunities 
1 2 3 4 5 
Domestic government 
policy (e.g. fertiliser subsidy) 
1 2 3 4 5 
International government 
policy (e.g. trade 
agreements) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Access to quality inputs (e.g. 
fertilisers, suckers) 
1 2 3 4 5 
 









Section 3: Contractual Relations 
(a)Input Supply 
17. (a) Does your firm import inputs (e.g. fertiliser, packaging materials) on its own? Y/N 
 (b) Why does it do so? .................................................................................................................. 
........................................................................................................................................................ 
(c) If inputs are sourced from the domestic market, who is the supplier?  









 (d) Does the firm have formal contractual relations with the supplier(s)? (e.g. trade credit 
relations) Y/N 




(b) Relations with Smallholders/outgrowers (If no relations with smallholders, please go 
to question 23) 
18. (a) Does the firm have a formal relationship with outgrowers or smallholders? Y/N 
(b) Does this relationship involve an agreed and signed contract? Y/N 
(c) What provisions are agreed upon in the contract? (please tick all that apply) 










 (d) How many smallholders does this firm contract with? ........................................................ 
(e) What percentage of the firm's output is supplied by smallholders/outgrowers? ............... 
................................................................................................................................................................ 
............................................................................................................................................................... 
(f) Has the percentage of output supplied by smallholders/outgrowers in the last two years 
increased/decreased/is stable? 
(g) Pease explain your answer in (f) above: ................................................................................... 
.............................................................................................................................................................. 
19. If the firm provides financial assistance, how is this done? (please tick) 
Direct financial 
assistance to the 
smallholder 
Guarantor of loans given to 
by financial institutions to 
smallholders 
Other (please specify) 
 









21. (a) Can you make investments into the cooperative/outgrower schemes, confident that 
the members will not default?  Y/N 
(b) Do you have to expend many resources in competing for supplies with other firms? 
Y/N 
................................................................................................................................................... 
22.(a) Would you say that contractual relations between firms and smallholders have 




(b) What has changed? (please tick) 
Smallholders business attitudes (e.g. 
meeting schedules) 
Knowledge transfer mechanisms to 
smallholders 
Market access opportunities Smallholder bargaining strength 





(d)How is the firm able to manage the trade-off between lower production costs and 




Relations with domestic processing firms 
23.(a) Does this firm have formal contractual relations with domestic processing firms? 
Y/N 
    
(b) If yes, what terms are agreed upon in the contract? (please tick all that apply) 










(c) If no, why is this so? ................................................................................................................ 
........................................................................................................................................................... 
 





Section 4: Linkages with the international market 
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24. (a) In your opinion, what are the main sources of Ghana’s competitiveness in the  
international market for pineapples? 
................................................................................................................................................... 
................................................................................................................................................... 




 (c) Is Ghana able to effectively compete with its competitors, using the marketing 
strategies pursued? Why? 
......................................................................................................................................................... 
......................................................................................................................................................... 





(b) Have the range of activities you perform for the buyer, increased over time? Y/N 
(c) Which other activities do you perform apart from cultivation of pineapples? 
........................................................................................................................................................... 
.......................................................................................................................................................... 
26.(a) How do you products enter their export destinations? (e.g.  Importer, Retail agent, 
 direct shipment to retailer): ..................................................................................................... 
 




27. (a) In the last two years, has this firm had a dispute with a buyer concerning the quality 
of exported produce? Y/N 
(b) In case of quality failure of exported produce, who bears responsibility? (please tick) 










(d) What dispute mechanisms are available for the exporter to seek redress in 






Section 5: Linkages with other domestic stakeholders 
 
(A) Knowledge interaction system 




 (b) If you urgently need information and knowledge on production processes, who from 
the list below do you turn to? On a scale of 1= least, 3 = medium and 5 = high, please rate 
the reliability, speed and importance of the knowledge to you.  
 




Own employees   
International Buyers   
GEPC   
SPEG   
Bomarts   
Chartered Impex   
Golden Exotics Ltd   
Koranco Ltd   
Bio-Exotica   
Jei-River   
Georgefields Farms   
Volta River Estates Ltd   
Donor organisations e.g. USAID, 
GIZ 
  




Domestic Agri-business consultant (s)   
Universities (please specify) 
 
  
Other (please specify)   
 
(c) Why does the firm choose to contact organisations above? (e.g. personal relations with 
employees in the organisation, etc).................................................................................................... 
................................................................................................................................................................. 
................................................................................................................................................................. 
(d)Which of the following has this firm provided information on production processes to?  
Please indicate the reliability and speed of the information you provided using the 
scale: 1 = least, 3 =medium, 5=high 




International buyers   
GEPC   
SPEG   
Bomarts   
Golden Exotics Ltd   
Chartered Impex   
Koranco Ltd   
Bio-Exotica   
Jei-River   
Georgefields Farms   
Horticulture Unit of MoFA   
Donor organisations e.g. USAID, 
GIZ 
  
Outgrowers   
Crop Research Institutions   
Universities (please specify) 
 
  
Business Associations   
Other (please specify)   
 
(e) Are there any government policies which make it difficult for the firm to access and use 





(f) Are there any government policies which make it difficult for the firm to be innovative 
in the industry? Y/N 

















(c)  SPEG is trying to put in place an industry-wide quality control mechanism. What are 

















29. (a) What role does the Ghana Export Promotion Authority (GEPA) play in the firm’s  











Section 6: Institutional Complementarities 
30. (a) Is there an understanding on who has responsibility for different sections of the 
market? Y/N 
    (b) Are the organisations responsible, able to carry out their functions efficiently? Y/N 




31. (a) Are you able to identify other organisations in the political, social environment, who  















33. (a) In your opinion, what relationships in the chain are the strongest and which ones 




(b) Is the firm able to identify a leader in the industry, in terms of negotiating with the 
government? Y/N 
(c) Who is this leader? ........................................................................................................... 
(d) To what extent is this company able to collaborate with other exporters/processors to 




34. (a) What forms of collaboration have taken place between this firm and other exporters 




export prices with 
buyers 





Other (please specify) 
 









(d) In the last two years, has this firm collaborated with any research institution or 
university? Y/N  
     Example of collaboration done: ................................................................................................. 
................................................................................................................................................................. 
(e) In the last two years, has this firm collaborated with any a donor agency? Y/N  
     Example of collaboration done: ................................................................................................. 
................................................................................................................................................................  
 
35.(a) What change(s) in the domestic pineapple sector would your organisation benefit 

























Thank you very much for the time you have dedicated to answering this 























Appendix 6.1: Evolution of EU countries share in Ghana’s imports of pineapple 
 
Source: Author, based on Eurostat Comext (2016) 
 
